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Preface
This book is the Proceedings of the International Conference on Trans-
portation, Storage, and Disposal of Hazardous Materials, which was held
at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (nASA), 1-5
July 1985. The Conference brought together representatives of
academia, business. and government from East and West to discuss the
nature of current problems in the area of hazardous materials. An
important objective of the Conference was to suggest steps that could
be undertaken by industrial firms, the insurance industry, and govern-
ment agencies to improve the safety and efficiency with which hazar-
dous materials are produced and controlled in industrialized societies.
Conference sponsors were nASA, the Geneva Association, and the
Center for Risk and Decision Processes of the University of Pennsyl-
vania. Additional financial support was received from the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency, the Monsanto Corporation. the Center for
Organizational Innovation at the University of Pennsylvania, and the
Canadian nASA Committee. We are grateful to all of these institutions
for their generous support of this Conference.
Within nASA, a long history of research in risk activities is evi-
dent. This owes much to the vision of nASA's founding Director,
Howard Raiffa, and program leaders who have promoted risk research
at nASA. The present Conference continued this tradition with the
strong support of nASA's current Director, Thomas H. Lee, and Deputy
Director. Vitali Kaftanov.
We wish to express our appreciation of Vivien Landauer's able
coordination of the Conference and the assistance of Janice Malseed in
putting together these Proceedings.
Paul R. KleindorJe'"
Howard C. Kunreuther
Philadelphia, August 1986
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Editors· Introduction
In July 1984. the Geneva Association convened a meeting for the pur-
pose of planning an international conference on transportation.
storage, and disposal of hazardous materials. with special focus on the
role of compensation. regulation, and insurance. The Geneva Workshop
recommended that the Conference be held at the International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Vienna. which has been an
important focus for international risk research. The recommendations
of the Geneva Workshop were strongly supported by the IIASA Direc-
torate. Thus was launched the International Conference on Hazardous
Materials. the Proceed.ings of which follow.
The focus of the Conference was on petrochemical industry prob-
lems. with emphasis on regulation and insurance. The Conference had
as its major objective a research agenda for the next five to ten years
for hazardous materials research in these areas. Given the interna-
tional nature and scope of hazardous materials problems. participants
at the Conference included broad representation from the interna-
tional community and a rich mixture of practitioners and scholars [1].
The basic themes for the Conference were laid out at the Geneva
Planning Workshop. They came to be structured under the following
headings:
(1) llistorica.l Background.. This topic was intended to provide per-
spectives on the nature and magnitude of accidents and losses
from previous technological disasters, notably Seveso and Bhopal.
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(2) Problem Context. We were concerned with hazardous materials
problems in the following contexts: production, transportation,
handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous materials. These con-
texts were meant to include both the dangerous goods sector (e.g.
chlorine and sulfuric acid) and the hazardous waste area.
(3) Risk Analysis. Here we planned to discuss the traditional prob-
lems of hazard identification, risk estimation, risk evaluation, and
related perception and communication problems. We were specifi-
cally concerned with linking risk analysis to available policy
instruments for managing hazardous materials risks.
(4) Risk Management and Insurance. Finally, the prescriptive
focus of the Conference was principally on risk management and
insurance measures. We were interested in determining what pol-
icy instruments could be used to mitigate risks, to reduce or elim-
inate risks, to spread risks, and to absorb the financial and other
loss potential of risks in socially and financially acceptable ways.
Figure Pt summarizes the above areas and shows the principal
stakeholders associated with the hazardous materials problem. The
overriding theme of the Conference, as it evolved. was to link theory
and practice in the use of policy instruments and legal institutions for
resolving conflicts among these stakeholders for the problem contexts
depicted in Figure Pt.
We now provide a brief overview of the Conference papers to give
the reader a foretaste of the contents of this volume. The chapters
are organized under the four headings listed above.
1.1. Historical Background
The chapters in Part One were commissioned to provide historical per-
spectives on the nature and magnitude of the hazardous materials prob-
lem, with particular attention being paid to the nature of serious
accidents in this area. We were also concerned with providing an over-
view of the magnitude of losses suffered through man-made environmen-
tal disasters.
In the first chapter, Lagadec discusses several case studies of
considerable interest in the risk management area. These include the
release of dioxin in Seveso, the explosion of a liquefied propane gas
tank in Mexico City, and the leakage of toxic gas from a pesticide plant
in Bhopal. India. He uses these case studies to derive a framework for
describing how organizations and public authorities have reacted to
crisis situations. Lagadec also uses these case studies to describe the
means for coping with crisis, including better emergency planning,
Ed1.tors· Introduct1.on
STAKEHOLDERS
Scientists, industry, insurers, regulators,
interest groups, the public, media, politicians
PROBLEM CONTEXTS
Production, transportation, storage,
and disposal of hazardous material
RISK ANALYSIS
Identification, assessment, perception,
and communication of risks
RISK MANAGEMENT
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Insurance, regulation, laws, negotiation,
and compensation
Figure P.t. Basic themes of the Conference.
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organizational and institutional design considerations, and approaches
to the management of crisis.
This chapter is followed with a description by Naschi of the
engineering aspects of severe accidents, with specific reference to
Seveso, Mexico City, and Bhopal. Naschi's major focus is on errors in
technical design and/or management of the operation which lead to
catastrophic failure. He describes some of the safety devices in place
for the three cases and indicates why they did not function properly at
the time of the accidents. Naschi summarizes his argument by suggest-
ing that the major causes of Seveso, Mexico City, and Bhopal were a
combination of "design deficiencies, operating errors, and managerial
mistakes."
In their chapter Pocchiari et al. describe Seveso and its after-
math in detail from a public health point of view. This original paper
was presented in a colorful fashion by Professor Pocchiari at the
Conference and described both the Seveso incident and the evacuation
procedures following the Seveso accident. Professor Pocchiari uses
Seveso as a case study to discuss the uncertainties surrounding the
problem of whether such evacuations should be ordered to safeguard
public health.
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In Chapter 4 Smets addresses the following question: What is the
magnitude of environmental damage caused by industrial activities?
And. further. are such damages insurable? Smets reviews damage due
to oil pollution at sea. accidents involving dams, and air, water, and
noise pollution. as well as environmental impairment resulting from
radioactive pollution and hazardous wastes. In each of these cases,
Smets looks at the best estimates available on actual damage and the
proportion of losses covered by insurance and other payments to vic-
tims. He concludes that environmental damage is not, by nature of its
magnitude and occurrence levels, an uninsurable event. The maRTlitude
and occurrence levels appear to be no higher, for example. than those
associated with commercial airline accidents. This original paper set
the stage for a lively discussion at the Conference as to what distin-
guishes environmental impairment accidents. for which insurance is
largely unavailable in the USA today, from accidents of other types, for
which insurance is clearly available. This discussion is reflected in the
comments following Smets' chapter, as well as in several other chapters
reviewed below.
1.2. Problem Context
As noted, the theme of the Conference was the use of the policy instru-
ments of insurance. compensation, regulation, and negotiation to pro-
mote safe and efficient practices in the hazardous materials area.
Several Conference papers explored the relationship between these
policy instruments and the specific problem contexts of Figure P.t,
namely the production, transport, storage. and disposal of hazardous
materials.
In Chapter 5 Kleindorfer and Kunreuther investigate the use of
insurance and compensation as policy instruments in the context of
hazardous waste management. First, they review the nature of hazard-
ous waste management activities, from decisions by firms as to how
much waste to generate, through the decisions related to the transport
and disposal of this waste. They discuss the complex interweaving of
liability and insurance considerations with these decisions. In theory,
there is an opportunity to utilize insurance as a policy instrument for
encouraging industrial firms to engage in risk reduction measures.
However, recent court rulings in the USA and elsewhere on the nature
of liability for health effects associated with hazardous materials have
created problems for industry and insurance firms with regard to the
implementation of such a plan of action. Kleindorfer and Kunreuther
then describe the current stalemate in siting new hazardous waste
facilities. They recommend the use of insurance and compensation as
policy instruments for sharing the benefits to a region from locating a
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hazardous waste facility with those stakeholders who have to bear the
risks associated with such facilities.
In Chapter 6 O'Hare describes the importance of bargaining and
negotiation in risk management in the context of hazardous materials
transportation. He points out the tremendous importance of negotia-
tion both in striking deals to appropriately spread risks and benefits,
and as a means of communication to arrive at an informed consensus
about the facts associated with a particular hazard. O'Hare describes
the negotiation problem for hazardous materials transportation by con-
sidering first the negotiable issues (e.g. classification of substances,
handling procedures. and emergency response measures). He then
describes the various stakeholders to the hazardous materials trans-
portation negotiation process and the impediments in bringing all of
them together in attempting to negotiate the issues involved. These
frequently turn out to be very serious problems since the issues are
technically complex and there are many stakeholders involved. O'Hare
argues, however, that there are also significant opportunities for nego-
tiations to improve the regulation and management of hazardous materi-
als transportation.
Chapter 7 by Kasperson, has as its problem context the siting of
hazardous waste facilities, both for radioactive and for chemical
wastes. Kasperson points out the very contentious nature of the
current stalemate among the stakeholders depicted in Figure P.t. By
now everyone is clear on the nature of the NIMBY ("not in my back-
yard") and LULU ("local unwanted land use") syndromes. These acro-
nyms reflect the difficult dilemma facing society when there is substan-
tial benefit to the general population from the production of goods and
potential risk to a much smaller set of individuals who are exposed to
the risks of having waste products transported and stored from indus-
try in their backyard. Kasperson argues for the increased use of pol-
icy instruments such as public communication, benefit sharing or com-
pensation, and public participation in resolving these conflicts. How-
ever, given the prevailing scientific uncertainty associated with the
consequences of hazardous waste, Kasperson suggests that we have a
very rocky road ahead of us in siting hazardous waste facilities. He
proposes a set of ethical and/or equity principles as guiding principles
for winning and maintaining public trust in the regulation of hazardous
materials and the siting of new facilities.
1.3. Risk Analysis
The third group of Conference papers focus on risk analysis, encom-
passing the traditional areas of hazard identification. risk estimation,
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and risk assessment. We were particularly concerned with the way in
which people and firms perceive and evaluate risks.
In Chapter 8 Covello and Merkhofer describe and evaluate prom-
inent methods for hazardous risk assessment for determining the
nature of different chemicals. These methods are organized according
to the component of the risk assessment process they are meant to
address. Methods designed for characterizing a source of risk are dis-
cussed initially, followed by methods for assessing exposures,
dose-response assessments, and lastly methods for risk estimation.
Covello and Merkhofer explore in detail the complex relationships
between the various phases of chemical risk analysis and management
illustrated in Figure P.t.
In the next chapter Lind surveys current methods of risk analysis
and recent advances in this area. Lind describes, through a set of
examples. current methods for assessing both the probabilities of
failures and their consequences through fault trees and event trees.
He also emphasizes the crucial influence of data and uncertainty in risk
analysis. At the Conference this paper triggered an animated discus-
sion on the limitations of risk analysis, which is taken up at length in
both of the discussants' comments on this paper. These comments
describe the practical use and promise, as well as the pitfalls, of risk
analysis for insurers and industry.
In Chapter 10 Slovic discusses the problem of communicating risk
to the public. The objective of informing and educating citizens about
risk issues has triggered a concern among policymakers as to just how
to present information to the public. This means among other things
finding ways of making technical and scientific uncertainties
comprehensible, as well as understanding the public's concerns and
anxieties about the risks caused by complex hazards. Slovic describes
the current state of research and its possible uses for overcoming
these obstacles.
In Chapter 11 von Winterfeldt describes a new methodology, value
tree analysis, for understanding the values which various stakeholders
may have in relation to policies affecting the risks associated with
hazardous materials. Professor von Winterfeldt describes the histori-
cal and disciplinary roots of value tree analysis in decision analysis and
multi-attribute utility techniques. He also describes its use in various
applications to date. Value tree analysis allows a hierarchical descrip-
tion of the value structure of various stakeholders associated with a
particular hazardous materials problem. Such an analysis may help in
diagnosing and resolving conflicts and in evaluating alternative policy
options from the different stakeholder perspectives. He illustrates
this methodology in an extended case analysis of options for offshore
oil development in southern California.
Editors' Introduction
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The final group of papers at the Conference consider the institutional
arrangements which society has developed for coping with risks. The
key areas of interest involved regulations, both by government agen-
cies and by industry, legal institutions, and, primarily, insurance.
In Chapter 12 O'Riordan and Wynne compare regulatory styles for
hazardous waste management in various countries. The authors ask
whether there are fundamentally different or convergent regulatory
styles in each of these countries induced by the nature of the hazard-
ous waste problem itself. The essential differences across countries
relate to centralization versus decentralization of control. However,
fundamental similarities are found to be induced by the common prob-
lems of scientific uncertainty and technical complexity in regulating
hazardous wastes.
The next chapter. by Baram, considers the legal background of
liability insurance and risk analysis for chemical industry hazards.
Certainly, the key institution for adjudicating and resolving conflicts
among parties will be the legal system. For this reason, Baram reviews
recent developments in toxic tort law and insurance law. The impact of
new developments in the USA and in other countries significantly
affects the economic vulnerability of industry and insurers. Baram also
suggests that defensive strategies on the part of firms or insurers in
restricting their liability or curtailing insurance will do little to
prevent risks or satisfy the public. Indeed, they may lead to further
risk regulation which may impose costs on industry and insurers in
excess of their own private initiatives. Professor Baram concludes that
insurers should join with industry, government, and academia in pro-
moting the development of active strategies, based on risk analysis and
risk management, to protect both their own interests and societal
well-being.
One of the high points of the Conference was the extended discus-
sion elucidating the role of insurance for environmental impairment lia-
bility (ElL). This discussion ranged from theoretical explanations of
insurance and regulation to the realities of insurance in practice.
In Chapter 14 Klaus provides an introductory discussion of ElL for
land-based incidents. He indicates that, from the insurer's viewpoint,
surprisingly low losses in relation to fire claims have resulted from the
well-known recent environmental disasters. This raises a natural ques-
tion as to why the insurance industry is so concerned about offering
ElL coverage. Klaus suggests that, with the possible exception of the
USA, where court settlements are prohibitive, ElL is insurable. How-
ever, he also argues that pollution of the environment entails very
complex management and insurance issues. He recommends strong
adherence to risk assessment and risk management practices on a
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cooperative basis between insurance firms and companies to increase
the likelihood that ElL insurance will be offered on a broad basis in the
future.
In the next chapter Orlando discusses recent developments con-
cerning the transportation of hazardous materials by sea. He points
out that marine insurance has a very long tradition: marine underwrit-
ers have been willing to provide collision liability protection for ship,
cargo, and freight. In the area of ElL associated with ocean transport
of oil and oil products. various pooling and fund agreements provide
workable arrangements for insuring such liabilities. Orlando indicates.
however. that attempts to arrive at an international agreement cover-
ing transport of other hazardous substances besides oil have not been
successful for several reasons that he outlines.
The above contributions highlight a perplexing dilemma. Smets
indicates that the nature and magnitude of losses in the environmental
area is not extraordinarily high compared to other areas for which
insurance is currently available. Both Klaus and Orlando propose some
workable arrangements for insuring environmental liabilities which
might be profitable for the insurance industry. Nonetheless, several
participants pointed to the stark reality that many firms increasingly
were going "naked", unable to purchase ElL coverage at any reasonable
price due to limited worldwide capacity in these lines. The institutional
arrangements and decision processes of the insurance industry itself
come under closer scrutiny in an attempt to explain this state of
affairs.
Aicken describes the basic logic of risk spreading in the
insurance industry in Chapter 16. He indicates several features which
make a set of risks insurable and then comments on aspects of ElL
which make it a very risky business for insurers. These issues include
the well-known problems of latent effects and gradual occurrence, as
well as uncertainties in establishing causality for toxic effects and
large court settlements negotiated by toxic tort lawyers.
In the final chapter, Pfennigstorf considers these insurance-
specific issues in more detail. He discusses the manner in which the
catastrophic character of certain environmental risks affects the
insurability and coverage of these risks. After a detailed comparison
of ElL insurance in the USA and Europe, he considers the outlook.
challenge, and market prospects for insurance in the hazardous materi-
als area. This paper stimulated a very active interchange among
Conference participants on the reasons for lack of available coverage
against environmental risks. Some of the flavor of this interchange is
contained in the two discussant comments following the Pfennigstorf
contribution. One of these, by Cowell. suggests that the lack of
insurance in risk spreading for technological and environmental
hazards is one of the key problems of our times.
Ed1.tors· Introduct1.on
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A major objective of this Conference was to plan a research agenda for
the next decade in the hazardous materials area. The last third of the
Conference was spent in doing just that. An extended panel discussion,
followed by small group meetings. developed an agenda for future
research. The research proposals generated by the small group meet-
ings were presented at a concluding plenary session and were based on
ideas from the papers included in this volume, and the discussant and
participant comments which followed. We summarize these research
recommendations at the end of this book in an Epilogue. which we hope
will serve as a prologue for significant future work in the area of haz-
ardous materials management.
Note
[1] A full list of participants at the IIASA Conference is included at the end
of this volume.



CHAPTER 1
From Seveso to Mexico and Bhopal:
Learning to Cope with Crises
P. Laga.dec
1.1. Introduction
A well-defined failure not unknown to statistical series, codified emer-
gency procedures, a limited number of people involved, a breakdown
brought rapidly under control, press releases drafted with no great
difficulty by the press offices concerned, and relatively easy coverage
by insurance: these are the features of the accident, the province of
safety specialists. Major technological hazards explode this system of
reference (Lagadec, 1981a,b).
The very large-scale event, extremely serious in its immediate ef-
fects and disturbing in its long-term consequences, causes sudden im-
mersion in a universe quite different from that of the "conventional"
emergency. Enormous and unexpected difficulties that defeat or
wrong-foot the operational arrangements in force; agonizing and
paralyzing uncertainty; a critical phase that goes on and on and is
therefore wearing on mechanisms, men, and organizations, and an ex-
traordinary increase in the number of people involved: these are some
of the features of the post-accident dynamic following a major accident.
The logic is scaled up from that of the "ordinary" accident to that
of the crisis. Disproportion, hypercomplexity, and strongly destabiliz-
ing tendencies are the hallmarks of the crisis phenomenon which we
must now learn to understand better and bring under control.
The chemicals sector can no longer ignore this problem in all its
different dimensions - technology, organization, decision-making, and
social policy.
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Some organizations have been violently confronted with the prob-
lem in recent years and have often had to invent - on the spot and with
the storm at its height - new tools, new behaviors, and new policies. It
is possible to learn lessons from these (often painful) experiences, to
shed a little light on the problem, and to carry out research that may
help all concerned (industry, the authorities, the organizations
involved, and the general public) to enhance their skills in this
respect.
Events show there is no time to be lost. During the 1970s Flixbor-
ough, Seveso, and Mississauga were so many "warnings" whose cost, for-
tunately, was not too high, but 1984 brought large-scale disasters:
(1) Cubatao, Brazil, 25 February: oil spillage and fire in the middle of
a shanty town - 500 deaths.
(2) Mexico City, 19 November: gas explosions with a domino effect in
an industrial site plumb in the center of a densely populated area
- 452 deaths according to official sources; 1000-2000 according
to the press; perhaps more.
(3) Bhopal, 2-3 December: release of poisonous gas affecting one
quarter of the population of the capital of Madhya Pradesh
(800000 inhabitants) - over 2000 immediate deaths.
These three events overtook all the statistics compiled since the
Second World War. The accident in India rocked America's third larg-
est chemical company to its foundations. The problem of the major
hazard - the structural vulnerability of our industrial systems - has
become an urgent strategic question.
Our purpose here is simply to signpost the field of study and clar-
ify the many different aspects of the problem to be defined. This wUl
be done under three headings. in this order:
(1) Reminders of actual cases to illustrate the complexity and sever-
ity of the subject.
(2) Points of reference to facilitate the approach to and understand-
ing of the crisis phenomenon.
(3) Pointers to help formulate responses or make them more effective.
1.2. The Shock of the Events
The first aspect of a crisis is the ordeal of the "black-out" - a stunning
and oversudden change of state, the unthinkable event that overwhelms
and destabilizes. The functions, relations, and missions of the system
or systems it strikes seem to have no relevance. Language itself seems
incapable of naming the ordeal that has begun. The organizations
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concerned are thrown into an unfamiliar universe. If the presence of
these phenomena is only faint the crisis may be described as "inci-
pient ". but if they fill the stage and structure the course of events
then that is a crisis situation.
But let us/not go too fast. For a start. the crisis does not take the
form of an ordered series of isolatable difficulties. Rather it is a global
phenomenon where the usual analytical approaches find no purchase.
The nature of the problem with which everyone is suddenly faced -
compact, elusive, and all-embracing - is a powerful destabilizing factor.
Before we go on to a more analytical study of the crisis
phenomenon, therefore. we need to dwell for a moment on this immedi-
ate and inescapable challenge: the shock of the event viewed overall.
A few significant cases will take us straight into this world of crisis.
1.2.1. Seveso
Today. some comfort is rightly derived from the fact that the conse-
quences of the accident on 10 July 1976 were limited, but we should not
forget the ordeal that those responsible and the populations concerned
went through in the weeks and months following the dioxin leak.
Let us return to the peak of the crisis when uncertainty was so
high. as can be seen from the following calendar of statements (D = day
of the accident):
D + 1: The manufacturer releases the information that a product
used in making herbicide has been accidentally discharged
and that precautions are advisable (Pecorella. 1977. p 106).
D + 3: The public health authorities write to the mayors of Meda and
Seveso as follows: "According to the inquiries that have been
made there is no fear of any danger to the people living in the
areas surrounding the plant" (Pecorella. 1977, p 106).
D + 12: The prefecture is reassuring: "At this time there is no cloud
of toxic gas" (Conti, 1977. p 15).
D + 13: The prefecture again: "Other health measures should not be
considered necessary or urgent" (Conti, 1977, p 16).
D + 13: Speaking on television, the Regional Health Director claims:
"Everything is under control" (Cerrutti. 1977. p 13).
D + 13: The Medical Research Board Director (G. Reggiani) of the
industrial group concerned (Hoffmann-La Roche) declares:
"The situation is very serious and drastic measures are called
for. 20 cm of earth needs to be removed. the works buried
and the houses destroyed" (Cerrutti, 1977, p 13).
"L _
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D + 14: The Regional Health Director replies: "This man has been
parachuted in: nobody was expecting him. It does not follow
that he is an official spokesman or speaks on behalf of the
firm. I have confronted him with the seriousness of his state-
ments and I have the impression he is bluffing. He will have to
answer for what he has said" (Conti, 1977, p 15).
D + 14: Change of tone. Official communique: "179 people will have to
leave their homes within 24 hours" (Cerrutti, 1977. p 13).
During the six months that followed, many of the people in author-
ity remained caught up in this confusion. Uncertainty about the
effects of the contamination and the inability to find effective decon-
tamination methods were combined with confrontations of a sociopoliti-
cal nature (central versus regional government. Milan versus Seveso,
Christian Democrats versus Italian Communists, the Church versus
advocates of abortion, the authorities versus the manufacturer, etc.).
All this produced a situation of complete helplessness.
Whence the conclusion of the Regional Health Director in Milan:
"If the steps taken do not produce positive results within three
months, we will let nature take its course" (Conti, 1977. p 100). A new
reality governed the situation: the major chemical risk.
1.2.2. IlisBiBaauga-Toronto
Here too the ordeal was severe because it was general. No one knew
what was in the inferno: the train's manifest was illegible, the
freightcars were unapproachable, the information given by railway offi-
cials was incorrect (they said there was no chlorine), the presence of
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) was rumored, and there was a succes-
sion of explosions, one tank being blown a distance of nearly 700 m.
Finally, it was decided to act on the assumption that there was a
chlorine tankcar in the blaze.
Arrangements had to be made to evacuate on an unprecedented
scale - 220000 people - and, more particularly (an underrated detail),
for over 24 hours, so that the social fabric was broken apart with
consequences of many kinds. The problems included the hospitals.
They did, of course, have emergency plans enabling them to receive an
inflow of victims but what they were asked to do was completely dif-
ferent, I.e. evacuate as well - and they had no plan for that. They
could be given 20 minutes' warning whereas they needed over 4 hours
to evacuate their patients. At the site of the accident the propane
cars needed spraying with water, whereas water had to be kept away
from the chlorine car, also in the fire.
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And, apart from the specific problems to which answers had to be
found, there were policy questions such as whether the police emer-
gency plan should be applied or that of the region. There was more
experience of the former (for lower-level incidents at least) but the
latter. with more involvement of policymakers. was reportedly "safer"
in terms of responsibility in the case of serious problems (Burton st al.,
1983).
1.2.3. Taft. Louisiana
At 11 PM on 10 December 1982. the management of Union Carbide
ordered part of its workforce to leave. There was a temperature surge
problem in one of the acrolein tanks. The tank exploded. 17000 people
were evacuated and river traffic on the Mississippi was brought to a
halt. The case would be of little interest except it is an illustration of
how crisis conditions can be created by a blatant lack of communication
between those responsible.
Neighboring towns had very well equipped and experienced emer-
gency centers but the information reaching them about the seriousness
of the event was too late and too indirect. Hence their surprise. for
example. at receiving calls from residents in the zone concerned asking
them what evacuation routes to take (what evacuation?) and at suddenly
being asked by the factory to shut off all roads up to 8 or 10 km out
(when it was only a question of a minor incident representing "no
danger"). "No-one told us anything," said a public official.
Sophisticated emergency systems were in place (e.g. direct tele-
phone lines between crisis centers and the dangerous plants in the
area). Specialized emergency teams were available. but when they
arrived in the plant they were taken under the wing of the public rela-
tions people and not allowed to attend the technical meetings. The
whole structure was cut off at the base by a single factor: mistrust
(Quarantelli, 1983).
1.2.4. The case of the 41 drums of waste from 5eveso
This is an example of another type: the "media accident". The affair
had been brewing since September 1982 and came to a head in March
1983 with the publication of an article asking the question: where have
the 41 drums of waste from Seveso gone? A symbolic word "dioxin", a
very well documented press article. unwise management by several
businessmen, and assurances given and accepted without double-
checking: all this set the scene for a situation of acute social tur-
bulence that kept the whole of Europe in suspense for two long months.
18 Insuring ana Managing Ha8araous Risks
The Italian authorities asserted that the 41 drums had left Italy
under official guard (as far as the French frontier) for a destination
"somewhere" in the north. France stated that the cargo had also left
French territory and let it be understood that Germany was the coun-
try of destination. The FRG issued a denial but started inquiries. The
GDR denied information given in Rome. The Swiss firm (Hoffmann-La
Roche) claimed that the cargo had already been buried in a controlled
dump by the authorities of the host country who should, therefore, be
fully informed. Suspicion grew and every government or agency with
some responsibility quickly came up against formidable problems of
credibility. Fingers were pointed at France, Germany, Belgium, the UK,
the North Sea, Italy, and even ... the USSR.
In April, Hoffmann-La Roche learnt that the documents on which
its information was based were false. The assurances it had given
governments were therefore worthless, as were the statements that
governments themselves had issued.
The questions became an obsession. Where were the drums? Who
knew? Claims, insinuations, denials, and corrections from Milan, Rome,
and elsewhere kept the excitement at fever pitch. A continent-wide
hunt for the drums and for the "liars and dissemblers" went on at a
vigorous pace, with extensive coverage in all the European dailies. The
FRG organized a full-scale search in a suspect waste dump as a spectac-
ular operation calculated to satisfy those with the strongest suspicions
but also to set a precedent that was both of limited effectiveness and
industrially suicidal - "break in everything, everywhere" could not be
the most rational instruction.
The issue was serious. A generalized suspicion of governments
developed but also, and above all, of the chemical firms. A strict boy-
cott was mounted against the Swiss group, which said it knew nothing.
Dumps of waste chemicals were systematically incriminated. In the end,
suspect drums were being seen everywhere and the checks made
(though always negative) regularly brought to light situations reflecting
little credit on the dumps themselves or the firms concerned.
Seven countries and governments and over 40 organizations had
the searchlights of the media thrown on them, for the case held the
front page or another prime position throughout. The officials and
businessmen concerned wondered just how far this unstoppable flood
would spread ... (Lagadec, 1984b).
1.2.5. san Juan lIhuatepec. Mexico City
This was not just a plant exploding (like Flixborough) but a whole indus-
trial site going up in flames. The dreaded domino effect came into
action. How far would it go? Large masses of flying metal prompted
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fears of disastrous chain reaction effects. What is more, the site was in
the middle, not of a country area (like Flixborough), but of a densely
populated urban zone.
Pemex, the leading national oil and gas company, was confronted
with one of the most serious industrial disasters in history. A search-
ing light was thrown on everything that could have been a contributory
factor. Industrial safety was remorselessly exposed to the probing of
the press whose list of questions included such things as:
(1) Problems of design: proximity of the different installations in the
zone to each other and closeness of the industrial site to the
conurbation.
(2) Inadequate prevention measures: absence of any plans at all for
the installation (Proceso, 26 November 1984) and highly inade-
quate maintenance, also mentioned. incidentally, in a report of the
Pemex Health and Safety Committee dated 17 September 1984
(Excelsior, 23 December 1984).
(3) No awareness of precursor accidents: "Everything is under con-
trol," as one municipal delegation was told that had expressed
concern after an accident a few months previously (Alarma, No
1127).
(4) Highly inadequate government supervision: laxity and incoher-
ence (Proceso, 26 November 1984; Por Esto, 19 December 1984.
(5) Corruption: installation of a bypass so that gas could be supplied
to private distributors from the storage site without what was
done being recorded (Proceso, 26 November 1984).
Apart from all this there were also the social problems - rural
exodus. poverty belts, uncontrolled land use and speculation - which
explain the worst effects of the disaster because of their partial
responsibility for the settlement of populations in the immediate prox-
imity of so dangerous a gas storage area. The questions seemed to be
too serious: no (accurate) final accounts of the disaster were published
(Lagadec, 1985).
1.2.6. Bhopal
The shock for Union Carbide (a foreign company for the country con-
cerned, unlike Pemex in Mexico) was on the same scale as the event. It
had to cope with immediate problems and at the same time safeguard
the future. It had to give a great deal of information to save what it
could of its image but it had only limited access to the Indian data.
Lastly, each of its statements was likely to impair its case in the
courts. The crisis turned every question into a trap:
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(1) Were the safety measures at Bhopal the same as at the other
Union Carbide methyl isocyanate (MIG) plant at Institute (West
Virginia)? If the answer were "no", that opened the door to
charges of exploiting the Third World. If the answer were "yes",
it could generate a panic or at least serious trouble at the United
States (US) location.
(2) Was the firm intending to take immediate steps? To mitigate the
effect of an affirmative answer to the preceding question, all MIC
production could be halted until what happened at Bhopal was
fully understood, but could such a decision take the place of pol-
icy, the collection of information being difficult and lengthy?
(3) Was Union Carbide's safety policy on a level with what was
required for such hazards? The reply could only be "yes". But
then, how could one account for the avalanche of problems
uncovered - "revealed" - at Bhopal: design faults, maintenance
deficiencies, inadequate preventive measures and insufficient
staff training? In its inquiry, the New York Times (28 January
1985) identified ten violations of rules that ought to have been fol-
lowed. While it was right to point out that the Indians were
responsible for the operation of the plant, it could not be pre-
tended that headquarters at Danbury (Connecticut) were not
keeping serious watch on these problems which Union Carbide
said were a top priority. Nor could there be any question of lay-
ing everything at the door of the Indians. Interests in India (and
elsewhere), now and in the future, ruled that out.
(4) Was the company in a position to pay? Here, too, the answer had
to be "yes", but the path to be trodden was a hairline. Overas-
surance could tempt applicants (and their lawyers of which there
were plenty) to step up their claims, which could change the
group's financial situation. The big question was that of the basis
of compensation. If North American standards were used, that
could raise some doubts about the firm's ability to pay. Taking a
yardstick with more affinity to the country concerned could again
spark off the polemic about multinationals and the Third World,
strategically a rather dangerous question. A further point was
that thee firm had also to contend with attacks from within: its
own shareholders had filed a court action against the management
that had jeopardized their profits in this way.
Vicious circles and perverse effects colored the scene which - it
has to be said - hardly favored nuanced declarations, even though
everything was done to avoid the simplified logic that emotion and the
media both tended to demand.
On the Indian side, the situation was not easy either. The respon-
sibility of the local subsidiary was unquestionable, but the Americans
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could hardly be blamed for urban planning (except on the score of not
giving enough information about the product). Certain efforts to inform
the public would have helped to save a very large number of lives
(H'rouda. 1985). Links between managerial staff and senior local politi-
cal officials were also rather embarrassing: the officials were in the
same party as the Prime Minister and the elections were in the offing.
The various illustrations - from Seveso to Mexico City and Bho-
pal - clearly show the general and variform nature of present and
potential crisis situations. They present a challenge to customary
Cartesian logic because the dynamic of crisis does not lend itself to
breakdown into independent subproblems. That said. we shall now take
a more analytical approach to the crisis phenomenon and endeavour to
define its principal dimensions.
1.3. The Crisis Dynamic
For the sake of simplicity we can identify three dimensions to the
extreme turbulence characteristic of the crisis situation:
(1) Crisis has the features of an unfurling wave. It overwhelms the
usual instruments of management, rendering them useless and even
counterproductive. It strips bare and leaves its stamp, that of
incapacity.
(2) Crisis throws things out of order. reducing operational mechan-
isms to uselessness. Worse, the mechanisms help to aggravate the
situation. The result is helplessness.
(3) Crisis causes a complete break. The missions and goals of the sys-
tem have to be reconsidered. too. The break - a fault line
through which many different eruptive manifestations may break
out - calls for revisions that are not simply tactical or organiza-
tional but more fundamental. Le. strategic and "political".
In combination, these three factors not only produce difficulties
rather more serious than the norm but generate a very special
phenomenon - the crisis dynamic.
1.3.1. Crisis as a tactical breakdown:
when tools no longer work
The ordinary tools of routine management are basically characterized
by their frame of reference. which is confined to the usual rules and
patterns. The unexpected. the improbable, and. more still, the abnor-
mal are not generally included (and it is best that this should be so for
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the satisfactory running of stable systems). Before the event, ques-
tions that might call for radical changes to the system are not put. Of
themselves, these facts explain why a crisis - consisting largely of the
unexpected and the abnormal - will find the system at a loss. Opera-
tionally, these structural limits express themselves as serious con-
straints. Straining the analysis a little (though this is justified because
processes become rigid in crisis situations), the conventional response
systems may be said to be capable - but only capable - of:
(1) Dealing with a limited number of difficulties at one and the same
time.
(2) Working at overload within fairly narrow margins and for a limited
span of time.
(3) Coping with relatively slow developments. not with complete
breaks.
(4) Acting within the framework of predefined regulations.
(5) Operating within stable homogeneous units, not in the looser
framework of networks whose contours and own dynamics are in a
process of rapid change.
(6) Mobilizing a limited potential of resources.
(7) Processing information that is relatively accurate. reliable. and
verifiable.
(8) Applying to a specific part of a system, the latter - overall -
being stable and well under control, the ceateris paribus condi-
tion here being an essential reference.
(9) Dealing with a limited number of persons and representatives.
(10) Dealing with difficulties in the framework of a trial and error pro-
cess of which irreversibility and the critical gravity of the
induced effects are not a feature.
(11) Dealing with difficulties which are not immediately exposed to the
glare of publicity, etc.
On all these points. a crisis is the exact opposite: difficulties pile
up, the struggle is long term, the usual frameworks are in malfunction.
action has to be taken at high speed, the basic rules have to be
changed, the whole system starts resonating, the general aims are no
longer known and no one knows how to formulate strategies and decide
objectives, or with whom. The unfurling wave effect is not the only
problem: things are out of order.
1.3.2. Crisis as an organizational breakdown:
when regulations no longer operate
Crisis is to be recognized "not only by the growth of uncertainties and
unknowns but also by the breakdown in regulations, I.e. the unfurling of
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antagonisms and uncontrolled processes that are self-accelerating and
self-amplifying" (Morin, 1981, p 16).
These basic mechanisms, acting in a time of considerable tension,
can cause the headlong plunge into crisis. The following processes
need to be considered in a crisis situation:
(1) The system will, if anything, function less effectively than ordi-
narily. The corrective mechanisms cease to work and the pace of
events heightens contradictions in contrast with the generally
held notion that when there is a problem everyone rallies round
and shows extraordinary dedication.
(2) Indeed, mobilization is the exception rather than the rule.
Instead of a general drive energizing a common action, one often
witnesses the prudent withdrawal of a large number of potential
sources of help. There are many individual organizations that see
a crisis as a major threat to their position.
(3) Neither will there be any mobilization of teams. Investigations
show that, in unprepared structure, only individuals - wholly on
their own in most cases - face up to problems ... watched in fasci-
nation, hypnosis, anxiety, or irony by those around them.
(4) Nor will the very many channels of communication be set up that
are necessary to link together the large number of organizations
confronted with the problem. If there has been no advance
preparation, the different parties involved are more likely to form
separate islands. The situation of extreme tension and vulnerabil-
ity is hardly conducive to the formation of these essential links.
(5) Where there is a vital need for trust, the opposite is what usually
materializes. It grows into conflict unless all concerned make
serious preparation to fight it immediately. So, instead of
shoulder-ta-shoulder unity in distress, what dominates is latent or
open conflict or even the sizing-up of opportunities for the set-
tling of old scores.
(6) The propensity to believe in myth is particularly acute because.
in combination, the worries, uncertainties. rumors, and mysteries
that are nursed increase the attraction of generalizing many pea-
pIe and organizations (this was particularly clear in the case of
the disappearance of the Seveso drums). Instead each person,
each entity, tends to rely on some item of information dredged out
of the grey areas always present in a crisis situation for the
assurance it gives (in terms of self-assurance and the conferring
of some petty power that he, she. or it holds the key to the
interpretation of the crisis and its solution).
Other avenues need to be studied and the analysis needs to be
deepened but a central lesson is already to be learned from these
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observations. It is that. given all these forms of disorder. what is
wanted is not to counter all failures one by one but to understand that
crisis is disorder and calls for other means of action.
1.3.3. Crisis as a "political" breakdown:
when missions and goals no lODger operate
A crisis is not simply the result of unsuitable tools or inadequate orga-
nizational capacities. It is the evidence of a deeper failing in the gen-
eral context which structured the life of the system concerned up to
that point. It is not the accidental failure of a particular element that
is most to be feared but the vulnerability of a general sociotechnical
architecture.
Tactical incapacity, of course, makes organizational inadequacies
that much worse, and both together increase the exposure to basic vul-
nerability. Crisis results from the interaction of these three fault
lines. Some of the examples already discussed clearly illustrate the
point.
Seveso
The problem here was the helplessness of science, technology, organi-
zations, governments, and states in the face of certain hazards of
industrial society. During the summer of 1976 it was shown that
extreme insecurity (irreversibility and incapacity) could arise from the
very heart of technological development. so promising in other
respects; the warning shot came from the chemical sector whereas
many had expected it to come from the civil nuclear industry.
The Seveso Drums
Admittedly, tactical problems, such as customs procedures, were con-
sidered for a time. and more serious problems like waste management
were raised. but the real issue related to more fundamental questions of
waste production and industrial policy. Clearly anyone who perceived,
in this situation, no more than a problem of customs papers or waste
management would be incapable of understanding the essential factors
of the crisis dynamic.
San Juan Ixhuatepec. Mexico City
The gas industry and its hazards were the first targets of post-
accident activity but the tremor spread in many other directions as
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well. Questions probed deeper and reached the crucial problems to
which the disaster had given new force.
Searching light was thrown on the whole question of safety in Mex-
ico. There were symbols: the big Azcapotzalco refinery located in the
very heart of the capital in a district numbering a million inhabitants,
the gas pipelines in poor condition threatening the whole of the north
of the country and the airport. ringed by urban districts. More gen-
erally, there was the reality of an extremely fragile urban system. But
there was some wavering. Where was one to begin? How much room was
there to maneuver in? Would it be enough if the case were taken up?
There was a general clamor for spectacular measures. The
President of the Republic set up a working group to study the problem
of major industrial hazards that could be threats to Mexican conurba-
tions.
But doubts were voiced. The difficulties of defusing the metropol-
itan powder keg of 17-18 million inhabitants are enormous, wrote The
News on 26 November 1984. The newspaper recalled the editorial it had
published a month and a half before the disaster, entitled "Exodus or
urban Hara-Kiri", in which it had reviewed the reasons for successive
failures in the efforts to deconcentrate the capital -the key to
improving the safety situation in Mexico. others smothered the
immediate crisis in despair. "As usual, the government will do nothing"
wrote Proceso on 26 November giving other and yet worse disasters as
the only prospect.
Bhopal
The disruption went deep and took many forms. The headline in Busi-
ness Week on 24 December 1984 was "Union Carbide fights for its life";
rarely was an accident to have so severe an impact on so powerful a
firm.
In the wider context, the multinationals, and their relation with
the Third World, were again potential targets. The chemical industry
itself was faced with a frightening possibility: the fears attaching to
the nuclear industry in particular might suddenly shift (this had
already happened - at regional level - at Mississauga). The protection
offered by statistical argument had gone and was now reversed. One
quarter of a regional capital was hit. The images of warfare (chemical
warfare) invaded the world of industrial hazards (the exact number of
deaths in Mexico City could also, perhaps, have warranted a similar
transposition).
Another unresolved question was what could happen if there were
a repeat of this kind of rout or even a minor accident in an industrial-
ized country {and it happened, in August 1985, in the Union Carbide
MIC plant at Institute - the "cost" of this second incident being
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perhaps higher for the image of the firm). Cumulative phenomena are
to be considered. Perhaps Bhopal has laid a minefield for the future.
Hence the acute nature of the subject which will leave its mark for
many years.
To sum up:
(1) A grave technical failure can affect a system in its key equilibria.
A major accident may explode into a crisis, Le. a process of
extreme social disruption.
(2) Several fault lines (tactical tools, organizational capacities. basic
"political" factors) crisscross the post-accident stage. The very
high number of factors clash with each other and the outcome
depends on their interaction.
(3) Everything may suddenly crystallize around an event of secondary
rank which will overturn what has previously been taken for
granted and trigger off the crisis in this or that direction. Atten-
tion to apparently harmless events is therefore essential without.
however. sight ever being lost of the basic structuring of the set-
ting on which the crisis plays itself out. In the famous words of
Montesquieu, if the chance of one particular incident causes vast
repercussions it is also because the general conditions existed to
give it that destabilizing power.
1.4. Coping with Crisis
1.4.1. Tactical capacities for stabilizing an emergency situation
Speed is the essence of emergency action. The rule of thumb with the
fire brigades is one minute for a glass of water, ten minutes for a
tender, and one hour for a complete brigade. Chemical accidents and
major hazards, however, set higher requirements: technical expertise
for the direct handling of the accident, high-performance emergency
organization resources, and overall planning fully capable of dealing
with situations on a very large scale and lasting a considerable length
of time.
Basic Arrangements
Several components have to be put together for all the necessary skills
to be available. Briefly, these include (Cashman. 1983; Cumberland.
1982; Lagadec. 1983b): hazardous materials response teams; communi-
cations and advice centers; on-site emergency plans; off-site emer-
gency plans; mutual aid systems.
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But the important thing today is to make sure that they are still
really operational instruments and that their scale is sufficient to cope
with a major situation.
Emergency Arrangements Scaled to Match
the Major Chemical Hazard
The gravity of the hazards entailed demands nothing less than excel-
lence in the quality of the response systems. The following points need
particularly careful attention.
Knowledge oj effects and their range. Very special attention needs
to be drawn to this essential point in the case of major hazards. There
are numerous manuals and data sheets on the dangers associated with
chemicals but the information they give relates more often than not to
the action to be taken in the event of an accident at work affecting a
limited number of staff. What are needed now are appropriate docu-
ments for major releases that may affect large populations.
Without this knowledge of the range of effects. emergency action
can only be tentative. This is obviously a "burning" issue. Investiga-
tion would show that in many cases the distance separating a plant from
an urban area (a few dozen meters. except in the explosives industry
where the lessons of the many accidents that happened during the 19th
century have been heeded) is too small. Apart from anything else. this
raises big legal questions: if expropriation proves necessary, who foots
the bill? So far. no one wants to grasp the nettle.
Homogeneity and coherence oj arrangements and measures. It is
vital to consider a given installation in the setting of the broader sys-
tem of which it is part. Two points call for special attention: overall
knowledge of the hazards in the zone where the dangerous installation
is located (Health and Safety Executive. 1978, 1980; Rijnmond Author-
ity. 1982): comprehensive emergency planning (Gray and Quarantelli,
1981: Quarantelli. 1981).
InJorming the population (and the workforce). A population
informed about the hazards of the place where it lives and knowing
what to do in the event of an emergency is that much less vulnerable.
as many examples show. But this social awareness of hazards is largely
lacking. and the reflex action ensuring safety and protection even more
so. It is therefore to be feared. for instance. that. in a situation where
the population has to be under strict instructions to stay at home,
there will quickly be an uncontrollable flood of people onto the roads.
The European Economic Community (European Communities Coun-
cil. 1982) Seveso Directive requires that this information be given to
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populations. In many cases, the leeway to be made up will demand a
considerable effort. There is one prior condition. however. that is not
always met. Information within the firm itself is sometimes inadequate.
Systems that are alive: planning rather than plans. Emergency
arrangements work only if they are alive, Le. if their quality is con-
stantly being improved. The purpose of a plan is not to buy cheap
reassurance. The authorities that bore the heavy responsibility of
bringing the Mississauga accident under control warn against the tradi-
tional inadequacies of emergency plans. Three words -"No paper
plans "- sum up their message. As Inspector Silverberg put it (Silver-
berg, 1983):
(1) "Emergency planning is a continuous activity requiring participa-
tion and understanding of all government departments, agencies,
voluntary groups, private sectors" (p 18).
(2) "Paper plans that have been developed without consultation with
all interested departments are of little use" (p 18).
(3) "The heart of emergency planning is: an active process of review.
consultation. exercises and training to develop teamwork and
preparedness" (p 18).
(4) "An emergency plan must accurately reflect existing operational
capabilities and resources. Many written plans reflect more co-
ordinated planning than actually exists. Actual participation is a
must by all concerned in the planning effort" (p 19).
(5) '''Compliance' plans or 'generic' plans represent little or no real
planning activity at local level and have often been produced to
satisfy government requirements" (p 20).
Even if a serious effort of preparation is made, doubt or at least
caution, must constantly be kept alive in the minds of those concerned.
The major event is not controlled that easily. Very relevantly, the
same Canadian official notes:
(1) "Warning stage is important - but remember - a disaster can
occur so fast that there may be no time for warning" (p 28).
(2) "Don't assume your communication system is going to work" (p 28).
(3) "Remember: the reality of impact totally changes the environ-
ment" (p 28).
(4) "No exercise will fully reproduce the actual atmosphere of a
disaster" (p 22).
(5) "Co-ordinated effort among technical sectors that may not work
together during normal times is a vital aspect" (p 23).
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(6) "There are no such things as purely technical decisions: political
factors are more prominent than ever during aftermath of disas-
ter. Prepare policy makers and administrators to deal with the
problems they will face" (p 23).
1.4.2. Organizational capacities able to bring
the runaway dynamic under control
A major accident causes more than just an emergency situation and the
mobilization of relief teams. It sets off a turbulence which puts vast
systems to the test and penetrates far deeper than just the outer
fringe of the organizations concerned. The major hazard creates the
need for a real "organizational defence in depth" allowing the general
momentum generated by the event to be brought under control. Often
the problem is not really grasped because, here too, there is an impli-
cit clinging to the "accident" concept for which the front-line action of
the emergency services will suffice.
Crisis is different. It is a situation in which a large number of
organizations. wrestling with critical problems. exposed to intense
external pressures and acute internal tensions. and placed in mutually
conflicting positions and stances. are suddenly and for a long period of
time thrust to the front of the public stage in a society of mass com-
munications - in other words, they are "live" - and are guaranteed an
unfailing place in the headlines of press, radio, and television (Lagadec,
1984a).
An Organizational Culture that often Excludes
the Possibility oj a Major Accident
The problem would be simple if organizations merely had to put
together response plans for the major accident eventuality. But there
are many other prior needs at a more fundamental level. The real basis
on which organizations' response capacity is founded consists of their
customary references. their standards - in other words. their "cul-
ture". Before considering what tools to provide or rules to follow,
therefore, we need to explore these basic springs of action which regu-
larly inhibit the preparation, initiation and control of the necessary
response.
Mindset. The case studies that have been made teach one very first
lesson: if problems of major hazards, crisis, and the exceptional are
not part of the culture of an organization, it will be incapable of
responding with the rapidity, skill, capability. and perseverance
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required. Worse still perhaps, the unexpected and the abnormal will
cause paralysis and reactions that will aggravate the situation.
It has to be understood that here we are up against deep-lying
difficulties: the morale of the organization and the stability necessary
for daily routine do not welcome any admission of the exceptional. It is
only recently that the reality of major accidents has become clearly
evident. The subject itself seems fraught with menace: would not even
recognizing it be a kind of acceptance of "defeat "?
These reasons explain the reluctance there often is to tackle the
problem frankly. That being so, organizations find themselves at a
serious loss if the major accident happens. The whole of their system
of representation is caught with its flank exposed, which sets off a
chain reaction of difficulties.
Helplessness in the face of the "unezpected". Many recent cases
yield a disturbing diagnosis. Unwilling to consider even the idea of an
exceptional disruption, organizations tend to enter into crises awk-
wardly, "backwards" so to speak. "Too late and too little" would seem
to be a fair description of all their attempts at response.
Exaggeratedly sometimes, the organization goes through a chain of
difficulties:
(1) It shuts its eyes to the many signs that precede the crisis in most
cases.
(2) It deciphers the start of the crisis a long time after many other
key actors.
(3) Hypnotized by the unexpected, the "unthinkable", its first reac-
tion is to shrink back into itself when, on the contrary, it ought to
be multiplying its relations with the environment. This is the
period of (suspect) silences, the "no comment" statements (partic-
ularly dangerous for the organization's credibility), the denials
that mislead no one (except perhaps their authors, which is seri-
ous), and hasty statements of the kind "everything is under con-
trol", immediately interpreted as meaning that the situation is
completely out of hand.
(4) The organization puts up the shutters, cultivates the "fortress
under siege" spirit, breaks up into a multitude of islands eyeing
each other watchfully, and soon offers itself as an easy victim to
the crisis and those who know how to benefit from it. When (for
example) too many denials have been disproved by the facts and
television pictures, the organization's room for maneuver is seri-
ously curtailed. It is then likely to harden its attitude still
further and worsen its position unless those in charge are able to
intervene and get different strategies adopted - a change of
heading it is very difficult to obtain when the storm is at its
height.
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We would stress one capital point: these processes can happen at
breathtaking speed. Take the example of the Mont-Louis, the French
ship which sank off the Belgian coast in August 1984 with drums of
uranium hexafluoride in its holds.
In less than 24 hours, after Greenpeace had sounded an immediate
alarm and following the silences and labored denials of the organization
in charge of the cargo, the Belgian Environment Minister accused the
French Government, on radio and television, of concealing the truth.
Amusingly, the Belgian Minister, while violently denouncing the fact
that his country had been unable to obtain the slightest piece of infor-
mation about the ship's cargo and the dangers incurred by his country,
gave assurances in his statement that the country was at no risk. In 24
hours the custom of the immediate "reassuring" denial had thus placed
not one, but two. governments (and certain firms or agencies in the
nuclear industry) in a very uncomfortable position vis-a-vis the ecolo-
gist organization. The latter - again following habit - then threw away
its advantage by making wild exaggerations, thus enabling those
responsible to extricate themselves from a very difficult position.
Although the risk, in the opinion of the specialists, was minimal, the
culture of the organizations involved had very nearly converted a minor
accident into a "media disaster".
The point to remember, therefore, is that even before the rules
for responding to an emergency situation could be brought out of the
safe, the "culture" of the organization had had the time to do consider-
able harm. So what purpose do writing clear press releases, holding
press conferences. showing one knows the facts, and so on, serve in
such circumstances? It is extremely difficult for even the best tactical
measures to rescue an organization from a strategic defeat.
So the first requirement to help an organization respond more
successfully to a crisis is not to provide it with a list of instructions.
The essential need is to look carefully at the deep-lying culture from
which its reactions spring. Once again, it is difficult to sidestep this
deep-lying culture. There is every likelihood it will surface (and
violently) at a time of crisis. In communications, for example, a pro-
fessedly outgoing policy pasted artificially over a culture of secrecy
will not last long, and the idea that things are being concealed will
quickly gain ground. So mere recipes will not do.
Crisis Management Aptitudes
A great deal of work would be necessary to draw up organizational rules
for crisis management. The case studies that have been produced, how-
ever, tell us that the ability to develop a proactive attitude both inside
the organization and towards the outside world is an important precon-
dition.
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The following points need to be considered.
(1) Recognition oJ the reality oJ the major hazard. The traditional
reaction rejecting any review of this subject on the grounds of the
need to show "optimism" has to be scrapped. "Clear thinking" is
not necessarily synonymous with "catastrophism" or "anti-
industrial attitudes".
(2) Knowledge oJ the major hazard.s that could concern the orga-
nization. Here, other references than just statistics and habits
need to be brought in. The rare event may in future carry just as
much weight as all accumulated experience. Marginal logic is no
longer the only desirable intellectual reference.
(3) The ability to recognize, quickly, the onset oJ crisis condi-
tions and to manage the information collected without delay.
The point is well illustrated by the case of the Mont-Louis already
referred to. It may be analyzed briefly as follows. A business
enterprise has to perform an ongoing mission. It therefore tends
to concentrate on the large masses, the regular event. The role
and interest of the press and critical groups is to highlight the
exceptional. These are two opposite cultures which have
developed different response modes and tools. The latter set of
actors possesses extraordinary capabilities in this respect: gath-
ering of information, the swift reporting of that information, and
immediate distribution. Public and private officials have duties, of
course, which oblige them to exercise more prudence - which
explains some delay in their response.
(4) The ability to bring swiftly to life a network oJ actors relevant
to the crisis. The collection of information, the analyses that
have to be made, and the decisions that have to be taken imply
that a large number of relationships - often new ones - have to be
woven immediately within the organization and with the outside
environment. Existing conflicts. the absence of previous links,
and differences in "culture" between the organizations concerned
greatly impede the development of the necessary cooperation.
Very often. a new mode of operation will become established only
after the higher levels of authority, recognizing the seriousness
of the situation, demand the necessary changes. But it is still dif-
ficult for them to modify the culture of their organization at a
time when it is dangerously exposed and therefore on the defen-
sive. The capability of proactive response has to be developed
beforehand.
(5) The ability to work with the media. Here again the basic culture
of the enterprise is deeply involved. Particularly in Europe. the
rule of secrecy is often all-powerful. There are reasons for it, but
the dangers of too uncommunicative an attitude have to be
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carefully weighed. Journalists do not simply ask for information
and wait for those responsible to be kind enough to give it to
them. They are professional information hunters and not easily
put off. To dispel the illusions that have long been held on this
subject, it is sufficient to remember the ingenuity of the journal-
ists at Three Mile Island (Scanlon and Alldred, 1982; Sandman and
Paden, 1979). Donald R. Stephenson (Director, Corporate Communi-
cations, Dow Chemical, Canada) sets out very clearly the attitude
needed in this field where the proactive approach is often tragi-
cally absent:
1. The public musl be fully informed frequently and accu-
ralely lhrough lhe media, from lhe oulsel. This musl
be done by one or lwo highly credible senior spokes-
men who undersland lhe silualion and can explain il
calmly and clearly in lay language. The firsl 24 hours
of a crisis are crilical.
2. If lhis is nol done, a public informalion vacuum prob-
ably will develop rapidly - and be filled by rumors or
alarms far worse lhan lhe real silualion.
3. Silence in lhe midsl of a crisis implies guill, whelher
Juslified or nolo
4. Il is nol enough merely to assure lhe public lhal
everylhing is O.K. and lhere's no reason for alarm. To
be credible, we musl provide delails of how lhal con-
clusion is drawn.
5. Il is vilal lo realize lhal reporlers face deadlines
hour by hour. Information musl always be correcl,
consislenl and currenl, even if all lhe answers aren'l
immedialelyavailable.
These are principles lhal many lop executives and operal-
ing managers find hard lo adopl. They fail lo undersland
lhe urgency of lhe silualion or lhe implicalion of delayed
response. They are inclined lo lry lo smolher bad news
ralher lhan air il. (Slephenson, 1964, p 3)
With J. Scanlon, one must stress the crucial importance of this
capacity to manage information in a crisis. In an open Information
Society there can be no division drawn between operations and com-
munication. Anyone who cannot control information problems can have
no control over the operational conduct of the emergency situation.
(1) "An emergency, among other things, is an information crisis and
must be treated as such" (Scanlon et al., 1982, p 31).
(2) "to a considerable extent whoever controls the access to informa-
tion, whoever is the source of information becomes the center of
operations and control; and if you don't have communications sys-
tems operational. if you can't disseminate it, then you also lose
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the power to have operational control and it will shift to whoever
has that" (Scanlon, 1982, p 17).
(3) "communications are so important in the aftermath of disaster
that the centers of communication may well be the centers of
operational control as well" (Scanlon, 1975, p 429).
Tactical capacities and organizational aptitudes form a whole, but
another dimension of response is needed to complete the picture: the
ability to run the system caught in the turbulence of a crisis.
1.4.3. Management capacities
The major accident and the crisis dynamic - where weighty issues are
at stake - are problems for top management. Here. too, basic refer-
ences have to be completely changed. The "incident" used to have only
marginal effects and could be handled by the relevant specialized
technical service. A major accident can derail or even fatally damage
the systems concerned. Today, managements of both public and private
organizations have a duty to recognize and explore this "new frontier"
and bring it under control. With brutal suddenness, Bhopal revealed
the critical importance of these matters for the heads of firms and
public agencies.
The men in top management must arm themselves with the specific
management capabilities necessary for controlling crisis situations and
prepare their organization as a whole to withstand such conditions.
Their task is also, of course, to take every step to prevent major
accidents and to make their constant concern the anticipation of prob-
lems. without which their field of maneuver could be extremely narrow.
Managements in the Eye of the storm:
Controlling Systems in a Crisis Situation
From a study of recent cases. it is possible to identify a number of
important requirements for the managements of systems faced with a
crisis dynamic:
(1) Put the organization on a "crisis mode" footing. This is a
question of swiftly actuating the patterns of thought, arrange-
ments, and behaviors that the organization (and not just the emer-
gency services) needs to adopt to be in a position to cope with the
situation in every respect instead of waiting for the crisis to
attack each of the subsystems concerned one by one.
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(2) Initiate an ad hoc data collection and analysis system. Crises
require the capture and verification of information received via
infinitely more diversified channels than in ordinary cir-
cumstances. They also demand a continuous effort of interpreta-
tion on the basis of unusual and very exposed criteria and models.
In particular, special attention has to be paid to the gross intel-
lectual mistakes that lead to fundamental errors of judgment and
persistence in those errors, each fresh item of information being
forced (to the point of absurdity) into the frame of logic adopted.
In spite of the absolute need for resolute and immediate action,
the functioning of the organization must leave room for caution
about the hypotheses that are formulated and for the active and
critical clarification of the implicit hypotheses behind the reason-
ing. In particular, the system that management perceives may not
be the real system: the gap between the two needs to be studied
without delay.
(3) Make sure no gross mistakes and blunders are made at the
very outset. It is not unusual for some subsystem in the organiza-
tion to act on its own initiative, without coordination, obeying
reflexes wholly inappropriate to crisis conditions, e.g. the
overhasty issue of a press release claiming "nothing has hap-
pened" or "everything is under control". Foolishness of this kind
can gravely compromise the position of the management (particu-
larly if committed in its name) or necessitate disclaimers which
would be highly inopportune, this not really being the time for an
outbreak of internal strife. It is vital to identify these untimely
initiatives that the organization might be tempted to take at the
earliest moment - and prevent them happening.
(4) Strive to maintain the organization's internal coherence and
capability. As we have seen, the crisis dynamic sends tremors
through the organization, causes cracks to appear in its struc-
ture, sows doubt about its objectives and fundamental missions,
weakens allegiances, resurrects bitter conflicts, etc. Soon the
system has broken up into so many islands all behaving like little
besieged fortresses. Immediate steps have to be taken to counter
these destructive tendencies by reclarifying the key dimensions
of the life of the organization: its missions, policies and stra-
tegies, the rules of communication, the rules for the settlement of
disputes, etc. No imprecision must be allowed to prevail about
these very foundations of the life of the system. The beginnings
of any internal contributory factors - conflict, rumor, or inertia
- must be identified and dealt with immediately. Here again, the
management must be constantly questioning itself on the gap
between its perception of the system and the system's real state,
36 [fl,sur1.fl,g afl,d Mafl,ag1.fl,g Hazardous R1.sks
and constantly checking to see that its decisions are effectively
put into practice and produce the effect desired.
(5) Maintain and develop the organization's external capacity.
Whereas the natural tendency is for the organization to shrink
into its shell, it must - on the contrary - strive to increase rela-
tions with its environment. This rapid deployment of relational
systems is necessary in order to be able to receive and give out
information and to implement actions with hitherto unfamiliar
organizations. Efforts need to focus on two main areas: the
operational and decisional system and the media. One of top
management's tasks in this respect is to check the quality of the
relationships that are established, in particular the level (posi-
tion in the hierarchy, authority, and power) of the persons with
whom links are made.
(6) Informing the public. It is a critical question in a crisis situa-
tion and this is therefore one of the important functions of which
management must take direct charge (which implies new patterns
of internal operation in this respect if the public relations
departments are not of the highest status in the company).
(7) Manage the time factor. A constant, questioning watch must be
kept on the development of the crisis. Every time a decision is
taken the question must be faced: What's next? The purpose is to
prevent incoherence over time and, more fundamentally, to ensure
that the response to the crisis dynamic escalates as time goes by.
(8) Be on the alert for any possibility of incipient crises break-
ing out on other fronts. Frequently the scale of a crisis will
grow as a result of certain details that the organization, paying
little heed to questions that seem to be of secondary importance,
fails to attend to quickly enough. Managements need to keep a
careful and constant watch for the outbreak of any subsidiary
crisis on a secondary front. The typical example is the case of
the 41 dioxin drums from Seveso. Every "suspect II waste dump
could become the main factor of the crisis within 24 hours.
Managing a crisis is managing a kaleidoscope: a slight shift can
change the scene completely.
(9) strive constantly to enlarge the organization's room for
maneuver. The reference here is to the need to combat a regular
effect of crises which is the overhasty and heavy-handed closing
off of many possibilities.
(10) In addition to running the organization concerned, work for
the development of the overall system affected by the crisis.
While the tendency is for the organization to turn inward on its
own problems and plans. top managements should take their part
in the more general moves. They should consider what initiatives
might be taken and give the help that outside actors may need.
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Possibly they should lay the basis for a new general configuration
of the system concerned and then define new places in it for the
organizations involved. Managements' tasks in a period. of crisis
extend far beyond merely defending the immediate and specific
interests of the organizations for which they are responsible.
Preventing the Major Accident and Preparing
the Organizationjor Crisis Situations
The precondition: mindset. Again, there can be no decisive progress
in the control of major hazards and crisis situations without a clear
awareness and recognition of the reality of the challenge and what is at
stake. This is necessary in order that the required stimuli come from
the top and so that the example of the upper echelons consolidates the
progress to be made in the organization as a whole. The rule is simple
and obvious, but putting it into effect is certainly more difficult. After
years and decades of not doing enough in this respect, changes of atti-
tude cannot be brought about without a great effort (MitroU and Kil-
mann, 1984). And yet it is here that the key to all the actions to be
launched or developed to prevent major hazards and crisis situations
and secure greater control over them is to be found.
A decision-making system reorganized to include the major hazard
question. One primary objective is essential: safety has to be made a
goal. field of decision, and problem for top management. To that end.
there are several operational rules that senior executives need to
institute or strengthen:
(1) There has to be a clear perception 0/ the safety options. For
this to be so, safety options have to be perceived as decisions
(not simply "technical" provisions) at all levels of the organization
and the choices made with regard to location, design, maintenance
and management need to be perceived as safety decisions.
(2) Sa/ety problems must be given speciJ'ic expression. The danger
is that technical, economic, and administrative considerations will
overshadow safety questions. To avoid this trap, organizational
systems need to be designed in which specific account can be
taken of safety. For example, the head of a plant - whose duty is
to develop his establishment - should not be the only architect of
safety options and the only channel for conveying those options to
top management. An internal critique on safety matters, via
recognized organizational machinery, must be possible and must
have every opportunity to express itself at top management level.
There is no point in hiding the fact: the management of safety is
another industrial bargaining situation. If certain equilibria are
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not secured, there is litUe likelihood of safety questions being
given proper consideration.
(3) Decision-making levels have to match the importance of the
issues. A major question for top management is whether hazard
problems are not covered up at the lower echelons, the danger
being that there may be undivulged trade-offs at the intermediate
levels based on considerations that are too narrow in the light of
what is at stake. Here again, it is important to ensure that the
organizational system guarantees the upward flow of information,
including proposed decisions. A point worth noting is that if
every organization dealt with safety questions at the right level,
communication between levels would become immediately easier.
In short, the question for the senior manager in the private or
public sector is whether he commands an internal organization
that enables him to exercise his decision-making powers effec-
tively in safety matters.
Specific prevention efforts. In view of the surprises that came out on
the occasion of the alerts and accidents discussed earlier, a first step
for managements in the public or private sector could be to produce a
diagnosis of the situation regarding safety problems in the systems
they are responsible for. A number of audits would make it possible to
identify any major technical or organizational shortcomings.
The object would be to ensure there was no chance of suddenly
finding situations like those there were at Flixborough or Canvey
Island:
It was clear that no-one concerned in the design or construction
of the plant envisaged the possibility of a major disaster happen-
ing instantaneously. (Department of Employment, 1975, p 36.)
During the preliminary visits to the premises selected for
detailed assessment, the Investigating teams were reassured to
find that, where hazardous materials were being processed, han-
dled or stored, the managements were generally very responsive
to matters of operational safety. Where relevant codes of prac-
tice were available, these had been taken into account in the
design and construction of plant and facilities. However, these
visits also established that none of the companies concerned had
made a systematic attempt to examine and document those few
potentially serious events which might cause accidents among
people In the surrounding community. (Health and Safety Execu-
tive, 1978, p 8.)
Similarly, the safety assessment which the French authorities
requested be made at the Union Carbide plant at Bllziers, after the
Bhopal disaster, revealed certain problems at the works but, more
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particularly, some very serious shortcomings in the system for trans-
porting MIC between Fos (near Marseilles) and Bllziers. Studies like
these - which need to cover both software and hardware - are essen-
tial for decision-makers in public and private sectors. They supply a
snapshot of the safety of their system, an information base enabling
them to determine priorities, and an opportunity for displaying, inter-
nally and externally, the importance they attach to accident preven-
tion.
Thus the exercise can be not only a tool of investigation but, at
the same time, (1) an effective lever for propagating that internal cul-
ture of the organization, making it more sensitive to major hazard ques-
tions, and (2) a valuable talking point in the social discussion which
unfailingly develops on the subject of major hazards.
This last point is worth stressing. It is vital to have accurate
references in these discussions that always threaten to get out of hand
when fear, suspicion, and the imagination rule the mind. It was one of
the lessons of the studies carried out at Canvey Island. The work done
by the Health and Safety Executive and the publications it produced
helped not only to reduce appreciably the hazards in the area but also
to ensure that the social debate had a solid basis (Lagadec, 1979;
1983a). The British Government had every right to say in its second
report on the zone in 1980:
We regard the report as a watershed - a unique, pioneering
exercise which will prove to be a major turning point in risk
assessment work. The report aroused extensive interest in the
U.K. and around the world, far beyond the sphere of those having
a direct local concern. In its range and depth the report pro-
vided, and still provides, a potent stimulus to the debate about
risk assessment techniques and the practical decisions which
have to be made about the relation between potentially hazardous
industry and people who live and work nearby. (Health and
Safety Executive, 1960, p iv.)
Decompartmentation and Opening Up to the Outside
The "ordinary" accident was something that stayed within the confines
of the firm, but the major accident makes its effects felt far beyond
and strikes at the surrounding communities. The consequence of this
new state of affairs is immediate: the outside world demands an expla-
nation from the company and even the right to look behind the scenes
in industry. Clearly, such demands are unprecedented and a shock to
the industrial culture previously sheltered by its protective walls.
Facilitating adaptation to these new social requirements is a
matter for senior management. It becomes important to engineer new
strategic positions defined in terms of credibility and legitimacy. It
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becomes necessary to be able to supply accurate information, to
embark on programs of internal transformation, etc. Authority or
invoking "Science" and "Progress" no longer carry enough weight.
They are even suspect, and therefore counterproductive. The major
hazard requires the company (but it is also true for the public agencies
concerned) to be able to justify its activity by far more open yard-
sticks than those previously used.
Several initiatives can be taken along these lines. One is to
accept (as is tried in France) that safety assessments be reviewed by
external experts reporting to the public supervisory authority and
another is to make safety reports public (not including certain pas-
sages which would otherwise reveal industrial secrets but whose
absence does not affect the understanding of the text). A few years
ago, this kind of possibility would have seemed unthinkable. The major
hazard has made readiness for this more open type of policy advisable
or even essential. But there are two possible approaches. one reactive
and the other proactive. The latter offers valuable strategic advan-
tages to a company in terms of consolidating its position in the event of
a crisis (which always remains a possibility even when the maximum is
done in the way of prevention).
A case oJ considerable significance Jor the .future: Union Carbide's
strategic decisions Jollowing the Bhopal disaster. On 20 March
1985, Mr Warren Anderson. Chairman of Union Carbide. announced the
following decisions (Anderson. 1985, pp 2-3):
1. There'll be intensified sampling procedures, training and
retraining sessions. process review and countless adminis-
trative and physical changes.
2. Our overseas locations will face three times as many com-
pany safety audits this year. compared to 1984. And
there'll be a significant increase in such audits at our US
sites as well.
3. A new committee of the Board of Directors is meeting semi-
monthly to handle health, safety and environmental affairs.
Head of the committee is Union Carbide director Russel
Train, first administrator of the Environmental Protection
Administration and presently president of the National
Wildlife Foundation. Mr. Train has been a director of Union
Carbide for the past eight years.
4. Another significant change established a new committee of
top-level management on risk assessment. reporting directly
to Union Carbide President Alec Flamm. This brings to the
highest level of the corporation compliance reviews of our
facilities that handle hazardous materials.
These key decisions are evidence of a qualitative change in an
industrial group's policy towards safety matters. They deserve most
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careful attention by everyone concerned and, first and foremost of
course, the whole of the chemical
These key decisions are evidence of a qualitative change in an
industrial group's policy towards safety matters. They deserve most
careful attention by everyone concerned and, first and foremost of
course, the whole of the chemical industry.
A Third Path oJ Action: Anticipating Risks and Vulnerabilities
Working with the future in mind and preparing for changes of direction
a long time in advance are increasingly necessary as systems become
more complex and the bearings that are set become more difficult to
alter. If hazards and vulnerabilities are not anticipated, efforts to
prevent and, all the more so, efforts to control crisis situations will be
severely handicapped. Two main directions need to be investigated
although our reference to them here will be very brief.
Internal development: hazards "in ovo" in the chemical sector.
Several different starting points can be taken, including hazards asso-
ciated with: expected new products; new manufacturing, transport and
storage technologies; new forms of business organization (computeriza-
tion, early retirement with the loss of long-experienced staff); new
strategies such as the development of biotechnologies. the relocation
of the basic chemical industry in the Third World, and the development
of certain fine chemical sectors.
The more general setting: underlying trends in the environment
of the chemical industry. The question of major hazards associated
with dangerous substances arises in a setting in which conditions are
becoming significantly more fragile. Some aspects are:
(1) The geographical interspersal oJ industrial and urban
activities. This is already raising the problem of the distance
separating industrial plants from urban areas. New legal provi-
sions need to be developed. A vital subject is compensation.
(2) The development oJ networks and structures oJ activity
through which havoc-creating chain effects are possible. The
safety of dangerous substances, for example, might be imperiled
by destabilizing accidents affecting wide-ranging geographical
areas. In November 1981. the Lyons region (1 million inhabitants)
was cut off from the outside world following a fire in a telephone
exchange. Even key government links were severed because they,
too, went through the same exchange. What would have happened
if some kind of major accident had happened demanding trunk
communications on a massive scale?
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(3) The economic crisis. This may have serious repercussions on
firms' safety in two ways: risk-taking increases and resources
allocated to control and safety (primarily maintenance and super-
vision) are reduced.
(4) Trends and changes in the social "demand" Jor safety. It is
clear that what until recently was regarded as "acceptable" will
no longer be so in the future. More than that, any major accident
may completely change perceptions and requirements. This was
brought out in Ontario, following the Mississauga accident.
Hazards became a far more prominent subject in people's minds
and the subjective rankings of various hazards were radically
reordered (Burton et al., 1983). The subject of many opinion polls
was the general perception of science and technology; it would be
wise to look into the far-reaching consequences in this field of
disasters like Bhopal. Such a survey, based on these considera-
tions, was conducted in France in March 1985 (SOFRES, 1985).
Here are some of the findings:
(a) Public opinion is concerned about major accidents. Asked
whether they thought accidents like those in Bhopal and
Mexico City could happen in France. 3% said it was inevitable.
55% likely, 32% unlikely, and 2% impossible. Conclusion: the
theory of the perfect control of technological systems pre-
valent in the 1960s and 1970s can no longer claim credibility.
(b) The subject of major hazards attracts much attention. Asked
if there were too much or too little said about the technologi-
cal risks that existed in France, 21% answered "too much"
and 67% "too little" (12% said they didn't know). Conclusion:
there is a definite demand for information on the subject.
(c) Opinion is divided about how seriously the problem is being
tackled. 44% said everything was being done to obviate tech-
nological hazards and 39% said not everything was being done
(no answer: 17%). These figures give food for thought on the
position that the main actors would be in were a major
accident to occur.
(d) The public do not seem to have much confidence in those with
primary responsibility - heads of businesses in particular.
Asked in whom they would put their trust to take effective
action to reduce technological hazards, 30% replied "central
government". 5% "local authorities", 9% "heads of
businesses". 14% "staff of the firms concerned", 45%
"accident prevention specialists", 4% "the general public",
and 2% "no one" (8% did not reply). Conclusion: here again
the position of business managements would be problematic
in the event of a major accident.
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(5) The problem oj sabotage and terrorism. For obvious reasons this
point will not be discussed here. but the brevity of the reference
should not be misinterpreted. This is one of the gravest questions
that those in charge at the highest level need to go into.
On these latter points, as on those referred to earlier, what
remains to be done is to set up groups to exchange views and formulate
proposals. Their purpose would be to go more thoroughly into the
problems arising and to identify the strategic innovations that need to
be introduced before the room for maneuver is seriously curtailed by
the absence of any response and before. above all. a major event - but
in a highly developed country this time - overturns the technical,
economic, and cultural framework in which it is still possible to think
out and handle problems of major hazards and crisis situations.
1.5. Conclusion
Tactical tools, organizational flexibility, strategic capability: at each
step along the way research requirements are apparent. They concern
a very large number of disciplines, and the problem, no doubt, is less a
question of how to identify the many different demands to be met than
of how to prepare the ground for fruitful investigation.
Certainly a first need is to bring together all the approaches and
disciplines. The crisis dynamic is a general movement and approaching
it in too compartmentalized a fashion - the classic temptation - would
be dangerous. The second need is to observe, very firmly, the require-
ment for research to stay very close to reality in all its complexity and
keep a healthy distance from models more satisfying to the intellect
than in their relevance. This presupposes that the research scientist
has access to data, which is. as yet, extremely difficult: the crisis
situation is, by definition. critical for those involved, and that makes
the quest for information particularly arduous.
Here, industrialists, senior public officials, and research scien-
tists have to invent, as a result of discussion and experiment, new rules
for work and for the exchange of information.
Many of these skills, incidentally, could be found among specialists
in international relations who have been exploring the field of crises in
that area for many years. But let there be no illusions: even in that
field which is so crucial for mankind, the crisis question is far from
being under control:
Crisis management is an overly polite description of U.S. activi-
ties. What we really have is crisis coping and adaptation
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(Richard Beal, a senior director for crisis management systems
and planning at. t.he Whit.e House, Science, August. 1984, p 907).
According to a host. of current. and former NSC [National Security
Council] staff members, much of t.he information available in a
crisis is useless or incorrect.; decision-makers have lit.tle or no
crisis experience; careful planning is inadequat.e (Richard Beal,
Science, August. 1984, p 907).
No one holds the key to the problem. Dangerous substances,
major hazards, vulnerability, crisis dynamics: the foundations neces-
sary for fruitful work and collaboration urgently need to be laid, with
determination and humility and bearing in mind the words of Warren
Anderson: "We're learning the lessons of Bhopal and we'll be doing so
for a long time to come" (Anderson, 1985, p 3).
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CHAPTER 2
Engineering Aspects of Severe Accidents.
with Reference to the Seveso. Mexico
City. and Bhopal Cases
G. Naschi
2.1. The Problem of Severe Accidents
Modern technological processes may present a relevant threat. to the
safety of employees and the public or to the integrity of the environ-
ment from adverse events such as catastrophic fires. explosions,
release of toxic substances, and so on, even if the probability of
occurrence is in some cases low. The possibility of accidents with
severe consequences is also related to the development of integrated
industrial systems: the combination of the complexity of the
processes, the extent of recent large-scale installations, and the high
density of various activities in industrialized countries has led to the
rather high rate of very dangerous accidents, which unfortunately still
occur.
Recently, a large number of events have occurred with such
immediate and delayed consequences as to receive a great deal of pub-
lic attention. An as yet unpublished report by the European Economic
Community (EEC) contains an inventory of severe accidents in the last
decade in the European industry: about 100 events are reported, most
of which involved fatalities and injuries. All these accidents were
caused by errors in the design and/or by bad management of the
plants: analytical diagnosis of the actual causes of an adverse event
and a detailed study of the sequence of incidents leading to the event
might give some insights that would be useful in identifying weak points
in the installations.
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In this context an examination of the most significant recent
adverse events is presented from the point of view of the engineering
aspects: the examples are related to the events at Seveso in 1976, and
in Mexico City and Bhopal at the end of 1984. It should be pointed out
that we can only mention the most probable hypotheses about the last
two accidents since at present the inquiries are still in progress and
the investigation data are in the hands of the pertinent authorities.
2.2. Engineering Analysis of the Case Histories
2.2.1. The accident at Seveso. Italy
This accident occurred on 10 July 1976. at ICMESA. a chemical plant for
the manufacture of 2.4.5-trichlorophenol (TCP).
A brief description of the process might be a useful aid in under-
standing the evolution of the event. The main stages of the process are
(Figure 2.1):
(1) Alkaline hydrolysis of tetrachlorobenzene (TCB) in a solution of
ethylene glycol and xylene, at atmospheric pressure and a tem-
perature of 135-150°C. to obtain sodium trichlorophenate (STCP).
(2) Removal of water and recovery of the solvent by distillation at a
temperature of 155-175°C and a pressure of 1-0.026 bar.
The first two phases take place in the alkaline hydrolysis reactor.
(3) Mixing with cooling water and acidification of STCP with hydro-
chloric acid. to obtain TCP. This operation takes place in the
acidification reactor.
(4) Settling. separation, and washing of TCP with water.
(5) Distillation of TCP in a batch still.
The accident occurred in the alkaline hydrolysis reactor.
One reasonable explanation of the event is the following
(presented here in a very simplified form). After the reactor was shut
down, the stirring of the liquid mass was conducted for about 15 min.
then the contents of the reactor remained inside for several hours.
The long stagnation of the liquid mass in the reactor, whose not sub-
merged wall was at a temperature of about 300°C (practically without
heat transfer to the outside), resulted in a thin hot liquid stratum,
within the uppermost layers of the contents, which rapidly reached a
temperature of about 200 °c. At this temperature. maintained for
several hours. at least two exothermic slow reactions were activated in
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Figure 2.1.. The TCP manufacturing process.
the layer, with a further temperature increase above the threshold
temperature of an explosive exothermic runaway reaction yielding
gaseous products and highly toxic 2,3,7,B-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin
(TeDD). The consequent internal pressure increase caused the break-
ing of a rupture-disk (set-point at about 4 kgf/cm2) and a dispersion in
the air of a cloud of mixed products such as ethylene glycol, STeP,
caustic soda, and TeDD.
This scenario leads to the following considerations:
(1) When in a chemical process there is a highly toxic product, it is
necessary to study not only the process but also the physical
parameters under normal and abnormal conditions and to provide
adequate safety measures with proper procedures.
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(2) The use of controlled relief systems to avoid releases of toxic
materials to the open air is necessary.
2.2.2. The accident at San Juan b:b.uatepec.
a suburb of lIeIico City
This accident occurred on 19 November 1984. at a liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) storage and distribution center of the Petroleos Mexicanos
State Company (Pemex). The total gas (propane and butane) storage
capacity consisted of four 10000 bbl and two 15000 bbl spheres and of
48 horizontal cylindrical bullet tanks for a total of 2210 bbl stored.
The layout of the facility is shown in Figure 2.2. including a square
storage area (estimated 100 m x 100 m), two flare pits, a tanker lorry
filling station, a gas bottling plant, a laboratory and a measurement
room, a control room, and a fire protection system. Adjacent to the
boundary of the Pemex center were located the privately owned distri-
bution compounds of Unigas and Gasomatico. The installation was
located in the middle of a highly populated area. At the time of the
event it is thought that about 80000 bbl were stored.
Probably the disaster could have been avoided if the management
of Pemex, the Executive Committee of the Petroleum Workers' Trade
Union, and the Labour and Social Prevention Committee had taken into
account the pressing advice which had been given by the Health and
Safety Committee after an inquiry carried out two months before: many
deficiencies were pointed out in the state of equipments located in the
pipeline discharge sector and in the pumping and tank-filling area. For
instance, the automatic fire protection system was found to be inopera-
tive and 80% of the safety relief valves, which should operate in case of
rupture or pipe disconnections, were in poor condition.
The Pemex company had asserted that periodic inspections were
scheduled for the systems in the storage area and for the fire protec-
tion system. However, an assessment of the accidents that had
occurred at other plants owned by Pemex during the previous year
would suggest insufficient safety management by the company.
The results of the official investigation have identified, as prob-
able initial cause, a gas escape from a cylindrical tank or from a faulty
pipe in the storage area. It seems likely that there had been an exten-
sive spread of vapor before ignition took place. At present we have no
clear information as to the nature and location of the igniting source.
The 48 cylindrical tanks, packed near one another and supported
on concrete stools, were set in such a way as to give rise to the possi-
bility of combustion and explosion of any wide vapor cloud of gas in the
storage area, being under partially confined conditions. The conse-
quent over pressures would probably have been sufficient to cause
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some dislodgement of tanks and adjacent pipelines. resulting in further
large gas spill followed by progressive fires and explosions and by
devastation of the area and its surroundings. In the very short period
of emergency, the water spray system was not activated (the pumps
required manual starting). The fire fighting services reached the plant
in a short time. but by then devastation had already occurred.
The fire was brought under control by fire fighters more than
seven hours after the beginning of the accident and it was finally
extinguished after burning for 36 hours. At least 20 city blocks are
thought to have been destroyed by the fires. in an area of radius about
2.4 km around the complex.
The accident was thus characterized by two main phenomena:
(1) A great extension of gas spread. which behaved like a dense
cloud.
(2) The "domino" or knock-on effect: this refers to a loss-of-
containment accident which interferes with the operation of other
nearby systems so that further loss of containment occurs. For
example, a small leak of flammable gas may ignite or explode, pro-
ducing an impingement on adjacent large vessels and a consequent
large spill of hazardous substances. In the case under considera-
tion, the progressive disintegration and explosion of the cylindri-
cal tanks produced a gradual, but rapid, sequence of ruptures. Of
course the "domino" effect produces the worst consequences when
an accident on one site affects the operations on nearby indus-
trial sites.
The accident leads to the following conclusions:
(1) The arrangement of a sufficient separation distance around each
part of the plant is very important for the protection of possible
housings on the site.
(2) The presence of large quantities of highly flammable and explosive
substances such as LPG requires the large-scale introduction of
adequate, reliable, and efficient safety systems. In addition, sys-
tematic control of the plants requires up-ta-date procedures for
maintenance and inspection.
(3) The location o~ hazardous installations in the vicinity of highly
populated areas must be avoided. Local planning is needed for the
use of adjoining land.
2.2.3. The accident at Bhopal, India
This accident occurred on 3 December 1984 at a chemical plant for the
production of pesticides owned by Union Carbide India Ltd.
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Methyl isocyanate (MIG), a highly volatile chemical product, was
used to manufacture some pesticides. In the factory MIG was produced
by a process using monomethylamine and phosgene as raw materials and
chloroform as a solvent. The refined MIG was later stored in type 304
stainless steel tanks, from which it was transferred to the derivatives
units as needed.
®
®
Figure 2.3. The equipment involved in the Bhopal accident: 1, storage
tanks, the third tank is usually empty and used for emergency and tem-
porary off-specification MIG storage; 2, vent gas scrubber, MIG escaping
from tanks i~ passed through circulating caustic soda solution and then de-
stroyed; 3, vent line, MIG vapors are discharged to the atmosphere or to the
flare tower; 4, refrigeration system, this keeps MIG at 0 DG, which slows
down the rate of undesired reactions; 5, water curtain and fire water mon-
itors, these can reduce part of the escaping MIG vapors; 6, flare tower, this
is used to burn vent gases from different plant units.
To follow the accident sequence it is necessary to outline the
equipments associated with the event: the MIG storage system, the
vent gas scrubber, and the flare tower (see Figure 2.3). MIG was
stored in two of three horizontal 60 t tanks. The third tank was used
for emergency storage of MIG and for temporary hold of off-
specification MIG; the content of the tanks was circulated through heat
exchangers cooled by a refrigeration system to maintain MIG at a tem-
perature of about 0 DG. This system was provided to maintain the
stored material at low temperature, which slows down the reaction rate
and allows time for reprocessing or destruction in the case of contam-
inated material (Le. off-specification MIG). It had been made nonopera-
tional some months before. probably because it was not considered
essential for the normal operation of the plant.
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In case of off-specification MIG or opening of the tank safety
valves the MIG could be transferred to the vent gas scrubber where all
entering gases were contacted with circulating caustic soda solution
and then destroyed. The vent from the scrubber could either go to the
atmospheric vent or to the flare tower. The flare tower was used to
burn vent gases, including normal ones from the MIG storage tanks and
the vent gas scrubber: prior to the accident the flare tower had been
removed from service for maintenance work and it was not operating at
the time of the accident.
We can now give a description of the most probable scenario, tak-
ing into account the hypotheses about the causes. The primary cause
was a direct introduction of water (estimated 500-1000 1) into an MIG
tank through the piping system connected with the tank. The water
with MIG led to an exothermic chain of reactions with the production
of. inter alia, carbon dioxide. The increase in temperature was not sig-
naled by the tank high-temperature alarm since it had not been previ-
ously reset.
The Union Garbide Go. Bhopal Incident Investigation Team pointed
out the following additional phenomena. MIG containing a high concen-
tration of chloroform was sent to the tank instead of to the adjacent
tank used for storage of off-specification MIG. As the temperature in
the tank increased. the corrosion rate increased because of the pres-
ence in the tank of an abnormally high concentration of chloroform.
The corrosion products catalyzed a concurrent exothermic trimeriza-
tion of MIG. Runaway reactions (MIG-water and trimerization of MIG)
accelerated as the temperature increased. The pressure in the tank.
due also to carbon diOXide. rose so quickly that the tank rupture-disk
and the downstream safety valve opened and remained open for approx-
imately two hours.
During this period about 25 t of MIG in vapor and liquid form were
discharged through the safety valve to the vent gas scrubber. This
equipment had to return to an operating mode when the operators
activated the circulation pump for caustic soda: the vent gas scrubber
proved inadequate to neutralize such a high flow rate of high-pressure
MIG. As the flare tower was out of order. MIG contained in the tank was
emitted from the vent gas scrubber stack to the atmosphere. The
operators turned on the fire water monitors and water curtains and
directed them to the stack and the MIG process area to knock down
MIG vapor partially.
A heavy gas cloud containing toxic MIG was dispersed in the direc-
tion of high-density population areas. When the alarm system was
activated, a crowd of people went towards the factory: they did not
realize the magnitude of the tragedy until it was too late (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4. Map of Bhopal, showing the gas-affected area. (Source: India
Today, 31 December 1984.)
From the above description we can draw the following conclusions:
(1) It is necessary to maintain auxiliary systems and instrumentation
devices in a continuous operability condition. In this case, the
refrigeration system, out of order for some months, would have
decreased the exothermic reaction rate; the temperature alarm,
which should have alerted workers, had not been properly set.
(2) It is important to have adequate design of protection systems
when a chemical process converts or produces toxic substances.
We refer to the efficiency of the vent gas scrubber, water cur-
tain. and monitoring systems. The scrubber was not turned on
until after the reaction had gone out of control.
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(3) Redundant and/or alternative safety-related equipment must be
available to guarantee a high level of safety during maintenance of
safety-related equipment. We refer to the flare tower. which
could have destroyed some of the escaping gas, but was out of
order.
(4) Cooperation between manufacturers and local authorities is neces-
sary to ensure the soundness and implementability of emergency
and evacuation plans.
(5) Adequate information should be disseminated to the public and
should include:
(a) The nature of the hazards which might affect them.
(b) The emergency arrangements.
(c) What the public should do in a major accident situation.
2.2.4. Lessons learned
As a conclusion of the available information related to the above case
histories we might summarize the causes of catastrophic accidents with
the following statement: "a combination of design deficiencies, operat-
ing errors. managerial mistakes".
From the experience of the Seveso accident, we can recommend
adoption of the following items:
(1) Deeper examination of the chemical process during plant design to
identify the complete range of variations of the physical parame-
ters, all the chemical products involved, and the relative proper-
ties.
(2) Development of the design along the lines of a "defence in depth"
principle.
(3) A controlled relief system to a contained atmosphere, to avoid
releases of toxic substances to the environment.
From the experience of the Mexico City accident we can recom-
mend the following items:
(1) A detailed study of plant layout to avoid the possibility of the
"domino" effect due to confined spaces.
(2) A preventive analysis of the effects on surrounding facilities fol-
lowing the occurrence of an adverse event in a high-risk installa-
tion and the adoption of adequate territorial planning in order to
minimize the consequences.
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(3) The adoption of specific maintenance and inspection programs to
guarantee the efficiency of safety-related systems.
The experience of the Bhopal accident indicates the need for the
following:
(1) Redundancy of instrumentation devices and safety provisions.
(2) The adoption of maintenance and inspection programs as men-
tioned for the Mexico City accident.
(3) Careful management of the plant with the adoption of written pro-
cedures following a proper quality assurance scheme.
(4) The implementation of emergency plans, taking into account infor-
mation for the public.
In all the cases we have examined, plant management deficiencies
had an important effect. To some extent, this is unavoidable in a
production-oriented organization, which suggests the necessity of sur-
veillance action by institutional bodies that are properly safety
oriented and have adequate enforcement powers.
2.3. Conclusions
At the present stage of modern industrialization a policy of balance
between workers' health protection and environmental defence on one
side and economic and social development on the other seems neces-
sary. Therefore adequate attention must be devoted to research into
reasonable and effective technical solutions to safety problems related
to high-risk industrial installations.
The normal practice of "trial and error" has been adopted up to
now to cope with the problems of adverse events. The experience
gained from the analysis of accidents that have already happened and
the identification of weak points in areas or systems of the plant has
led to the adoption of corrective safety measures. We think that this
method in itself is not sufficient as a general approach to safety,
because it implies case-by-case correction after the occurrence of an
accident.
Nowadays, safety experts agree in recommending preventive glo-
bal analysis as the most effective approach to safety. This means sys-
tematic analysis, at the design stage, of installations and of their modes
of failure, and assessment of the consequences associated with poten-
tial accident sequences. All this implies the study of the relationship
between the plant and the environment as well. The main objectives of
these studies should be:
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(1) A balanced level of plant protection against different malfunctions
and accident sequences:
(2) A full understanding of plant response that allows proper manage-
ment and operator practices and procedures.
(3) A correct perspective on the relative importance of plant equip-
ment and components that leads to correct maintenance pro-
cedures.
It is evident that such a global approach responds to the needs that
emerge from the lessons learned from the above-mentioned case his-
tories; in addition. it promotes adequate management and prevents air
and water pollution.
The overall approach to safety assessment has been most widely
applied both to nuclear and space activities. In the nuclear industry
the methodology of systematic safety assessment has been adopted
with an "anticipatory" attitude. In 1975 the Reactor Safety study or
WASH 1400 Report (NRC, 1975) offered a comparison of the risk levels
involved in nuclear and other human activities. After this, the progres-
sive introduction of probabilistic methodologies in the safety analysis
of plants took place; these methodologies are presently well developed
and they have reached a sufficient degree of maturity to suggest their
application to other fields, especially in relation to the most technolog-
ically sophisticated plants or complex situations. In fact a significant
application of this methodology has been adopted in two particular
situations: the Canvey Island area and, more recently, the Rijnmond
area. Both the Canvey Island and Rijnmond sites, respectively located
in the estuary of the Thames and in the vicinity of the Rhine delta. are
examples of concentration of industrial installations involving many
major hazards: the final reports of two different studies contain a set
of recommendations and proposals that were presented to public
inquiries and submitted for approval to the authorities (Health and
Safety Executive, 1978, 1981; Rijnmond Authority, 1982).
As a final note we can point out that the Directive 82/501 of the
EEC "on the major-accident hazards of certain industrial activities"
(European Communities Council, 1982) in force in the European coun-
tries is in accordance with the implementation of a rational approach to
the safety of industrial plants. It has been called the "Seveso Direc-
tive" because it arose from the Seveso accident. The principal objec-
tives of the EEC Directive are:
(1) The prevention of major accidents arising from industrial activi-
ties.
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(2) The limitation of the effects of such accidents both on man and on
the environment.
(3) The harmonization of control measures to prevent and limit major
accidents in the EEC.
The requirements of the Directive can be divided as follows:
(1) General requirements, which can be more widely applied. These
require that manufacturers adopt the necessary precautions to
prevent major accidents, report those that do arise, and take
steps to limit their consequences.
(2) Specific requirements, to be applied only to the most potentially
hazardous activities. These require that information be provided
to the public that could be subjected to a major accident.
Through a notification procedure, the manufacturer must submit
to the competent authorities a detailed study, containing informa-
tion about:
(a) Installations and dangerous substances.
(b) Hazards and their control.
(c) Possible major accident situations, on-site and off-site emer-
gency plans, alarm systems, and resources for dealing with
the accidents.
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CHAP'T'ER 3
The Seveso Accident and
Its Mtermath
F Pocchiari., V. Silano, and G. Zapponi
3.1. Introduction
This chapter considers the accident at the ICMESA plant at Seveso,
Italy, an accident which has had profound effects on public policy
relating to chemical safety within the European Economic Community.
On 10 July 1976 an exothermic reaction raised the temperature
and pressure inside a reactor used at the ICMESA plant for trichloro-
phenol (TCP) production beyond limits, thereby causing a safety device
to blowout. At the moment the safety device gave way, the principal
volatile compound (ca. 1000 kg) inside the reactor was ethylene glycol
(boiling point 198 DC). It can be assumed that, at the moment of blowout,
batch temperature was well over 200 DC and that the temperature
decreased somewhat (ca. 200 DC) while glycol was being expelled into
the open air. Once glycol had been exhausted, the temperature most
probably rose to a higher level during the elimination of ca. 1300 kg of
diethylene glycol (boiling point 245 DC). Reactor temperatures are
thought to have increased further (>300 DC), thus causing extensive
mineralization of residual organic substances. Emission gradually
dropped during this phase until it ceased altogether.
Almost certainly the violent blowout following the valve's giving
way caused the escaping vapors and entrained particles to leave the
reactor at a speed of some hundreds of meters per second. Smaller
particles may have been carried out by the glycol vapor during its
violent initial boiling phase. Mixed with various particles and chemi-
cals, the 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) settled to the
ground in accordance with prevailing wind directions at the time of
blowout.
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The accident directly involved about 1800 ha of a densely populated
area (Brianza) of Seveso (Figure 3.1) and five municipalities of the Lom-
bardy region (province of Milan). However, as a preventive measure the
administrators decided to place the inhabitants of 11 municipalities
(about 220000 persons) under medical and epidemiological surveillance
(Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.1.. The Seveso area: zones A, B, and R allheir maximum exlension,
showing major buill-up areas (sUppled) and surrounding farmlands. (Source:
Pocchiari et al., 1983.)
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Figure 3.2. Map of t.he 11 municipalities involved in t.he health monit.oring
program by pollution zones. (Source: Abat.e et 0.£., 1962.)
At the very beginning, the Seveso emergency was dealt with by
the general emergency services. The alert system was from industry to
police, and immediately afterwards the mayors of Meda and Seveso were
involved as heads of the local authorities responsible for contingency
plan enforcement. At this early stage, coordination and expert advice
were mainly provided by the province, while regional authorities were
kept constantly informed. A significant feature of the Seveso emer-
gency was the lack of an immediate understanding of the nature of the
chemicals involved and of the extent of the affected area. This only
became clear with the progressive appearance of adverse effects on
human beings and the progress of environmental monitoring.
At this more advanced stage, it became clear that a number of
municipalities had been affected and that the focal point of the
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accident response system had to be at a regional level. Within 16 days
after the accident the Regional Minister of Health was invested with
full powers by the Lombardy Regional Council. Since then the Lom-
bardy region has been responsible for all relevant actions. A series of
measures to simplify administrative procedures was adopted so as to
enable the region and other local authorities to utilize more rapidly the
funds provided by the Italian Government and to overcome some prob-
lems of coordination which had become evident in the meantime. On 17
January 1977 the Lombardy regional authorities issued a law specifying
the norms for utilizing the government allocation of US $150 million and
the procedure to be followed for the approval of operational programs.
On 2 June 1977 the programs were approved by the Regional Council,
but instead of passing a law, the Council passed an administrative act
which facilitated timely modifications in case new contingencies should
require change in one or more points of the plan. The efficacy of the
governmental action was further strengthened with Act No. 27 of 17
July 1977, which established a special office headed by an ad hoc com-
missioner. The commissioner was responsible directly to the regional
president, who, in turn, answered to the Regional Council. The powers
conferred upon this commissioner were many and far-reaching, includ-
ing the power to coordinate, direct technical matters and manage
operations through pre-established operational plans. Figure 3.3
shows the organizational outline of the authorities and consultant
bodies involved at this stage.
The role of the Italian Government was mainly to provide suffi-
cient funds for handling the emergency and to supply expert advice,
personnel and materials (particularly for TeDD assays). For instance,
an ad hoc section of the Istituto Superiore di Sanita (ISS) was estab-
lished at Seveso to help local laboratories to carry out the environmen-
tal monitoring of TeDD. The government authorities, in conjunction
with regional authorities, were also responsible for relations with
international agencies, organizations, and experts.
3.3. The Emergency Phase
The various phases of the emergency day by day are shown in Table 3.1.
Courtyard animals were severely affected, many dying within a few
days of the accident. At the same time, dermal lesions among human
beings who had been exposed to the toxic cloud began to appear.
About ten days after the accident, it was clear that TCDD had been
formed in the ICMESA reactor and released into the environment with
the toxic cloud.
Preliminary analytical findings concerning TCDD in soil and vege-
tation and available information on the sites of toxic and pathological
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Figure 3.3. Organizational outline of the authorities and consultant bodies
charged with medium- and long-term activities management (WHO/Euro
refers to the World Health Organization/Regional Office for Europe,
Copenhagen, Denmark). (Source: Pocchiari et ClL., 1986.)
events, and on air movements at the time of blowout. were used to
approximate the contaminated area. As a first step, on 26 July 1976,
the Italian authorities evacuated 225 people from a 15 ha area immedi-
ately southeast of the plant. A few days later. further analytical find-
ings concerning TCDD contents of soil and vegetation samples prompted
the Italian authorities to evacuate all the inhabitants (733 people) of a
wider area (coded as zone A) extending for about 2 km southeast from
the ICMESA plant (approximately 110 ha). The TCDD levels detected on
vegetation indicated a low-rate exponential decrease of TeDD environ-
mental contamination with the distance from the plant. Data concern-
ing TeDD levels in soil were the major indicators of environmental con-
tamination, particularly during the first two years after the accident.
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10 July 1976 (Day 1): At 12.40 hours, an exothermic reaction of unknown
cause raised the temperature and pressure inside reactor AI0l at the
ICMESA plant in Meda beyond limits, causing the safety device to blow up.
11 July 1976 (Day 2): Samples of leaves, that appeared yellow after contact
with the toxic cloud, were gathered by ICMESA personnel and sent to the
Givaudan laboratories in Switzerland. At 17.45 hours (29 hours after the
accident) two ICMESA firm representatives informed the military police sta-
tion as well as the Mayor and the Public Health Officer at Meda that a cloud
of herbicide vapors, containing trichlophenol (TCP) had been released
(TCDD was not mentioned).
12 July 1976 (Day 3): ICMESA officials informed the Health and Hygiene
Office of Seveso municipality that they had notified the people living in
areas close to the plant to abstain from eating vegetables, owing to the toxi-
cological hazard caused by herbicidal substances.
14 July 1976 (Day 5): The first manifestations of skin eruptions appeared in
exposed children. In areas adjacent to the ICMESA plant, the first animals
(cats, rabbits, and chickens) died.
15 July 1976 (Day 6): Other cases of edema and skin and eye irritations
occurred among the people of Meda and Seveso. The mayors of Meda and
Seveso declared the San Pietro area (close to the ICMESA plant) to be pol-
luted by toxic substances. The area was marked off with pickets and the use
of vegetables and fruits within it forbidden.
16 July 1976 (Day 7): Thirteen children were admitted to hospital with toxic
dermatitis. Local public health officers sent samples of local vegetation to
the Provincial Laboratory for Public Hygiene and Prophylaxis (PLPHP) in
Milan for analysis.
17 July 1976 (Day 8): The mayors of Seveso and Meda ordered that the
plants, vegetables, and crops, as well as dead animals, of the polluted area
be burnt.
18 July 1976 (Day 9): The mayor of Meda issued an ordinance to close down
the production sections of the ICMESA plant. The gates to plant section B
were locked and sealed by law.
19 July 1976 (Day 10): The Provincial Inspectorate for Labor Conditions was
requested to intervene. The Director of Givaudan chemistry laboratory
arrived in Italy and admitted that TCDD had been found in the samples
analyzed.
20 July 1976 (Day 11): The chief chemist from the Provincial Inspectorate
for Labour Conditions issued a writ accusing ICMESA directors of having
violated several articles of Italian regulations for prevention of labor
accidents.
(cont.)
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20 July 1976 (Day 11) (cant.): All local doctors were requested to notify the
authorities of all gastroenteritis and skin condition cases.
An ordinanoe was issued, forbidding the consumption of food products from
animals of the polluted zone.
Analytical tests confirmed the presence of TGDD in the toxic cloud. These
early tests, carried out at Givaudan laboratories, showed relatively low lev-
els.
21 July 1976 (Day 12): A meeting was held at Seveso Town Hall, attended by
the Mayor, the Regional Public Health Minister, and other authorities.
Givaudan results showing the presence of TGDD were presented. Further
safety measures were decided. A college of experts was appointed by the
Public Health Minister.
Health monitoring was decreed for all the people living in the affected area.
The National Ministry of Health and the ISS (National Public Health Institute)
were informed. The ISS was placed at the region's disposal by the Public
Health Ministry.
22 July 1976 (Day 13): Eighty children were relocated in a resort area. The
National Ministry of Health supplied the regional authorities with data on
TCDD from international literature and sent technical officials to the pol-
luted zone. An urgent meeting of the Provincial Council for Public Health
was called.
23 July 1976 (Day 14): The Provincial Council for Public Health met in spe-
cial session with experts from the national Ministry of Health, the ISS, Milan
University, and the Mario Negri Institute. They confirmed the measures
taken by the Regional Public Health Ministry as follows:
(1) Vegetation was to be tested by the Institute for Plant Pathology to
establish the borders of the affected zone.
(2) Dead animals were to be tested by the regional veterinary officer and
the Institute for Animal Prophylaxis of Brescia.
(3) A clinic was to be established at Seveso to serve people affected by
toxicant-associated symptoms.
(4) Chemical monitoring was to be carried out by the PLPHP.
The national Ministry of Health arranged for a gas chromatography
research team from the ISS. ISS and PLPHP technicians commenced sys-
tematic sampling of vegetation. That night, the extraction method was
worked out and results from the first analyses were obtained, using low-
resolution gas-liquid chromatography in combination with MID/mass spec-
trometry (mass fragmentography).
24 and 25 July 1976 (Days 15 and 16): Results of the laboratory tests com-
pleted by the ISS and PLPHP during the night of 23-24 July were reported at
a meeting held by the regional Public Health Minister. Officials and techni-
cians from the Lombardy Region, the national Ministry of Health, and the ISS
(cant.)
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were present.. as well as t.he direotor of Givaudan laboratories. The pres-
ence of high levels of TeDD was reported and confirmed.
The boundaries of t.he most. contaminated area zone were t.raced (ext.ending
sout.hwards for approximat.ely 750 m and covering approximat.ely 15 ha).
Evacuation of population from t.his zone (coded as zone A) was decided.
Sampling and chemical analyses continued t.hroughout. t.hat. day and night. to
define contamination levels around zone A.
26 July 1976 (Day 17): The regional Public Healt.h Minist.er was made respon-
sible for supervision, management. and coordination of t.he various emer-
gency measures at. Seveso (focal point.). The Lombardy regional resources
were put. at. his disposal. Two hundred and t.went.y-five people (170 from
Seveso and 55 from Meda) were evacuat.ed by t.he local aut.horities.
27 July 1976 (Day 16): Results from laborat.ory t.ests over t.he next. few days
caused t.he regional healt.h aut.horities to ext.end zone A approximately
1600 m sout.hwards from t.he plant.. A furt.her evacuation was decided.
26 July 1976 (Day 19): The regional Public Healt.h Minist.er set. up four
t.echnical scientific commissions for:
(1) Medical and epidemiological aspect.s.
(2) Gat.hering data on environmental pollution.
(3) Land reclamation.
29 July 1976 (Day 20): The healt.h problem commission assessed t.he sit.ua-
tion. Skin t.ests carried out. on more t.han 500 people established t.hat.:
(1) Unusual skin morphological disorders were observed.
(2) None of t.he patients exhibit.ed obvious general symptoms.
(3) Some subjective complaints (e.g. nausea, gast.ralgia, it.ching) were t.em-
porary.
All cases were kept. under medical surveillance. Close surveillance was con-
sidered advisable for all pregnant. women in contaminat.ed areas. Prevention
of new pregnancies was also considered advisable in such areas.
30 July 1976 (Day 21): The Lombardy regional government. decided t.o
declare t.he area a disast.er zone and to appoint. a special government. com-
missioner.
2 August. 1976 (Day 24): Furt.her laborat.ory t.ests caused t.he zone A t.o be
ext.ended sout.hwards to a distance of up t.o 2200 m from t.he source and t.he
local population t.o be evacuat.ed. Zone A now covered some 106 ha, wit.h
more t.han 730 people having been evacuat.ed. A lower contamination level
zone, coded as zone B, was defined, including t.wo municipalities and covering
about. 260 ha.
The regional aut.horities ordered t.hat. children younger t.han one year old
and women up to t.hree mont.hs pregnant. should be kept. away from t.he area
during daytime.
(cant.)
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4 Augusl 1976 (Day 26): The Prime Minisler insliluled a cenlral lechnical
and scienUfic commission lo sludy deconlaminaUon measures.
5 Augusl1976 (Day 27): To slreamline financial adm1nislraUon, a coordinal-
ing commillee was formed, including lhe regional Minisler for Public Heallh,
lhe mayors of involved municipalilies, represenlatives from lhe lrade
unions, commerce, induslry, craftsmen. agricullural organizaUons, and a
naUonal governmenl represenlaUve.
10 Augusl 1976 (Day 32): A decree was issued by nalional governmenl. which
included provisions for emergency acUon (40 billion lire).
The regional medico-epidemiological commission recommended lhal volunlary
lherapeuUc aborUon be available for pregnanl women who had been exposed
to TCDD wilhin lhe firsllhree monlhs of lheir pregnancy.
A special office of lhe naUonal Minislry of Heallh was eslablished in Milan,
to liaise belween cenlral and regional adminislraUons.
The consUluUon of an ISS task force (already operaUng) was formalized.
12 Augusl1976 (Day 34): A medical commission was formed allhe Universily
of Milan to help and advise pregnanl women wishing to aborl.
14 Augusl 1976 (Day 36): The Cenlral Technical and ScienUfic Commission
recommended lhe eslablishmenl of a lhird zone (zone R). around zone A and
zone B. TCDD levels in zone R were below 5 j4l/mZ. Zones A, B, and R now
covered a 1430 ha area. Heallh precauUons in zone R included prohibiUon
of use of local crops and local animal products as food.
15 Augusl 1976 (Day 37): The firsl complele polluUon map of lhe area
affecled was released by lhe regional Minislry for Public Heallh.
In Figure 3.4. four contamination maps of zone A, carried out in dif-
ferent periods, are shown. Soil data indicated large variations of TeDD
environmental levels even in limited areas: this was interpretable as
the consequence of the "semidiscrete" TCDD environmental dispersion
process (in the form of TeDD-eontaining particles of various dimensions
and contamination levels) as well as due to air turbulence and obstacles
during the deposition. The comparison of TeDD levels. detected in
replicated soil samples gathered in the contaminated areas, indicated a
lognormal distribution of replicated measurements. whose standard
deviation in log-units corresponded to a factor of about 2.5 for original
data. These findings showed the opportunity of an adequate caution
level in data evaluation for risk assessment (e.g. reference to confi-
dence limits of estimates) and the need for extensive TeDD monitoring
of the affected environment.
Zone B (270 ha) was the natural extension of zone A along the main
TCDD diffusion pathway and exhibited lower dioxin contents. Both
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F'igure 3.4. Evolution in time of zone A TCDD levels. (a) The upper part.
(clear area) of t.he August. 1976 map was det.ermined on t.he basis of TeDD
findings of various environment.al samples collect.ed before 26 July 1976.
The boundaries of t.he lower part. of zone A (dot.t.ed area) were established on
t.he basis of numerous t.opsoil specimens sampled on 26 July and analyzed im-
mediat.ely afterwards. The nort.h-sout.h square grid (each square is
200 X 200 m) shown is int.ended t.o facilit.at.e t.he comparison of TeDD levels in
t.his map wit.h t.hose report.ed in (b). (c), and (d). but. does not. identify wit.h
original coordinat.es. Mapped sit.e locations are accurat.e t.o ± 50 m. Early
analytical findings were expressed as 14l/100 g of sample. They are here
convert.ed into l4l/m2 t.o make dat.a values consist.ent. wit.h t.hose of ot.her
maps. Data are accurat.e to approximat.ely ± 2.5 times t.he l4l/m2 numerical
value obtained (not. reported) which must. be allowed for such conversion.
(b) Sept.ember 1976 map. Original polar coordinat.es are labeled wit.h Roman
numerals; t.he square grid has been superimposed as discussed above in (m).
Soil specimens were collect.ed on 11-13 August. 1976. (Source: Pocchiari et
al.• 1983.)
zones A and B were enclosed by a larger territory, zone R (1430 hal,
exhibiting just-detectable threshold contamination levels. The border-
line between zones Band R was where the average TeDD concentration
in soil was found to be 5 J.If!./m2 whereas zone R boundaries were set at
nondetectable TeDD levels (formally, below 0.75 J.If!./m2). The borderline
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F'Lgure 3.4. (cant.). (c) January 1977 map. Sampling sit.es were established
on a 50 m square grid. The sampling campaign started in lat.e September and
lasted t.hrough December 1976. (d) March 1978 map. Sampling sites are as
in case (c). Most. soil speoimens were sampled in t.he period from 15 De-
cember 1977 to 5 January 1978. For (6), (c), and (d) mapped site locations
are accurat.e to ± 25 m. (Sourcs: Pocchiari st a.l., 1983.)
between zones A and B ran along the 50 IJIil/m2 line. The inhabitants of
zones Band R (Figure 3.t), were subjected to a number of hygiene
regulations, including the prohibition to farm and consume local agricul-
tural products and keep poultry and other animals.
3.4. Rehabilitation Activities
A very extensive monitoring program was carried out on:
(1) Soil and building surface distribution of TeDD.
(2) TeDD vertical distribution in the soil.
(3) TeDD levels in atmospheric particles.
(4) TeDD in ground and surface waters.
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(5) TeDD in animals and cows' milk.
(6) TeDD in vegetation and grains.
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The aim of this monitoring program was twofold, Le. to understand the
extent of contamination and to verify the effectiveness of the environ-
mental rehabllitation works.
The ICMESA accident has, probably, caused the world's largest
contamination of soil and buildings by TeDD. A number of contaminated
areas, including some sections of zones A, B, and R, have been
reclaimed using various detoxification techniques. Reclamation was
relatively easier and particularly urgent for subzones A6 and A7, areas
that had lodged approximately 490 people (about 60% of the total evacu-
ated population) before the ICMESA accident. So far it has been
achieved for the whole of zone A. In 1978, after reclamation, inhabi-
tants of zones A6 and A7 were allowed to go back to their houses,
whereas those of the remaining part of zone A have definitively settled
somewhere else.
Farming land and yards were normally scarified to a depth of at
least 20 cm and often more in order to reduce the topsoil level of TeDD
to at least 5 p.g/m2 . Contaminated topsoil was disposed of by transfer-
ring it to an underground waste deposit and was replaced by an
equivalent amount of fresh earth. The extensive soil scarification car-
ried out produced about 200000 m3 of contaminated soil. A number of
alternatives were considered for the disposal of contaminated soil. The
only practical solution was to dispose of the polluted soil in basins, the
peripheral parts of which were damp-proofed with a layer of bentonite
(a mixture of gravel and sand), overlaid with a sheet of plastic material
(high-density polyethylene), and finally capped with clean soil. The
procedure is similar to the one used for radioactive waste, for which
several natural and artificial barriers are used to ensure that no
radioactive elements may come into contact with the environment.
In the case of Seveso soil a variety of barriers were also available:
(1) The dioxin is bound to the clay, which is rather abundant in the
soil of the polluted zones.
(2) In the disposal of the polluted soil resulting from the reclamation
work, the most polluted is deposited in the central part of the
basin while the less polluted is deposited around the core along
the protective sheeting.
(3) The plastic sheet (high-density polyethylene, 2.5 mm thick) is
welded so as to constitute a unique blanket.
(4) A 15 cm thick foundation built with sand and bentonite (rein-
forced concrete) has the appropriate characteristics of imper-
meability and plasticity.
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In addition to all these barriers. the deposit cap is protected by a
layer of "Gunite" (concrete reinforced with an iron net) to prevent
possible damage from the outside. The entire deposit is covered with a
1 m thick layer of soil. A well with a drainage pump allows the extrac-
tion of water which gathers at the bottom of the deposit during the fil-
ling phase. The water is extracted with a pump and then analyzed. The
barriers are controlled by inspecting the interior part of the basin
through the well. Periodic checks of the deposit integrity have also
been established (Nee, 1983).
In some cases where soil removal was not possible or desirable.
soil plowing was used to dilute the contaminant and reduce the level of
TCDD in the superficial soil layer that is the most important for direct
exposure of human beings.
Smooth nonabsorbing surfaces of buildings were washed with sur-
factants and common solvents, while wall plaster finish and wooden
floors were often subjected to various degrees of scraping. Lino floors.
wallpaper, furniture. and loose objects which could not be cleansed
were eliminated. Many interior surfaces were subsequently coated with
paint or synthetic varnish. Agricultural lands with residual TCDD lev-
els in the range 5-15 ,."g/m2 were fenced off to prevent people from
entering them and normally cultivated to speed up degradation of
TCDD.
Detoxification of zone B implied scarifying town yards, plowing
topsoil layers in order to dilute TCDD in the surface and then covering
with fresh soil; in agricultural lands, cereals and other food crops were
grown. Rehabilitation in zone R basically consisted of agricultural
works.
Maximum permissible TCDD levels after rehabilitation were estab-
lished by the Lombardy regional authorities as follows: in the 7 cm top-
soil layer, below 5 ,."g/m2; on exterior building surfaces, below 0.75
,."g/m2; on interior building surfaces, below 0.01 lJf!./m2 .
At present, the reclamation is complete in zone R and in zone A,
but is still under development in zone B.
The company owning the ICMESA plant was ordered to begin, at its
own expense, a decontamination project for the plant unit from which
the toxic cloud originated. A number of possible options existed (Nee.
1983):
(1) Construction of a giant monolith (a concrete casting) to enclose
both the equipment and the building containing department B.
(2) Dismantling and (i) construction of a small monolith to enclose the
equipment only or (ii) chemical reclamation of the dismantled
equipment.
The Seveso Accident Qnd Its A,flerm«lth. 73
(3) Dismantling of the equipment using the so-called "nuclear
method", and successive removal of the highly contaminated
material properly contained and packaged.
It was decided to dismantle the equipment with the "nuclear
method". To dispose of the resulting low-eontamination wastes, the
underground deposit above~escribed for soil was utilized. The high-
contamination wastes (e.g. the content of the exploded reactor) were
sent to Switzerland where they were incinerated.
As a consequence of the rehabilitation work carried out so far, it
has been decided that the hygiene regulations issued in zone R immedi-
ately after the accident (e.g. prohibition of farming and consumption of
local agricultural products and the keeping of poultry and other
animals, and prohibition to undertake construction works) no longer
apply in view of the extensive reduction of TeDD levels that has
occurred since 1976. In zone A a natural park is being established.
3.5. Impact on Health
A progress report on the health effects of the ICMESA accident was
published by Pocchiari et al. in 1979. A number of epidemiological
studies have been carried out or are still in progress to assess fully
the impact on public health of the Seveso accident. The interpretation
of these studies, however, is not always easy owing to several factors,
the most important of which is the difficulty of identifying the exposed
people and quantifying exposure.
Initial exposure of the Seveso population to the toxic cloud was
acute and occurred mainly through inhalation and dermal routes. Such
exposure was not only to TCDD but also to other chemicals including
caustic soda and TCP. During the first ten days after the accident,
before the discovery of TCDD in the contaminated environment and
before the population was alarmed, there was an additional opportunity
that people were exposed through ingestion of contaminated food grown
locally and through contact with contaminated surfaces. After evacua-
tion of inhabitants in zone A and enacting the hygiene restrictions in
zones Band R, the likelihood of exposure was greatly reduced. In the
meantime the soluble toxic substances released with the cloud were
washed away by rainfall, while TeDD slightly penetrated the topsoil
layer, where it was bound very strongly to soil particles.
Quantitative assessment of exposure is difficult not only because
of the changing pattern with time, but also because of its dependence
on the compliance of exposed persons with hygiene regulations, which
is difficult to assess.
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In order to improve the sensitivity of epidemiological analysis, the
affected area has been broken down not only by subzones A, B. and R
and an outside zone according to soil concentration of TCDD (Figure
3.1), but also in several other ways:_
(1) By global soil content of dioxin.
(2) By density of chloracne cases.
(3) By density of cases of acute skin lesions (313 cases observed in
July 1976).
Mortality data in the Seveso area, available from 1975 to 1981
(Apricena et al., 1983), reflect the mortality pattern of industrialized
countries (cardiovascular diseases and cancer being the leading causes
of death). The data do not indicate that the ICMESA accident appreci-
ably altered the specific mortality rates by sex, age, and cause in the
monitored area. No significant clusters were observed within the area,
either in space or time, that could be attributed to the accident.
The ICMESA accident caused many cases of chloracne (Pocchiari et
al., 1979; Fara et al., 1982). Of the 187 cases recorded in total, 50 were
detected between September and December 1976 ("early" chloracne)
and 137 in a subsequent screening between February and April 1977
("late" chloracne). The large majority of cases of early and late
chloracne occurred in zone A (6.3% and 2.1% respectively of the popula-
tion originally present in this zone). About 88% of the cases were chil-
dren under 15 years old. A third screening undertaken after January
1978 involved 32000 subjects and indicated a gradual decrease of
chloracne cases (no new cases were detected after 1978). A significant
association between the severity of chioracne lesions and the soil con-
centration of TCDD (measured close to the home of affected subjects)
was assessed (Fara et al., 1982). The clinical follow-up of chloracneic
children was started in 1976 and was completed in June 1985. Results
of the complete study are not yet known, but interim reports indicated
a significant difference between a group of 146 chloracneic children
and a 183-children age-matched control group with respect to symp-
toms of the gastrointestinal tract (lack of appetite. nausea, vomiting,
abdominal pain. gastritis). Headache and eye irritation were also more
frequent in chloracneic children (Fara et al., 1982). Very extensive
clinical laboratory investigations were carried out by Mocarelli et al.
(1982, 1983a,b). The most consistent differences between the exposed
children and those from the control areas concerned serum alanine ami-
notransferase and gamma-glutamyltransferase activity and cholesterol
level. In all instances, these parameters were higher in exposed chil-
dren. However, the differences were restricted to values inside the
"normal range" and lessened with time after July 1976. The serum com-
plement activity (CH50) of a rather small group of exposed children
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(about 50% chloracneic) was significantly higher than that of the con-
trois: the exposed children also showed higher values of lymphocyte
response to lectins (pHA, PWR) than controls and a tendency towards a
higher number of lymphocytes in peripheral blood. It appears that
available data are not suggestive of an immunological depression in the
exposed children (Sirchia, 1982). Lastly, no major pathology that might
be attributed to TeDD exposure has been reported by physicians in
postnatal pediatric screening of babies born so far in zones A, B, and R
after the ICMESA accident. Three surveys on the excretion of D-
glucaric acid (an indicator of hepatic microsomal induction) were car-
ried out in children in 1976, 1979, and 1981 (Ideo, 1983). Children with
chloracne showed a significantly higher excretion of glucaric acid in
1976, and those from zone B in 1979. In 1981 no statistically significant
differences were observed.
The Pregnancy Register began to operate systematically in 1979.
Before this date information was gathered at the welfare clinics and
hospitals in the zone. The population covered by the study included
the about 15000 babies born after 1976 who at birth were resident in
the 11 municipalities affected by the accident. The monitored unfavor-
able outcome of pregnancy included: abortion, stillbirth. death in the
first week. death in the first year, severe malformation, underweight
for gestational age, and slight malformation. A significant reduction of
conceptions was detected in the third quarter of 1976 (immediately
after the ICMESA accident). Moreover. higher spontaneous abortion
rates were recorded in zone A + B than in zone non-A + B + R, with a
peak of 33% in the first quarter of 1977. Lastly, in the 11 municipali-
ties under surveillance, between July 1976 and June 1978, the abortion
rate was higher in zone A + B + R than in the rest of the territory dur-
ing the two years following the accident. whereas in 1979 and 1980, the
abortion rates in zone A + B + R were lower than those in zone non-A +
B + R (Blanco et a.l.. 1983). The malformation rates (both total and
severe ones) vary widely according to the parameter used to define the
risk areas, and probably also because of the small size of the popula-
tion under study. A statistically significant (p < 0.05) excess was
detected only for angiomas in the areas at risk defined on the basis of
chloracne. The frequency of angiomas smaller than 4 cm2 was signifi-
cantly higher (p < 0.001) in the area with a higher frequency of
chloracne, whereas that of angiomas larger than 4 cm2 was not (Mas-
troiacovo et a.l., 1984).
The internal medicine monitoring plan provided for half-yearly or
yearly medical examination. As far as the correlation with risk areas is
concerned, prevalence of hepatomegaly (modest degree. I.e. 1 cm on 1
fingerbreadth beyond the costal arch) was higher in some exposed
groups. Transaminases rose in the latter half of 1976 in zone A and
normalized later. Several hundred people in the 11 municipalities
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showed one or more abnormal liver function tests (e.g. ')'-GT, ALT, and
AP) but the significance of these data is difficult to assess.
An ad hoc cancer registry has been established for the 11 munici-
palities under surveillance (this registry is expected to be in operation
at least until 1997). The rates obtained so far have been compared with
those of the Varese Cancer Registry. The data available so far indicate
that there was no significant increase for any type of tumor, except
for "malignant tumors of the connective tissue of the soft tissues" and
lymphosarcoma, reticulosarcoma, Hodgkin's disease and other lymphoid
tumors" (Fini et al., 1982). However, the number of cases reported for
these types of tumor is so small that the observed variations could be
due to chance.
A high association of prevalence of peripheral nerve impairment
(PNI) with chloracne was detected, suggesting an association of PNI
with other possible TeDD effects (Filippini et al., 1980, 1981). A differ-
ence was also assessed between the residents in the most polluted area
of Seveso (37.5% of the evacuated population) and an unpolluted town
(Cannero) with respect to prevalence of symptoms of PNI, which were
more frequently reported in the Seveso area.
Several other special studies have been carried out on adults. D-
glucaric acid excretion in the urine of adults was determined in 1978
and found to be higher in the exposed subjects than in nonexposed
controls. Immunological and cytogenetic screenings were also carried
out on selected groups, particularly from zone A, zone B, and control
groups. In general, the differences were small and not statistically sig-
nificant (Mottura et al., 1980; Sirchia et al., 1980).
3.6. Conclusion
The Seveso accident has had profound effects on public policy relating
to chemical safety in Europe and possibly worldwide. It had a consider-
able impact on both government and public opinion in a number of coun-
tries and convinced them of the need for stricter control of hazardous
chemicals throughout the whole life cycle. As a consequence, the
development of several legislative systems concerning chemical safety
was considerably accelerated. Good examples of this are the three fol-
lowing EEC Directives that have had a major impact in improving chemi-
cal safety in Europe:
(1) The EEC Council Directive to prevent major accidents which might
result from certain industrial activities and to limit their conse-
quences for man and the environment (EEC Directive 82/501).
(2) The sixth amendment of the EEC Council Directive 67/548 on ap-
proximation of laws, regulations, and administrative provisions
The Seveso Accident mnd Its A,ftermmth. T7
relating to the classification, packaging, and labeling of dangerous
substances (EEC Directive 79/831).
(3) The EEC Directive on supervision and control of transfrontier
shipment of hazardous waste.
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CHAPTER 4
Compensation for Exceptional
Environmental Damage caused by
Industrial Activities
H. Smets [lJ
4.1. Introduction
Incidents causing severe environmental damage, sometimes referred to
as "ecological disasters", only receive attention from time to time
because, so some people think, they are isolated occurrences, although
this is not confirmed by the statistics. While some disasters are
remembered, most are quickly forgotten or were never widely reported.
And, as Deschamps (1972) points out, "the best way to ward off misfor-
tune is never to discuss it. To study it might be tempting fate. The
scientific investigation of disasters is a sign that man has
mastered his ancestral fears and taken charge of his own destiny
[emphasis addedJ". Recent interest in the risks of technology [2J is an
indication of changing attitudes but has shed little light on compensa-
tion for potential damage in the vicinity of fixed or mobile industrial
plant.
In this chapter, damage means off-site bodily injury and material
damage, including the cost of measures to limit or make good such dam-
age. Damage and injury to the plant itself and to workers, as well as to
users, is therefore excluded, as are environmental damage caused by
natural disasters and by pollution from widely dispersed sources, and
payments made before a polluting installation is set up to "compensate"
for permanent deterioration of the environment [3J. The study does
not cover damage linked to military or defence activities. It is there-
fore confined to environmental damage associated with industrial emis-
sions of pollutants or energy.
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This damage can affect man (death, injury, immediate and later
medical costs, evacuation costs, loss of earnings, disamenity), fauna and
flora, land. and property. It may be costly to clean up or dispose of
waste and to restore the environment to its original state.
This study will be confined to the most serious cases of damage to
the environment, ignoring incidents involving under FF 1 million [4] and
those whose effects on man and environment do not appear very signifi-
cant. It will be mainly concerned with "disasters" involving deaths,
large-scale evacuation, or expensive clean-up.
In Section 4.2 we examine oil pollution at sea, environmental dam-
age due to accumulations of toxic substances or energy, water and air
pollution, noise. and radioactive pollution, in order to see how much
damage can be caused in exceptional conditions. Section 4.3 will deal
with the special arrangements introduced to provide compensation for
exceptional damage.
4.2. Exceptional Damage to the Environment
4.2.1. Damage to the .arine enviroment by oil spills
The marine environment suffers considerable damage in the event of
large spills of crude or other oils, especially accidents to tankers.
offshore wells, coastal reservoirs, or seabed pipelines.
Damage Caused by Oil Transported by Sea
Several tanker accidents have led to heavy expenditure to counteract
oil pollution. The cost varies according to how much oil is spilled,
weather conditions, where the pollution takes place. and what measures
are taken. Furthermore, such accidents can involve serious economic
losses for neighboring populations.
In each year from 1974 to 1983, between five and 37 tanker
accidents involved spills of over 675 t (average: 19 per year). Between
1974 and 1982 accidents costing over $250000 (at current prices) in
pollution damage averaged 17 per year. Since 1974. seven accidents
have cost over current $10 million. The two most expensive accidents
have been the Amoco Cadiz (220000 t) and the Tanio (17000 t) off the
Brittany coast [5].
Compensation in respect of the Amoco Cadiz is to be determined
by a Chicago court. French sources [6] suggest it will reach at least
1978 FF 800 million. French and United States (US) economists have
produced a study of the economic consequences of that accident [7].
The main heads of damage related to:
Compe7'l.satto7'l. /0.,. E:r:ceptto7'l.at E7'l.vtro7'l.me7'l.tat Damage
(1) Clean-up costs. FF 445-490 M (excluding tax).
(2) Marine resources, FF 140 M.
(3) Loss of amenity (residents and tourists), FF 53-342 M.
(4) Brittany tourist industry, FF 16-251 M.
(5) Secondary regional effects, FF 25-26 M.
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On top of these. account must be taken of costs borne by the local
authorities (over FF 100 million) and losses incurred by them. For the
Tanio, compensation claimed amounted to FF 516 million including FF
490 million for government clean-up costs. Reimbursable costs will
probably be between FF 360 million and FF 516 million. Government and
private claimants have already received FF 245 million and are continu-
ing proceedings.
Table 4.1 breaks down tanker spill costs between 1974 and 19BO.
The five most expensive spills are estimated to have cost 1120, lBO,
856, 851, and 836 million (19B3) (Table 4.2). Table 4.3 shows that most
oil pollution damage took place in Europe.
Table 4.1. Oil spill costs, 1974-1980.
Cost psr sliclc
(1983 $ M)
0.94-3.75
3.75-15
15-60
60-240
Sliclcs
43
24
7
2
Total cost
(1983 $ M)
84
1918
2148
200·
Total 76 689
·The three highest oost categories had approxt-
mately the same total oost.
Sou.,.ce: OCIMF tlgures, July 198Z, amended by
estimating the overall oost tor the two most ex-
pensive aocldents at 1200 million Instead at S3Z5
m1llion (1983).
Damage Caused by Offshore Oil Installations
Although there have been relatively few accidents involving offshore
oil installations as compared to maritime transport, highly spectacular
accidents resulting in considerable expenditure have nevertheless
occurred. Unfortunately, information is incomplete (see Table 4.4)
especially with regard to the Persian Gulf. The most serious cases of
pollution would seem to be those at Santa Barbara (I45-B5 million in
1969) and Funiwa in Nigeria [B]. The biggest spill (500000 t at Ixtoc
One) polluted the American coastline over 1000 km away but does not
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Table 4.2. Main tanker accidents since 1967 (compensation of $20 M and
over for pollution).
lJate
Country
aJ'j'Bcted. Ship (FT.a.g)
Qua.ntit1l
spilled.
(103t.)
Estima.ted.
costsB
(1963 $ M)
51
120
60
56
6
220
6
6
Amoco Ca.d.iz (Liberia)
Ta.nio (Madagascar)
A. Gra.msci (USSR)
France
France
Sweden, Finland,
USSR
Cuba
1976
1960
1979
Princess Anne Ma.rie
(Greece)
1979 Ireland B~telgeuse (France) 27 36
1967 France, UK Torrey Ca.n1lon (Liberia) 121 21
1976 France Boehlen (GDR) 11 20
1976 Spain Urquiola. (Spain) 101 20
1973 Puerto Rico Zoe Colocotroni (Greece) 6 20
1960
Bcost estimates based on oompensation awarded (or likely to be paid when out-
standing olaims are settled). Real costs are generally higher than oompensation
paid.
Table 4.3. Compensation for oil spills. 1970-1961.
Country
Compensa.tion
(1962 $ M)
Norway, Sweden, Finland
France
UK
Ireland
Spain
Greece
Turkey
USSR
USA
Canada
Japan
Rest. of world
32
267
34 402 (56%)
46
21
16
6
21
123 140 (19%)
17
53 (7%)
60
Total OECD count.ries
Total ot.her count.ries
619
101
(66%)
(14%)
Total 720
Source: Interpretation ot Temple et lit. 's data on ex-
pected or paid claims (198Z') (Temple et lit., 1983).
seem to have caused an ecological disaster even though so much oil was
involved.
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Considerable damage can also be caused by the bursting of oil storage
tanks situated near the coast. Some 8500 t of oil was spilled on a coast-
al area in Japan (Mitzushima). following the bursting of a storage tank.
Clean-up costs amounted to $43.3 million, and in 1975 Mitsubishi paid
$56.7 million as damages to third parties.
4.2.2. Damage to the enYironment due to
accwnulatioDB of dangerous waste
An aspect that has recently grown to considerable proportions is
environmental damage resulting from the build-up of dangerous waste at
waste disposal sites and the progressive contamination of the soil
around industrial installations.
Older Hazardous Waste Dumps
In many European countries and in the USA, numerous industrial waste
dumps have been found to constitute serious health hazards and have
therefore had to be cleared. Given the quantities of toxic wastes that
have accumulated, the cost involved can reach several tens or even
hundreds of millions of dollars for a single site. In the USA. legal
action has been taken against a large firm to cover the costs of clear-
ing a Colorado dump, for which the Defense Department has already
earmarked $500 million. Present estimates suggest that the USA will be
paying out more than $16 billion over the next decade or so to clear
older dumps [9J. One of the most fMmous examples is Love Canal, where
2500 people had to be evacuated in 1978 and more than $53 million
(including $30 million for rehousing) paid out because of cancer risks.
Europe has also been affected, and at Lekkerkerk in the Nether-
lands, it cost $70 million to evacuate 870 people from the vicinity of a
dump [10]. In the FRG, a large dump in the Georgsweder suburb of
Hamburg is causing concern and may also involve significant expendi-
ture. In France, costs have been relatively low so far (ten million
francs per site at most) [11].
In Japan, residues from numerous disused mines have been left
above ground. Between 1920 and 1962, 3000 t of arsenic waste poisoned
more than 140 people. Under a recent court decision [12J, 22 casual-
ties were awarded Yen (Y) 507 million ($2.3 million).
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 give an indication of actual or estimated costs in
a number of serious cases in Europe and the USA. Although it is too
early to assess the exact extent of the costs associated with old waste
dumps, their financial impact would appear to be such as to make this
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Table -i.5. Deoontamination costs for hazardous waste dumps: Serious
oases (over $4 M/slte).
Ca.se Cost ($ M)
($7 M spent)
($35 M spent)
(claim for $17 M)
($6 M spent)
36.5
36
30
25
21
16.6
14
12.6
10
10
7
6.5
5.6
4.6
4.3
500
235-
70
55
53
50
50
45
over
over
Colorado, USA (law suit claim:
$1950 M)
Times Beach, USA (estimate)
Lekkerkerk, Netherlands
Bridgeport, New Jersey, USA
Love Canal, USA
Louisiana, 2 sites, USA
Dordrecht, Netherlands (G 150 M)
Seymour, Indiana, USA
Velsicol/Gratiot County, St Louis,
Michigan, USA
Gouderak, Netherlands (G 110 M)
Niagara Falls, S. Area, New York, USA
Wilsonville, Illinois, USA
Waukegan, Illinois, USA
Iron Mountain, Redding, California, USA
Swartz Creek, Michigan, USA
Southwest Philadelphia, USA
Vickery, Ohio, USA
Kent, Washington, USA
BT Kemi site, Sweden
Picillo Fan", Coventry, Rhode Island, USA
Green-up, Illinois, USA
FRG, one site
Sylvester, Nashua, New Hampshire, USA
Ventrol/Velsicol, Woodbridge,
New Jersey, USA 4
Tokyo, Japan (hexavalent chromium) 4
Grand Prairie, Texas, USA 4
-The figure of 1235 M represent.s pollution by spreading oil oontalnlng dioxin In
1971, not by dumping.
one of the major environmental problems in the 1980s. According to
the Netherlands Minister of the Environment [13], clean-up costs could
amount to $700 million a year for 13 years in Europe. Just clearing the
old dumps could absorb 0.25% of gross national product (GNP). In the
FRG, $2.2 billion would be needed to clean up about 1400 dumps. For
the USA, some 2000 older dumps would cost approximately $16 billion to
clean up at an annual rate of $2 billion. There is some prospect that
such a program might be implemented only partially, in view of the very
high cost.
Gradual Contamination 01 the Soil
A problem similar to that of disposal sites is the build-up of pollutants
near industrial installations. In Morocco, 31 children are said to have
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Table -i.8. Commit.ted and act.ual expendit.ures8 for
clean-up of toxic wast.e in t.he USA.
E:r:pense per site Total
($ M) No. oj sites ($ M)
Committed j'ederal e:r:penditures (.J~ March 1985)
1.25-2.5 23 40.1
2.5-5 17 56.7
5-10 8 54.3
10-20 3 51.9
20-40 1 34.4
Subtotal 52 237.4
Total 416 407.6
Actualj'ederal e:r:penditures (.J~ March 1985)
0.8-1.6 22 23.8
1.6-3.2 10 23.6
3.2-6.4 3 12.7
6.4-12.8 3 24.0
Subtotal 38 84.1
Total 416 133.3
8 These expenses represent only a fraotlon of total clean-
up cost. Many decided-upon clean-up activities have not
yet materialized in financial commitments. The average
cost per stte is now estimated to be 18.5 M.
died of lead poisoning owing to waste from a leadworks being dumped in
the middle of a village (Mekouar. 1984).
In Belgium. in a suburb of Antwerp. it cost Belgian francs (BF) 100
million (about $22 million) to eliminate lead-contaminated dust which
had settled on the ground and in houses in the vicinity of a leadworks.
In the areas surrounding old aluminum works in France, the FRG,
Switzerland, and Greece, soil contamination by fluorine effluent was
severe enough to destroy much livestock. obliging the operators to
compensate farmers. However, compensation paid came to under FF
100000 per works, per annum: at Lannemezan. in 1974. fluorine killed
200 cows; compensation in Greece totaled $30000 for the loss of 720
animals in six years.
Gradual Contamination of Marine Sediments
Continuous pollution of coastal waters can cause an excessive build-up
of pollutants in sediments which may be very expensive to dredge. In
the bay of Tokuyama. 450000 m3 of mercury-contaminated sediments
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were removed at the expense of the two firms responsible (Toyo Soda
Kogyo and Tokuyama Soda) costing a total of Y 10 billion in 1975. Simi-
lar works were undertaken for Minamata Bay (75% borne by the firm
and 25 %by the authorities).
4.2.3. Damage to the environment caused
by release or stored energy
Serious damage to surrounding areas has been caused by the storage of
energy mechanically (water) or chemically (explosives, gas). Ta.ble 4.7
shows that the number of lives lost as a result of dams bursting can
exceed 1000. Worldwide, the probability of a dam bursting is 2 x 10-4
per year, Le. between 1 and 2 cases a year in the world involving
deaths and devastation over wide areas. In the USA five dams burst
between 1918 and 1958, killing 1680 people (Okrent, 1979). For
Western Europe and Japan, dam burst risks are lower (0.2 x 10-4) [14].
Environmental damage can also be caused by loose earth move-
ments. In Aberfan (Wales) a slag heap wiped out part of the village (144
dead, one school and 18 houses destroyed).
The chemical and oil industries have also caused several disasters
involving the explosion or combustion of dangerous substances [15].
Table 4.8 gives details of disasters involving over 50 deaths (employees
and third parties). Ta.ble 4.9 shows that over the last 50 years there
have been at least 24 such accidents worldwide of which 14 involved
fixed land-based plant; and of these, seven involved chemicals. Over
the same period, of eight accidents causing over 200 deaths, five were
in OECD countries. It is also noteworthy that most recent serious
accidents have occurred in the Third World (six out of seven for land-
based installations) and involved oil or gas.
Furthermore, explosions have been responsible for severe damage
destroying buildir:tgs or industrial plant. In Buenos Aires, Argentina, in
1967 a propane fire destroyed 400 houses; in Escombreras, New York,
in 1969 an oil explosion meant evacuating 5000 residents; in Flixbor-
ough, the UK, in 1974 a cyclohexane explosion involved the evacuation
of 3000 residents and destroyed 100 houses. Carriage of explosive sub-
stances can also involve heavy damage [16]. In 1974 in Los Angeles, FF
250 million of damage was caused by an exploding tank of organic
peroxide. Serious damage has also been caused by munitions and explo-
sives (carrlage, storage, manufacturing), by fireworks, and by gas
explosions in buildings and urban supply networks.
These figures suggest that it is release of stored energy which has
involved the severest damage to the environment.
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Table i.? Accidents involving dams, 1959-1983.
Da.ma.ge
Da.te Pla.ce Country Dea.ths ($ M)
1959 Vega de Tera Spain 144-400
Malpasset France 421 68
1960 Oros Brazil 1000
1961 Kiev-Babu Yar USSR 145
1962 Sunchon-Hyokiri South Korea 250
1963 VaJont8 Italy 2118 30
Quebrada La Chapab Colombia 250
Balwin Hills
(California) USA 3 50
1967 Nanaksagar India 100
Sempor Indonesia 200
1969 Pardo Argentina 100 20
1972 Toledon Colombia 60
Canyon Lake (South Dakota)8 USA 231 115
Buffalo Creek (West Virginia) USA 129 26
1976 Tetons (Idaho) USA 11 407
Del Monte Columbia 80
Santos Tomas8 Phflippines 80
1977 Limpopo Mozambique 300
Toccoa (Georgia)8 USA 39 3
Euclides de Cunha8 Brazil - 60
Armando Salles de
Oliverra8 Brazil - 60
1978 Bakhera Nepal 500+
1979 Morvi-Macchu 2 8 India 15000 (1)
1980 Oressa India 1000
1981 Kernataka India 120
1982 - Liberia 200
1983 Cundinamarca Colombia 150
Lrhese aooldents were caused by heavy rainfall, rivers In spate, or earthslldes
(VaJont).
bNatural dam.
Sources: Q'U.1.d, 1982, P 1149; S1.gmG, 1976-1984; Goubet, 19'79.
•.2... EnviroDlDental damage caused by air and water pollution
Pollution near industrial plant caused by emissions of harmful pollu-
tants during the production process, from chimneys, and as effluent
discharged into rivers is a well-known side effect of industrialization.
Although this often occurred in the past, the situation is nowadays dis-
tinctly better; however, as the Bhopal disaster reminds us, the risks
are still present.
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Table t.S. Dislribution of induslrial disaslers (over 50 dead, see Table 4.8).
Lan~-ba.se~ Surface Ojjshore Maritime
Area plant transport oil transport Total
Oil aM gas
1934-1969 OECD 1 0 - 0 1
Olhers 0 0 - 0 0
1970-1984 OECD 1 0 3 2 6
Olhers 5 1 1 0 7
Subtotal 7 1 4 2 14
Chemicals
1934-1969 OECD 4 0 - 1 5
Olhers 2 0 - 1 3
1970-1984 OECD 0 1 - 0 1
Olhers 1 0 - 0 1
Subtotal 7 1 - 2 10
TOTAL 14 2 4 4 24
of which OECD 6 1 3 3 13
Air Pollution
Some industrial plants have been the cause of continual or accidental
air pollution serious enough to give ground for complaint by people in
the locality and. in some cases. to require special protection measures
(closed windows. evacuation, ban on agricultural produce grown close to
the factory, etc.). The pollutants most often involved are fluorine,
lead, asbestos. mercaptan. hydrogen sulfide, certain pesticides. sulfur
oxide. chromium. chlorine, and ammonia [17,16]. Owing to the localized
nature of damage, the cost seldom exceeds FF 2 million per incident. To
take one example, a sulfur oxide cloud damaged 700 vehicles (at a cost
of FF 1.2 million) in the car park of a French firm.
Nevertheless, there have been some very costly incidents. Com-
pensation for pollution caused in the USA by Trail Smelter in Canada
finally came to 8426000 (1940 prices).
In 1950, at poza Rica (Mexico) a hydrogen sulfide leak put 320 peo-
ple in hospital and caused 22 deaths. The evacuation of 240,000 people
at Mississauga near Toronto in 1979 because of a pollution hazard
caused by a derailed chemicals shipment cost several tens of millions of
US dollars and full compensation has yet to be paid [19].
In 1974, accidental discharge of 460 kg of chlorine in a Japanese
factory in Yokkaichi caused eye and mucous irritation to 10000 local
residents [20].
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The Seveso dioxin leak in 1976 caused 736 people to be moved out
and affected 1800 ha. The burial of 250000 m3 of contaminated soil
cost about lire (L) 30 billion. Off-site expenditure amounted to more
than Swiss francs (SF) 300 million [21].
In 1984, over 2500 people were killed in the Bhopal (India)
accident by an accidental escape of 30 t of methyl isocyanate [22].
Compensation payable varies, depending on the assumptions on which
estimates are made, from many tens of millions of dollars to several bil-
lion dollars. This accident is the largest pollution disaster ever
recorded. Figures in Table 4.W give an idea of the cost of a similar
disaster in Europe. The Indian Government refused a $350 million set-
tlement out of court.
Table 4.10. Estimated cost of an ecological disaster (toxic gas).
'I'ype of ezpenses
Compensation:B
250 dead
12580% handicapped
500 501 handicapped
625 20% handicapped
Emergency hospilal and medical
expenditures for 10 000 patients
Special medical expenditures (medium term)
Subsequent medical atlention (long term)
Evacuation of 30 000 residents (5 days)
Loss of earnings
Evacuee accommodation
Miscellaneous
Tolal
Estima.ted. cost
(FF M)
50
125
225 80%
80
10
20
20
20
20
30
600
BThe compensation figures are based on average payments for road aooldents In
Franoe (1982). Ho aooount Is made for eoonomlc losses to trade.
Published information on air pollution incidents has been fuller as
from December 1984. In the space of two months, nine serious
incidents were recorded [23], three of them in countries of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In France in
1984, a disaster was narrowly averted [24].
Air pollution can also be caused by the combined activities of
several enterprises. In 1971, in the Lacq region of France, market gar-
deners in Gave de Pau received FF 3.3 million for air pollution damage
caused by four firms.
At Yokkaichi. Japan, six petrochemical companies and one electri-
city company were held jointly liable for poor air quality (sulfur oxides,
94 [fI,sur1:n.g afl,d Mafl,ag1.fI,g Hazardous R1.s/t;s
etc.) and ordered to pay damages to bronchial casualties in the vicinity
(130 casualties. Y 569 million in 1973). In 1975. a Japanese steel com-
pany paid Y 2 billion ($6.6 Million) to air pollution victims under the
Compensation Act (see [25] and Section 4.3.6).
Pollutant emissions from industrialized regions have also led to
serious pollution in exceptional weather conditions. In 1930 there were
63 deaths in the Meuse Valley and in 1947 in Donora (Pennsylvania) 43%
of the population (14000 people) were affected and 20 deaths recorded.
In 1962 in the Ruhr. high pollution is thought to have caused an
increase in the number of deaths (over 100 people).
Water Pollution
There are many instances of rivers being badly polluted by industrial
waste or by sludge when reservoirs behind dams are emptied. but in
general the damage involved is not very great [26]. Tens of thousands
of fish can be lost and aquatic life destroyed over several kilometers
without the cost of damage exceeding FF 1 million. In France, freshwa-
ter fishing associations seem to obtain about FF 5000 per kilometer pol-
luted [27]. Among the highest figures recorded are those for the pollu-
tion of the Sandrine (Garonne basin) by a metal processing factory,
which cost FF 803090 in 1977, and for the accidental spilling of 20 t of
acrolein into the Rhone in 1976 (300 t of fish killed), which seems to
have been settled out of court for under FF 3 million.
In 1982 at Saint Fons. the accidental discharge of 1.7 t of hydro-
quinone caused the accidental death of 60 t of fish [28]. In 1983. the
bursting of an earth dyke for a potassium waste dump at Lvov in the
USSR polluted the Dniester for 500 km, causing considerable damage.
River pollution damage can be considerable when drinking water
installations are affected or when water is used for irrigation. In 1984.
Pec Engineering were ordered to pay FF 3 million on account for pollut-
ing the Upper Rhine with toluene, with the result that wells in four vil-
lages (5000 residents) had to be shut off.
Leaks from storage tanks and pipelines can be very costly if not
detected quickly, and can seriously damage the water table. as can
waste from which toxic liquids seep or drain away, particularly after a
storm. In France such incidents have cost several million francs. espe-
cially where they have affected drinking water supply (FF 4 million in
one case).
In the Rhine salt case, the Alsace potash mines were held liable
for salt damage in the Netherlands. Damages have not yet been
assessed but the claim in 1975 was for gulden (G) 45 million ($15 mil-
lion).
Industries have also caused serious damage by discharging waste
in coastal areas. For instance, fishing was seriously affected at the
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mouth of the Seine. In Corsica damages in respect of red sludge
discharged by Montedison into the Mediterranean in 1972 has been
assessed in 1985 at FF 680000, while 20 Italian fishermen received FF
174000 as compensation.
In 1974, 250 t of tetraethyllead went down with the Cavtat 15 km
off the coast of Italy. In 1977, the Italian authorities spent FF 57 mil-
lion to retrieve the drums. In 1981, the salvage of a dangerous cargo
from the Klearchos which went down near Sardinia cost S9 million. In
1984 the accidental loss of 80 drums of Dinoseb in the North Sea cost
over G 2 million in search and retrieval expenses. In the Netherlands.
disposal of 51 drums of chlorinated products lost 25 km offshore in
1979 by an Iraqi vessel cost over G 1.75 million.
In Turkey the city of Istanbul received S7 million in 1983 from the
airport authority and $3 million from a banking group as compensation
for coastal water pollution for which they had been responsible.
In the USA in 1975. release of pesticides (kepone) into the James
River and Chesapeake Bay in Virginia caused serious damage. More
than $12 million was paid to fishermen in compensation and the Allied
Chemicals Company was fined $13.2 million. This fine was reduced on
appeal to $5 million, but the company donated S8 million to an environ-
ment protection fund. In another case, the Dupont Company offered to
pay the State of Virginia S2 million in settlement of litigation arising
from the presence in a river of mercury discharged more than 30 years
previously. A pollution of underground water at Jackson Township (New
Jersey) by a municipal waste dump caused damage estimated at $15.8
million by a court (see [29]).
In Canada, rivers flowing through Indian reserves were polluted
by mercury from a pulp and paper plant. The Federal Government paid
$1.6 million in 1982 to Whitedog Indian Reserve and S4.4 million in 1984
to Grassy Narrows (River Wabigoon). In the latter case, negotiations
are in hand to obtain additional compensation from the company [30].
The most serious water pollution damage seems to have occurred in
Japan following the build up of toxic waste over the period 1950-1970.
A group of petrochemical companies paid compensation of Y 200 million
to the Tokuyama Bay fishermen for fishing losses between 1957 and
1961. Dumping of heavy metal waste into a river by the Ashio Company
polluted rice fields [30]. An out-of-court settlement of Y 1.55 billion
was made to cover damages for the period 1952-1971. Two outbreaks of
chronic arsenic pollution from mining wastes caused 155 casualties
(Table 4.11).
"Itai Itai", a disease that affected some 100 people, was caused by
cadmium pollution of a river. A first payment of Y 148 million was made
in 1972 and was followed by other payments.
Mercury pollution of rivers and bays caused what was known as
the Minamata disease. The worst case was due to discharges by the
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Table 4:.11. Water pollution in Japan.
Firm d~te C~su~lties Cl~ims still
'I'ype of ofJ'f,rst compens~t- F~talities pending
poisoning observation ed in 1983 to 1983 in 1983
Minamata Chisso 1370 595 5605
(mercury) (1956)
Minamata Niigata Showa Denko 553 135 48
(mercury) (1965)
ltai-ltai Mitsui 37 80
(cadmium) (1955)
Toroku Miyazaki Sumitomo 107 32
(arsenic) (1972)
Shimano Sasagadani 9 12
(arsenic) (1970)
Source: Environment Agency (1984).
Note: Not all fatalities of compensated viotims were caused by pollution.
Chisso Company into Minamata Bay. Under the first judgment in 1973,
138 victims were awarded Y 937 million ($3.4 million). By 1977, Chisso
had paid a total of Y 36 billion to 1348 victims. In 1983. 1909 victims
had received compensation and nearly 5368 claims were pending. In
another mercury pollution case, in Niigata, the Showa Denko Company
paid Y 270 million ($0.92 million) to 76 victims in 1971. By 1983, com-
pensation had been paid to 685 victims. These figures would suggest
that total compensation paid to victims of water pollution in Japan up to
1983 could well exceed Y 60 billion, I.e. Y 6 billion a year for ten years.
It should be noted that this represents the cumulative effect of
discharges over the period 1950-1970.
Environmental Noise Nuisance
Noise can cause serious damage, especially near airports or railways.
Aircraft, airport, and rail operators have sometimes been compelled to
reduce disamenity for buildings or make good falling property values.
In the FRG nearly $300 million had been spent by 1981 to soundproof
houses near airports. Table 4.12 shows that outlays have been consid-
erable in some cases. After 14 years litigation. 3828 victims of Osaka
airport noise were awarded Y 1.3 billion as settlement in 1984. In
France, one airport's noise victims were awarded FF 2.7 million [31].
4.2.6. Damage caused by radioactivity
Serious damage may be caused by "nuclear" plants and radioactive
materials for medical and industrial use. We shall not deal here with
damage caused by nuclear weapons just as we have excluded damage
associated with explosives and munitions under Section 4.2.3.
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Table 4:.12. Compensation paid for noise nuisance (airports, railways).
rTf
Compensation
Sound.proofing (airports)
Heat.hrowand Gat.wick, UK (1966-1976)
(1976- )
40 FRG airports (1974-1976): civil
military
Japanese airports (1979)
Housing
Public buildings
Paris airports (Roissy and Orly) (1973-1963)
Copenhagen, Denmark 1976-1960
1961-1966 (500 houses)
Fall in property values (airports)
Japan (1979): Rehousing
Los Angeles, USA (1972-1976): Purchase
Paris, France (1973-1963): Purchase
Fall in property values (railways)
Shinkansen t.rain Japan (railways)
Rehousing
Purchase
4.25 Mb
19.0 Mb
DM 12.7 M
DM 7.7 M
Y 50 600 M
Y9900M
FF 67.2 M
DKr 196 M8
DKr 125 M
Y 12 700 M
$300 M
FF 114 M
Y 757 M
Y 466M
8 Dkr, Danish kroner.
bPounds sterling.
Sources: No1.se Abllteme1'l.t PoL1.c1.es, DEeD, 1980; Aeroport de Paris; Danish Aut.hori-
t.les.
With the exception of the Chernoby1 disaster, nuclear installa-
tions have rarely caused serious damage in their immediate vicinity,
owing to precautions taken and the size of sites [32]. The most serious
reactor accidents have been at Windscale (1947), where enough radioac-
tivity was released to lead the authorities to destroy milk produced in
the area, and at Three Mile Island (1979), where evacuation was advised
as a precaution against any significant radioactivity leak. While the
Three Mile Island accident involved high compensation (S33 million)
[33], the damage to third parties in the Chernobyl case is considerably
larger.
Radioactive effluent from reprocessing plant leaking into the sea
at Sellafield (1983) caused enough contamination for the beach to be
closed off to the public. The cost of decontaminating the beach is not
known but was probably not very high.
A strange recent case was the contamination of an American sub-
marine hull by a drum of radioactive waste dumped at sea. In the USA
in New Jersey (Essex County), an S8 million program was launched in
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1985 to counteract radium wastes affecting 80 houses (radon contamina-
tion).
Transport of radioactive substances (e.g. uranium, plutonium, irra-
diated fuels, and waste) has caused a few instances of road and rail con-
tamination but at comparatively low cost (less than $1 million). The loss
of 450 t of uranium hexafluoride (the Mont-Louis) may have caused
some slight radioactive pollution but the drums were soon recovered at
a cost of some tens of millions of French francs.
Radioelements for medical and industrial applications (e.g.
radioactive cobalt sources, needles, etc.) have caused serious accidents
to members of the public when found after being lost or stolen. Deaths
and serious burns have occurred. The most expensive case seems to
have been in 1983 and 1984 in Mexico, where 450 Ci of radioactive
cobalt contaminated over 6000 t of steel and castings [34]. Apart from
injuries (some severe. affecting about 100 people) and radiation-
induced leukemia, extensive material damage must be anticipated if
hundreds of houses built with the contaminated material have to be
demolished.
The fall of the Soviet satellite, Cosmos 954, on Canada caused
radioactive contamination of the soil in an uninhabited area. Costs of
retrieval and decontamination amounted to Canadian $16 million. The
Canadian authorities claimed $6 million and finally accepted $3 million.
Lastly, mention should be made of damage caused by the natural
radioactivity of uranium. In the USA. uranium mining byproducts used
as building sand in the 1950s were discovered in the 1980s to be
dangerous. Work costing several hundred million dollars is in hand to
remedy the situation. In 1984. work was done on 61 properties (for a
total cost of $1 million) [35].
4.2.7. Worst-case environmental damage
Tables 4.i3 and 4.14 show the heaviest damage to the environment men-
tioned in this report for the period 1959-1984. The largest forced eva-
cuation was 240000 people at Mississauga and 13 other forced evacua-
tions involved over 4000 people (Table 4.15).
In terms of deaths, dam accidents have been the most disastrous.
Apart from Minamata disease. the Bhopal accident, and the Chernobyl
disaster, no instance oj accidental pollution has caused more than
50 deaths. In terms of costs, the most expensive so far has amounted
to $200 million (excluding dam bursts of up to $740 million). With one or
two exceptions only, pollution accidents have never caused third party
damage valued above that seen in air crashes or industrial fire or
explosion [36]. It should therefore be possible to provide the same
kind of third party liability cover as that available for wide-bodied air-
liners.
Compensatton/or E:I:cepttonal Envtronmental.Da.mage
Table i.13. Third party damage: number of incidents
recorded, 1959-1984.
99
'/7nJe of incident
Dam
Explosion: factory
transport
Oil: tankers
offshore
Waste disposal
Air pollution: plant
Water pollution
Radioactive pollution
Nu.mber of incidents
4 incidents with over 1000 deaths
3 incidents with over 100 deaths
2 incidents with over 100 deaths
5 incidents exceeding $10 M (1983)
4 incidents exceeding $10 M (1983)
13 incidents exceeding $20 M (1983)
3 incidents exceeding $10 M (1983)
7 incidents exceeding $10 M (1983)
1 Incident exceeding $20 M (1983)
Theoretically there is no limit to the amount of environmental
damage that a company could cause, because some more serious
accident can always be imagined. Bhopal confirms that an accident can
always be on a larger scale than any previously experienced. However,
it is observed that serious damage only rarely exceeds certain amounts,
which can be put at a few million dollars for accidental water and air
pollution. some tens of millions for oil tanker pollution, old waste
dumps, and toxic pollutant leaks, and several hundred million dollars
for major disasters (dam bursts. explosions. large-scale toxic gas
leaks). But at the same time it has to be recognized that environ-
mental damage caused by certain industrial activities cost tens if
not hundreds of millions of dollars per incident. These figures will
probably increase over time, partly because of inflation and because
firms are getting bigger, and also because more types of damage are
being compensated, awards are becoming larger, and it is increasingly
easy to identify victims.
The high cost of this damage could seriously embarrass most firms.
though the problem should not be exaggerated. Losses in the form of
destruction of plant, compensation payable to injured employees, and
other direct and indirect financial losses may well far exceed the civil
liability risk in respect of pollution [37]. When these items are covered
by insurance. the premium for third party damage will be only a modest
proportion of the total premium. especially that for damage to plant
[38].
4.2.8. Disaster costs as a proportion of the
total cost of environmental damage
The high cost of damage caused by certain industrial firms to the
environment sometimes gives the impression that it would be financially
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Table 4-.14-. Third party damages: worst-case costs, 1959-1984.
Type oj CostsB Third po;rt'll
Incident (1983 $ M) deaths Evacuations
Dam 600 (Tetons) 150001 (Morvi)
2118 (VaJont)
Earth slip - 144 (Aberfan)
Explosion:
plant 12.2 (Signal Hill) 452 (Mexico) 3000
(Flixborough)
pipeline
-
508 (Cubatao) 3000
(Callao)
transport 103 (Eagle Pass) 216 (Alfaques) 2500
(Hagerstown)
Oil:
tankers 120 (Amoco Cadiz)
offshore oil 120 (Santa Barbara)
coastal 200 (Mitzushima)
reservoir
Waste disposal 84 (Lekkerkerk) 31 (Morocco) 2500
(Love Canal)
Soil pollution 30 (Times
Beach)
Sedimentary 64 (Tokuyama)
pollution
Air pollution:
plant 138 (Seveso) 2500 (Bhopal) 17000
(Taft)
transport 57(US Railroad) - 240000
(Mississauga)
Water pollution 300 (Chisso) 250 (Chisso)
Radioactive 33 (Three Mile
pollution Island)
BThe cost rlgures are compensation for work already carried out. The costs were
oorrected for infiatlon in the Inoldent country and then converted Into 1983 US
dollars.
difficult to insure and provide compensation for the consequences of
such events. In fact, available statistics show that the total financial
burden of major disasters is not all that large a proportion of total
accidental damage to the environment.
As an example, for tanker spills (Table 4.i and Figure 4.i), those
costing more than $60 million represent 28% of total oil spill costs. For
natural disasters, those involving over $400 million represent 27% of
incidents costing more than $50 million [39].
For other kinds of disaster, e.g. serious fires [39], those costing
over $100 million represent 35% of the cost of all disasters costing over
$25 million. The proportions are similar for deaths caused by fires and
explosions, and for accidents in mining, at sea, and on the railways [38].
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Figure 4.1.. Number of oil slicks costing in excess of $:z: million.
Statistics available for the frequency and scale of the various
kinds of serious accident [39, 40] show that frequency diminishes in
proportion to severity (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) and that the financial
weight of the combination of disasters belonging to the different sever-
ity brackets stays roughly constant. This statistical "law" [41] seems
to prevail for serious accidents caused by human activity, but does not
apply beyond certain severity thresholds where no incident has
occurred [42]. And there are other kinds of disaster to which the
"law" does not apply - in particular, natural disasters for which the
loss of life associated with the most serious and rarest cases far
exceed the losses for all other cases.
For accidents obeying the statistical "law", the financial weight of
the maximum severity class (Le. accidents ranking as disasters) equais
the weight of each of the lesser severity classes. If there are three
severity classes, the disaster-scale accidents represent 33% of the
combined costs of accidents in all three classes. Since accidents can
generally be classified into more than three severity classes, it follows
that disaster-scale accidents cost less than 25" oJ all accidents. So
it follows that compensation for disasters introduces no important
economic constraint into compensation systems and that the cost of
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Figure 4.2. Frequency of falalities due to man-caused events (accidents per
year killing over N people). (Source: Rasmussen, 1974.)
compensating all accidents is not much higher than the cost of compen-
sating most accidents. Hence compensation ceilings for third party
damage have no intrinsic economic justification although they facilitate
management of the risk insured and make it possible to satisfy a max-
imum of claims of less cost. Nevertheless, they are necessary to
prevent an exceptional or unexpectedly costly event from ruining an
insurance system based on a certain distribution of accidents.
This justification of ceilings in actuarial terms applies in the first
place to the insured who can choose higher or lower liability coverage
but should not be used to reduce compensation for victims in the most
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dramatic cases of a disaster-scale accident. Nevertheless. in certain
disasters the state may have to stand in for the person liable. pay com-
pensation to victims, and prevent the disaster from ruining the firm.
Here some mechanism for state aid to firms (industrial disaster funds)
would be better than setting a ceiling on their liability, thereby
prompting victims to look to the state for compensation not paid by the
party liable. or even to claim against financially powerful firms whose
liability may not be obvious .
•.2.9. Economic impact of the cost of pollution accidents
All the available indications show that the total cost of compensation
for environmental damage caused by industry is no more than a small
fraction of the cost of measures to prevent environmental damage [43].
For instance. compensation for tanker spills is about $140 million
per year worldwide. whereas prevention measures cost over $1 billion
per year. In other words. the cost of damage is about 15% of the costs
of prevention.
The very high cost of cleaning-up older waste dumps in the United
States (over $1 billion per year) is about 10% of industrial waste dispo-
sal expenditure in the United States. but no more than a few percent of
US industry pollution prevention costs. In France. the annual cost of
cleaning up older dumps is apparently well under FF 25 million, while
French industry spends FF 2.9 billion on waste disposal (including some
FF 600 million for toxic wastes). The economic impact of older dumps in
France is therefore ten times less than the impact in the USA.
The total cost of compensation for accidental air and water pollu-
tion in France is thought to be some tens of millions of francs per year
[44] as against the FF 7.2 billion per year (1983) French industry
spends on preventing air and water pollution. Damage accordingly
costs less than 1 %of the cost of preventing pollution [45]. The cost of
accidental water pollution damage in France represents only a few per-
cent of the pollution charges collected by the French Water Basin
Agencies [46].
In Japan in 1982. the total cost of compensation for air and water
pollution is thought to have been about Y 106 billion. Le. 16% of the
Y 648 billion Japanese industry spends on pollution prevention. This
compensation cost is inflated by the very high amount paid to air pollu-
tion victims which would be borne in part by social security in France
(health effects).
It seems fair to conclude that the cost of pollution damage to
industry is low compared with the costs of pollution prevention. In
practice, many polluters seem to take compliance with new pollution
control standards much more seriously than possible liability for
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failure to comply with such standards. The risk of stricter controls
and more stringent operating conditions affects the decision-maker
more than possible compensation liability.
OECD studies of the impact of pollution control costs upon various
industries show that for the most polluting industries they only
represent between 5% and 15% of production costs and that for other
industries the figures are still lower. Taking the highest figures for
compensation and pollution control costs, the compensation cost
represents 2% at most of the production cost. A more realistic figure
would be between 0.1% and 1% of production costs. Thus, in maritime oil
transport, total compensation is 1% of the shipping cost and 0.1% of the
oil cost. This means that doubling compensation would have very little
economic influence on the price level.
4.2.10. Pollution disasters and natural disasters
in industrialized countries
The total cost of pollution disasters seems very much smaller than the
total cost of natural disasters in the industrialized countries. For the
USA in 1983, compensation and insurance paid out for natural disasters
amounted to $2.55 billion while total compensation for environmental
damage to third parties due to industrial activities in 1983 in the USA
was probably well below $400 million (the costs of cleaning up older
dumps are not included in that figure because the damage had been
caused previously). France has in ten years had only two very costly
pollution incidents (oil spill), at a total cost of some FF 1.5 billion. On
an annual basis, pollution disasters therefore cost FF 150 million as
against natural disasters which cost insurers some FF 3 billion.
Effective compensation for pollution disasters would therefore not
appear to be an unreasonable aim, but it would require special govern-
ment action. Victims might receive compensation from insurance com-
panies, which would pass on the cost to industry (firms' civil liability,
industry charge, etc.). Such a system might cost up to FF 300 million
per year in France if it were to include all accidental industrial
environmental damage. The financial impact of such a system would be
the same as a 5% increase in the cost of preventing industrial pollution
(0.01% of GNP). Compensation for such damage would appear to be
financially supportable to the extent that appropriate machinery were
introduced [47]. Initially, guaranteed compensation could perhaps be
limited to FF 200 million per incident. including FF 100 million for
private victims. In the USA insurance cover was available for third
party pollution liability up to a ceiling of $30 million per event (Table
4.18). In Europe. insurance pools offer smaller coverage for
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Table t.18. Maximum cover on leading insurance markets for nonsudden en-
vironmental damage in the USA and Canada. 8
Mw:imum cover (1983 $ M)
Insurer per incident per year
Shand, Morahan, & Co., Inc. 30 60
London (through Alexander Howden) 30 60
Stewart Smith, Inc. 25 50
Hartford Steam Boiler and InspecUon Co. 20 40
American International Group 20 20
Swett and Crawford Management Co., Ltd. 20 20
Dryden & Co., Inc. 15 30
Hartford Insurance Group 10 10
PolluUon Liability Insurance AssociaUon - 6
8 1982 premium volume was S28 M; while 1983 premium volume was 140 M. The 1984
situation Is distinctly less favorable: less cover Is available (about .10 M) and
premiums have soared.
Source: Risk Science International, Flf.nanciaL Responsi61.Hty under th.e
Compreh.ensive EnvironmentaL Response Compensation and LiaML1.ty Act 0/
1.980, Summary 01Issues, June 1983.
environmental damage (in France FF 20-30 million, in the Netherlands
G 7.5 million).
4.2.1.1.. Conclusions
Compensation for serious environmental damage does not substantially
increase the total cost of compensation, since the latter represents
only a small proportion of the cost of pollution control, and the cost of
pollution control has a minimal impact on prices. Accordingly, compen-
sation has no appreciable economic impact and there is no economic
argument Jor depriving victims oj compensation Jor damage
caused by industrial activities. A substantial improvement to com-
pensation systems is therefore an economically feasible target.
However, the high cost of certain accidents and pollution situa-
tions can pose difficulties, because firms could not easily pay compen-
sation of millions of dollars. Costs of severe damage would therefore
have to be shared among potential polluters, consumers, and taxpayers
to avoid their being borne partly by the victims or ruining the firm
responsible.
4.3. Compensation for Exceptional Environmental Damage
4.3.1.. Compensation tor serious pollution
Over the last 30 years, compensation arrangements have improved for
certain specific kinds of pollution and for environmental problems
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generally. The main improvements have been in the rules governing lia-
bility, in authorizing collective legal action, and in extending the range
of damage eligible for compensation.
In most countries, liability for pollution varies according to the
type of pollution. For instance, liability for pollution of fresh water in
France is strict and unlimited, while for maritime pollution by tankers
it is strict but limited. Air pollution liability is based on a fault, but if
the pollutant is highly toxic, liability is based on risk. In some coun-
tries no-fault liability for environmental damage has become the norm.
Other countries have created an obligation to clean up and dispose of
pollutants upon administrative order (with no financial limit) but have
not changed the civil liability system. Lastly, it has been recognized
that the state might be required to compensate victims when the dam-
age results from its own default.
For the most serious kinds of pollution, the main improvement has
been to ensure that victims are fully compensated notwithstanding the
high cost of the damage. For this purpose, insurance has been made
compulsory, compensation funds have been established (industry-wide
or at budget level), and parent companies have been made liable for the
obligations of their subsidiaries.
Compensation Ceiling Under Sharing Arrangements
Compensation payable by firms is necessarily limited by their financial
capacity, taking account of the insurance cover available to them from
an industry pool or via the insurance and reinsurance market. These
risk-sharing systems can function in a balanced way provided total
claims do not fluctuate unduly, Le. provided that a very costly claim
does not overshadow total claims arising over a period of time. This
means that no pool system can cover the very rarest and most costly
events [48]. In other words, there will always be a compensation ceiling
[49] and the higher the total cost of damage covered (spreading the
risk among a great number of insured) the higher the ceiling will be.
For tanker spills, maritime insurers in 1983 felt able to provide
cover against civil pollution liability up to $50-100 million, Le. an
amount equal to the total oil pollution damage claims paid out by insur-
ers over about two years. The maximum insurable compensation might
be attained about once every five or ten years [50].
Applying the same principle to other types of accidental pollution,
compensation ceilings could be determined for pools. Beyond sums
between $100 million and $1 billion for damage caused by industrial
activities to the environment. the state would probably be prompted to
intervene financially if it wished to guarantee compensation for victims
(disaster funds, etc.) because industry would not succeed in obtaining
insurance cover or organizing to share the costlier risk [51].
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Compensation ceilings are linked to economic magnitudes, which
are themselves determined by the cost of living. Accordingly, a ceiling
can vary from year to year. Although it is fixed at a particular moment
in accordance with a particular insurance market, it should not be
allowed to assume the status of a legal norm, nor to become an instru-
ment for gradually lightening the liability of polluters to the detriment
of victims or the state. This unfortunately occurs when the law limits
liability (e.g. nuclear and oil liability) and even more so in an interna-
tional convention which can only be amended with the agreement of all
parties.
In the following sections we examine measures to provide better
compensation for victims in the event of a major incident occurring. We
start with nuclear energy and oil, where problems first arose.
4.3.2. Compensation tor damage caused by radioactivity
In 1960 the first international system specially designed for large-scale
environmental damages was adopted, under DECD auspices [52]. The
system applies to accidents caused by nuclear plant. It established a
strict liability regime for Europe, concentrating on the operator, with
limitation of liability to $15 million. For damages between $15 and $70
million the state steps in, and for damages between $70 and $120 million
states party to the Supplementary Brussels Convention (1963) would
provide compensation.
The Paris and Brussels Conventions were revised in 1982 but the
Protocols will not come into force for several years. When they do,
maximum compensation payable by the operator and the state will
increase from Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 70 million to 170 million
and compensation payable by states will be within the band of SDRs
175-300 million instead of SDRs 70-120 million.
In the USA, the operator's liability is currently limited to $595
million of which $160 million is covered by insurance and $435 million
by the reactor operators [53]. In the FRG, operators are liable up to
DM 500 million (of which DM 300 million is covered by insurance) and
the government covers compensation between DM 500 million and DM 1
billion. In Switzerland, the operator's liability in the event of accident
is up to SF 300 million and for damage in excess of SF 1000 million, while
the state covers the SF 300 million to 1 billion band. Table 4.17 shows
the wide diversity in compensation and liability ceilings for DECD coun-
tries.
Switzerland abolished the limited liability system and the FRG
recently did the same. In the USA the compensation ceiling will shortly
be revised upwards to at least $1 billion, Le. the v.alue of the plant (for
a group of some 80 nuclear power stations). In Japan, the operator's
liability has never been limited.
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Severe damage due to radioactivity has occurred in circumstances
not covered by the special nuclear energy regime and in particular as a
result of the dumping, loss. or theft of radioactive substances. In
these cases the ordinary liability rules apply with all the uncertainties
they may entail, especially if the persons liable are unknown or insol-
vent.
4.3.3. Compensation tor damage due to the transport ot oil
In 1969 and 1971 special liability and compensation rules were intro-
duced for the sea transport of oil [54] based on the earlier arrange-
ments for nuclear energy. Table 4.1B compares the two systems and
shows that. for the same annual turnover. maximum liability and aver-
age risk are also similar. In the long run, maximum compensation pay-
ments will be similar too. More surprising is the fact that the number
of serious accidents per year of operation is the same for tankers and
nuclear reactors.
Features of the 1969 system are the shipowner's strict liability
limited to SDRs 14 million for large tankers and a smaller amount for
ships of under 105000 t registered tonnage. Not all liability is chan-
neled exclusively to the shipowner, and victims may therefore seek
compensation from the actual operator, the salvager. the shipbuilder,
or the state. This system was supplemented in 1971 by a compensation
fund financed by oil importers in the contracting countries. Since
1979, the compensation ceiling has been SDRs 45 million irrespective of
ship size. Shipowners from countries that have ratified the Convention
setting up the fund have had their maximum liability reduced from
SDRs 14 million to 8.3 million. It may be noted that this system is more
in the nature of an insurance for the damage to the oil importing coun-
tries themselves than supplementary liability insurance paid for by
importing countries for the benefit of victim countries.
The liability and compensation system set up in 1969 and 1971
entered into force in 1976-1978 and has proved satisfactory in every
case except for the two oil spills where a compensation ceiling was
greatly exceeded, this being a consequence of the steady erosion of
the value of the amounts set in 1969 and 1971 for liability and compen-
sation. In 1984 these were worth less than a quarter of their 1969
value.
Given the inadequacy of the compensation normally available for
the Amoco Cadiz oil spill in 1978. victims sought compensation outside
the terms of the 1969 Convention and took their case to the Court of
Chicago which held that liability for the accident lay not only with the
operator, Amoco Transport, but also with the parent company. Stan-
dard Oil of Indiana. What happened in this case greatly influenced the
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revision of the 1969 and 1971 Conventions. Another significant
incident was the Antonio Gramsci oil spill (5000 t near Riga in the
USSR) for which a Soviet court assessed "ecological" damage at 33 mil-
lion pounds sterling, a figure bearing no relation to assessments that
might have been made by courts in Western Europe.
The International Maritime Organization (lMO) Conference adopted
two Protocols in 1984 to revise the 1969 and 1971 Conventions. The lia-
bility and compensation figures were steeply increased after difficult
negotiations during which shipowners (and certain countries) sought to
limit the increase in their liability to a figure simply reflecting infla-
tion between 1971 and 1984.
A special procedure for revising liability and compensation
amounts was also adopted. It is not an indexing formula and will not
allow the amounts to be modified frequently. Tables 4.19 and 4.20 show
that the shipowners' maximum liability will decrease from SDRs 14 mil-
lion in 1969 to about SDRs 3.2 million by 1991 and maximum compensa-
tion from SDRs 30 million to 14.6 million over the same period.
Thereafter the position of victims will improve until, at best, amounts
equivalent to those adopted in 1969 and 1971 are reached.
The channeling of legal action for compensation has been
tightened. In future it will no longer be possible to sue the actual
Table -i.19. Changes over time in shipowners' maximum llabillty.B
Amounts
Year Decision in force Notes
Actual situation
1969
1976
1983
1984
14
9
5.2
16.9
o
9
5.2
4.9
Signing of the 1969 Convention ($14 M)
Entry into force of the 1969 Convention
Adoption of the 1984 Protocol (increase from
$14 M to $48.8 M, current prices)
Possible future situation
1991 11.3
1992 10.6
1993 10.0
1994 16.9
1996 15.1
1997 14.2
3.2
10.6
10.0
9.5
8.4
14.2
Implementation of the 1984 Protocol
Start of the revision of the 1984 Protocol
Revision of Protocol amount from $48.8 M
to $87.4 Mat current prices (maximum
permitted rate of 6% over ten years)
Implementation of the 1994 revision of
the 1984 Protocol.
BYlgures for a 105000 t. t.anker In millions of 1969 US dollars, assuming a 6'% Infia-
t.lon rat.e as from 1984.
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Table 4.20. Changes over time in maximum compensation (lankers). B
Decision Amounts inforce
Current 11J69 Current 11J69
Date prices prices prices prices Notes
Actual situation
1971 30 27.1 - - Signing of lhe 1971
Convention
1976 34.4 22.2 - - Enlry into force of lhe
1969 Convention
1978 37.2 20.9 37.2 20.9 Enlry into force of lhe
1971 Convention
1979 58.1 29.3 58.1 29.3 Revision of lhe 1971
Convention (X 1.5)
1983 50 18.4 50 18.4
1984 140-207 48.5-71.8 47 16.3 Revision Prolocol
Possible .future situation
1987 140-207 40.7-60.2 63 18.3 Second revision of lhe
1971 Convention ceiling
1991 140-207 32.3-47.8 63 14.6
1992 140-207 30.5-45.1 140 30.5 Partial enlry inlo force
of lhe 1984 Prolocol
Slarl of lhe revision of
lhe 1984 Prolocol
1993 140-207 28.7-42.4 140 28.7
1994 250-350 48.5-67.9 207 40.2 Full enlry inlo force of
lhe 1984 Prolocol
Revision of lhe 1984
Prolocol
1996 350 60.5 207 35.8
1997 350 57.0 250 41.1 Partial enlry inlo force
of lhe 1994 revision
1999 350 50.7 350 50.7 Full entry into force of
the 1994 revision
BIn mHlIons of US dollars, assuming a 6'% Inflation rate as from 1984.
operator, the salvager, or the state except in cases of intentional fault.
Surprisingly, however, it will be possible to proceed against the ship-
builder. The shipowner will benefit from limitation of liability except
in cases of intentional fault. whereas previously the limitation did not
apply where there was "actual fault or privity of the owner." To
prevent excessive claims, damage qualifying for compensation has been
defined more clearly so that courts will no longer be able to proceed
exclusively on the basis of the national law applicable. In accordance
with the new law of the sea, damage occurring within the economic zone
has been made subject to compensation, as has the cost of preventive
measures prior to an oil spill.
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The Protocols adopted in 1984 will increase victims' compensation
when they enter into force in 1990-1992 or later. In the interim,
governments will have recourse to the 1969-1971 system and, in some
cases, equivalent systems introduced voluntarily by shipowners
(TOVALOP) and oil companies (CRISTAL) [55].
National compensation systems have also been introduced, espe-
cially in the USA. They guarantee compensation up to as much as $200
million in some instances [56].
4.3.4. Compensation for damage due to offshore oil installAtions
Offshore installations are governed by the liability rules laid down by
the authorities of the country on whose shelf they operate. In the UK
liability is strict but limited. Many countries make liability both strict
and unlimited, on the grounds that offshore operations are ultrahaz-
ardous. It is noteworthy that Norway has dealt with the possibility of
an operator's proving insolvent after an accident by insisting that
parent companies underwrite the operator (in this connection see the
Amoco Cadiz ruling).
The purpose of the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed
Mineral Resources, which concerns countries bordering the North Sea,
is to set up a no-fault liability system with a SDRs 40 million limit for
pollution damage and measures to prevent or minimize pollution (with
the exception of well-control measures and measures taken to protect,
repair, or replace an installation). Not all the countries concerned
have signed this Convention, and none has ratified it. This is because,
for many of them, ratification would mean that a lower amount of com-
pensation would be available.
Oil companies operating offshore in the North Sea have formed a
pool within the framework of the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement
(OPOL). In the event of an accident, OPOL guarantees a maximum of $60
million compensation for pollution damage and preventive measures.
It should be noted that neither of these two systems covers the
cost of what has to be done to stop an oil blowout, which is often higher
than the costs that are covered. The economic losses suffered by
offshore operators through platform accidents have so far been much
higher than the cost of damage to the environment.
4.3.5. Clean-up costs for accumulations of dangerous waste
When an accumulation of waste (e.g. in an abandoned dump) is found to
be a source of danger to the environment and it is decided to remove
the waste for disposal in ways deemed acceptable today, the covering
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of the considerable removal and disposal costs raises very serious
problems. The companies who generated the waste, and those operat-
ing the dump who accepted it. may have acted in ignorance of the
dangers involved. and sometimes even in compliance with the adminis-
trative provisions in force at the time. Those liable, when identifiable,
were not always insured for civil liability and their ability to pay is
often very limited. Moreover. they could be held jointly liable for
waste dumped by others. Given that removal and disposal costs may
easily exceed several million dollars for each enterprise involved,
governments understandably find themselves obliged to contribute
financially to the solution of some of these environmental problems.
In the USA, "Superfund" totaling $1600 million was set up for five
years in 1980 under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Figures quoted in the current
debate about the renewal of this Act suggest that some $7.5 billion will
be paid into Superfund for the second five-year period. Of these
resources, 861. is from taxes on chemicals and oil products, and the bal-
ance from the federal budget. Its main purpose is to finance the remo-
val and disposal of waste from abandoned sites.
Under CERCLA, any person dumping waste is held to be liable for
it, without proof of fault, and must meet any costs incurred by the
government in connection with the waste and indemnify the government
up to a maximum of $50 million for any damage caused to publicly owned
natural resources. Any such person deliberately causing damage or
infringing mandatory waste disposal provisions loses the benefit of the
$50 million maximum. Should he fail to remove waste when ordered to
do so, he can be sentenced to punitive damages equal to three times the
cost of removal. Surprisingly, the current CERCLA does not amend the
liability rules regarding compensation for damage caused by waste to
private persons.
Over the last few years, several large US enterprises have been
made to pay for the clearing of old disposal sites at a cost of several
million dollars per site. However, it seems that only a quarter of the
cost will be met by the enterprises liable. the balance coming from the
Superfund.
In other OECD countries, the setting up of a fund to cover the
costs of cleaning up old waste dumps has not so far been deemed neces-
sary [57]. When the waste producer can be identified and has the
necessary resources, he is often ordered to meet the cost. As for the
future, the trend is to prevent dangerous wastes building up and to
increase the extent to which the authorities are responsible for dump-
ing and other disposal facilities. In the USA, moreover, operators of
waste disposal facilities are obliged to meet their liability (including all
clean-up costs outside their property) up to a ceiling of $1 million for
each sudden incident. and $3 million for each nonsudden incident.
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One unanswered question is whether a waste producer effectively
transfers all liability attaching to the waste when he hands it over to a
government-approved disposal agent. Another is how to organize viable
funding systems to guarantee compensation, after site closure, for
environmental damage caused by dumps operated in conformity with the
legislation and regulations. One such fund has been set up in the USA
and financed to the sum of $200 million by a tax on waste delivered to
dumps.
4.3.6. Compensation for damage caused by air pollution
Damage to health by air pollution is covered in many countries by sick-
ness insurance (social security). In Japan. where such systems are less
developed, a serious problem has arisen in highly polluted industrial
areas. Legislation has been enacted to provide compensation for vic-
tims in certain areas by means of a tax on industrial sulfur emissions
(80%) and on car emissions (20%). The yield rose from Y 35 billion in
1975 (20755 compensated victims) to nearly Y 100 billion in 1982 (85541
compensated victims).
As it can sometimes be difficult to establish a causal link between
air pollution damage and the person responsible, the Netherlands has
established a compensation fund to cover air pollution damage which
would not otherwise be compensated. Up to now, this fund has inter-
vened only very rarely and for modest amounts [58].
4.3.7. Compensation for damage due to noise
Compensation for people living near airports has been awarded on the
basis of no-fault liability on the part of the airlines or because of
abnormal neighborhood disturbance of the airport (e.g. Orly in France,
Osaka in Japan).
A more effective method is to pay for soundproofing and provide
compensation for erosion of property values out of public funds or
under special legislation (Land Compensation Act in the UK). Compen-
sation funds financed by noise levies have been introduced in France,
in the UK (Manchester), the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Japan [59].
4.3.8. Conclusions
Because of the scale of environmental damage which could be and has
been caused by radioactivity, oil slicks, discharges of dangerous waste,
air pollution, and noise. some governments have established special
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compensation systems to protect both the industries concerned, and
public and private victims. These systems, which rely on insurance and
contributions by government or the industries concerned, should make
it possible to collect larger sums and to compensate victims more
rapidly without having first to prove that any particular party has
been at fault.
These arrangements could be extended to other countries and
other problems, so that, in the event of serious environmental damage,
victims should receive compensation without delay and without having
to rely on government help (except in certain special circumstances).
In other words, one could try to implement the "polluter pays" princi-
ple more fully, so that the cost of the damage is borne by the firm
responsible for it or, rather, by all firms in the industry concerned, by
sharing out the risks among them all. The risk can be shared out in
this way via insurance and reinsurance [60] or via a fund constituted
from levies on the products of the industrial sector concerned (Table
4.21).
To facilitate compensation, it would be necessary for government
to step in to introduce the industrial levy designed to feed a compensa-
tion fund, and to insist that polluting plants have full insurance cover
for civil liability. This is because experience has shown that some
firms have been unable to pay up in the event of costly pollution, while
some have gone out of business. Experience has also shown that vic-
tims may in some cases not obtain satisfactory compensation, through
inability to identify the polluter or to establish the chain of causality,
and may have great difficulty in obtaining the funds necessary to pur-
sue their claim.
The problem with major disasters is that they impose a heavy if
not impossible financial burden on the firm liable, and on victims and
perhaps even insurers who may not have sufficient finance. Conse-
quently, government may be called upon to intervene to save the firm
or help victims. Such intervention may be justified if the government
has tolerated or authorized a dangerous activity without providing for
compensation. It may also be justified if the disaster is so great as to
exceed existing compensation ceilings [61]. Lastly, it may result from
the fact that a government may sometimes implement measures which
are not necessarily justified but correspond to a "political" need; or
the government may not have been able to evaluate the dangers of a
particular form of pollution or land use which only proved to be
dangerous several years later.
To reduce the frequency of government involvement and to
prevent the taxpayer from having to bear costs which should be met by
those benefiting from the technology concerned, the government might
encourage the introduction of systems based on insurance and rein-
surance to guarantee compensation for environmental damage of up to
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Table 40.21. Civil liability in certain high-risk activities (up to 1984).
Number
Type worldwide
Nuclear USA 82
reactors Other coun-
tries 182
Oil 3127 over
tankers 10000 DWt
Oil rigs 700
Annual premium for
$10 M liability
coverage: ca.
$0.1 M/reactor
Annual premiums:
shipowners, ca. $50 M;
oil importers, ca. $50 M
Premiums
Unlimited
Max. damages paid:
$300 M (Chisso)
$595 M
$16-383 M
Max. damages paid:
$33 M
SDRs 45 M
Max. damages paid8 :
$50 M of 1980
(l'anio)
Pollution: $60 M
or unlimited
Max. damages paid:
$30 M
(Santa Barbara)
$100 ODD/passenger
or unlimited (USA)
Max. damages paid:
$100 M/crash
Unlimited
Max. damages paid:
$3 M (Cosmos)
Ma.zimum third
party liability
Premiums: $185 M/year
for civil liability
and $440 M/year
for hull insurance
1975-1982 accidents:
$192 M
1983 accidents: $85 M
1984 accidents: 3
($300 M)
Premiums: 10-20%
ElLb Insurance in the
USA
Premiums: $40 M
in 1983, $65 M in 1984
Max. cover: $30 M per
accident in 1983,
$20 M in 1984
Unlimited Accident frequency:
Max. damages paid: 2 X 10-4 to 2 X 10-5
$600 M (Tetons) per year
Several dozen
insured per
year
8950 aircraft
10000
6000 to 12000
according to
definition
(according to
Seveso Directive
1500 in the EEC)
Dangerous
plant
(pollution)
Dams
Satellites
Civil
aviation
8Compensatlon to be paid for the Amoco Cadiz could be higher.
bElL, environmental Impairment lIablll ty.
several tens or hundreds of millions of dollars per incident. No doubt,
this kind of initiative will only be taken when public opinion realizes
that the present situation is rather unsatisfactory and that serious
damage can be caused by firms with limited financial resources.
In the meantime, widely varying compensation systems are to be
found. Some may require insurance cover for unlimited no-fault liability
while others give victims of serious pollution little chance of obtaining
compensation.
A first step forward would be to authorize "dangerous" activities
only on condition that s1."tisfaetory liability cover is obtained (financial
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security or insurance) especially for firms with only moderate financial
resources [29]. A second move would be to harmonize liability systems
by the general adoption of no-fault liability which already applies for
certain types of pollution in all countries [62].
Since such developments would impose extra costs on those poten-
tially liable and would run counter to certain "traditional" legal princi-
pIes, they will come about only very gradually and perhaps only at
international level so as to share out the high risks involved. Yet there
is no argument based on economics or equity to refute the principle
that those who create a hazard should take responsibility for it, given
that the small extra cost involved will in any case ultimately be borne
by the consumer.
Notes
[1] The author is solely responsible for the opinions expressed here.
[2] On technological risks, see Lagadec (1979; 1981a,b).
[3] Many accidents causing environmental damage seriously impair the
health of workers and users, and facilities themselves, but those
consequences are not examined here. Aspects not discussed include
decontamination and decommissioning of polluting installations, and
compensation for workers and members of the armed forces affected
(e.g. asbestosis, which has caused 50000 ca.sualties in the USA with
possible compensation of between $5 Band $30 B; agent orange; $180 M
for US civilian and armed forces victims of nuclear tests in Nevada,
USA); compensation for victims of thalidomide, mercury wheat in Iran,
toxic oils and adulterated foods in Spain and Japan, and Bendectin in
the USA ($120 M); intrauterine device (IUD) users (7700 cases, $259
M); gas distribution explosions; damage by ships to port facilities; etc.
Similarly, we do not consider damage caused by volcanic eruptions,
floods, hurricanes, road noise, acid rain, or diffuse pollution due to
phosphates, nitrates, or pesticides, excess mortality in polluted cities,
the purchase of the right to pollute in fishing areas, expropriation
prior to the construction of roads or airports, etc.
[4] FF, French francs.
[5] Very full statistics on tanker accidents have been drawn up by the P
and I Clubs (Revision of 1969 Civil Liability Convention and 1971 Fund
Convention, IMO-LEG, February 1984). Studies of these statistics have
been produced by the OCIMF (position papers, IMO-LEG documents,
1982, 1983, 1984) and by the author (Smets, 1984).
[6] The figure of 1983 $120 M for the Amoco Cadiz spill compensation
reflects the following estimates:
IT 800 M, Minister for the Sea, France (Le Monde, October 1982).
FF 1 B, Environment Ministry Official (Int. Env. Rep., 1984,
P 188).
The original claims were much higher but do not seem to fit in the
framework of this study. French claims in the Amoco Cadiz case (Le
Monde, 13 March 1985) are given in Table 4.22.. According to Standard
CompensaH.onfor Exceptional Environmental Damage 121
Oil of Indiana (Wall street Journal, 6 March 1985) the total claim is
only for $665 M.
Table 4.22. French claims in the Amoco Cadiz case.
Government
Various private claims
''Syndicat mixte"
Department of CDtes du Nord
Department of Finist~re
43 CDtes du Nord communes
47 Finist~re communes
Sea fishermen
Shellfish producers
Nature associations
Tourism industry
TOTAL
1978 FF 478 M
1978 FF 980 M
1978 FF 13.7 M
15.9
339.5
454.8
57.2
75.5
6.3
16.3
$263M
$218M
$287.8 M
$769 M (1985)
[7] See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1983) and DEeD
(1982).
[8] Pollution of the Niger delta in 1980 (270000 bbl of oil after an explo-
sion) involved an oil slick covering 100 km of coast and extending 30
km inland, seriously affecting a population of 250000 dependent upon
fishing. The Nigerian Government provided about $6 M in aid and Tex-
aco voluntarily gave $1 M [Earthscan, 3 (8), 1980].
[9] In the USA, the cost of cleaning up old dumps is thought to be between
$8.4 Band $26 B (see Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News, 1984, p 5).
In December 1984 the US Environmental Protection Agency estimated
that the approximately 1800 priority sites would by themselves cost the
government $12 B to clean up and anticipated that those responsible
would pay something of the same order. The clean-up cost is expected
to rise from $290 M per year to $1 B per year. In 1985 the US Govern-
ment proposed a new $5.3 B Superfund for five years, two-thirds of
which would be financed by a levy on wastes.
[10] According to the Dutch Minister, Mr. Winsemius, clean-up costs for
hazardous dumps in the Netherlands will amount to several hundred
million dollars and the Netherlands Government decided to spend $33.3
M in 1983 (Int. Env. Rep., 1983, p 390). At Lekkerkerk, 270 houses
were evacuated gulden (G 200 M); at Dordrecht 106 houses will have to
be demolished and the total cost of the operation may reach G 750 M.
At Gouderak, 99 houses will have to be demolished (333 people, G 20 M)
and soils will have to be shifted (G 100 M) (Ambio, 13, 1984, p 71. The
Netherlands is expected to spend G 200 M per year over 15 years to
eliminate old dumps. In 1984, the Netherlands Government had already
spent G 600 M to clean up older dumps and had commenced legal
proceedings against Duphar, Shell, Phillips, and Argrunal amounting to
a total of G 125 M.
[11] According to the French Environment Ministry (Les anciens d~ots
industriels, May 1D84), the cost of eliminating older dumps (of which
there were 62 in 1978) varies from a few tens of thousands of francs to
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several hundred thousand francs. Two dumps (Carling and Mulhouse)
will cost several million francs. The same report cites the following
clean-up costs: Lillebonne (FF 5 M), Saint S~bastien (FF 4.8 M), Mul-
house (FF 3.7 M), Dannemarie (FF 3 M), Abscon (FF 1.5 M), Mailleraye
(FF 1.2 M), Traitt (FF 1.2 M), Montjalin (FF 1.2 M), Gravenchon (FF 1 M),
Roumazi~re (FF 3 M). The total of cases exceeding FF 1 M amounts to
some FF 29 M for a period of about five years (i.e. an annual cost of
over FF 6 M). Overall, the 92 older listed dumps may represent costs of
the order of FF 50 M (at most FF 10 M per year). Such costs are very
low in comparison with the costs of eliminating toxic wastes in France
(FF 600 M a year). However, the situation is not very satisfactory
because, in France in 1984, the official services were aware of the des-
tination of only 1.1 M out of the 2 M tons of dangerous waste produced
(Presse Envir., 28 September 1984).
[12] See Int. Env. Rep., 1979, p 851 and 1984, p 137, The Sumitomo Mining
Company case.
[13] Opening Speech at the OECD Conference on Environment and Econom-
ics, 18 June 1984.
[14] According to Goubet (1979), the total risk of dam bursts in Western
Europe and Japan is calculated at 0.2 X 10-4 (1 for 50000 dam-years)
mainly due to the risk of submersion. According to Goubet, the burst
costing the most lives before 1979 was at South Fork River, Pennsyl-
vania, which is thought to have killed between 2000 and 4000 in 1889.
Other older disasters have been at San Francis (400-2000 killed,
1929), Iruka (1200 killed, 1868), Mohne (1200 killed, 19(2). Between
1966 and 1979, 17 of the 21 dams to have burst in the world were of
earth and only one was in Europe (Spain).
[15] For accidents caused by chemicals in factories and transport, see
Andurand (1979). In 1958, a refinery accident at Signal Hill (Califor-
nia) caused damage to neighboring properties estimated at $3.5 M. In
1974, an organic peroxide fire in a Los Angeles warehouse caused $5 M
in damage to the neighborhood. In 1973, a liquefied petroleum gas fire
at a Staten Island plant caused 40 deaths and $5 M worth of damage.
[16] Of the accidents involVing the road transport of hazardous materials,
those at Los Alfaques and Xilatopec were far more severe than the
accidents at St Amand Les Eaux, France, 1973 (4 deaths, 2 missing, and
37 casualties), Li~vin, France, 1976 (6 killed, 20 hospital casualties),
and Martelange, Belgium, 1973. Los Alfaques and Xilatopec must be
regarded as exceptional in comparison with all road transport
accidents in which the actual cargo caused high damage to third par-
ties. But they appear less exceptional if all transport accidents are
considered, some of which do cause heavy loss of life (e.g. buses falling
into ravines, vehicles out of control in a crowd). The most cosUy road
transport accident in the USA seems to have been at Eagle Pass, Texas,
where a liquefied petroleum gas tanker exploded (17 deaths, 34 casual-
ties) and caused $50 M worth of damage.
[17] The Indian tribe St R~gis claimed $50 M compensation for fluorine pol-
lution by the Reynold Metal Co. and Alcoa plant on the Cornwall Isle of
the St Lawrence (Int. Env. Rep., 1980, p 101).
[18] In 1928, in Hamburg, 10 t of phosgene escaped from storage in a chemi-
cal plant. Damage to the vegetation extended up to 14 km from the
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plant owing to a large 2 km cloud, causing 11 deaths and 200 poisoning
casualties - a forerunner of the Bhopal accident.
[19J At Mississauga, economic losses are thought to have amounted to $25 M
per day of evacuation. The accident caused the compulsory evacuation
of 75000 families of which 71200 stayed with relatives or friends and
3800 in reception centers [see the study by P. Lagadec (1984), based
on the final report of Burton et al., 1983]. Canadian Rail Pacific is
thought to have paid $10 M to the evacuees and the accident to have
caused $70 M worth of damage (mainly economic losses due to the shut-
ting down of activities). The costs of cleaning up an acrylonitrile spill
from a train in Indiana in 1977 amounted to $1 M. A derailment in Texas
causing a propane fire enlailed damage of $4 M to properties in 1977.
(See Swaigen, 1981.) When ammonia poisoning killed two people in their
own homes as the result of a derailment on the Louisville and Nashville
Railways in the USA the compensation paid was $52 M (Pfennigstorf,
1982).
[20J See Int. Env. Rep.. 11 April 1979 and 14 March 1984.
[21J The Seveso accident (1.6 kg of dioxin) contaminated an area of 1800 ha.
The population affected was 37235 (including 735 in the most heavily
polluted 110 ha and 4699 in the vicinity). Immediately after the ac-
cident 3300 chickens and 12 livestock animals died. Tolal animal losses
were 80000 chickens and 650 livestock.
After the accident the government enacted Laws Nos. 615 (19
August 1975) and 688 (8 October 1976) which provided fiscal facilities
for pollution victims, an advance of L 40 B to the Lombardy region,
grants to workers, pensioners, farmers, craftsmen, and shopkeepers,
and exemption from social security contributions. These were ad-
vances on compensation payable with a right of subrogation. The ex-
penditure anticipated in 1977 (Gaz. uJficiale della Regione Lombar-
dia, Suppl. No. 28, 14 July 1977) amounted to L 121.6 B (SF 328.6 M),
listed in Table 4.23. In addition to these were the costs of decommis-
sioning the plant and eliminating the pollution in its vicinity. In
Table 4.23. Breakdown of expenditure on compensation for Seveso.
Welfare assistance to displaced
persons, accommodation, schools, etc.
Contributions to craftsmen, farmers,
shopkeepers, and industrialists
Health inspection and other
medical outlays
Improvement of contaminated zone
(removal of contaminated earth. pro-
vision of fresh earth, elimination
of pollution, planting, etc.)
Civil engineering
General
TOTAL
(1D77 L B)
15.1
13.7
18.1
66.4
7.8
0.5
121.6
(1D77 SFM)
40.8
37.0
48.9
179.5
21.1
1.3
328.6
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Table 4.24. Breakdown of costs to Hoffman-
Laroche of third party damages.
(W84SFM)
Italian Government
Lombardy region (clean-up. health programme)
Compensation to residents and firms
Compensation to local authorities
Miscellaneous
Total
15
147
58
25
58
303
December 1980, Givaudan (Switzerland), the Italian government and the
region of Lombardy reached a settlement amounting to L 103 B. The
accident cost Hoffman-Laroche over SF 300 million in third party dam-
ages. broken down in Table 4.24. Additional costs were for cleaning up
of the plant itself and for financial losses (loss of capital, compensa-
tion to workers, lost income. etc.). Soil decontamination costs in zone
A (the most heavily polluted) amounted to some SF 46 M (60 ha). Re-
strictions on the agricultural use of 1800 ha lasted six years. In 1984,
only a few cases of chloracne persisted and a 40 ha park had been
established in the contaminated area. The cost of eliminating plant
wastes (41 drums) is thought to be SF 3 M. paid out by Mannesmann
Italia which received SF 500000 for its attempts to recover the wastes
after their disappearance (Int. Env. Rep., 11 July 1984, p 220).
[22] The gas that leaked at Bhopal was methyl isocyanate, which is five
times more toxic than phosgene and 50 times more toxic than chlorine
which were used as gas weapons during World War I. Methyl isocyanate
was well known to be very dangerous, having asphyxiated a Bhopal
employee in 1981. Apart from the 2500 people killed by asphyxia and
other acute effects, the consequences of the Bhopal accident have not
yet been completely determined. According to European Chemical
News (December 1984) and UNEP News (January 1985), 200000 persons
are thought to have inhaled the gas. 120000 to 150000 have received
treatment from 1000 doctors, 20000 are thought to have been seriously
poisoned, and thousands may expect minor eye or lung disorders. Ner-
vous system, liver, and kidney disorders may occur later. The long-
term effects are as yet uncertain. but several miscarriages. still-
births, and nonviable births have already occurred. Ascertaining what
caused the observed lung disorders will be complicated by the fact that
the exposed population was not in an excellent state of health to begin
with. Large numbers of animals were also killed (over 1500 buffalo,
cows, and goats). People in Bhopal panicked both after the disaster
and again when the plant was recommissioned. Over 150000 people are
thought to have left Bhopal on two occasions. The toxic gas is thought
to have spread over 50 km2. The damage caused by this disaster can-
not be assessed at this stage as it depends to a large extent on the
number of handicapped and the extent of their disability, and also on
whether Indian or US criteria are used. If compensation is calculated
on the basis of current legal practice and salary levels in India, it may
not amount to more than a few hundred million dollars. In that case the
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Bhopal disaster will not cost the parties liable, or their insurers, much
more than compensation paid in the USA by insurance companies after
two wide-bodied airliner accidents.
Union Carbide is understood to have up to $200 M civil liability
insurance cover, its Indian subsidiary up to rupees (Rs) 25 million.
The 51% owned subsidiary operates 13 factories in India, whose turn-
over is Rs 2.12 B with profits of Rs 150 M, making it one of India's 20
largest firms.
[23] In September 1984 a bromine leak at Fawley (Southampton, UK)
affected between 60 and 70 people and will be the subject of compensa-
tion. In the USA in 1984, a methyl isocyanate leak at Middleport, New
York, caused eye trouble to nine children, and an accidental pesticide
leak at Linden, New Jersey, put 160 people in hospital. In Switzerland,
between 2 and 3 kg of bromine leaked in Geneva in November 1984.
During the same month 29 people (local residents and employees) in
Liverpool (UK) were poisoned by a chlorine leak when two chemicals
were mixed. Two months later, 16 were still receiving treatment. The
accident was due to a labeling error. Civil proceedings are in hand
and a fine of 3600 pounds sterling has been imposed. In the USA in
December 1984, a defective wagon carrying 80000 1 of ethylene oxide
at Little Rock, Arkansas, obliged the authorities to evacuate 2500 peo-
ple for a night. In December 1984, 3000 people were evacuated for 24
hours from Callao, Peru, following a tetraethyllead pipeline break. At
Matamoras, Mexico, in December 1984, 3000 people had to be evacu-
ated and 200 received hospital treatment when 35000 1 of ammonia
leaked at a fertilizer factory. In January 1985, 42 people had to be
hospitalized when cholorine leaked in a textile plant at Trichur, India,
and four Gujarat villages were troubled by a gas leak from a chemicals
plant, while at Javalpur 100 people had eye and throat irritations after
inhaling gas leaking from sodium hydrosulfate drums contaminated by
water. In January 1985 at Karlskoga, Sweden, 30 t of sulfuric acid
vapor formed a 3 km 2 cloud above the town. The accident, caused by
cold weather in the Bofors-Nobel plant, involved evacuating 300 peo-
ple and hospitalizing 20. The 35000 residents were advised not to
leave their homes and to keep doors and windows closed. In January
1985, 15 t of ammonia leaked at a national fertilizer plant at Cubatao,
Brazil, resulting in the evacuation of 5000 people and hospitalization
for 300. At Westmalle, Belgium, in February 1985, a cloud of chlorine
and hydrochloric acid put 25 people in hospital. The town center was
closed off to traffic and residents were advised to stay at home with
doors and windows closed. In February 1985 an ammonia leak in a
prawn processing plant in North Sumatra injured 130 workers, some
requiring hospital treatment. In March 1985 a mesitylene cloud leak
from a Union Carbide facility at Charleston made ten people ill, putting
four in hospital.
[24] In France in September 1984, a truck lost drums containing 22 t of
sodium cyanide on a motorway at Lyons. About 15 t of cyanide spilled
onto the road surface and had it come into contact with rain would have
threatened the city with large-scale poisoning. Fortunately the
dangerous substances were recovered 10 minutes before rain began to
fall.
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[25] Total compensation paid out for air pollution in Japan between 1973 and
1982 is thought to be of the order of Y 650 B, i.e. the equivalent of
over $3 B, to some 85000 victims (nearly $5000 per year per person).
[26] Water pollution accidents in the USA between 1976 and 1980 caused on
average 687 substantial fish losses per year (averaging 4000 fish per
accident). Of those accidents, 21.2% involved farming, 17.2% industry,
24.2% municipal undertakings (e.g. electricity) and transport, 12% had
other causes and 25.3% were for unknown cases [see Environmental
Quality, 1983, Table A29 (Fourteenth Annual Report of the Council on
Environmental Quality, Washington, DC)]. That distribution shows that
industry in the broad sense is not responsible for most fish destruction
and that in at least one-quarter of the cases no compensation will prob-
ably be paid (diffuse agricultural pollution). In the FRG, the average
number of losses of dangerous chemicals (other than from tankers) pol-
luting water during storage and transport was 208 per year between
1979 and 1981. In 1981, 1504 accidents (oil and other dangerous sub-
stances) involved 7259 m3 of which 5633 m3 were recovered. Surface
water pollution occurred in 650 cases. In France there were 19 main
pollution accidents in industry in 1983.
[27] Deprimoz (1984). According to Deprimoz, there are three potential
damage levels:
(1) Pleasure fishing: between FF 100000 and FF 1 M.
(2) Drinking water pollution: FF 5-10 M.
(3) Toxic air pollution: FF 100 M.
The French market can offer cover of up to FF 30 M or even FF 50 M.
In 1983, some 400 French firms, mainly small and medium sized, took out
a contract called GARPOL with a maximum cover of FF 20 M. Most
French firms insure against accidental pollution liability under their
existing civil liability policy.
[28] The death of 60 t of fish following a spill of 1700 kg of hydroquinone
into the Rhone in 1982 cost Rhone-Poulenc FF 120000 in compensation
to fishing associations as "good neighbor" payments (2 F/kg). The firm
also paid a FF 12000 fine and FF 16000 damages to nature protection
bodies. According to "Donn~es ~conomiques de l'environnement" (Doc.
Franc., 1984), the cost of the damage was FF 1 M.
[29] One consequence of very costly pollution cases could be for gradual
and even accidental pollution to be excluded from insurance policies
covering the liability of firms (as already for radioactive pollution).
The pollution risk would then have to be covered by an additional pol-
icy which might seem costly and might not be taken out by all hazardous
undertakings that already have liability insurance. As a result, cover
of pollution risk would be even worse than at present.
At the end of 1984 the US Insurance Services Office developed a
model operator's liability policy which excludes all pollution damage.
The result is that pollution risk cover will only be available under spe-
cial pollution policies. That decision was partly related to the Jackson
Township (New Jersey) case ($15.8 M) in which gradual pollution of
groundwater was found to be an accidental situation.
In this case, the jury awarded. in November 1983. $8.2 M for med-
ical surveillance costs, $5.4 M for impairment of quality of life, $2 M
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for emotional distress, $104000 for expenses in securing new water
supplies, and $92000 for nuisance damages. After appeal, the awards
for medical surveillance and emotional distress were nullified. Further
appeals are being introduced. In the Jackson Township case, contami-
nation of the water supply system (well water) was caused by the opera-
tion of a municipal waste disposal facility. No illness or injuries to
health were established. The Jackson Township was insured for sudden
and accidental releases. The court found that unintended pollution
damage from gradual contamination constituted an accident and quali-
fied for coverage (see Baran, 1985).
In Minnesota. as a result of the MERLA Act making firms liable for
wastes produced since 1960, insurers have decided no longer to cover
gradual pollution (environment impairment liability insurance) and 27
firms are no longer insured (see Int. Env. Rep., 13 June 1984, p 199).
According to the Wall street Journal (20 March 1985), the pollution
insurance market has collapsed in the USA.
[30] A study ($300000) of the decontamination of the River Wabigoon shows
that it will cost $20 M to extract the mercury-contaminated sediments.
The contamination, discovered in 1970, could involve the liability of a
paper mill (see Int. Env. Rep., 11 July 1984, p 221, and 12 September
1984, p 291). When Reed sold the mill to Dryden it was agreed that
Reed would not be responsible for damages beyond $15 M (mercury pol-
lution of the Wabigoon) (see Int. Env. Rep., 1980, p 101).
[31] In France, three airlines were ordered to pay FF 2.73 M in 1979 to a
commune In the neighborhood of Orly airport. Two other cases are
before the courts for damage in the neighborhood of Roissy airport. It
has been decided in principle that the air companies are liable, but
four years later the assessment of damage has not been completed. In
another case, 87 applicants were Invited in 1982 to contribute FF 7000
each towards costs of expert witnesses (medical, FF 1000; acoustic, FF
3000; property valuer, FF 3000). An appeal has been lodged against
this decision, which will be very influential in regard to collective dam-
age. Payments have been made from 1981 to finance soundproofing for
88 private buildings near Paris airports (FF 1.2 M). Other payments
have been made for the soundproofing of 79 schools (FF 58 M) and eight
medical/welfare Institutions (FF 8 M). FF 114 M were spent to purchase
377 buildings for demolition.
[32] Exhaustive statistics for compensation associated with civil nuclear
accidents In the USA (Marrone, 1984) highlight the Three Mile Island
accident as a unique case. Other accidents cost less than $700000 (18
accidents between $7500 and $75000, nine accidents between $75000
and $750000 from 1962 to 1982). The Three Mile Island accident was
unique because it is the only insured reactor to have polluted its
neighborhood with radioactivity. Furthermore, the cost of compensa-
tion reflects the panic caused by the accident rather than the physical
effect of the radiation emitted.
[33] The damages paid to third party victims of the Three Mile Island
accident were:
(1) $1.3 M: evacuation costs of 3170 families (including $92400 for
loss of earnings by 636 claimants).
128 Insuring and Manag1.ng Hazardous R1.sks
(2) $20 M: flnanciallosses of residents within a 25-mile radius.
(3) $5 M: costs of medical surveillance of residents within the 25-
mile radius (paid to a "public health fund").
(4) Payments to local authorities for disruption of their activities.
There are still many unsettled proceedings for personal injury (stress,
cardiac disorders, genetic defects, etc.) assoclated more wlth the
panic caused than with radioactivity as such (1.4 mrem on 2 M people).
(Marrone, 1985). In February 1985, a further settlement was signed
with 280 claimants for an unknown amount in excess of $4 M. It is
noteworthy that evacuation costs were paid only In respect of a small
number of families out of all those deciding to leave their homes
(nearly 50000). For the utility concerned, the accident had a much
greater financial impact. The cost of the Three Mile Island accident
for the undertaking is estimated at $4 B (Nuclear News, January 1981):
I.e. $1 B for decontamination; $430 M for repairs; $1.5 B for substitute
electricity supplies; two reactors' down time, $950 M; financial costs,
$40 M. The cost of substitute electricity is thought to have been $14 M
per month.
[34] A 450 Ci cobalt-60 source dumped nepr Ciuadad Juarez (Mexico) seri-
ously irradiated some 140 persons and in 1983 contaminated 6000 t of
steel and the production of a Mexican cast-iron factory. The Aceros de
Chihuaha company might be fined Pesos 7 M ($435000) for air pollution
and physical injury. Over 1000 t of steel were exported to the USA.
Several hundred houses in Mexico may have to be demolished. The
costs of storing the contaminated steel are in excess of $1 million (see
Int. Env. Rep., 14 March 1984, p 73; 8 August 1984; and Science, 223,
1984, p 1152).
[35] In the USA wastes from uranium mining were used as a building material
in the 1950s but were found to be slightly radioactive. The US Govern-
ment has undertaken a substantial decontamination program applying in
1984 to over 61 properties in Colorado ($17500 per property) (New
York Ti.mes. 14 May 1984).
[36] The collision between two Boelng 747s at Tenerife in 1977 cost $161 M
in insurance and the Chicago DC-l0 crash in 1979 cost $122 M. Between
1978 and 1983, accidents to wide-bodied aircraft cost up to $52 M for
the aircraft and $100 M for civil liability. For the four costliest
accidents in the USA, average compensation was $470000 per death.
Thus the loss of a wide-bodied aircraft in the USA carrying 300
passengers could cost $141 M for civil liability. In Europe, the cost
would be lower because the compensation limit per passenger is tending
to be established at Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 100000 (Montreal
Protocol No.3). In France, the limit has been FF 500000 since May
1982. Since 1983 losses In aviation insurance amounted to $700 M, a
40% increase in premiums has been announced.
[37] This obviously does not apply to major accidents, which can cause dam-
age well in excess of the value of the plant affected. The Bhopal plant
had cost some $30 M, much less than the compensation to be antici-
pated. The same applies to the ICMESA plant at Seveso. However, the
pollution risk is still low compared to the risk of losing the plant.
Insurance for the pollution risk may cost a polluting firm 0.1% of its
turnover.
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The highesl risks can be Insured againsl, since Union Carbide
whose lIabllily was insured up lo $200 M declined an exlension lo
$300 M which would have cosl $30000 (0.03% of addlUonal cover). Cer-
lain leading chemical corporaUons In lhe USA have insured for civil
liabilily up lo $800 M. In France, Rhone Poulenc Is lhoughl lo be
Insured up lo FF 500 M againsl lhird parly liabilily (wilh lhe firsl
FF 100 M exempl).
[38] For example, a nuclear power slaUon operalor in Belgium or Japan
faces a nuclear lIabilily premium lhal is aboullen limes lower lhan lhe
cosl of Insuring lhe power slaUon ilself. The liabilily oil pollution
premiums paid lo lhe P and I clubs (mulual insurance companies)
represenl under 17% of lhe P and I premiums for lanker owners' civil
lIabllily. Of alllhe insurance premiums paid by an owner, pollution lia-
bilily accounls for under 5%, lhe cargo being insured by lhe shipper.
According lo a sludy by M and M Prolecllon Consullanls, Major Oil
Industry Losses Exceeding $I Million 1.964-80, lhe average (insured)
loss for offshore facllilles belween 1969 and 1980 was $97.5 M per
year. This figure is well over len limes lhe civil liabilily for pollution.
In aviation, malerial losses are lwice as high as civil liabilily. Tolal
premiums are 0.6% of fleel values ($102879 M in 1983). Tolal pollution
civilliabilily premiums in lhe USA for 1983 were $40 M, while properly
and casually insurance premium volume amounled lo $110 B.
[39] Among lhe costliesl accidenls for insurers and reinsurers, Sigma
(Oclober 1982) ciles:
(1) The San Francisco earlhquake (1906): $350 M (I.e. $41.6 B nowa-
days).
(2) Hurricane Belsy (1965): $715 M (I.e. $2.2 B nowadays).
(3) Hurricane Frederick (1979): $752 M (I.e. $1 B nowadays).
Nalural calaslrophes belween 1970 and 1981 caused insurers lo pay
oul compensation as in Table 4.25. According lo Berlz (1984), for
TobIe 4.25. Compensallon for nalural calaslrophes, 1970-1981.
Compensation range
$50-100 M:
$100-200 M:
$200-400 M:
$400-800 M:
No. oj incidents (Total compensation)
13 ($964 M)
9 ($1156 M)
4 ($1175 M)
23 ($1232 M)
Source: Sigma (current US dollars).
nalural disaslers belween 1960 and 1983 lhe cosl dislribution Is as in
Table 4.213.
According lo Sigma, 21 fire accidenls exceeded $25 M belween
1970 and 19B1 (currenl US dollars):
$25-50 M:
$50-100 M:
$100-200 M:
12 ($476 M)
6 ($359 M)
3 ($463 M)
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Table 4.28. Cost distribution for natural disasters, 1960-1983.
Loss range
$50-100 M
$100-200 M
$200-400 M
$400-800 M
$800 M-1.6 B
$1.6-3.2 B
Over $3.2 B
TOTAL
Assessed losses
9 ($2424 M)
18 ($10043 M)
11 ($12420 M)
9 ($21250 M)
2 ($13300 M)
49 ($59437 M)
Insured losses
9 ($585 M)
7 ($838 M)
7 ($1896 M)
4 ($2395 M)
1 ($825 M)
28 ($6539 M)
Source: Bertz, 1984 (current US dollars).
An enquiry by M and M Protection Consultants into material dam-
ages between 1951 and 1980 in the oil and chemicals industry (explo-
sions, fires) shows that the 65 costliest accidents break down as follows
(1981 US dollars):
$15-30 M: 34 accidents ($665 M)
$30-60 M: 21 accidents ($839 M)
$60-120 M: 10 accidents ($813 M)
According to the RecueiL de donn~es statistiques sur
l'assurance automobile en France (French Car Insurance Statistics,
1982, Table 81, Assembl~e G~n~rale des Soci~t~s d'Assurance contra
les Accidents), sums paid in respect of civil liability for material dam-
age and personal injury in car accidents in France are given in Table
4.2:1.
Table 4.27. Sums paid for civil liability for
material damage and personal injury in France.
Amount Number Costs
(FF) (%) (%)
1000-10000 68.4 29.4
10000-100000 8.5 28.1
100000-1 M 0.9 27.9
over 1 M ca.O 11.7
Fires in France for the period 1982-1984 expressed in 1984
francs approximately obey the law of equal weight for successive
classes of severity between FF 5 M and 40 M (see Table 4.28). Beyond
FF 40 M, the distribution law is different because losses are limited and
there are so few insured installations liable to cause high losses. The
sum of the direct risks of the two upper brackets (FF 1.4 B) is close to
the amount of the average direct risks (FF 1.2 B) of the four preceding
brackets. Generally speaking, when the number of accidents in succes-
sive brackets beyond FF X M declines according to the square of the
ratio between the maxima and minima of successive brackets (A), the
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Table 4.28. Number and cosls of fires in France, 1982-1984.
Direct risks Operating losses
Costs bracket Cost Cost
(FF M) No. (FF M) No. (FF M)
5-10 153 1072 42 260
10-20 109 1547 20 265
20-40 34 954 6 162
40-80 25 1302 6 337
80-160 9 984 2 252
160-320 2 431 0 0
TOTAL 332 6290 76 1276
Source: Assembl~e Plenl~re des Socl~t.~s d'Assurances Incendle et
Risques Divers, Paris, 1985.
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lolal weighl of all accidenls in excess of FF X equals 1/(A - 1) times
lhe lolal weighl of each brackel below X if lhe equal-weighllaw applies
lo brackels below X. For A =2, lhe weighl of accidenls in excess of X
is equallo lhe weighl of accidenls belween X/2 and X. For A =10, lhe
weighl of accidenls in excess of X equals 1/9 of lhe weighl of accidenls
belween 0.1X and X.
[40] On lhe basis of lhe reporl by Fryer and Griffilhs (1979), lhe dislribu-
tion of serious man-made accidenls can be shown lo comply approxi-
malely wilh lhe equal weighl law for successive classes of gravily (in
lerms of dealhs) for four lypes of human aclivily (Table 4.29.).
The Fryer and Griffilhs reporl also shows lhal nalural disaslers
(slorms, floods, earlhquakes, avalanches) do nol obey lhe equal weighl
law when classes of successive gravily are measured in dealhs.
because lhe number of dealhs in lhe maximum gravily class is nearly
lhe same as lhe lolal number of dealhs for all classes. In lhis case,
whelher a compensation syslem remains in balance depends very much
on whelher or nol a grave evenl occurs.
On lhe basis of Table 4.7, dam bursl accidents are broken down in
Table 4.30.
The Rasmussen reporl (1974) gives delails of lhe dislribution of
disaslers as a function of severily. Dislributions for meleoriles
(dealhs), explosions, dam bursls (dealhs), fires (dealhs and damage).
and accidenlal chlorine emissions during shipmenl (dealhs) are charac-
leristic of lhe law of equal weighl for all classes of gravily. Con-
versely. dislributions for hurricanes (dealh and damages) and earlh-
quakes (dealh and damages) give relatively grealer weighl lo lhe
severer evenls. Rasmussen also shows lhal lhe dislribution for com-
bined man-made disaslers (in dollars) corresponds lo lhe equal-weighl
law for damages belween $10 M and $1 B (see also Figure 4.2).
[41] If damages are divided inlo lhree classes of gravily (l-A, A-A 2 , and
A 2 -A 3 ) and if lhe number of evenls in lhose classes is B/ A o.5 ,
B / AA 0.5, B / A 2A 0.5, each class conlains A times fewer evenls lhan ils
predecessor bul lhose events are A limes costlier, so lhal lhe com-
bined cosl of evenls in each class is lhe same. The relative weighl of
lhe higher class is 33%. If compensation is paid for all events wilh a
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Table 4.29. Deat.hs due t.o serious man-made accident.s.
Severity Number 01 Total
(number 01 deaths) accidents deaths
(1) Fires and ezplosions
100-200 15 2010
200-400 4 1122
400-800 2 952
800-1600 1 1200
1600+ 1 1700
TOTAL 153 12084
(2) Maritime accidents
100-200 37 4774
200-400 17 4480
400-800 5 2591
800-1600 1 1500
1600-3200 1 2750
3200+ 1 6000
TOTAL 281 31277
(3) Mining accidents
50-100 21 1460
100-200 11 1515
200-400 4 1179
400-800 3 1296
800+ 1 3700
TOTAL 97 11000
(4) Railway accidents
50-100 33 2350
100-200 20 2670
200-400 5 1204
TOTAL 188 10277
SOUTce: Fry and GrUflths (1979).
Table 4.30. Deat.hs due t.o dam burst..
Severity
(number 01 deaths)
100-200
200-400
400-800
800-1600
1600-3200
3200+
Number 01 Total
accidents deaths
7 959
4 1000
3 1383
2 2000
2 3755
1 15000 (?)
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limil of A 2, lhe uncompensaled fracUon of lolal damages equals (A 0.5 -
1)/3A 0.5. For A = 2, lhal fracUon is 9.8% and for A = 10, 23%. The
fracl10n of evenls nol fully compensaled is 1/(A2 + A + 1), l.e. 14% for
A =2 and 0.9% for A =10. If A =10, 99.1% of accidenls are fully com-
pensaled bul only 77% of damages are compensaled. Given lhal lhe
assumption lhal lhere will never be an evenl cosling more lhan A 3 does
nol seem demonslrable (alleasl as regards lhird parly' liabilily), il may
be useful lo provide a compensaUon ceiling such as A 3 lo forestall lhe
possibilily of anyone very rare evenl profoundly modifying lhe finan-
cial balance of an insurance syslem.
[42] Il has been asked whelher lhe Bhopal disasler was slaUslically
prediclable. Since lhere have in 50 years been 16 "lerreslrial"
accidenls in lhe chemicals and oil induslry causing from 50 lo 500
dealhs (including eighl causing over 200), il is in accordance wilh lhe
slaUstical law menUoned lhal an accidenl should also occur involving
belween 500 and 5000 dealhs. However, referring only lo serious air
pollulion, lhere have been no accidenls even len limes less serious
lhan al Bhopal and accordingly lhe Bhopal disasler consUlules a
genuinely excepUonal evenl. Among a combinaUon of polluUon
accidenls cosling up lo several million dollars, ooverage for a single
$100 M accidenl can cause difficullies for lhe insurers.
[43] The facllhal prevenlion cosls are very much higher lhan damage cosls
in no way means lhal il would be preferable lo reduce prevenUon and
pay compensalion lo vicl1ms. The reason is lhal compensaUon pay-
menls correspond lo only parl of lhe damage caused, and courls prob-
ably assess lhem very much lower lhan economisls would. Furlher-
more, lo arrive al an appropriale level of prevenUon expendilure, we
calculale lhe damage caused by reducUon in lhe level of prevenl10n
and lhe benefil in lerms of lower prevenl10n outlays. A comparison
belween lhe cosl of imperfecl prevention and lhe cosl of damage
caused by lhe absence of perfecl prevenUon is no help as lo how
appropriale prevenUon outlay mayor may nol be.
[44] Slalemenl by Mr J. Graveleau (1982), who reports 300 accidenls in 18
monlhs cosling several lens of lhousands of francs and slales, "a mil-
lion francs is commonplace." (See discussion of Siskind, 1982.)
[45] For 1979, accidental pollul1on of French rivers is lhoughllo have cosl
FF 2.5 M while lhe cosls of prevenUng such polluUon were FF 15.5 B
(1981) of which FF 2.27 B were shouldered by induslry (Siskind, 1982).
In lhe FRG, lhe chemicals induslry spenl DM 27 B ($8.44 B) over len
years on environmenlal prolecUon, l.e. 10% of lolal investmenls and 2%
of sales, (Wa.ll street Journa.l, 6 February 1985. (Note: FRG induslry
spenl DM 7.23 Bon environmenlal prolecUon in 1978.) There is every
reason lo suppose lhallhe FRG chemicals induslry has nol been paying
DM 100 M every year (4% of lhe cosl of conlrolling pollulion, or 1% of
sales) as compensaUon for lhe pollulion il has caused.
[46] In 1981 lhe French Agences de Bassin received FF 1914 B of which FF
532 M were for induslrial pollulion. If lhe cosls of accidenlal waler
pollulion damages were covered by an addiUonal fee, lhe maximum
exlra cosl for induslrial pollulers would be well under 5 %of lhe pollu-
lion fee lhey are already paying.
[47] According lo lhe French Environmenl Minislry (L'inaustrl.e et
l'environnement en 1984: L'~ta.t aes gros rejets, Augusl1984), 50000
134 Insuring lind MlInllging HlIl/IlIrdou$ Risks
faclories in France "are sources of serious environmental poLLution
and hazards". In fact most of t.he hazards and poLLution are concen-
trated in only a few of them. Half the organic poLLution, for instance,
comes from 377 sources, half the toxic water pollution from 55, and
half the sulfur dioxide discharges from 50. Two thousand of the largest
sources are participating in a self-monitoring exercise. Assuming that
those 2000 sources annuaLLy pay FF 50 M oompensation (higher than in
fact), the average oompensation would be FF 25000 per factory in
respect of accidental industrial pollution. Such poLLution on average
causes no more than a few third party deaths per year in France. In
1982, 1360 people died as a result of industrial accidents. Mining
accidents cause a few dozen deaths per year while silicosis causes 700
per year. Full and prompt compensation for physical Injury to third
parties through accidental poLLution would not constitute an additional
burden In comparison with the compensation already paid to workers
for Industrial accident.s.
[48] It is noteworthy that nuclear civil liability does not satisfy t.his cri-
terion because It is based on a very low number of costly accidents
while there Is no high number of inexpensive accidents. Similarly
spaoe Insurance (losses associated with sateLLite launch failures) fluc-
tuates considerably because the market is narrow and the loss in the
event of failure can be so high. Between 1975 and 1981, premiums paid
amounted to $107 M and In 1982 two accidents together cost $90 M. The
present capacity of the market is thought to be about $100 M per
launch. Aviation civil liability also fluctuates widely because accidents
in the USA have now become very expensive (four accidents costing
over $50 M between 1978 and 1983: $51, 70, 85, and 100 M). In systems
with ex post facto premium payments (e.g. Cristal and FIPOL for oil pol-
lution), the premium varies widely from year to year because the sys-
tems cover the most serious and unusual forms of pollution.
[49] In France, road carriers (hazardous goods) have unlimited civil liabil-
ity Insurance cover and can cause costly accidents. The very few such
accidents do little to disturb the motor insurance system (FF 26536 M
In civil liability premium for 1982 and FF 17788 M in damages). The
cost of an accident Like the one at Los ALfaques (Pts 2.4 B or FF 144 M)
can be compared with carriers' civil liabiLity premiums in France (FF
1.41 B Including FF 470 M for lorries over 20 t). In the USA, the 1980
Motor Carrier Act requires minimum cover of $5 M for hazardous goods
transport.
[50] While maritime Insurers announced that they could cover tanker own-
ers' civil lIablllty up $100 M, the P and I Clubs (mutual insurance com-
panies) offered their members insurance of up to $300 M in cases
where the limitation of Liability under the 1969 Convention did not
apply.
[51] The ceiling depends on the country, the industry concerned, the risks
covered, and demand. Where insurance for environmental risks is com-
pulsory. there should be enough of a market to attain high ceilings.
[52] The Paris Convention was intended, according to its preamble, both to
ensure "adequate and equitable compensation" and "to ensure that the
development of the production and uses of nuclear energy ... is not ...
hindered." The maximum liability (SDRs 15 M) has probably made it
possible to reduce the cost of Insurance for nuclear opera.tors
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(although no incident has reached that figure). The figure was set in
the light of insurance market condil1ons in the early 1960s and remains
in force in 1985 whereas the market could very easily offer cover of
$75 M.
[53] It seems probable that the $595 M limit will be doubled in 1987 so that
the compensation ceiling is of the same order of magnitude as the sum
assured in respect of damage to the facility.
[54] After the Torrey Ca.nyon accident in 1967 (117000 t of all, $15 M
clean-up costs), governments signed the foLLowing conventions:
(1) Internal10nal Convenl1on on Civil Liab1L1ty for Oil PoLLulion Dam-
age (1969).
(2) Convention on the Establishment of an International Compensal1on
Fund for Oil PoLLulion Damage (1971).
[55] The CRISTAL plan offers maximum compensal1on of $36 M for vicl1ms in
states that have not ratified the 1971 Convenl1on.
[56] In the USA, several enactments provide for special compensal1on
machinery for oil damage (Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Outer Conl1nental
Shelf Liability Act, Deep Water Port Act). There are also state and
nal10nal funds to compensate for oil damage [Florida, Maryland, Maine,
Texas, New Jersey, North Carolina, Washington; also South Africa, Fin-
land (Mk 100 M), Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, Japan,
Ontario]. Turkey has introduced unLimlled Liab1L1ty for shipowners.
[57] In Belgium, a law creal1ng a nal10nal fund was adopted in 1974 to
finance the disposal of wastes whose producer would not do so owing to
bankruptcy. The costs involved were to have been borne by aLL waste
producers. However, the fund has not yet been established. In the
Netherlands, a Soil Clean-up Interim Act, which entered into force on
15 January 1983 for a term of six years, provides government funding
for the disposal of older wastes by provinoes and local authoril1es.
The government may also proceed against the parl1es responsible. The
financial security requirement applies to disposers in the FRG, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, and the USA. In Belgium, Canada, and the USA,
the disposer has to take out insurance whereas in Germany and Austria
a condition for granting a disposal permit may be that an insurance has
been obtained. For waste carriage, special insurance is required in
the FRG, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the USA and Sweden. In Italy, a
financial guarantee is required for a permit to store hazardous wastes
temporarily or permanently (see Arl1cle 5.3.5 of the implemenl1ng pro-
visions of Arl1cle 4 of Decree No. 915 of 10 September 1982, Gazz. U./f.,
Number 253, 13 September 1984).
[58] For a descripl10n of the Netherlands fund, see Thiem (1981). The fund
was established in 1972, prompted by a 1965 smog causing serious agri-
cultural damage in the Rijnmond area of Rotterdam. It is financed by
industry (35%), domestic healing (15%) and motorists (50%).
[59] In France, the parafiscal passe~er tax system in force from 1973 to
1983 has been replaced by a noise levy as from 1 January 1984. Under
a French Bill, the Paris airport levy system is to be extended to aLL
other airports. The BiLL may also cover issues of Liab1L1ty and compen-
sation. Noise levies apply in the Netherlands (G 7 M per year) and
Switzerland ($2.9 M in 1982). In the FRG, quieter aircraft qualify for a
rebate on the landing tax.
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[60] The capacities of the reinsurance market should not be underes-
timated. For air transport, their capacity is thought to be $800 M.
Cerlain chemical and oil companies are insured for up to $1 B per
event. When there is a long time lapse between the generating event
(leak) and the damage, public fund systems may be preferred to
insurance systems.
[61] Leaving aside payments which may be covered by the general budget,
the highest compensation ceilings in force are found in the USA, I.e.
$595 M for nuclear energy and $200 M for oil. In Europe, the highest
are SF 300 M (Switzerland, nuclear power) and DM 500 M (the FRG,
nuclear power). These figures suggest that the damage level beyond
which the government should intervene is at present between $100 M
and $200 M per accident. These levels also correspond to the maximum
amounts ever paid out for third party damage by insurers (and reinsur-
ers) after an accident affecting the vicinity.
[62] In December 1984 a Bill laid before Parliament as part of the Nether-
lands Soil Protection Act provided that environment and agricultural
ministers could "require that cerlain activities potentially hazardous
to the soil be insured to cover the risk of soil pollution." It was slated
that "the Government wanted to be sure that the community would not
pay for contamination caused by individuals" (see Int. Env. Rep., 13
February 1985). Similar provisions might be made for all hazardous
industries (guarantee or insurance).
M.J. Florio, Chairman of the Sub-Commillee on Energy and Com-
merce of the US House of Representatives, has announced that a bill is
being considered with the aim of prescribing no-fault liability for phys-
ical damage caused by toxic chemical products (Int. Env. Rep., 13
February 1985, p 34).
In 1984, the German Federal Court issued a decree requiring pol-
luters to prove that they had laken the necessary precautions to fore-
stall damage (World Environment Report, 23 January 1985).
The US Environmental Protection Agency is contemplating com-
pulsory insurance cover for hazardous waste incinerators, of $50 M to
$500 M (Int. Env. Rep., 1985, p 92). The insurers have argued that
$500 M is too high, there being so far few incinerator ships (Int. Env.
Rep., 1984, p 393).
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4.D. Discussion
J. Deprimo'Z [1]
A great merit of the chapter by Smets is to set forth the large variety
of situations likely to be termed "disasters" involving exceptional pol-
lution damage. Among such disasters, the distinction must be made not
only in terms of causes (explosions. dam or dyke burst. pipe leakages
or shipwrecks, etc.) but also according to their consequences which
chiefly depend on the transmitting vector (soil. water. air). Some of
them will mainly cause property damage and loss of use of property up
to complete clean-up (black tides, ground pollution arising from dump-
ing sites); others will mainly cause bodily injury and will also necessi-
tate measures for evacuating surrounding populations who are exposed
to bodily injury (air pollution).
4.D.1. Firat remark
For an estimation of what possible part private insurance can reason-
ably play in the compensation of major environmental impairment losses
caused by industrial activities it seems appropriate to distinguish the
following types of losses:
(1) Losses after which "bodily injury" prevails.
(2) Losses after which material damage prevails.
Losses with Bodily Injury Prevailing
The distribution of an empirical aggregate amount of FF 600 million
shown in Table 4.W of Smets' paper for an ecological disaster caused
by poisonous gas seems reasonable enough. Figures are based on an
assumed average compensation of FF 200000 for each death (costs +
lump sums or annuities paid to the widow and two children), of FF 1 mil-
lion for each permanent disability exceeding 80%. and of FF 128000 for
each permanent disability between 20% and 50%. Other items. estimated
at FF 120 million. correspond to the refund of medical expenses or, as
the case may be, to the refund of evacuation costs.
These values would not be significantly modified by the fact that
victims will benefit, in their respective countries. from a legal system
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for health protection and for the payment of disability annuities or
death benefits as the bodies in charge of such systems (health service
and/or social security) will probably make use of their rights of
recourse against the polluter up to 100% of indemnities paid by them.
Starting from the above figures, it can be noted that the number
oJ injured victims to be directly compensated by the private insurer
covering "polluter's liability" will significantly decrease where this
insurer reduces the per loss commitment limit down to an amount
noticeably under FF 600 million. Accordingly, even if the aggregate
value of health and evacuation costs refund is brought down from FF
120 to FF 50 million (the evacuation of 30000 people living in the sur-
roundings is in fact rather on the pessimistic side), the number of vic-
tims entitled to compensation by payment of capitals or annuities would
be reduced as in Table 4.D.1.
Table 4.D.l.
No. of victims entitled to compensation
DisabledAssumed insurance
coverage
coverage (FF M)
600 - 120 = 460
300- 50 =250
100- 50 = 50
Deceased
250
130
26
>60%
125
65
13
>50%
500
260
52
>20%
625
325
65
At present, the different national markets for pollution insurance
will only offer. for all combined types of damage, covers generally lim-
ited as shown in Table 4.D.2. Currently, these amounts are sufficient
Table 4.D.2. Limils lo pollution insurance coverage.
USA
Ilaly
France
Nelherlands
Maximum commilmenl limit of PLIA Pool:
Maximum commilmenl limit of ANIA Pool:
Maximum commilmenllimil of GARPOL Pool:
Maximum commilmenllimil of MAS Pool:
ca. FF 90 M
ca. FF 75 M
ca. FF 30 M
ca. FF 30 M
for the coverage of almost all losses involving bodily injury of low and
average importance, but they will not be sufficient in the case of true
catastrophes due to the accidental release of noxious gases in the
atmosphere (the Bhopal accident, for instance).
Accordingly, the following question is raised in terms of economy:
How many tens or hundreds oJ bodily injured victims after a pollu-
tion accident are necessary to have this accident considered as cata-
strophic and to have the currently available insurance cover taken
over by another financial guarantor?
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Losses with Material Da.mage Prevailing
It seems that the total cost of Love Canal exceeded 850 million and that
of the Lekkerkerk case 870 million for the evacuation and rehousing of
surrounding populations. Such figures are, of course, largely above the
currently available covers offered by private insurance.
Conversely, and according to examples given by Smets, most river
and groundwater pollution losses will not in general exceed an amount
of FF 1-10 million. Consequently, insurance coverages limited to FF
20-30 million for each loss would be satisfactory in a great many cases .
•.D.2. second remark
The financial impact of high-cost losses, which owing to their low fre-
quency represent only 25-30% of the total weight of environmental
losses (Note 39 of Smets' paper), can be considered as a possible
charge only if it is spread over the whole community of environment-
polluting industries.
As long as the "law of great numbers " is not applicable, Le. as
long as all concerned polluting industries are not bound to join together
to form a very large mutual group to cover risks. the necessity for each
industrial firm (or its own particular insurer) to "carry for itself" the
cost of an eventual disastrous loss implies a direct threat of debt - not
to mention insolvency - leading to bankruptcy. In other words, the
corrective factor based on low frequency can be included in a
macroeconomic calculation only and not in calculations applied to
one or a couple of industrial firms.
Would it be an appropriate remedy to provide that the liability
coverage of polluting, transporting and waste disposal firms is made
compulsory in order to give private insurance all appropriate means
for obtaining substantially increased commitment limits (e.g. several
hundred million French francs)?
We may feel rather dubious of this result if we contemplate the
annual amount of earned premiums which can be raised under this type
of compulsory insurance. The current premium amounts collected on
the French market from the liability insurance of waste-producing
industries (chemicals, petrochemicals, leather and skins, metal works,
industrial cattle breeding, etc.) will apparently never exceed FF 1 bil-
lion. An average 5% overpremium gathered for the coverage of pollution
hazards "from cradle to grave" would only produce. for a one-year
period including all the activities connected with waste handling,
approximately FF 50 million. In round francs. these earned premiums
would only allow the correct settlement of one loss of FF 100 million
every two years. and of one loss of FF 500 million every ten years.
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Combined with the need for insurers to make up for the "law of
great numbers" at a given date, appears the need to benefit from a
long-term insurance agreement, and this leads to our third and final
remark.
4.D.3. Third remark
To satisfy requirements for a cover spread over several years in order
to meet late claims brought long after the date of handling of noxious
waste and their buriaL. the insurer must be in a position to rely on
premiums collected over a long-term period. Therefore, the stop-
page of premium payments after the producing or reprocessing firm has
ceased its activities represents a major obstacle which must be over-
come before any offer of long-term coverage is possible.
At present in France, a solution to this difficulty is being con-
sidered as regards hazards Linked with the firms operating class I
disposal sites Licensed under article 9 of the Law dated 15 July 1979.
Those firms are now contemplating the setting up of a "Professional
Guaranty Fund" which should be made up of contributions paid by all
firms working on French territory. The contributions would be used
not only for the settlement of the costs of controlling and putting
back in order disposal sites after shutdown (compare the "Post CLo-
sure Liability Trust Fund" in the USA) but also as security for the pay-
ment of insurance premiums applicable to pluriannual liability cov-
ers against third parties and concerning claims notified with five years'
notice (or perhaps more) after shutdown of disposal sites, even if the
firm or firms operating these sites have ceased their activities when
claims are notified.
Thus, assuming that this fund acts as a del credere agent for the
payment of premiums, subsequent coverage could be more easily
underwritten from private insurers. In any case, however, beyond the
insurers' maximum Limit of commitment and as regards claims notified
after the contractually admitted period, there will still remain a gap of
cover. So a "financial relay" is to be found for taking over the total
compensation of victims. The SERVANT Report handed over to the
French Ministry of Environment in February 1984 has proposed a
governmental relay.
Note
[1] These discussion comments were delivered and interpreted at the
Conference by Jean Collart.



CHAPTER 5
Insurance and Compensation as
Policy Instruments for
Hazardous Waste Management
PR. KleindorJer and H. Kunreuther
5.1. Introduction
Public policy regarding the transport, sale. and processing of hazard-
ous materials has become an area of acute concern for industry,
government and the public. The magnitude of the problem is large. In
the USA, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency estimates
(see US Environmental Protection Agency, 1980) that more than 50000
chemical substances are currently in commercial circulation, and this
number is growing at a rate of 500-1000 new substances per annum.
Hazardous waste streams stemming as by-products from the industrial
use of these substances are now estimated at upwards of 50 x loB t per
annum in the USA (see Baram, 1982, Ch 9) and 30 x loB t per annum in
the European Economic Community (see Brusset and Rochevolles. 1979).
Given the number and heterogeneity of these hazardous materials,
an immense problem faces public policymakers attempting to determine
an appropriate mix of regulatory and market forces to assure a viable
and safe infrastructure for the transport and use of hazardous materi-
als. The key in this effort is to balance the benefits associated with
the use of hazardous materials in producing products and services con-
sumed by society with the costs associated with understanding and con-
trolling their potentially negative side effects.
This chapter will be concerned with a small part of this overall
problem. namely the choice of waste and transport technology by firms
generating wastes and the siting of hazardous waste treatment and
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disposal facilities. Our approach might best be called a "decision pro-
cess perspective" (see Figure 5.1). The key in this perspective is the
mediating effect of decision processes of actors on consequence evalua-
tion as these actors respond to regulatory and policy options.
Regulatory/policy options:
Scope
Enforcement/sanctions
Agency responsibilities
1
Decision processes of actors:
Producers
Transporters
Insurers
The public
Agencies
1
Consequence evaluation:
Economic
Environmental
Health
Figure :5.1.. Research framework.
The following three areaS of choice will be of special interest here:
(1) Choice by waste generators of how much waste to produce.
(2) Choice by waste generators and transporters of the means and
location for disposal of waste.
(3) Choice by developers and communities of locations and control
procedures for siting hazardous materials disposal facUities
(HMDFs).
These three areas interact strongly with each other and with regula-
tory policy. The key policy instruments of interest in this chapter are
compensation and insurance. The underlying motif is to understand
how compensation and insurance can help balance the social incidence
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of risks, costs. and benefits of hazardous waste management. We
proceed as follows.
In Section 5.2 we consider the problems of waste generators in
more detail, concentrating on the effects of insurance and liability laws
on the behavior of waste generators in their choice of waste reduction
technology as well as means of transporting and disposing of waste.
The basic theme of this section is that insurance and liability regula-
tion concerning environmental and safety aspects of a firm's operations
can strongly influence the firm's choices of how much waste to produce
and what means it chooses to transport and dispose of the resulting
waste. We also briefly discuss ongoing subsidies and taxes (I.e. compen-
sation) to the firm or the public for waste-related activities.
In Section 5.3 we consider the problem of siting hazardous waste
facilities. However, as indicated above, and as is abundantly clear to
nearly everyone by now, the actual siting of such facilities is a very
difficult task, fraught with public opposition and scientific uncertainty
(see, for example, Morell and Magorian, 1982; O'Hare et al., 1983; and
Wynne, 1984). In view of this, we discuss how compensation and
insurance may be used to facilitate communication among affected
stakeholders in the siting process to achieve some measure of improved
efficiency and equity. Several illustrative cases from practice are
noted as encouraging signs that compensation and insurance can help
solve the current stalemate between communities and beleaguered sit-
ing authorities in developing a viable treatment and disposal infrastruc-
ture for hazardous waste.
The concluding section couples the results of Sections 5.2 and 5.3
concerning the waste generator's decisions and the ultimate siting of
treatment and disposal facilities. We reflect in our conclusions the dif-
ficulties of balancing environmental and public health concerns with
the financial and property rights structures of industry and the
affected public. We argue that compensation and insurance can play an
important policy role in achieving this balance.
5.2. Compensation. Liability. and Insurance Issues
for Waste Generators and Transporters
Transportation, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste have three
major consequences which policymakers must balance: economic
effects, environmental effects, and health effects. In this section we
examine how compensation and insurance might affect these conse-
quences at the level of waste generators and transporters. The
approach we will use is to model the decision process of a waste genera-
tor or transporter in a very general way, following Shavell (1964), con-
centrating on the incentives which anticipated liability and
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compensation may be expected to have on the total risk exposure a
generator or transporter will accept.
Consider a profit-oriented firm which generates or transports
hazardous waste. Suppose that this firm must choose between several
alternatives which affect the probability of an accident involving this
waste. The firm must decide how much it will spend on safety or waste
reduction measures to avoid such an accident. We denote by % the
amount the firm decides to spend on such measures and by p (%) the
probability of an accident. This probability depends on % of course:
the more the firm expends on waste reduction/safety, the less is p (%).
Choice of x
H+x
x
Figure 5.2. Decision tree for wast.e control decision.
Suppose that, if an accident occurs, the cost or harm resulting
will be H, [1]. We can depict the outcomes of this process as in Figure
5.2. In the figure, the firm first chooses %; this results in an accident
with probability p (%) and costs % + H and no accident with probability
1 - P (%) and costs %. The expected social cost (ESC) of the firm's
decision on % will be p (% )(% + H) + [1 - P (% )]%, or simply
ESC =% + P (%)H , (5.1)
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the sum of the firm's outlays to reduce the probability of an accident
plus the expected cost of an accident.
ESC
x* Care taken (x)
Figure 5.3. Expected social costs of waste control.
If an omniscient regulator were to choose x, then (s)he would do
so by minimizing expected social costs (ESC) as shown in Figure 5.3,
where we graph ESC = x + P (x)H and show its minimum x·. But the
firm may not perceive its costs to be coincident with social costs.
Indeed, a profit-oriented firm would only face that portion of the social
costs which results from fines or other sanctions it could expect to
ensue from an accident. We might represent this formally as a com-
pound "lottery" as in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4 represents the following scenario. If t.here is no
accident, which happens with probability 1 - P (x), then the firm pays
nothing except the cost x of whatever measures it undertook. If there
is an accident, then the firm pays the full amount of damages resulting
from the accident with probability q (x. y), and pays nothing with
probability 1 - q (x, y). We can think of q (x, y) as the probability of
the accident "being noticed" and litigated with assessed damages of H.
The variable y can be thought of as the level of effort expended by
regulators to monitor and litigate damage suits. From Figure 5.4, the
costs seen by the firm as it chooses x are
COST = x + p(x)q(x,y)H , (5.2)
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H+x
x
Figure 5.4. The waste generator's decision problem.
which are less than the true social costs x + p (x )B, unless the proba-
bility q (x. y) of being held fully liable for damages is 1. Assuming that
q (x , y) is less than 1. it is easily seen that the level of expenditure £
chosen by the firm will be less than that which minimizes expected
social costs x· , as shown in Figure 5.5.
Cost
x +p(x)q(x,y)H
x x· x
Figure 5.5. Firm's cost versus social cost.
Note that we have represented q as depending not only on y. but
also on x. The probability of being held liable may depend in a court of
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law on whether "adequate" care was taken or not. Under strict liabil-
ity, q would not depend on % but only on the level of monitoring y.
This results in lower expenditures % for reducing the probability p (%)
of an accident.
This divergence between private (the firm's) cost and social
(society's) cost can strongly affect the level of care taken by the firm
and the resulting expected social cost. One would expect this diver-
gence to be less the greater is the level y of regulatory expenditure on
monitoring and litigating damages. However, these monitoring and liti-
gation costs are themselves a part of the total social cost associated
with waste management and are not freely available. We will not pursue
here the problem of appropriately setting such expenditures (see
Diver, 1980), but it should be clear that whatever this level is, there
may still be significant departures between perceived private and
social costs of safety and waste reduction measures undertaken by a
firm.
What we pursue here is the issue of insurance and liability. The
above model assumes that the firm meets all assessed damages from its
own assets. This is unrealistic on two counts. First. the firm may not
have sufficient assets to pay assessed damages, and second it may,
freely or by law, insure itself. In Figure 5.6, we present a more com-
plete model of the firm's decision alternatives.
Let us first consider the mechanics of Figure 5.6. The first
branch of this decision tree reflects the firm's decision to buy
insurance or not. Here we consider only two choices: buy insurance
coverage of SI or buy no insurance. Actually, of course, the firm must
decide how much coverage to purchase. The cost of insurance is
denoted by r in premium per dollar coverage, so that the cost of SI of
coverage is rI. The firm's assets are denoted A. Thus, if A is less than
the net loss H - I, after insurance payments, then the firm (if required
to pay H) would lose all its assets and some damage would go uncompen-
sated by the firm. This explains the payoffs % + rI + A of the branch
"buy insurance I, accident occurs. firm held liable", which has a proba-
bility of p (%) q (% , y) of occurring. For the same branch, if A is
greater than H - I, then the firm would pay damages and final payoffs
would be % + rI + H - I. The explanation of the other branches is
similar [2]. A detailed discussion of the incentives embodied in "solv-
ing" the decision problem of Figure 5.6 would take us beyond the scope
of this chapter. However, the following points should be clear intui-
tively.
First, the issues of insurance (I), liability [q(%, y)] and care taken
(%) are joint decisions. Second. the level of assets at risk (net of any
insurance coverage) strongly influences the decisions which a profit-
oriented (or cost-minimizing) firm will undertake. If we assume cost
minimization, the lower these assets, the less the incentive for the firm
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min (x + rI+ A,x + rI+ H-II
min (x +A,x + HI
x
Figure 5.6. Firm's problem with insurance.
to invest in waste reduction or safety measures [3]. The policy conclu-
sion of this analysis is that firms with small assets at risk may present
a special problem in designing appropriate incentives for
control/disposal of hazardous wastes. For such smaller firms, financial
requirements under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and Superfund are just coming into effect in the USA.
Appropriate levels of assets and insurance coverage remain a contro-
versial topic (see Katzman, 1985).
Third. as noted above, if additional expenditures on safety or
waste reduction reduce liability or assessed damages, the firm will have
a stronger incentive to invest in such measures. Fourth, as has been
noted by several recent commentators, large firms have not only
assessed damages at stake in environmental impairment suits, but also
reputations. To the extent that reputation losses are perceived to be
substantial, the firm may perceive its net probable losses from an
accident to be higher even than the total social costs. In this case, the
firm could expend considerably more on waste reduction and safety
measures than would be socially optimal.
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Finally, the issue of compensation in the form of insurance pre-
mium subsidies or partial public payment of damages from accidents
would have the joint effect of lessening the social inequity of uncom-
pensated victims (due to inadequate assets or insurance coverage) as
well as diminishing the incentives of the firm to undertake protective
or waste reduction measures. Minimal insurance coverage laws would
have the same equity/incentive effects.
Let us now consider some additional complexities not covered in
the above analysis. We first note that the actual application of this
general model to specific problems in waste reduction technology and
transportation analysis involves detailed and firm-specific trade-offs in
the allocation of a firm's scarce resources between output enhance-
ment and waste/risk reduction. The interested reader is referred to
Kleindorfer (1986) for a discussion of these issues.
A more serious simplification in the above model is the assumption
that all damages are expressible in monetary terms. A richer view of
the consequences of hazardous waste management is given in Table 5.1,
where monetary (M). environmental (E). and adverse health effects (8)
from an accident are related to four impacted groups.
Table 5.1 The consequences of hazardous wasle accidents.
Nature 01 damages caused by accident
Source 01 compenstation Monetary Environmental Health
Firm HYM HYE HYH
Insurance HIM HIE H IH
Public and induslrial funds H pM H pE H pH
Victims H YM H YE H YH
Here we show the disparate nature of potential losses from haz-
ardous waste accidents as well as potential sources of compensation.
The point of this table is that firms may only pay a fraction of actual
damages. for example. owing to problems of assessing damages and prov-
ing causality. Remaining damages may have to be paid by insurance
from public and industrial funds. or by victims. When victims pay, dam-
ages are uncompensated.
Given the nature of the firm as a profit-oriented organization. one
would expect that only monetary. compensable consequences will be
considered by the firm in its choice processes. These compensation
considerations give rise to many related and unresolved policy issues
concerning insurance in the hazardous materials area. These include
the following:
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(1) The problem of insuring nonsudden environmental impairment and
health impairments. Given the latency periods for many such
impairments. there are fundamental problems in assessing liability
for an "accident". depending on when it happened. when it was
noticed. and who the insurance and industry stakeholders were at
these different moments of time. For example, the US insurance
industry has vigorously complained against interpreting general
commercial liability (GCL) coverage written in the 1960s and 1970s
as implying coverage for nonsudden environmental impairments
discovered in the 1980s (see Katzman, 1985). These risks, says
the insurance industry, were never meant to be covered by the
GCL policies in question.
(2) The problems of determining an appropriate historical data base
for various coverage situations. The scientific uncertainties and
ambiguities associated with hazardous materials and environmental
impairment make it virtually impossible to assemble a "predictive
data base" for assessing risks. This ambiguity strongly affects
insurability and total available coverage for such risks. as we dis-
cuss further in the next section.
(3) The problem of small-asset firms and "the polluter pays" princi-
ple. Fair as this principle sounds. strict application would likely
leave many victims uncompensated. Contrast the "polluter pays
principle" with the "public pays principle". In the former, the
firm faces complete liability for its actions. but this requires
enforcement [4]. The resulting enforcement gap may be quite sig-
nificant (see Diver, 1980), leaving many victims uncompensated.
especially those with limited resources and access to the law. If
the public pays. the problem of uncompensated victims is
ameliorated. but now firms face even less of the social costs of
potentially unsafe practices. and their incentives for undertaking
efficient protective measures will be correspondingly less. This
leads to the trade-off noted above between enforcement costs.
incentives, and inequities of uncompensated victims.
(4) The problem of establishing fault and apportioning liability when
several parties are involved in an environmental or health impair-
ment case. The problems of establishing fault have led in the USA
to the requirement of joint and several liability for nonsudden
environmental impairment. This has. in turn, led to tremendous
problems in the insurance industry in providing adequate coverage
and to industry efforts to police its own clean-up and liability
apportionment activities (see Conservation Foundation. 1984).
The essential point of the above discussion is the mediating influ-
ence of compensation. liability, and insurance on the firms' decisions
concerning the volume of waste generated and transport
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means/modes/routes for disposal activities. A crucial question arising
from this is where and how one locates disposal facilities. Concerning
the approximate "where", this involves a trade-off between transporta-
tion costs and risks as firms go through the choice processes described
above. The more difficult question is "how" to site such facilities. an
issue we now examine in detail.
5.3. Compensation and Insurance Issues
for Siting Hazardous Facilities
The siting of HMDFs presents a set of challenging problems owing to the
conflicts among the interested stakeholders. Although there appears
to be general agreement that properly designed and managed disposal
facilities are desirable for society, few people are willing to sanction
one in their own community. The perceived benefits from tax revenues
and perhaps a few jobs pale in relation to the perceived risks. A pub-
lic opinion survey, conducted by Resources for the Future in 1960,
revealed that fewer than 10% of 1576 respondents were unconcerned as
to how near their homes the disposal site for hazardous waste chemi-
cals was located. Approximately 30% were willing to accept the facility
within 10-14 miles of their residences. On the other hand, over 70% of
the respondents favored the facility, as long as it was more than 100
miles from their residences (US Council on Environmental Quality,
1960).
The inability to site new facilities in the USA during the last three
years (Bacow and Milkey, 1963) as well as in European countries, poses
grave risks to society since the currently generated volume of haz-
ardous materials exceeds the safe disposal capacity of existing facili-
ties. In particular. the volume of hazardous materials generation is
growing at a rate of 3% per year; at least 50-60 major new sites will be
required over the next few years (US Environmental Protection Agency,
1960).
As has been pointed out in two excellent studies on the siting
problem (O'Hare et al., 1963; Morell and Magorian, 1962), there is a
need to utilize policy tools, such as compensation and insurance, for
helping to negotiate a feasible site, and to develop appropriate tech-
nology for storing the materials (e.g. incinerators, the deep well injec-
tion system). The need for a site will be affected by the type of waste
reduction methods that industrial firms are undertaking, and its loca-
tion will be partially determined by the costs of bringing the waste
from the producer to the HMDF. Hence, there is a clear interrelation-
ship between the production of waste, its transport, and the site selec-
tion process.
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We will consider the role that compensation and insurance can play in
helping to facilltate the negotiation process by first looking at the
goals and objectives of key interested parties in the siting debate:
(1) Waste generators. Industrial firms are the principal sources of
hazardous materials and, hence, most interested in finding a place
to store them so they can continue their production of goods and
services. They should be willing to incur part of the cost of siting
a facility, particularly if they know that their own production
processes will be threatened by their not having appropriate
disposal mechanisms. Legally, waste generators in the USA are
partially liable for costs of any accidents associated with an HMDF
through rules of joint and several liability. These rules hold that
defendants who were remotely connected with a hazardous chemi-
cal may be liable for a share of the damages, even if they were not
directly associated with the handling of the waste themselves
(Katzman. 1985).
(2) Facility developer. The developer has a financial incentive to
compensate the host community for locating the waste treatment
and disposal facilities in its backyard. These payments may par-
tially be in the form of taxes; however, these revenues are nor-
mally relatively small unless the disposal facility is unusually large
(Morell and Magorian. 1982, p 59). The developer will also be pri-
marily responsible for property losses as well as adverse health
and safety consequences due to the disposal facility. Hence, the
developer will likely want to purchase insurance as protection
against these potential losses. In the USA the RCRA requires all
developers that store or dispose of hazardous materials to demon-
strate financial responsibility to cover any accidents. This means
that they must either obtain liability insurance, have enough
funds to self-insure, or have some parent company guarantee them
funds in case of an accident.
(3) Host community. As pointed out earlier, there are limited gains
from siting a hazardous facility. The costs, on the other hand, are
likely to be large. ranging from intangible psychological impacts
on residents to negative environmental and health effects from
the facility.
(4) Insurance companies. There has been an increasing concern by
the insurance industry with the feasibility of offering coverage
against potential losses from hazardous materials. There is limited
statistical data on which to estimate the probability that there
will be an accident from a hazardous facility. In addition, there is
great uncertainty as to future court settlements regarding
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liability from hazardous materials facilities, both in the magnitude
of the awards and their timing (Huber, 1985). Following the Bhopal
accident, there has been a withdrawal in pollution liability cover-
age and a large increase in rates. Today only two worldwide insur-
ers provide coverage against large risks so that industrial firms,
particularly the small ones, are scrambling to obtain coverage
(Katzman, 1985).
(5) other residents. Communities and residents who are not affected
by the HMDF will benefit from the production of goods and ser-
vices from the industrial concerns which generate these wastes as
by-products. By having a facility located elsewhere they are pro-
vided with a cleaner and safer environment than if the wastes had
been stored improperly.
We will restrict our discussion to the above stakeholders, since
they are most directly involved in compensation and insurance arrange-
ments [5].
5.3.2. Stages in the siting processes
In the negotiation process for choosing a site there are three distinct
stages which need to be explicitly considered. These stages reflect
different impacts that the waste disposal facility is likely to have on
the community. Although we will be treating each of them separately
below for analytic convenience, they will have to be viewed as part of a
package when a final site is actually being selected.
stage 1: Building the Facility
Unless taxes and employment benefits are significant, the disposal
facility will be viewed as a "public bad" by any potential site. Hence,
some type of ex ante compensation arrangement may be necessary to
convince the community that the net benefits of the facility are
greater than the expected costs.
The word "compensation" at this stage is frequently interpreted
by the general public to mean a bribe or payment, particularly when
the health and safety of people are involved. Society wants to
preserve the belief that life is special; money may cheapen it, while
laying bare the inequality of wealth (Calabresi and Bobbitt, 1978). For
this reason, one should also consider changing the term "ex ante com-
pensation" to "benefit-sharing" indicating that interested stakehold-
ers, such as the developer, industry, or other communities who benefit
from the facility, will provide either monetary payments or payments in
kind to the host community. A number of successful examples of
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sharing gains from winners to potential losers suggests that this type
of benefit-sharing may be feasible for future siting decisions:
(1) Massachusetts Hazardous Facility Siting Authority Act. This
legislation, passed in July 1975, illustrates the use of monetary
compensation for siting a regional resource recovery facility. One
dollar per ton royalty would be paid to any city which agreed to
host a regional resource facility. The town of Haverill initially
agreed to play this role but, in the face of opposition, the City
Council withdrew its offer. The town of North Andover was award-
ed the site in May 1977 after it virtually unanimously approved
the project at a town meeting. By early 1981 several communities
had committed their wastes to the proposed plant (O'Hare et al.,
1983).
(2) Wes-Con Inc.. This company converted two abandoned Titan mis-
sile silos in Idaho into small HMDFs. Although there was no public
opposition, the developer offered in-kind compensation in the
form of free disposal services, additional fire protection, and med-
ical training (O'Hare et al., 1983).
(3) Gray Rocks power plant. Environmental opposition halted con-
struction of a coal-fired plant in Wyoming because of the potential
damage to the surrounding environment. The suit was settled
when the utility company agreed to set up a $7.5 million trust fund
to preserve a stretch of the Platt River which was the habitat of
several species of migratory birds, including the whooping crane
(Lave and Romer. 1983). The coal plant was completed in 1981 and
is fully operational today.
(4) French nuclear power plants. People living within 15 km of a
nuclear power plant, who feel they are adversely affected, can ap-
ply to the local authorities for a reduction of 15-20% in electrici-
ty rates. Both businesses and households are eligible for this
compensation (Kunreuther and Linnerooth, 1984).
(5) LNG facility in Wilhelmshaven. The FRG provided an additional
subsidy for the construction of a recreational facility, because of
the adverse effects that a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant prom-
ised to have on the tourist industry in the area (Kunreuther et
al.. 1983).
Stage 2: Living with the Site
An important consideration in the decision by a community to accept an
HMDF is the impact that the facility will have on property values and
future economic development. Residents will normally be concerned
that the location of a waste treatment plant may discourage others
from wanting to live in the community so that the market price of their
property will fall and the community's tax base will be eroded.
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If the developer is willing to provide some type of compensation to
residents forced to sell their house at a price lower than its compar-
able market value elsewhere, then this may partially allay these
economic fears. To our knowledge this arrangement has not been imple-
mented in any community. One reason may be the difficulty of deter-
mining what a fair market price would be in the absence of an HMDF.
A principal reason that communities are concerned with the
effects of an HMDF on their economic base has to do with the operation
of the plant. Property values are likely to plummet if there are shown
to be adverse health and safety impacts on workers and residents near
the facility. Insurance can be a useful policy tool for encouraging firms
to incur costs for improving plant design and undertaking protective
measures (e.g. thicker liners for landfills, a better stack gas scrubber
for an incinerator) if premiums are based on risk.
Regulations and specific standards can also be imposed with regu-
lar inspections to ensure that the plant is complying with the rules.
Before a community embraces a waste disposal facility, it generally
wants to be assured that the plant will be forced to meet these regula-
tions or else be shut down. The following two examples illustrate these
types of monitoring and control arrangements in practice:
(1) Antonelli Corporation (Providence, Rhode Island) constructed a
facility to treat and store electroplating materials. The corpora-
tion allowed annual monitoring inspections by the citizens and city
officials, as well as providing additional fire-fighting equipment to
deal with any accident (Sanderson, 1984).
(2) Wes-Con. The developer informally negotiated with residents to
permanently shut down the facilities if there were ever a fire.
In the USA, the RCRA program has taken a step in this direction
by setting minimum standards with regard to the handling, transport,
storage, and disposal of hazardous materials. Developers must locate,
design, construct, and operate their facilities in conformance with
Environmental Protection Agency requirements or equivalent state
requirements. Federal and state regulatory officials have free access
to inspect all these facilities at all reasonable times (Baram, 1982).
stage 3: Accidents
Communities are naturally concerned with the risk of an accident from
an HMDF storage site and its consequences to residents. There is a
need for some type of guaranteed ex post compensation, by the facility
developer, insurance industry, and/or the government, to cover the
accident costs to victims. As we have already indicated, the ambiguity
of the risk plus the long latency period associated with health
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consequences have made traditional insurance arrangements inadequate
in this situation.
In addition, chronic health problems have multiple causes and may
be influenced by genetic factors and nutritional status. It is difficult
to determine whether hazardous substances produce specific effects
and, hence, traditional toxic tort law may fail to provide adequate com-
pensation for these damages (Trauberman, 1981).
Federal-Private Insurance. Some type of private-government
insurance program may be necessary to cover the costs of accidents
while at the same time offering protection to the operators of an HMDF.
Specifically, a reinsurance guarantee by the government for losses
above a certain magnitude may enable the private sector to cover the
first layer of losses. The Federal Flood. Insurance Program as well as
the Price Anderson Act for protecting residents from nuclear power
accidents have incorporated this feature.
The insurance industry will undoubtedly still be concerned with
the uncertainty associated with claims payments owing to the latency
problem. One way to deal with this problem is to offer "claims made"
policies in contrast to standard occurrence policies. Under this new
policy, an insurer's coverage obligation is triggered by the receipt of a
written claim rather than when bodily injury occurs (e.g. exposure to
asbestos dust). Hence. the insurer will be able to determine its losses
in any given year, since only individuals with current policies can col-
lect on their claims even if exposure had occurred in prior years.
Trust Funds. Some type of trust fund similar to the one established
by the Black Lung Act may help provide compensation to those exposed
to toxic substances from an HMDF. In the Black Lung Program miners
who are totally disabled owing to pneumoconiosis (a type of respiratory
cancer) and can demonstrate that the disease arose from employment in
a US coal mine are entitled to compensation. The Act requires miners
to obtain insurance but a trust fund is established to pay claims where
a "responsible" mine operator cannot be identified or has not paid
benefits.
The concept of Superfund established under the RCRA is modeled
after the Black Lung Program. A fund is created to clean up existing
environmental waste financed partially by the US Government but pri-
marily by charges on the wastes generated by the chemical industry.
In contrast to the black lung disease where causality is easily deter-
mined, there are problems as to who will be compensated from Super-
fund owing to the causality problems mentioned above (Baram, 1982).
Self-Insurance Funds. If private or government insurance is unavail-
able then special types of self-insurance arrangements may be
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necessary to protect industry and developers from suffering large
losses from an accident. For example, the chemical industry may want
to administer an insurance fund where premiums would be collected
from the parties engaged in the storage and disposal of waste. A fund
would then be established to pay for specific losses. The concept may
be attractive in theory but has large-scale administrative problems.
Some type of monitoring and control of facilities would be essential to
base premiums on risk and to assure that those participating in the
process were not behaving carelessly because they knew they were
protected from losses through this industry-developer fund.
5.3.3. Integrating stakeholders and stages
The different interested parties and the three stages of the siting pro-
cess can be integrated through a stakeholder-strategy matrix. Table
5.2 illustrates the use of the matrix by depicting which interested par-
ties are likely to be involved with a policy strategy associated with a
Table 5.2 Stakeholder-st.rat.egy mat.rix for siUng an HMDF.
sta.ge 1:
Locating
the Site
stageZ:
Living with the Site
stage 3:
Accident
stakeholder
Host.
communit.y
Ot.her
communiUes
Developer
Wast.e
generat.or
Stat.e siUng
aut.horit.y
Federal
government.
agencies
Insurance
indust.ry
Monetary
or in-kind
compensation
•
•
•
•
•
Compensation
for property
value
decreases
•
•
Environ-
mental
regulation
•
•
•
Insurance
and e%
post com-
pensation
•
•
•
•
•
particular stage in the siting process. For example, monetary or in-
kind compensation in Stage 1 should involve the host community, other
communities, the developer, the waste generator, and the state siting
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authority. One can see from the matrix that the insurance industry
will normally be associated only with Stage 3 of the process.
We have intentionally developed the stakeholder-strategy matrix
in rather primitive form to illustrate its potential for analyzing the sit-
ing process rather than being very specific as to the roles that each
stakeholder will play. The institutional arrangements for a particular
country or state will define the available compensation and insurance
options for consideration. A number of studies have revealed the
importance of cultural differences in influencing the way siting deci-
sions are made and the policy strategies which have been utilized [6].
We can illustrate the conditions necessary for determining which
sites are feasible by constructing a relatively simple decision tree for
any given stage under the assumption that there are n candidate sites
under consideration for an HMDF. Consider Stage 1. Figure 5.7 de-
picts the branches of the tree if there are m different events with
event j having a probability Pij that outcome Cij will occur. An exam-
ple of a particular event in Stage 1 is the construction of an HMDF that
meets all specifications; another event might be the discovery that the
HMDF is on an earthquake fault after it is completed. We will assume
that there are no events which will yield any net benefits from the site
itself so that each Cij < O.
In order for site i to be willing to accept the HMDF. some type of
compensation or benefit (Bij ) must be provided if event j occurs. If a
fixed ex ante compensation package is given to the community no
matter what event occurs, then Bij = Bi for all j. We have adopted
this assumption in Figure 5.7. For Stages 2 and 3 the amount of com-
pensation will most likely depend on specific events. For example, if
the developer pays residents for decreases in property values, then
there will be a probability distribution associated with anticipated
changes in market prices of property in the area.
The only feasible sites are those where the proposed benefit
package provided by the other stakeholders is sufficiently large that
the community is willing to accept the HMDF. In addition, the health
and safety standards must be acceptable to both the site and the
developer.
The above decision tree provides a framework for discussing the
issues of risk perception and eliciting community preferences for
accepting a site. Both of these issues are important in specifying a
compensation and insurance package that has a chance of being imple-
mented.
Perception of Risk
There is an extensive series of controlled experiments on public per-
ception of risk that suggests that the figure Cij associated with each
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Figure 5.7. Decision tree for Stage 1 of siting process.
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event j at site i has a number of attributes attached to it. Slovic et
al. (1980) have analyzed extensive data on individuals' attitudes toward
a number of risky activities ranging from skiing to living near a nuclear
power plant. Two general factors appear to capture the public's rank-
ings of different activities: the dread of the risk and whether the risk
is knowable. Technologies perceived as uncontrollable. catastrophic.
involuntary, and highly risky to future generations score high on the
dread factor. Those that are not observable, unknown to those
exposed. delayed, and new are viewed as unknown risks.
If a proposed technology scores high on both factors, as one would
expect an HMDF to do, then the required amount of compensation will
also be high. Events such as Love Canal, Seveso and Bhopal may raise
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the public's concern even though the technologies associated with
these disasters were not the same as those of proposed hazardous
waste facilities. One of the difficulties in siting new technologies is
that there are differences in perceived risks by the relevant stake-
holders. Industry and the developer may feel that an HMDF does not
represent much of a risk because the technology is known to them and
considered controllable. while the public has a different view. Von Win-
terfeldt and Edwards (1984) have noted that conflicts with respect to
technology are due to differing values between the stakeholders.
A related challenge in siting HMDFs is estimating the probabilities
associated with the different events. Given the limited historical data
on accidents from an HMDF coupled with the difficulty of determining
causal relationships between specific diseases (e.g. cancer) and
specific toxic substances, there is considerable ambiguity associated
with probabilities of losses being related to an HMDF. Extremely low
probability events, such as the Bhopal accident, may fall in the realm
of what Weinberg (1972) calls "transcientific" phenomena, which implies
that there may be no practical basis for estimating the statistical
chances and consequences of specific types of accident.
Ambiguity associated with losses has two principal effects.
Insurance firms have relatively little interest in marketing coverage
since they are unsure of the chances of incurring specific claims. For
example. the insurance industry has been opposed to nuclear coverage
claiming that the risk is not insurable because of the ambiguity associ-
ated with such losses (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1983).
Secondly, if there is ambiguity surrounding the probability of specific
events, the potential host community may imagine the potential losses
graphically rather than focusing on the probability dimension. An
advantage of employing some type of benefit-sharing arrangements is
that potential sites will be forced to concern themselves with trade-
offs between obtaining a certain payment now or having to incur possi-
ble losses in the future with some unknown probability.
Eliciting Preferences from Communities
There is a large literature which has emerged in economics that
attempts to answer the following question: How can one design an
approach for eliciting the true willingness of an individual or commu-
nity to accept a facility which does potential harm to them but benefits
others? If such a mechanism induces truth telling on the community's
part it is called "incentive compatible" [7].
Economists have searched in vain for incentive compatible
mechanisms which will maximize aggregate net benefits and balance the
budget (Le. the amount paid by developers and other communities cov-
ers the amount demanded by the host community). Problems of equity
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and fairness complicate the matter further [8]. The institutional
arrangements associated with the siting process add a further dimen-
sion to designing appropriate compensation mechanisms. We will illus-
trate this latter point by briefly describing two facility siting laws,
each of which implies a different set of negotiation procedures.
(1) Massachusetts Hazard.ous Waste Facility Siting Act. Under this
legislation passed in 1980 the developer negotiates a siting agree-
ment with the host community, offering compensation if necessary
to satisfy the residents' concerns. The community itself cannot
exclude an HMDF unless they can demonstrate that these facilities
pose special risks. Compensation is also provided to communities
likely to be affected by an HMDF in adjacent districts. Arbitra-
tion is offered to break any deadlocks (O'Hare et al., 1983).
Under this arrangement the developer has an incentive to
offer the lowest possible compensation to the host community as
well as its neighbors while the communities have an incentive to
demand as large a payment as possible. To- the extent that there
are a few communities vying for the facility, some type of auction
might ensue with the lowest bid hosting the HMDF. Even here
there is no incentive for a community to tell the truth if it knows
that its bid is likely to be considerably below that of any of the
other possible sites. To date there has not been any HMDF
located under the Siting Act, although the town of Taunton was on
the verge of accepting a facility in 1984.
(2) Ontario Waste Management Corporation (OWMC). This Crown
Agency established in 1981 has the responsibility for determining
the types and quantities of waste in Ontario that are not receiving
proper treatment, specifying potential sites for locating an HMDF
that will provide maximum protection for health and the environ-
ment, as well as developing ways for Ontario industries to reduce
the volume of waste requiring final treatment and disposal.
With respect to the siting procedure, the OWMC has identi-
fied eight possible sites within the Golden Horseshoe region
around the western end of Lake Ontario. This region generates at
least 701. of the province's liquid industrial waste. Although com-
pensation is not explicitly part of the OWMC siting process, it may
have some potential value in facilitating the negotiation process
between these eight sites.
We have been investigating an allocation mechanism whereby
each site submits a bid indicating how much they would require to
host the facility (Kunreuther et al., 1986). The site which pro-
vides the lowest bid is the "winner"; all the other communities
would have to pay 1/7 of their bid to the OWMC [9]. This pro-
cedure is guaranteed to yield a budget surplus so that the
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regional siting authority would be able to use any funds not given
to the host community to reward residents along the approach
routes to the site, all of whom will be demanding a share of the
pie.
To limit the portion of the population requesting some form of
compensation it is useful to construct the approach routes in a
concentrated band so that the potential losers are well defined.
If there are industries associated with each site. as there may be
in Ontario, then the payments could be made by them rather than
using the tax revenues of the communities. One other theoretical
advantage of the proposed mechanism is the inability of any
potential site to form a coalition with any other candidate area.
Both the Massachusetts and Ontario siting plans recognize the
challenging process of finding a suitable location for an HMDF. They
remind us of the importance of integrating compensation and insurance
policies into a broader framework. More specifically, there is a need at
the outset to screen all of the potential sites from an environmental
and economic perspective. eliminating any that do not meet specific
health and safety criteria and may be inefficient with respect to the
transportation of wastes from industries in the region. Following this
step one must gain an understanding of the values of each of the
interested parties by detailing their perceived costs and benefits of
different sites. This action can be taken using some type of value tree
analysis as developed by von Winterfeldt and Edwards. At this point.
conflicts between the stakeholders will be uncovered and specific
benefit- and risk-sharing arrangements can be explored such as com-
pensation and insurance. Specific standards for design and operation
of the HMDF can be stipulated with appropriate monitoring and control
procedures by a governmental agency instituted.
5.3.4. NOl'lllative criteria for a desirable Biting process
To conclude this section we will specify four normative criteria in
determining a siting procedure for any given state or country. These
criteria are couched in relative rather than absolute terms since each
society will determine its own appropriate targets. Since the status
quo usually serves as a reference point. there may be a tendency to
stay close to existing procedures.
Criterion 1: Degree oJ Openness
The prevailing viewpoint in the USA and Canada is that the siting pro-
cess should be sufficiently open that different viewpoints can be heard
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and that the public can actively participate in the final siting decision.
Both the Massachusetts legislation and the Ontario procedure provide
for extensive public participation through meetings, information
exchanges, and sessions with individuals and groups. Other siting pro-
cedures have had a similar character [10]. An illustration of a success-
ful siting process which involved active participation was the Alberta,
Canada, experience where over 75% of the local residents voted in favor
of hosting an HMDF. One reason for the large support base was active
involvement of the public at all stages of the process, beginning with
the determination of siting criteria, review of developer proposals. and
inputs into the final site analysis and environmental impact assessment
(McGlennon. 1983).
Criterion 2: Nature ofDeadlines
How rigid should time schedules be with respect to final decisions on
the siting of an HMDF? To our knowledge there have not been any
specific deadlines regarding the choice of a final location within any
region or country. For this reason there have been few examples of
successful siting decisions in recent years.
We feel that specific deadlines are very important for facilitating
the determination of a feasible site. The necessity of either signifi-
cantly reducing waste generation or constructing safe disposal facili-
ties in the near future has forced this action. Fixed schedules also
reduce the incentives for other interested parties to use information
as a delaying tactic.
Criterion 3: Specificity of Contractual Arrangements
How detailed and well specified should contractual siting arrangements
be? We feel that these arrangements should be explicitly specified at
the time a host community is chosen so all stakeholders know their
responsibilities at each of the three stages of the siting process.
These specifications would provide a firm basis for negotiations
between stakeholders since the expected gains and losses would be
clearly delineated.
Criterion 4: Nature of Compensation and Insurance
The philosophical underpinnings guiding societal decisions will influ-
ence the role that compensation and insurance play in the siting pro-
cess. For example. a libertarian system stresses the importance of
individual freedom and any project that is likely to harm a single per-
son would not be approved unless that person was sufficiently compen-
sated so that (s)he felt as well off after the siting decision as before.
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Under a utilitarian system. an HMDF would be approved if the aggregate
net benefits were positive even if some people would be made worse off
than under the status quo. We favor the explicit use of compensation
and insurance mechanisms for guiding siting decisions with the caveat
that they be utilized in combination with other policy mechanisms. par-
ticularly regulatory standards for health and safety of the HMDF.
5.4. Concluding Remarks and Future Research
Up to this point we have focused on hazardous waste management within
a single jurisdiction. Recently, interstate and international problems
have also received much attention [Cain, 1983; Gusman et al., 1980; the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 1985].
The issues arising in multijurisdictional settings include the following:
(1) Classification of wastes (see Wynne. 1984, Ch 5) strongly influ-
ences how wastes are regulated and controlled among several ju-
risdictions. Given the various purposes which classification
schemes serve, it is not surprising that it has taken considerable
time to generate international agreement on a common (if rough)
classification scheme for regulating and monitoring international
and transborder flows of hazardous wastes.
(2) Documentation and reporting of transborder flows is essential to
maintain control of hazardous waste shipments. Recent agree-
ments on reporting formats and procedures in the OECD (1985)
provide a good example of the nature and magnitude of regulatory
problems for transborder flows of hazardous materials.
(3) Financial responsibility and liability laws require international
agreement as well. For example, if such laws are meant to provide
standards and incentives for carriers, they will be ineffective if
mere registry in another jurisdiction, with less stringent regula-
tions, were an exemption to the requirement.
(4) Interstate and international cooperation in coordinating decisions
on infrastructure development is necessary. For example. each
jurisdiction might develop its own infrastructure for low-level
toxic wastes but cooperate in constructing a single facility for
disposal of highly toxic wastes. To date, problems of coordinating
and conflicting regulations have hindered such international and
interstate cooperative ventures (see Cain, 1983; OECD, 1985).
(5) A related problem is assuring sufficient demand for collection and
disposal facilities. The point is that there are large fixed costs
for such facilities. These fixed costs imply that a high volume of
wastes must be processed in order to break even. They also lead
to a number of sustainability problems, since high per-unit
charges to users provide them with an incentive to look elsewhere
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(e.g. neighboring states) for disposal opportunities. The fall-off in
demand can be expected to be highest for high disposal-cost (e.g.
high-hazard) wastes. The resulting "cream-skimming" and demand
reductions then require either substantial subsidies by the state
or significantly higher monitoring and enforcement costs to force
industry to use such high-cost facilities. It is precisely this
scenario which has unfolded in Bavaria and Hessen in the FRG (see
Wynne, 1984, Ch 5) and in Sweden recently. This problem requires
international or interstate coordination for its resolution.
In addition to the above international issues, several important
research questions arise from our foregoing analysis. Concerning firms'
choices of waste reduction and transport means, the key issue for
future research is to determine how firms actually value liabilities and
risks in these decision areas. The evaluation processes, as embodied in
choices such as the one illustrated by Figure 5.6, are quite complex,
even for "hyper-rational" firms. The question is, therefore, how do and
will firms respond to the policy options on insurance and compensation
discussed in this chapter (DECD, 1985).
With respect to siting decisions, there is a need to determine ways
in which one can overcome the stigma associated with the use of com-
pensation as a way of sharing gains from winners to potential losers.
Siting is a political issue and there needs to be ways that local commu-
nities can convince their constituencies of the benefits of having an
HMDF. Experimenting with in-kind compensation arrangements such as
providing a community with improved health facilities may be helpful in
this regard. Trade-offs between lives lost and lives saved can then be
made more explicit than if just money were given to the community.
Concerning research on siting procedures, a key area of interest
is bargaining and collective choice research. Both of these areas are
well developed theoretically and some work has begun to focus specifi-
cally on bargaining in siting problems (Kleindorfer, 1985; Kunreuther et
al., 1986). Field and experimental validation of these theoretical con-
cepts is incomplete in several important respects relative to HMDF sit-
ing problems. First, validation is required for theoretical predictions
of bargaining outcomes in problems involving the existence of risk with
possible compensation from winners to potential losers. Second,
theories of bargaining typically assume that unanimous consent is
required for an overall collective action; otherwise the status quo or
some default options (e.g. restriction of industrial output) obtains.
However, in siting there are typically multiple jurisdictions, each of
which has enactment or veto power over only a part of the overall solu-
tion. This is clearly a different sort of problem from that dealt with in
traditional theories of bargaining and more research on this topic is
needed.
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Regarding insurance arrangements, there is a need for some
creative policies to deal with the current uncertainties associated with
environmental hazards. This requires more well-defined liability
arrangements, a better appreciation by the courts as to the impacts
their decisions are having on the stakeholders concerned with haz-
ardous waste, and a well-defined role for government in dealing with
catastrophic losses. The potential for other industry initiatives to
complement actions such as Clean Sites Inc. should also be explored. In
particular. some type of industry-wide insurance program with rates
based on risk deserves consideration given the reluctance of the
insurance industry to offer pollution liability coverage.
Notes
[1] For simplicity we deal first only with monetary costs. Clearly a more
realistic approach would measure consequences on at least three dis-
tinct dimensions: monetary, environmental, and health. We consider this
issue further elsewhere in the chapter.
[2] For the mathematically inclined reader, we may note that the total
expected costs for the firm facing the decision problem embodied in
Figure 5.6 are
COST =:z; + rI + p(:z;)q(:z;,y) min [max(H -I.O),A]
[3] This could give rise to incentives, possibly to be thwarted by JUdicial
precedent, for larger firms to set up minimum-asset subsidiaries to
shield the assets of the larger firm from damage assessment. In the
Amoco Cad.iz case, which involved the transport of crude oil. the total
assets of the transport firm was the market value of one (debt-ridden)
tanker.
[4] This discussion essentially mirrors the analytical presentation associ-
ated with Figure 5.5, where the enforcement gap represents the dilut-
ing effect of q (:z;, y) on firm incentives.
[5] Other stakeholders involved in the siting process are environmental
and public interest groups, local politicians and planners, as well as
contractors and labor: for more detail, see Morell and Magarian (1982,
Ch 4).
[6] See Kunreuther et al. (1983) for a comparison of the siting of LNG
facilities in four countries. The differences in locating HMDFs across
countries are discussed in Wynne (1984) and Gusman et al. (1980).
[7] For a detailed discussion on incentive compatible mechanisms for this
problem, see Raiffa (1982, Ch 22).
[8] There is a large body of work in recent years designed to elicit willing-
ness to pay and willingness to accept values for public and private
goods: see Brookshire et al. (1985) for a summary. Recently, Smith et
al. (1985) completed a questionnaire to determine an individual's
evaluation of the expected reduction of risks of hazardous materials.
On the basis of the field survey in the Boston area, the authors tenta-
tively conclude that one may be able to elicit households' benefits for
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reducUon of hazardous materials risks. If this preliminary finding is
substantiated then one may be able to compare these esUmates with
those obtained from procedures, such as the one described in the text.
[9] The rule is that communities not selected pay l/(n - 1) of their bid if
n communities are in contention for a site. In Ontario, as we noted,
there are eight candidate sites.
[10] See Andrews and Pierson (1983) for a comparison of state approaches.
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This discussion of insurance and compensation as policy instruments
presents a cogent argument in favor of applying these tools to facili-
tate the public dialogue on hazardous waste management. The authors
are to be congratulated on articulating the complex problems faced by
decision-makers in government and industry to assure a viable and safe
infrastructure for the manufacture, transport. and use of hazardous
materials. They also point to inherent uncertainties in assessing risk
and to a related lack of public confidence in government's and
industry's abilities to manage such risks associated with the technolo-
gies that comprise this infrastructure. Recognition of this is critical
to a full understanding of both the utility and the value of "tools" such
as insurance and compensation as policy instruments. The fact remains
that the availability of economic and noneconomic incentives to, say.
potential host communities of hazardous waste treatment facilities has
proved ineffective in addressing the "not in my backyard" syndrome
that has frustrated siting attempts in the USA and increasingly in
other countries.
In my own state of Massachusetts a siting law does in fact recog-
nize the significance of compensation and insurance as policy tools to
ensure an infrastructure of safe waste management. The Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting Act of 1980 requires insurance well above the
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requirements and calls
upon developers to negotiate compensation with a host community. It is
from the perspective of a public sector practitioner with responsibili-
ties related to the implementation of that Act that this response is
written.
Theoretically, these instruments should facilitate policy imple-
mentation. Unfortunately, in practice, they fall short of the mark. As
it becomes increasingly difficult for industrial firms to acquire
insurance for long-term liability from pollution, public policymakers
will be forced to rethink regulations that have yet to be tested and to
seek other means to foster appropriate and sound waste management
practices. With respect to compensation, the issue is even thornier.
The public perception of risk associated with the treatment or storage
of hazardous wastes is so grave that it is virtually impossible to arrive
at a dialogue stage with respect to compensation.
Consider the Massachusetts experience. Despite a well-defined
process for identifying impact and for negotiating measures to reduce
impacts and compensate a host community for accepting a facility, five
attempts to develop facilities have been abandoned. The experience
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has been humbling - and has given rise to a broader perspective on
what it will take to foster sound waste management and to site much
needed facilities. The fact is that we have been unable to really test
these tools because we remain at the starting gate with respect to
hazardous waste treatment facilities.
This is not to say that these tools have failed us. Indeed, we have
not even reached the point where they can be tried out. Rather, the
problem rests in the broader context of society's understanding of the
need for such facilities. Kleindorfer and Kunreuther stress this in the
introduction:
The key in lhis efforl is lo balance lhe benefils associaled wilh
lhe use of hazardous malerials in producIng products and ser-
vices consumed by sociely with lhe cosls associaled wilh under-
slanding and conlrolling lheir polentially negative sIde effects.
Society - the public at large - needs to understand this in order to
move forward. And public policymakers need to incorporate such
notions in the development and application of their policies. From a
practical stance. integration of these tools into an array of regulatory
and market forces must be accompanied by continuing efforts to com-
municate with the public to foster an appreciation of the notion that
waste management is the concern of all of us. Industry, too, must simul-
taneously be prepared to demonstrate that effective measures are
being taken to reduce the amount of wastes being produced at their
source of generation.
5.D.l. Compensation. liability, and insurance issues
for waste generators and transporters
Relief from insurance and liability regulations can provide incentives
for appropriate waste management practices. but only to a limited
degree. Economic, regulatory, and liability concerns together are forc-
ing industrial. commercial. and institutional waste managers to examine
and, in some cases, to reshape their hazardous waste management prac-
tices. In many cases these practices are moving away from an end-of-
pipe treatment approach to a waste reduction, reuse, and recycling
approach. In Massachusetts. where strict financial responsibilities are
applied to waste generators and managers. the cost of insurance is
regarded as part of the cost of doing business. On the other hand, it
has been noted that insurance is not likely to cover the costs of major
accidents or damages resulting from nonsudden environmental
incidents. In the end. a firm's choice of how much waste to produce
and what means it chooses to transport and dispose of the waste will
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depend primarily upon two factors: the state's enforcement capabili-
ties (swift and effective) and economics. For private companies, the
bottom line is profit: What can they do to earn the most?
Massachusetts is one state to implement strict financial responsi-
bility regulations. The purpose of these provisions is to ensure that
adequate funds are in fact available to close a facility and to provide
postclosure care, if necessary. Our financial regulations are in fact
much stricter than the federal requirements in several respects:
(1) Sudden/accidental insurance limits required are 83 million per
incident and a 86 million annual aggregate (EPA: 81 million and 82
million, respectively).
(2) Non-sudden gradual pollution insurance limits are 85 million per
accident and a 810 million annual aggregate (EPA: 83 million and
86 million).
(3) Cost estimates and funding for closure may not be lumped with
similar requirements for out-of-state facilities owned by the same
company.
(4) Neither the "financial test" (exempting firms with large net
worth) nor corporate guarantee is included as an option for either
closure or postclosure funding or as a substitute for third party
liability insurance.
These regulations may prove problematic in the long term, espe-
cially with respect to the nonsudden gradual pollution insurance limit.
As insurance companies withdraw from offering this coverage, policy
makers will have to consider other options to assure communities that
there will be adequate protection.
One fruitful avenue to consider in insurance and liability regula-
tion is to consider waste generator group systems with incentives for
companies that institute appropriate waste management systems. A
management designed to minimize environmental impacts and potential
liabilities would attempt to maximize waste reduction and to reuse or
recycle those wastes that cannot be eliminated.
5.D.2. Compensation and insurance issues for siting
Compensation and insurance are clearly issues in siting facilities to
treat hazardous wastes. Any community willing to consider hosting
such a facility would certainly want to be assured of adequate
insurance to cover the costs of damages or losses from operations or
closures. Moreover, such a community could legitimately argue for com-
pensation to accept risks generated by society at large - in as much as
all of society relies on the products that generate the wastes.
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To assess where we are today in hazardous waste management and
to determine the effectiveness of tools like compensation and insurance
we need to remember the social impact of the revelations of Love Canal
and the Valley of the Drums on society; and we need to remember the
fact that we were unprepared to deal with these calamities. The shock
effect of those revelations crippled the public's confidence in
industry's and government's ability to cope with this issue. This means
that the public will be wary of any tools designed to facilitate siting:
there is much to be done to win public confidence before such tools can
be effectively applied.
When we first started working on this issue, we did not know a lot
about it - except that we had to do something to avoid the mistakes of
the past. We did not know where the generators were; we did not know
what was in their waste streams. or how much waste there was, or how
hazardous it might be; and we did not know where it was going. Our
institutional structures for dealing with enormous data collection needs
were minimal. Governments had virtually no institutional capability
whatsoever to firmly anchor necessary actions. We had to set up the
institutional structures, multiply enforcement capabilities, develop
planning and analysis teams. and address the very legitimate fears of
the public. We had to move quickly. And we had to do so in a climate of
fear, mistrust. and acrimony.
A great deal has been accomplished in a short span of time. First.
we know a great deal more about the hazardous waste problem. There
is no question that it is a large problem. Second, we know that it must
be dealt with in various ways - that there is no single solution. Third,
institutional mechanisms for dealing with it are now in place.
In Massachusetts, the Dukakis Administration put a comprehensive
plan for hazardous waste management into place in its first days. It is
a program that addresses both the problems of the past and the needs
of the future. The program encompasses five elements:
(1) The identification and clean-up of contaminated hazardous waste
sites: the state's Superfund legislation.
(2) The promulgation and enforcement of strict regulations for waste
management: Phase II regulations are in place and Phase III will
be ready shortly.
(3) The reduction of hazardous waste generated at the source: we are
now developing one of the nation's first source reduction pro-
grams.
(4) Siting of treatment facilities to meet industry's needs.
(5) Establishment of sound public transportation and information pro-
grams to involve citizens in resolving this problem at regional and
local levels.
Insurance and Compensation as PoL1.c1l Instruments iTt
Despite this sound multifaceted approach and a siting law that
builds in mechanisms to ensure compensation and insurance, our ability
to site facilities to treat hazardous waste has been seriously hampered.
At present, compensation under Massachusetts law can be nego-
tiated between the developer and potential host community. This has
not proved fruitful for one basic reason: in our siting process, no one
has arrived at this point in negotiations. All attempts have been
stopped by public opposition before they have reached this important
point.
Thus, the fundamental question we must ask ourselves is not
whether or not these are good tools, but, rather, how they fit into a
comprehensive waste management strategy.
I must stress how important this is to overcoming the major obsta-
cle to siting - local opposition. Tangible demonstration of the link
between economic development and safe disposal is essential. And one
way industry can help is through a commitment to assist economic
development in communities that accept safe treatment facilities.
Finally, and most important - before tools such as insurance and
compensation can be applied effectively - all those concerned with
hazardous waste management must work to achieve better communica-
tions on the issues of safety, uncertainty, and economics.
A decade ago no national initiatives had been taken to deal with
waste management, and hazardous waste activities were inadequately
regulated. Today federal and state legislation aims to protect public
health through "cradle to grave" regulation of hazardous wastes from
the point of generation through storage and transportation to treat-
ment or disposal. But hazardous waste is an issue that will not be
resolved only by law and regulation. Those of us who have worked on
this issue over the past few years recognize its scientific complexity
and political volatility only too well. Solutions will not come easily -
nor will they come quickly. But come they must. Our society has a
responsibility to deal directly, affirmatively, and openly with this
issue. Chemicals touch virtually every facet of our lives. New products
and processes stemming from advanced chemical technologies have
greatly improved the quality of our life over the past 50 years. But
these same technologies generate wastes that threaten our environ-
ment and public health. We need to better understand how these
wastes are generated and how we can reduce them.
We need to learn how we can deal with those that are integral to
the manufacturing processes of companies that benefit society by pro-
viding jobs and paying taxes. And we need to be able to better com-
municate regarding what we know and what we do not know with the
public at large in order to establish a climate in which instruments
such as compensation and insurance can be effectively applied.
CHAPTKR 8
Bargaining and Negotiation in
Hazardous Material Management
M. O'Hare [1]
6.1. Introduction
Management of hazardous materials is interesting to people other than
engineers because:
(1) People disagree about the likelihood of accidents.
(2) People disagree about the severity of consequences.
(3) Different people experience different benefits from risky activi-
ties even without accidents.
(4) People have varying abilities to influence the practices that
impose risks.
(5) Different people are likely to suffer different amounts of injury
when accidents do occur.
For a number of reasons, these differences persist through the
decision-making processes that affect hazardous materials handling. If
they could be eliminated, the same decision would be favored by every-
one concerned with a particular case; however, until we learn how to
eliminate them we will have to manage conflicts.
Risk management conflicts rooted in fact and value differences
have attracted the attention of analysts and policymakers impatient
with the poor performance of traditional "resolution" mechanisms like
command and control regulation. and intrigued by the pervasive success
of negotiated settlements in other kinds of disputes. Environmental
disputes. which conceptually include hazardous material policy con-
flicts as a proper subset, have occasionally been settled by negotiation
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and bargaining in fact, and are increasingly perceived as being more
amenable to the making of deals than to litigation or regulation [2].
The case for moving the regulatory process towards more, and
more explicit, negotiation has three parts. First, arguments from
equity principles, especially a concept of procedural equity, purport to
show that individual autonomy, as manifested in the right to barter
"goods" broadly conceived, is a virtue and one that is advanced by
encouraging negotiation between the parties affected by decisions.
This argument appeals to people who think individual differences
important and respectable. (It is subject to attack on grounds that
autonomous negotiation systematically excludes or underrepresents
particular classes of interested parties and also that the political pro-
cess, whatever its faults, not only advances the virtue of social cohe-
sion and public responsibility, but also better protects individual
autonomy.)
Second, arguments from efficiency point out the impossibility of a
legitimate government authority ever being able to process the infor-
mation needed to find "correct" solutions to all significant market
failures and inequities. (Even in socialist countries, where the govern-
ment subsumes the economy and where official policy holds that all
economic activity intrinsically generates externalities, the impossibil-
ity of duplicating the productive and personal choice-making capacity
of citizens and firms in a parallel administrative machinery has gen-
erated experiments in devolving economic decisions to nongovernmental
forums.) Efficiency also favors practices that vary with the tastes of
particular affected parties and the opportunities of particular situa-
tions: negotiated regulation can do this better than command-and-
control rulemaking.
Third, arguments from pragmatism are made to show that, partly
because people understand the impossibility of pure political regula-
tion, regulatory standards will always be negotiated (as will regulatory
enforcement actions) and the inequities and inefficiencies we suffer are
less when the inevitable negotiations are explicit and legitimated
rather than apologized for and hidden.
When two people meet. each of whom has something the other
wants, they are usually seized by one of the most powerful drives in
human psychology (a drive that governments can suppress only with
the greatest difficulty!): the urge to make a deal. Rather than asking
how negotiation might be employed for hazardous materials, it would
seem sensible to ask why it is not the conventional mode of action
already. Two responses to this question apply. The first is to note
that, in a sense, all hazardous materials decisions are made by one sort
of negotiation or another, as are all decisions involving more than one
actor. The second is to review the important obstacles to explicit
negotiations inherent in the hazardous materials problem: for each. I
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will suggest some implied opportunities to encourage negotiated poli-
cymaking. Illustrations where appropriate will be drawn from the con-
text of hazardous materials transportation, where explicitly negotiated
policy is a rarity [3]. Most of these obstacles are deeply rooted
between potential negotiating parties' models of reality or of how real-
ity ought to be described.
While the formal hazardous materials decision-making environment
is usually not explicitly a negotiating forum, both implicit and explicit
negotiations are under way. Statute-making is, of course, intrinsically
a negotiation. Regulatory rulemaking involves negotiations between
experts inside an agency and between regulators and overhead agen-
cies, like the Office of Management and Budget. When proposed regula-
tions are presented for comment, the agency will balance conflicting
claims of both fact and value presented by intervenors. That inter-
venors' claims are rarely offered as quid pro quo alternatives should
not obscure the balancing involved in responding to them: "We might
relax the 90-day-notice requirement for shipments, but if we do we'll
have to give the environmentalists more frequent truck inspections or a
larger enforcement budget request."
Even enforcement is carried on in an atmosphere of continuous
implicit negotiation. The plant manager bargains with the inspector
over what constitutes a violation and what is merely an opportunity to
improve practice. She bargains with the inspector's supervisor over
the actions required to attain compliance, and she may find herself
negotiating with the district attorney over the size of fine that can be
expected for a guilty plea (see Bardach and Kagan, 1982).
Despite the foregoing, health and safety regulation does not usu-
ally evidence the formal machinery of, say, labor negotiation. Deal-
making often seems to have insinuated itself imperfectly into a process
that "ideally" operates in another fashion entirely. Several charac-
teristics of the hazardous materials problem, or of how we think of it,
obstruct negotiated settlements. In the following pages I will discuss
these approximately in the order they would be confronted in an ongo-
ing negotiation. This is not, however, the order in which they take
effect. Instead, most of these obstacles are anticipated by partici-
pants: if they look formidable, the participants will not come to the
table in the first place.
All the following impediments. then, must be considered as affect-
ing incentives to negotiate in the first place, and not just the process
of negotiation itself. Most disputes offer several means of settlement,
and negotiation is unique among these in requiring unanimous consent to
its use by the parties. Anyone can usually withdraw to another field of
battle if it promises better results: people only negotiate if they
expect to do better that way than by any other means. A party to a
dispute evaluates negotiation by comparing its likely outcome to his
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"BATNA" ("Best alternative to a negotiated agreement") (Fisher and
Ury. 1981). Importantly. the comparison is between the perceived
negotiated outcome and the perceived BATNA. which mayor may not be
the "real" alternatives. Parties who think they can better advance
their own interests through the ballot box or rulemaking public hear-
ings or the courts or civil disobedience cannot be expected to enter a
negotiating session in good faith. Parties who think other parties fore-
see better alternatives to negotiation cannot be expected to ignore the
likelihood that the negotiations are a sham, likely to be vitiated if they
do not come out the way the other party wishes.
Bringing to the tabie parties who can negotiate requires changing
the relative perceptions of negotiated outcomes and BATNAs. This can
be accomplished not only by diffusing knowledge of successful negotia-
tions in environmental and safety disputes (disputes in which plausibly
"right" sets of parties are demonstrably satisfied with the outcome).
but also by making the predictable outcomes of negotiation failures less
attractive.
To do this in practice is difficult. For example. the Massachusetts
Hazardous Waste Siting Act provides that if negotiations between a
local government and a waste processor over a facility proposal are
found to have failed by an administrative body, an arbitrated solution
will be put in place (O'Hare et al.. 1983). The expectation was that an
arbitrated solution would look less attractive in prospect than what the
parties could work out together.
Unfortunately, the process established by the Act has not been
pursued to a project yet, which shows the importance of perceptions in
this kind of analysis. While the real BATNAs are probably better than
what the various parties in four proposals have achieved, looking else-
where for a site (from the developers' viewpoints) and the status quo
ante (from the towns' viewpoints) obviously appeared preferable. The
developers could not expect enough profit from the projects to justify
making the threat of arbitration real by fairly expensive persistence
in the process, and in any case could not be certain that the siting pro-
cess - not yet proved by success - would really work. The towns
sensed this caution and, again because the process is so novel, have so
far been understandably dubious that a hazardous waste plant would
ever be able to provide enough compensatory benefits as a result of
negotiations to be worth having.
6.2. Impediments to Negotiation
6.2.1. Branching risk structure
The first task in negotiation is to decide what should be decided.
Injury from hazardous materials can be avoided by changing behavior at
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any of several points in a handling process, and it is not usually obvious
to all which should be the target of policy. In the case of hazardous
materials transportation, for example, many conditions are, explicitly
or not, on the table:
(1) A definition of the substance in question.
(2) What other substances may be transported with it.
(3) The routes that may be used.
(4) The packaging to be required.
(5) The terminals where the substance may be accumulated.
(6) The frequency and hours of permitted carriage.
(7) The liability rules that will apply.
(8) The persons who may carry the material.
(9) The parties to be notified in case of accident or on the occasion of
each shipment.
(10) The procedures to be followed by shipper, carrier, and govern-
ment in case of accident.
(11) The records that must be kept.
Such conditions affect sequential opportunities to avoid the injury
a hazardous material is capable of causing, whether to people, the
environment, or property. For example, since transportation is almost
always a less controllable or predictable environment than storage or
processing, risk is usually reducible by not transporting a hazardous
material at all, or by moving it after a processing step that reduces its
hazard. The next opportunity, if shipping is necessary for whatever
reason, is choice of route or mode: rail and water shipment concen-
trates risk by increasing shipment quantity relative to truck transpor-
tation (but seems about as safe on the average per ton of material car-
ried [4]). Avoiding populated areas will reduce injuries per accident,
though, if longer routes are required, the likelihood of accident may be
higher. Risk to a subpopulation can be reduced, though without effect
on total social cost, by diverting hazardous shipments through someone
else's town.
Every shipment experiences the ordinary risks of carriage:
trucks bounce, barges roll, people drop packages, and so on. Some
shipments experience unusual insult: airplanes meet clear air tur-
bulence, ships encounter hurricanes, trucks have traffic accidents.
And a few are subject to extraordinary stress: airplanes crash, ships
founder, and trains derail into rivers and rupture tanks. Injury can be
made less likely by packaging hazardous materials to withstand trans-
portation risks of lesser or greater severity.
Finally, damage from materials that escape their protections is
reduced by increasing the effectiveness of accident response. A wide
variety of actions can be taken to accomplish this, from equipping fire
Barga1..,,,in.g aM Negotiation. in. Hasardous MateriaL Man.agemen.t 183
departments to handle certain kinds of chemical fires to "hot lines"
like CHEMTREC [5] that provide information on hazardous shipments
through a 24-hour telephone network.
The importance of the foregoing stages is that hazardous materials
transportation danger is a tree-like structure beginning with a ship-
ment and branching out to different kinds of accidents in different
places [6]. Along each branch, risk is a particular amount of damage
multiplied by a chain of conditional probabilities: e.g. E(injury from
fire in Safeville) =P(shipment of flammable) x P(route through Safe-
ville given shipment) x P(accident given shipment through Safeville) x
P(container breaks given accident in Safeville) x P(Safeville fire
department makes a mistake given previous events) x amount of injury.
Reducing any probability in the chain provides a proportionate
reduction in expected loss: if a material is trucked in containers that
will survive a 100-m.p.h. collision and subsequent fire, not much addi-
tional safety can be obtained by training fire departments to deal with
a spill.
The "best" probabilities to reduce are those where the safety ~
gain per unit of resources invested is greatest. Unfortunately, (1) the
influence of particular probabilities on the risks particular parties
face, (2) the degree of control available to different parties over dif-
ferent probabilities, and (3) the understanding different parties have
of the relationship of actions at different stages in the chain to their
respective safety or other benefits are not distributed in the same
way. Not only do different parts of the tree seem salient to different
parties. but a single party is likely to find some probabilities interest-
ing because his control is great but others interesting because reduc-
ing them would more effectively reduce his risk.
The result of this complicated set of emphases is to discourage
some parties from becoming involved in the hope that others will act
first, and to make simple policies, including many with poor efficiency,
look attractive to others. It also turns the problem as a whole into a
game quite different from direct bargaining, since the actions taken in
one decision forum, such as national packaging standards for nuclear
materials, will have value varying with the risk-averting decisions made
downstream (Harrison and O'Keeffe, 1984). Many parties will find it
preferable to wait for others to act rather than to commit themselves
on the issue they can affect.
Opportunities
The complexity and the underlying asymmetries described above have
been frequently observed. A common recommendation is for a sys-
tematic and holistic attack on the problem, involving extensive techni-
cal analysis of complete strategies rather than piecemeal corrections
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of smaller defects in the existing system [7]. In the abstract, it is hard
to object to a set of hazardous materials practices determined by such
a thorough analysis; the problem is that no one has described a process
by which it could be attained. Trying to achieve it, furthermore,
directly discourages any serious effort to deal with parts of the sys-
tem. It may be wiser to endorse an attainable local optimum, represent-
ing the best we can do through piecewise accommodation, relative to an
unattainable global optimum.
At the same time, it would be useful to reduce the number of deci-
sions to be made by simplifying the regulatory environment so that as
few agencies as possible supervise any particular hazardous materials
activity. The obvious way to do this is to move control to higher levels
of government: this is consistent also with the desire of some parties
for uniform and geographically consistent regulations. Unfortunately,
this displacement will systematically discourage the participation of
such locally concentrated interests as neighbors of transportation
routes, and suppress the expression of different individual aversions
to hazardous materials risks. There is no simple solution to this com-
plexity.
8.2.2. Unrepresentable constituencies
Negotiated social regulation will fail if it is seen by society as a whole,
or by effective interest groups, not to have been generated by the
"right" parties. Accordingly, negotiations can fail if essential
interests are not represented. The failure can be latent - negotiations
are never undertaken because they are expected to be ineffective - or
post facto, when a deal negotiated by a few parties is delegitimized by
others.
Parties can fail to negotiate for several reasons. First, some of
the parties to hazardous materials disputes lack the ability to bind
themselves, or (if associations) their members, to agreements. If such
parties present themselves at the table, other parties will realize that
they offer only predictions of contingent behavior - "if you put flash-
ing lights on the truck, my members [probably] won't picket your ter-
minal" - and not contracts. Other parties either have nothing to trade
or have only the ability to trade in such large lumps that all-or-nothing
demands are inevitable. For example, in an environment of competitive
pricing and good substitutes, a shipper may be unable to offer any
important protection beyond what his competition provides; safety
advocates will correctly infer that they must accept conventional prac-
tice or forbid the particular carriage entirely.
Sometimes the problem is uncertainty over where property rights
or authority lie: for example, just which aspects of hazardous
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materials transportation are under the respective control of local,
state. or the federal governments is a matter of continuing and litigious
confusion in the USA (Price et al., 1983, Vol 1, pp 17-18). A govern-
ment that does not know whether it has the power to permit or forbid
cannot negotiate over its future use of such power; parties who each
think they already have what both want (but only one can have) will be
in court rather than at a bargaining table.
In many conflicts, important latent parties cannot properly be
represented; their absence may predictably bias the outcome of nego-
tiations enough to discourage their implicit allies from participating.
For example, when a town considers excluding a hazardous shipment,
neighboring towns are potential recipients of the risks. But no partic-
ular neighboring town is threatened enough to take action, so an impor-
tant advocate for allowing the shipment is absent from the negotiation.
The result can be a series of contests, no one of which is of great
consequence, but all of which (successive exclusion of routes) are so
unevenly balanced because of the absence of important parties that
they are resolved alike and therefore produce a major social cost: a
net beneficial shipment is not made at all. As we have seen in the siting
paralysis for hazardous waste treatment plants and prisons, a series of
highly correlated decisions to put risks or costs "somewhere else"
amounts, despite everyone's good intentions, to a decision to put them
nowhere (O'Hare et al., 1983).
The most important obstacle to the representation of particular
interests in decisions governing a multitude of actions, like a rulemak-
ing, cannot be overcome: I refer to the limits on the time and attention
citizens can give to all issues that concern them. No one can make his
voice heard, much less useful, about every problem whose solution will
affect him, no matter how conscientiously he commits himself to any
particular issue. This constraint is, at bottom, why we have political
parties that aggregate positions at high levels of abstraction ("pro-
environmental", or even "liberal ") for public decisions that comprise
many policies. It is also a reason for establishing executive regulatory
agencies to apply a general political and economic philosophy to partic-
ular problems. in effect substituting the labor of a few experts for that
of millions of generalists.
Opportunities
A wide variety of options can be recognized under this heading. Stat-
utes can explicitly empower local governments or trade associations to
commit themselves or their members to agreements. The scope of
authority of governments can be clarified by statute more quickly, and
probably better. than through the accretion of case law. Parties to a
decision who have a right to affect events but lack the resources with
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which to make their presence consequential, such as low-income neigh-
bors of routes or terminals, can be endowed by government or by other
parties to a dispute with money or delegated authority or both.
The challenge in the context of hazardous materials is frequently
to identify and empower specific, legitimate. representatives in a prob-
lem that is highly diffuse in space and time. It is much easier to create
a quasi-government to negotiate over a terminal facility in a particular
location than it is to enable the neighbors of a variety of 100-mile
transportation routes to negotiate on conditions or location. It is
easier to find the people who will care about a new prison than to dis-
tinguish among the multitude of parties claiming to represent future
generations at risk from toxic materials with long latency periods.
In the end. it might be wise to embrace this class of obstacles
rather than struggling with them. If the fundamental limits on time and
attention I refer to are significant, it would often be more useful to
strengthen the public trust in political and regulatory processes than
to try to substitute explicit negotiation for them.
8.2.3. Incommensurable risk models
The foregoing obstacles are predictable on the basis of standard nego-
tiation theory. Another, which I have come to think at least as impor-
tant. is an epistemological conflict that usually appears disguised as a
clash of values. The conflict is between two ways of thinking about
uncertainty that I have elsewhere called "sophisticated" and "practi-
cal" (O'Hare. 1984). In the sophisticated view, the world presents
hazards that vary widely and that can be avoided only at a cost; risk
itself is unavoidable. Sophisticated observers know that people accept
many risks for convenience, for money. or even for fun, and that some
actions, like taking powerful medicines, are worthwhile in some cir-
cumstances and ill advised in others. They distinguish between very
small probabilities and impossibility, and allow small probability to bal-
ance large costs. They take pains to guard against the errors in
assessing risks introduced by such inferential "errors" as the well-
known "representativeness" and "availability" heuristics [8].
The sophisticated approach to risk assessment is familiar to pro-
fessionals in engineering and policy analysis. It is most visible when
someone is analyzing the risks others will bear; indeed, it is not possi-
ble to analyze most important decisions intelligently without it.
The practical view divides the world into acceptable and unac-
ceptable actions: potential policies are either safe or dangerous; if
dangerous, they should be forbidden. While practical observers know
that some people seem to take more risks than others. they see an
important role of government as making drugs, skiing, coal mining, and
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appliances "acceptably safe". When using the practical approach,
decision-makers embrace shortcuts, heuristics, and approximations:
probabilities are rounded and costs coarsely categorized. This view is
familiar not only to people inexperienced in formal analysis but also,
through practice, to the same experts who use sophisticated analysis
in their work. Indeed, it is not possible to accomplish all the tasks of
everyday life without it: though one might take a sophisticated
approach to any parLicular problem, no one has time to analyze a deci-
sion tree for more than a tiny percentage of the important choices we
have to make. In fact, the sophisticated analyst must rely on practical
methods for most of his professional decisions: even if we consider the
regulations for shipment of a class of hazardous materials with careful
attention to finite probabilities and costs, we will handle each indivi-
dual shipment in that class by practical analysis. Note that a sophisti-
cated analysis of a class of problems is itself a heuristic technique for
simplifying any member of the class!
The difference in attitudes to risk portrayed above makes conse-
quential discussion among people taking both approaches extremely
difficult - often hostile. The mismatch will not go away, either,
because both approaches are correct in a complicated way. The
sophisticated approach is obviously necessary for thorough analysis of
any particular large decision, but it is impossible to apply, because of
legitimate competing demands for our time, to all or even most deci-
sions. It is also irrational for people to use it in a particular decision
that is of small importance compared to their work, family, and other
interests; a hazardous materials proposal is "small" in this way for most
members of the public affected by it. Thus, it is not possible to resolve
the misunderstanding by teaching citizens statistical decision theory
on a large scale, nor by teaching experts to deal with risk in a dichoto-
mous way as "ordinary" people do.
The importance of this mismatch for negotiations is that the prac-
tical view makes a negotiated settlement of a risk conflict look like an
immoral tolerance of an unacceptable risk. If a particular hazardous
materials proposal is either safe enough or not safe enough, the bene-
fits that might be obtained in compensation or mitigation of it are
either unnecessary or insufficient. To put a proposal on the table as
though it might be acceptable if packaged with a quid pro quo but not
otherwise appears inconsistent with the practical view of risk, and a
reasonable person who thinks he has to choose between the practical
view and negotiation must cling to the former.
Opportunities
The common ground between sophisticated and practical analysts of a
particular hazardous materials problem is that both ultimately face a
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real decision, and have made such decisions before. An aggressive
search by policy analysts for risk descriptions that compare new poli-
cies to familiar, accepted degrees of risk, like the examples given by
Slavic in Chapter 10 in this volume, encourages attention to the effects
of different general policies on particular actions. rather than to the
making of atomistic decisions. Whether we should allow a solvent
recovery facility to transport its products through the streets is
easier to discuss if all parties think about the relationship between
that decision and our tolerance of gasoline tankers delivering to filling
stations.
A good mediator will trust his parties to see the implications of
such comparisons for themselves rather than trying to browbeat them
into accepting a particular inference. The results of practical and
sophisticated analysis tend to converge as the scope of policy decisions
increases. More generally, it will be useful to design choice mechanisms
to accommodate both views rather than implicitly pitting them against
each other. One way to do this is to place the process of risk analysis
in the hands of the parties to the dispute instead of trying to enshrine
it as an objective or technical process. This has the effect of focusing
negotiation on the actions to be taken in the future rather than on the
views of the world parties subscribe to: I discuss below the importance
of this focus.
6.2.4. Non-fungible goods
Assuming that the parties to a conflict have been identified and
brought together, the issue to be negotiated properly defined, and a
common language for discussing the future agreed to, an agreement
almost always turns on an exchange of different goods. In commerce.
one of these is usually money. because it can uncontroversially be
transformed into many other goods at predictable rates: one side of
the transaction can think of herself as receiving a known amount of
"whatever she wants". Hazardous materials conflicts, however. involve
many "goods" not typically traded or sold, and not easily transformable
into others. A trucking company can agree with a municipality to pay
for damage to roads caused by heavy vehicles, because the town knows
it can buy "road repair" that will make the roads very much like "the
roads as they are now". It is not so simple for the carrier to agree to
pay for damage to health caused by chemical leaks: "people repair"
often cannot be bought at any price, and does not always make people's
bodies just like "the bodies people have now" even when available.
Hazardous materials negotiation will therefore be much more like
barter than haggling over prices, with each party offering specific
goods not easily transformable by the other. The right to inflict
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environmental damage may have to be traded for treatment plant
landscaping. This specificity alone greatly complicates the negotiation.
It will be further complicated by difficulties in distributing these non-
fungible goods over individuals: money payments to a local treasury
can be allocated across citizens quite flexibly, but even when the new
park looks, for the town as a whole, like a fair exchange for some river
pollution it may not serve the people most concerned about water qual-
ity.
Hazardous materials conflicts involve health and safety damage
with low probabilities. and this most salient issue is especially difficult
to bargain over. People sometimes act. and usually speak. as though
health and safety risks are not exchangeable - because of "priceless-
ness", infinite value, or moral obligation - for anything. Reasonable
computations of the losses suffered by people whose lives are short-
ened, and by their friends and families. do not seem compelling as mea-
sures of the cost of risk, but the use of money as a numeraire. while
off-putting to many, does not seem to be the main reason for the diffi-
culty.
Reasonable people, in my experience, find it difficult even to dis-
cuss exchanging health and safety protection for other health and
safety protection. as in the familiar awkward classroom discussion of
whether we should be spending $5 million per life protecting people
from risk A when they could be saved from risk B for only $500000
each at the current margins.
Opportunities
The difficulty of exchanging different kinds of nonmarket goods. espe-
cially risk reduction, is especially frustrating to analysts comfortable
with what I called the "sophisticated" approach to risk management.
who see the myriad ways in which people do exchange safety for money
(stunt persons and fire fighters), for fun (skiers), for overall life-style
benefits (living over the California earthquake fault), and even for
trivial convenience (seat belt nonwearers).
Perhaps slow progress can be made if policy analysts and public
officials repeatedly and nonstridently draw attention to the inevitabil-
ity of making these difficult exchanges and to the advantages of doing
it thoughtfully rather than carelessly. Specific negotiating opportuni-
ties should be handled with special sensitivity to the reluctance of
most citizens to be seen bartering their own health for other benefits,
much less the health of people they represent; similar goods should be
compared whenever possible. and money compensation should be put on
the table only when the issue is raised by recipients. Unfortunately,
all these techniques have been tried, and have shown only modest suc-
cess in facilitating explicit negotiations. In the next section, I
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consider whether "safety" or "risk avoidance" may be the wrong name
for the good actually being traded in these cases.
6.2.5. Confusion of anIi.ety and risk
A paradox of conventional risk analysis as used in policymaking [9] is
that the most salient cost considered is not visited upon "anyone": all
the people who directly suffer death are already dead! How should we
assess the cost of possible death? Many other costs, such as illness,
are costly when they are imposed. but may also injure people in a mean-
ingful way before anyone becomes sick. They may even hurt people
who will not suffer them directly. If we look carefully at the strict
behavioral definition of a cost - "that which people commit resources
to avoid" - we can see evidence that the important costs of risky deci-
sions are imposed on people before the untoward event occurs, and
whether or not it does. These costs, which we might as well call "anx-
iety", may even include the "actual" cost with which we have conven-
tionally tried to model risk-avoiding behavior (Schelling, 1968).
The importance of this possibility in the present context is the
difficulty of conducting negotiations in which A thinks, and B says (but
subconsciously does not believe), that a certain kind of "good" (safety)
is the central problem. If the real issue is "worrying about safety", A
will seem, to B. responsive only when proposing actions that coinciden-
tally increase safety and decrease worrying, while other actions (such
as greater use of warning signs) that increase both safety and anxiety
will generate frustration and hostility.
That the cost of danger is something other than an expectation of
quality-adjusted-life-years lost is suggested by a variety of fragmentary
evidence, much of which is at least qualitatively consistent with treat-
ing unlikely injury as though it hurts people before, and whether or
not, it happens. Risks are avoided as though they are multidimensional,
and the dimensions measure perceptions rather than objective qualities
(see Chapter 10 by Slovic in this volume).
One important dimension is the degree to which risk is control-
lable by the potential victim: in this context, risk analysts are
bemused by the common preference on safety grounds for driving
rather than flying, despite ample statistical evidence of the relative
safety of the latter. What people who fear flying avoid is a period of
anxiety, not a mere likelihood of death. This anxiety is avoidable when
driving by the following analyses: "If I have a blowout, I will steer
carefully towards the shoulder and brake gently. If I see an obstacle
in the road, I will stop. If I feel sleepy, I will pull off and have a nap or
coffee." Almost any scary driving scenario can thus be terminated with
a psychologically plausible, if not statistically sound. resolution, and
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the mind turned to other things. In contrast. few such scenarios in an
airplane can be "put away" by a plausible conjecture: "If an engine
catches fire I will .... " The poor passenger must make do with "I hope
the pilot knows how to ", which is a feeble substitute as reassurance
for the confident "I will II
Thoughtful psychologists have conjectured that the (statistically)
exaggerated fear we display of certain accidents results from distor-
tion of our estimates of actual occurrence rates, probably induced by
the greater frequency with which newsworthy disasters are presented
to us relative to banal injury [10]. Might it instead (or also) result from
a recognition that accidents of the newsworthy sort will, because of
frequent reminder, be costly to us directly, through the anxiety
induced by their being forced on our attention? Perhaps I want mul-
tideath accidents controlled out of proportion to their expected
number of deaths not because I think them more common than they are,
but because I know that everyone will be put before me again and again
on the evening news, while people who die one at a time will do so
without making me think about them.
Another paradox partially resolved by considering anxiety rather
than events is public tolerance for major risks frequently confronted,
such as the gasoline truck on the city street. A standard result in
psychophysics, the Weber-Fechner law, finds response to vary with
(the logarithm of) a change in stimulus. Ubiquitous risks present a
fairly constant stimulus: gasoline trucks are part of everyday traffic,
we use the hard and slippery bathroom more than once a day,
dangerous occupations surround their practitioners most waking hours,
and so on. What provokes worry is not, arguably. great danger, but a
danger signal that rises greatly above background. What provokes risk
reduction may therefore be the expectation that a certain risk will
generate rare signals of hazard, like irregular news stories concerning
hazardous shipments or indictments for careless waste disposal.
Opportunities
To the extent that anxiety rather than occurrence is the fundamental
cost of risk, negotiating over any risky policy is a very difficult task.
To begin with, explicit recognition of the proposition is likely to be
insulting to participants using a practical risk model. Risk imposers,
such as hazardous material carriers, could improve their tactics by
carefully choosing only risk reduction mechanisms that are likely to
reduce anxiety, but the policy landscape will be dense with moral
traps.
If anxiety imposes real costs, for example, they must be deserving
of balance against direct injury costs. Some practices, such as warn-
ings, intrinsically increase the former to reduce the latter; should we
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look for ways to achieve great reductions in anxiety at a modest price
in lives? Most people would say "no", but this answer is inconsistent
with treating anxiety as a real cost. Could a regulatory agency
announce a policy of trading real risk against anxiety and stay in busi-
ness, even if that would increase welfare as behaviorally evidenced?
Should it?
This may be an obstacle that must be deliberately muddled
through rather than overcome by a direct attack. The challenge of
anxiety cost is much broader than negotiated risk management.
Research is needed to clarify the place of anxiety in the structure of
social cost. and if it has the importance I conjecture, some new political
lheory will be required to apply the result in practice.
8.2.8. Contusing disagreement with failure
If the foregoing obstacles can be overcome, agreement can probably be
reached. Unfortunately. common expectations of what such an "agree-
ment" should be can present a last important obstacle to negotiations
over hazardous materials. As everyone knows, contracting parties must
agree on certain things: the price to be paid, exactly what goods will
be transferred when. and precisely what actions the parties are
obliged to take in the different futures that may be realized.
However, what makes contracts possible and worthwhile is
disagreement between the parties - about values. about the facts. or
about both (Leonard and Sebenius. 1983). If two people agree on the
value of one good in terms of another, a trade will leave them no better
off: people exchange A for B at a particular rate because. while the
person gaining B thinks it worth more than the A he has to give up for
it, the other party thinks it worth less. Contingent contracts, such as
stock purchases or horse racing bets. depend on differences between
two parties' beliefs about the state of the world: an investor will buy a
security from another because the buyer thinks the company's future
is brighter than the seller thinks it is.
What is widely ignored (by people who have no trouble in everyday
life acting in accordance with the preceding paragraph) is the toler-
ance of a negotiating process for these differences. As a result, a
doomed search for unnecessary and impossible agreement cripples
negotiations both in practice and in anticipation.
This puzzling ignorance seems to have several sources. First, the
formal machinery for managing hazardous materials and analogous con-
flicts is fraught with procedures that imply a need to agree on the
facts and on objectives. Environmental impact statements are supposed
to present an "objective" description of the future, which must there-
fore be persuasive to all; the same standard is held up for a variety of
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consulting reports and blue-ribbon studies (O'Hare, 1980). Regulatory
hearings, patterned after trials. suggest a similar standard of discern-
ing universal facts that "everyone should accept".
Social convention, which in most societies rewards real or feigned
consensus, obscures the difference between the kinds of agreement
distinguished above. It is rude for a purchaser to dwell on his continu-
ing belief that the seller has been taken, and labor negotiations usually
end with a smiling group press conference emphasizing the "agreement"
reached. This convention makes it difficult for people to begin negotia-
tions consciously expecting to finish with important differences of
view. Political good manners also emphasize similarities of values among
citizens: the most vigorous efforts at income redistribution, in which
one group will benefit only at the expense of another, are civilized by
frequent obeisance to highly abstract values (caricatured as "mother-
hood and apple pie") on which the parties can agree.
Finally, the public success of science in generating both widely
accepted interpretations of reality and a means of persuasion to
transmit them probably distorts our view of the results one can reason-
ably expect from "scientific" analysis of risky policies.
An implicit belief that the agreement sought by negotiation must
include agreement on the facts or on values to be served seems to me to
lie behind much of the disappointment and mistrust that quickly poi-
sons many promising negotiating processes. As soon as it becomes clear
that some of these agreements are not going to occur. a party without a
clear understanding of what must be agreed on and what may remain
unsettled will either fear being forced to say things he thinks false, or
despair of the group's ability to ever make a deal. Such despair is
probably anticipated subconsciously by potential negotiators in haz-
ardous materials conflicts.
Opportunities
The persistence of differences between the parties to hazardous
materials conflicts provides the most important reason to seek nego-
tiated agreements in policymaking and the most promising opportunities
to make them possible.
While I emphasized earlier the extreme difficulty of having all
hazardous materials practice tailor-made to the tastes of particular
groups of neighbors, and thus the difficulty of implementing negotiated
rulemaking for general regulation in this area, it is also true that much
hazardous materials activity is limited in space and time. It is in these
cases that practice can be made to respond to the differences in cir-
cumstances, tastes, and perceptions of parties. The community sur-
rounding a hazardous material terminal or facility usually experiences a
much higher density of pound-miles of hazardous materials than other
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places, and the parties to negotiation over its conditions are few
enough to bring together practically. Some hazardous materials move-
ments are special enough, and use few enough routes, that their condi-
tions can usefully be attended to on their own terms; an example is the
transportation of a feedstock between a refinery and a few users.
Most of these relatively localized disputes are covered, uncomfort-
ably, by the application of regulation designed for a large category of
hazardous materials cases. Many could be handled by negotiated agree-
ments that depend on the fact that the parties are, first, different
from the parties to other similar disputes and second, different from
each other in several ways, while not exactly opposed. The first kind
of difference is what makes negotiated settlements not only efficient
but also respectful of the particular qualities of particular people in a
way that general rules cannot be. The second kind is what makes it
possible to agree.
Such negotiations would be advanced by several practices. First,
the differences between parties in ways of making inferences and in
the particular types of outcomes that concern them should be recog-
nized by putting analysis directly into the hands of the parties and not
into a separate "objective" investigation. I have argued elsewhere that
there is no study of a controversial matter that will be treated as
though it is objective (O'Hare, 1980): it is better to equip people with
the ability to obtain information they trust than to waste resources
writing analyses no one will use except as propaganda or a punching
bag.
Diffused information-gathering will provide the parties with what
they want to know (there is not much incentive to buy tendentious
analysis for your own consumption). It will, however, leave the parties
with very different views of the facts of the dispute, and not much
change their conflicting values. Accordingly, negotiations should be
focused on actions subject to the parties' respective control, and not
on facts or values. For example, it is useful to discuss whether ship-
ments may be made by truck at night, but not helpful to "negotiate"
whether such shipments are really more dangerous than in daylight.
Conditional agreements are especially appropriate when facts are in
dispute: a carrier, who expects his drivers to be careful, can contract
with a town government, that expects them to be careless, to pay for a
police escort for each shipment after being convicted of two traffic
violations.
Value differences require an attempt to distinguish the essential
from the peripheral qualities of activities. Some values are exact oppo-
sites. and negotiation will be a zero-sum game. People fundamentally
opposed to nuclear electric generation will find little scope for agree-
ment with the operator of a nuclear generating station: what makes
him better off intrinsically makes them worse off. But many conflicts
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conceal a poor or imperfect opposition of values: people opposed to
hazardous materials are often sympathetic with a shipper's economic
prosperity and the jobs and taxes it generates. Can the shipper con-
solidate his operation by bringing a downstream process on site,
thereby improving the local economy and avoiding a risky shipment?
The prospect for agreement is improved when alternatives are
described as continua and sets rather than yes-or-no propositions, if
only because "how much?" and "which of these?" keep the parties'
attention on (1) the opportunity to have movement without complete
surrender, and (2) the existence of possible actions different from the
parties' original positions. A good way for a shipper to open negotia-
tions with route neighbors is to approach them with a variety of
options for reducing risk and ask them to help him choose among them.
The implication, favorable to negotiation, is that they have knowledge
and desires different from his but equally important.
It is important not only to include as many concerned parties as
possible but also to be clear about whose interests are not being
represented and therefore must be cared for in another process. The
most common example in a hazardous materials negotiation will probably
be people distant from the dispute physically who fear not only injury
to people but also diffuse damage to the natural environment. In some
cases these concerns may be represented in a particular dispute, but
in others they will have to be managed through a rulemaking process
that mayor not be an explicit negotiation.
6.3. Implications
The foregoing discussion has attended little to negotiation obstacles
easily corrected by public policy, many of which are noted, with useful
advice, in the works cited in [2]. The obstacles presented here, by
contrast, are either intrinsic qualities of the choice to be made, like its
branching risk structure, or habits of mind and conventions of
discourse that have positive value in many circumstances people face,
like the practical view of risk. They are troublesome in the particular
circumstance of negotiation over policies and practices that will help
everyone somewhat but might hurt a few of us a lot.
The analysis that illuminates these problems is for the most part
experience and common-sense based, which is to say it regards people
as being not only "rational" economic utility-maximizers of the familiar
type, but also as knowing enough to include their own time as a
resource with a cost attached, and as being smart enough to maximize
in complicated games with a complex relationship between particular
goods and their own utilities.
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I have been able to make only modest contributions to the "solu-
tion" of these problems. For a variety of reasons, negotiated agree-
ments covering hazardous materials will be difficult to obtain compared
to agreements in other social choice contexts. However, the obstacles
cited here seem to suggest that they will be dealt with better if we
develop procedures that are accommodated to them rather than trying
to change human nature, or the fundamental structure of hazardous
materials problems, to make them go away.
Notes
[1] The author very much appreciates comments from Gail Bingham,
Howard Kunreuther, and the discussants. Remaining errors are his
own. The research described here was partially supported through the
Interdisciplinary Programs in Health, Harvard School of Public
Health, by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under contract
no. CR807809. The conclusions presented here do not necessarily
represent the position of the EPA or the US Government.
[2] The literature on environmental negotiation and on expanding the role
of negotiation in conflict generally has become too extensive to sum-
marize conveniently. To sample the field, see Bacow and Wheeler
(1984), Sullivan (1984), and Raiffa (1983). For an extensive analysis of
negotiated settlements in the area of facility siting, especially hazard-
ous material disposal facilities, inclUding a prescriptive discussion of
statutory and informal methods of encouraging such negotiations, see
O'Hare et al. (1983).
[3] Two useful general treatments of hazardous materials transportation
issues are the collection of research papers in Price et al. (1983) and
the practitioner-oriented work by Abbott et al. (1984).
[4] Aggregate data for hazardous materials transportation are difficult to
come by and imprecise. This observation is taken from Abbott et al.
(1984, pp 8, 26).
[5] Funded by the Chemical Manufacturer's Association, CHEMTREC pro-
vides information about chemical hazards and links to shippers for pos-
sible direct assistance.
[6] For a critical discussion of conventional practice and philosophy of
risk assessment in hazardous materials transportation, see Philipson et
al. (1983).
[7] See, for example, Price et al. (1983, Vol 1, pp 14-15) (recommenda-
tions) and Philipson et al. (1983).
[8] See Chapter 10 of this volume by Slovic. For a discussion of inferential
heuristics that appear as errors when decisions are reviewed care-
fully one by one, but as efficient policy when a way of making many
decisions must be chosen, see Nisbett and Ross (1980).
[9] See, for example, the review of risk analyses in Kunreuther et al.
(1983).
[10] For a review, see Chapter 10 by Slouic in this volume.
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6.D1. Discussion
J. C. Davies
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I found the chapter by O'Hare important and interesting. It alternates
between practical and theoretical observations, which sometimes makes
for difficult reading, but, like a good book, it is even better on a second
reading. I want to focus on just one of a number of stimulating ques-
tions raised by Professor O'Hare: how to treat public perceptions of
risk. This is a question that arises in several different contexts in
Chapter 6.
Professor O'Hare suggests substituting the "value of not worrying
about death" for the traditional "value of a life" when calculating the
importance of a risk. There is no question that worry and anxiety are
definite societal costs. But, as Professor O'Hare notes, one implication
of this substitution is that "shippers, carriers, and regulators should
look for ways to make risks invisible.... It might even be appropriate
to accept higher absolute risk as a trade for less visible risk.... A
moral trap seems to yawn here; how can we steer between cynical
deception and appropriate response to what appear to be people's fun-
damental values?" The issue is at least as old as Plato. We should
recognize that the determination of risk may pit the views of philos~
pher kings (or their contemporary equivalents, scientific regulators)
against Jeffersonian faith in the general public.
A different aspect of the same problem is presented in O'Hare's
discussion of the "sophisticated" versus the "practical" way of think-
ing about risk. He implicitly concedes that dichotomous (Le. zer~risk)
thinking about risk is popular. But he also states that it is "inap-
propriate" in regulatory practice. Why is it popular? O'Hare and oth-
ers have suggested some reasons, but they are not fully adequate. Why
is it inappropriate? Because it is impossible to have zero risk, and thus
the public is not being realistic.
Paul Slovic, Professor O'Hare, and others have shown that in fact
the public perceives more subtle dimensions of risk than do the
experts who tend to view risk solely in terms of deaths and injury. The
public has ways of integrating different dimensions of a given risk that,
if they could ever be made explicit, probably would be superior to any
of the methods currently used by the experts. But, at the same time,
the accuracy of O'Hare's portrayal of the public as unrealistic and
simple-minded about risk cannot be denied.
More specifically with respect to O'Hare's chapter, it is difficult
to reconcile, on the one hand, his views that we should pay obeisance to
public fears in that they should in fact be the definition of risk and we
should place the process of risk analysis "in the hands of the parties
to the dispute" with, on the other hand, his portrayal of a public that
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demands zero risk and that defeats politicians who favor cost-benefit
analysis.
It is difficult to reconcile these views but not, I think, impossible.
And both views represent different aspects of reality, so that to
highlight the difference is in no way a criticism of O'Hare's contribu-
tion. Each view of the public implies significant political and moral
choices, so that reconciling them is a task of immense practical impor-
tance.
The task is not made simpler by the fact that it is just one facet
of the overall issue of experts versus laymen in a technological society.
As the Vietnam War issue made quite clear, at least in the USA the
experts do not trust the public and the mistrust is reciprocated. This
is one of the crucial issues of our time, and risk analysis is at the cut-
ting edge. The many sophisticated techniques for analyzing and manag-
ing risk that have been described in this Conference are all doomed to
failure if we cannot successfully grapple with the issues of trust, credi-
bility, and the role of experts. This, it seems to me, is our central
task.
For the past nine years, The Conservation Foundation has been
experimenting with and doing research on alternative methods of
dispute resolution, particularly mediation and what we call "policy
dialogues". We see these techniques as one of many possible ways of
addressing some of the challenges outlined above.
Our research has shown that mediation - the involvement of a neu-
tral third party - has become an increasingly common method of set-
tling environmental disputes. A research report that we recently com-
pleted documents 160 cases, over the past ten years, of environmental
disputes in which mediation was utilized. The number of such cases has
increased each year, and in recent years institutions have been formed
devoted entirely to mediating environmental disputes.
At The Conservation Foundation we have conducted a number of
policy dialogues. These are meetings among the interested parties
directed at reaching agreement about specific environmental policy
issues. They have mostly involved representatives of the business com-
munity, representatives of the major environmental groups, and a neu-
tral chairman. They have dealt with such subjects as implementation of
the Toxic Substances Control Act, development of a handbook for siting
hazardous waste disposal facilities, disposal of radioactive waste, and
energy pricing. Two such groups are currently active: one, initiated
by several church groups, is developing guidelines for pesticide use in
developing countries: the other is working on several proposed legisla-
tive changes to the Toxic Substances Control Act.
The example most relevant to the subject of this conference is the
formation of Clean Sites, Inc. This was not really a dialogue group
because there was no neutral mediator. But it was an effort involving
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both the chemical industry and some of the major environmental groups
under the auspices of The Conservation Foundation which served as a
neutral institutional home.
The result of the effort was agreement among the Chemical
Manufacturers' Association. several major chemical firms. The Conser-
vation Foundation and the National Wildlife Federation to create a new
institution - Clean Sites. Inc. - to clean up hazardous waste sites on a
voluntary basis. The new institution was created about a year ago and
is now active in cleaning up more than 20 sites, all of them on the
government's list of priority sites.
Our overall experience has shown that mediation and negotiation
can be effective methods for dealing with environmental problems,
including many types of hazardous waste problems. The methods are
successful in that they have a high rate of success in achieving agree-
ment among the interested parties and the agreements often provide
better solutions than could otherwise have been achieved. The main
problem in some of the efforts has been implementation. The results of
some of our dialogue groups were ignored, for example. because govern-
ment officials were reluctant to accept a solution which they had not
crafted.
Mediation and negotiation are not panaceas. There are many
situations where these techniques are not appropriate: there may be
no deadline to spur agreement, one of the parties may benefit from lack
of agreement. the resources available to the different parties may be
so disparate that they cannot bargain as equals. But the experience to
date has been very encouraging. At a minimum it shows that new
methods for dispute resolution can be developed. can be applied. and
can serve the public interest.
6.D2. Discussion
F. Dinglinger
Siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities has been the subject of a
Parliamentary Investigation Committee in our state (Baden-
Wiirttemberg. FRG), and waste management has led to the formation of
another Parliamentary Investigation Committee that is sitting
currently.
In this delicate situation it is hard to say whether the siting and
realization of a waste disposal facility is the result of a bargain. It is
the result of a legal and administrative procedure based on scientific
expertise and facts concerning all possible risks people can think of.
This is the reason why the new industrial waste disposal site in Baden-
Wiirttemberg is one of very few in the FRG that could be realized in the
last decade.
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First, I want to point out the legal situation. In the FRG it is pos-
sible to get a waste disposal facility strictly according to legal regula-
tions, which include public hearings and expert studies. In cases of
conflict between different parties, it is the courts that settle the
dispute, basing their decision on formal law and expert opinion. This is
the reason why - in principle - there is little scope for negotiation
and bargaining but plenty of scope for experts of all kinds on either
side.
Of course nobody would actually try the legal procedure without
first considering other ways. Looking back, one can see three stages:
(1) Looking for a site.
(2) Bargaining.
(3) Legal and administrative procedures.
8.D2.1. Looking for a site
You have to start thinking very early! If, for example, the site obvi-
ously does not have a 30 m layer of clay, as assumed, or if the Prime
Minister's house is just adjacent to the site, you will probably try the
next alternative. There are other obstacles that you can establish
very easily: if, for example, the site is situated in the Prime Minister's
constituency or situated in the constituency of another strong minister
or secretary of state, or situated close to the local mayor's home, then
the site will be no good even if it is an intrinsically suitable site.
Such a situation may provide the first frustration; then a good
engineer will start looking out for objective requirements that have to
be met. In doing so he or she may easily pass five years, and end up
with an honorable PhD. It is true that such a systematic evaluation of
benefits helps a lot - but the Prime Minister has not moved away in the
meantime. Thus, it can be seen that very important decisions - possi-
bly the most important ones - are made in the first stage, and very
often without the public being aware of it.
8.02.2. Bargaining
If one of 50 possible sites has finally been chosen, the negotiations can
begin. It may happen, however, that the community's officials have in
the meantime decided, legally, that within the borders of their commu-
nity no waste disposal facilities are to be "allowed". That does not
bother you, however: there are 49 other sites left. If you want to go
any further here, the experts have to start their job of convincing
people.
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8.02.3. Legal and adwinistrative procedures
In the third stage. all the settlements become part of the final decision
or, if that is not possible. are verified privately. The legal procedure
ends up with or without a court decision. Such settlements may involve:
(1) A new pond for homeless frogs.
(2) A new fire station for the community.
(3) Two more fire engines because of the dangerous materials to come.
(4) Connection of the community to a distant water supply system.
(5) A new street or improvement of existing streets.
(6) A new sewage plant for the community to take the expected
dangerous leachate.
8.02.4. Conclusion
Let me summarize. The role of negotiations must not be overestimated
in FRG. I would put more emphasis on the first stage. and especially on
the scientific study. If this does not provide a strong basis for further
arguments. there is no way of winning a favorable court decision. And
after the experience of the last ten years. one is inclined to return to
clear court decisions if bargaining and negotiations are no longer
timesaving elements.
CHAPrER 7
Rethinking the Siting of
Hazardous Waste Facilities
R. E. Kasperson [1]
7.1. Introduction
Siting conflicts are as much a part of organized human experience as
politics itself. Traditionally such conflicts centered upon competition
among places to obtain desired functions, as with the location of state
capitals in early American political history or the siting of national
capitals elsewhere (as with Brasilia or Islamabad), other times upon
desired facilities (e.g. "clean" industries in residential suburbs), and
sometimes for federal contracts or grant awards. More recently,
disagreement and controversy have erupted over where to locate facili-
ties or functions such as prisons, cemeteries, taverns, "adult" book-
stores, or town dumps with undesired characteristics. With
widespread urbanizational and technological development. with increas-
ing pressure upon land, and with growing concern over environmental
and health protection, siting of controversial facilities of all sizes and
kinds has become increasingly difficult and has emerged as a national
policy problem of major significance (Popper, 1983). Nowhere are the
difficulties greater and the stakes higher than with the perplexing
issue of how and where to locate hazardous waste treatment and dispo-
sal facilities.
Let the stakes not be underestimated. In April 1985 the US
Congress Office of Technology Assessment (US Congress, OTA, 1985. p3)
estimated that more than 10000 disposal sites for hazardous waste will
require cleaning up at a cost which may eventually total S100 billion.
Dealing with this enormous task and the ongoing generation of hazard-
ous waste will require successfully siting hundreds of new facilities
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across the country. Failure to do so will involve substantial prices
(Morell, 1984). Industry is understandably reluctant to cooperate in
site clean-ups that require relocating the wastes in existing landfills
likely to leak in the future. thereby impeding the Superfund program.
The national resolve under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), and similar state initiatives. to close existing landfills is
thwarted by the unavailability of new and better sites. The lack of a
credible program of hazardous waste management also detracts from in-
centives to reduce the volume of hazardous waste generated, thereby
exacerbating the long-run waste problem. While the proposed ban on
land disposal of wastes under the RCRA would be a critical step in an
effective rational management program. numerous sites for waste treat-
ment facilities will still be required. Meanwhile. public skepticism and
distrust of those charged with the management task grows, while the
remaining margin of good will and cooperation so necessary for a
coherent siting program erodes still further.
Underlying the various attempts to wrestle with these problems
are conceptualizations of the nature of "the" siting problem, assump-
tions as to how it should be addressed. and preferred strategies of in-
stitutional response - siting paradigms, if you will. The adequacy of
each of these paradigms will do much to determine the eventual success
of the various national and state programs now under way. The initial
returns do not inspire confidence that ongoing programs are adequate
to the task. yet remarkably little rethinking appears to be occurring.
Something like a conventional wisdom has evolved in the scholarly and
practitioner communities, and it deserves critical scrutiny.,
Accordingly, the objectives of this paper are:
(1) To conceptualize the nature of the problems involved in siting ha-
zardous waste facilities and compare it to currently held views.
(2) To examine the adequacy of major siting models underlying current
national and state waste disposal programs in the light of objec-
tive (i),
(3) To outline an improved siting paradigm to guide new initiatives in
hazardous waste management.
The discussion to follow addresses each of these objectives in
turn. To begin. however. a brief review of the current waste siting si-
tuation sets the context.
7.2. The Current Situation
Although hazardous waste landfills have be.en sited for many decades,
sometimes resulting in societal alarms (as in Love Canal or the Valley of
Reth.inking the SiUng 0/H~lIl~rdo1J,s W~ste F~citities zoo
the Drums), the legacy of past failures and associated remedial efforts
are not of primary interest in this review. Rather the focus is upon
recent and ongoing efforts to find appropriate waste sites through the
considered siting strategies embodied in national and state programs.
In its 1985 review of the national hazardous waste problem, the US
Congress OTA painted an ominous picture. Disposal of such wastes over
a number of decades had been largely unregulated by the states or
federal government; some 80263 sites existed with contaminated sur-
face impoundments, 90% of which posed a potential threat of groundwa-
ter contamination; the long-term health threats of hazardous waste
were uncertain and potentially serious; and economic costs of managing
hazardous wastes were estimated at 84-5 billion and rising rapidly (US
Congress. OTA, 1985, pp 9-11). Arthur D. Little analysts have
estimated that the quantity of hazardous waste generated would
increase at a 3% annual rate, the same rate of growth as the chemical
industry. Further, they estimated that off-site treatment and disposal
would be used for 80% of the waste, as compared with the then existing
level of 20% [2]. In a 1985 review of the national hazardous waste pro-
gram, the OTA found that, despite the expenditure of $1 billion from
the Superfund, only 50% of the 538 sites on the priority list of the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were receiving remedial clean-
up attention (US Congress, OTA, 1985, p 3). Equally disturbing was the
OTA's observation that "current remedial cleanups tend to be imper-
manent. Some sites get worse, and repeated costs are almost inevit-
able. Environmentally, risks are often transferred from one community
to another and to future generations" (Shabecoff, 1985, p 31).
Both the national clean-up effort and the continuing generation of
new wastes will require the finding of hundreds of new facility sites
over the next several years. Failure to do so will impede the EPA's
clean-up program, undermine efforts designed to reduce hazardous
waste generation and to develop alternative control technologies,
export this generation's risk into the future, and magnify the costs of
eventual solution. Hazardous waste management occurs under the
auspices of the RCRA of 1976 which was designed to produce "cradle to
grave" control, primarily through land disposal over solid waste. But,
because the Act is silent on the siting of facilities and the federal
government thus has no authority to become involved, the responsibil-
ity of siting has, as with the case of low-level radioactive waste, fallen
to the states (Bacow and Milkey, 1982, p 267).
The state response to this burden has been highly uneven.
Approximately one-half of the states have established siting programs
for new hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
The approaches show considerable variation, ranging from those that
emphasize central authority and preemption to those (e.g. Mas-
sachusetts) that emphasize bargaining and negotiation. Whatever the
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program, state siting efforts encountered determined, and often vehe-
ment, local opposition. The resistance shows an impressive ability to
unite "grandmothers and US Congressmen, factory workers and univer-
sity scientists, those who never graduated from high schools and those
with doctorates in ecology and physical sciences" (US Environmental
Protection Agency, 1979, p iii). The vehemence of the opposition often
stuns facility developers and regulators, as in one example where angry
citizens were prepared to blow up a facility and there were reports of
threats of death or physical harm to key individuals and their families
(US Environmental Protection Agency, 1979, p iii). In the face of such
volatile local response, it is not surprising that the siting record is
rather dismal: some 32 siting efforts occurred nationally between 1979
and September 1984, with five treatment and two storage facilities
approved (but not yet built) but only one waste disposal facility suc-
cessfully sited and constructed, and that (in Maryland) was subse-
quently closed because it could not compete economically with previ-
ously sited facilities (Ryan, 1984. p 3).
Siting experience over the past decade for high-level and low-
level radioactive waste and for more recent attempts with hazardous
waste facilities clearly indicates a serious national problem - one that
is shared to varying degrees by other countries. Why has hazardous
waste facility siting run aground while other unwanted facilities con-
tinue to find host communities despite local reluctance?
7.3. The Na.ture of this Siting Problem
Although hazardous wastes facilities share a number of problems with
other unwanted facilities. they present a different configuration of
impact on these problems. They also reveal some risk and choice con-
siderations not found in many other siting tasks. Five major issues con-
tributing to siting difficulties are the lack of a systems approach, risk
uncertainty, public perception of risk, inequity in costs and benefits,
and institutional distrust.
7.3.1. The need for a systems approach
By its nature, hazardous waste management requires a systems
approach. The waste production process is a complex one, involving
numerous opportunities for management to reduce risks, to lower
economic costs, and to recycle wastes to beneficial uses. All opportuni-
ties need to be weighed against one another to maximize health protec-
tion and economic efficiency, and to minimize the transfer of risks to
future generations.
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No less than waste management. facility siting is also a system
activity. The deployment of a waste management system requires a net-
work of waste processing, storage, and disposal facilities, intercon-
nected by waste transportation links. The network may be designed in
ways that increase equity, minimize risk, and lower costs, or. alterna-
tively. produce the reverse effects. This is clearly apparent in Fig-
ures 7.1 and 7.2. which show the implications of a centralized versus a
regional siting strategy for high-level radioactive waste repositories.
The centralized system creates a national system of waste movement
involving many nonnuclear states in risks, public concern, and regula-
tory burdens. The regional system, by contrast, minimizes such prob-
lems. thereby suggesting the importance of the underlying policy
choice.
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Unfortunately current hazardous waste facility strategies tend to
be facility-specific. Most of the state laws governing hazardous nonra-
dioactive waste facility siting are geared to the process for siting a
given facility. Low-level radioactive waste facility siting, because of
the scale of the institutional structure. addresses the siting of a single
facility. Network and systems considerations receive little treatment
in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and only belatedly are being
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addressed by the US Department of Energy, with regional distribution
questions unresolved.
7.3.2. Risk uncertainty
Varying degrees of uncertainty characterize the health implications of
waste facility siting. Generally there appears to be little chance of
massive uncontrolled releases of hazardous wastes into the environment
from well-designed disposal facilities (US Congress, OTA 1985, p 46).
On the other hand, residual risks unquestionably exist. The long
time periods which characterize the waste disposal task, the limited
experience with repository design and behavior, the necessary reli-
ance upon computer models for simulating waste behavior, and limita-
tions upon model validation and remaining gaps in scientific knowledge
all suggest that uncertainties will remain. For land disposal (should it
occur) of hazardous wastes, these uncertainties may be particularly
substantial owing to limited knowledge of (US Congress, OTA, 1985, pp
22-23):
(1) The likely quantity and timing of releases of particular consti-
tuents.
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(2) The rates of transport of released hazardous constituents through
the environment and their rates of degradation in the environ-
ment.
(3) The extent of possible exposures of people and the environment
to persistent hazardous constituents and their degradation prod-
ucts.
(4) The probability of damages.
Compounding these uncertainties is the fact that there is generally
inadequate scientific knowledge to decide which locations are best for
specific hazardous wastes (US Congress, OTA. 1985, p 20). All this sug-
gests that:
(1) Given the magnitude of the siting task - with hundreds of facili-
ties needed - some failures. and releases. must be expected.
(2) Authoritative statements linking the disposal of hazardous wastes
at a particular location with associated long-term health and
environmental effects are not possible.
Such risk uncertainties not only complicate the management task but
exacerbate public concerns about the dangers posed by a particular
suggested disposal facility. All this supports a policy initiative to ban
the land disposal of hazardous waste.
7.3.3. Public perception ot risk
Whatever the actual public health and environmental risks posed by
new hazardous waste disposal facilities. they undoubtedly pale in com-
parison with what the public believes they are. There can be no doubt
that members of the public perceive substantial dangers from such
facilities and are intensely concerned about them. Indeed. community
responses to hazardous waste threats take on characteristics which
share some similarities (as well as several key differences) with conta-
gious hysteria (Schwartz et al.• 1985). Intense concern is apparent
experientially in the controversy that nearly always erupts whenever
search activities are conducted for a hazardous waste facility. It is
also apparent in the findings from a significant accumulation of pools,
surveys, attitude studies. and psychometric research.
A 1980 national poll conducted by Robert Mitchell at Resources
for the Future (US Council on Environmental Quality, 1980) found that
only 10-12% of the US public would voluntarily live a mile or less from
either a nuclear power plant or a hazardous waste disposal site as com-
pared with 25% who would accept a coal-fired power plant and nearly
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601. a ten-storey office building. Further, majority acceptance for the
hazardous waste disposal site did not occur until 100 miles from the site
despite assurances in the poll that the facility "would be built and
operated according to government and environmental and safety regula-
tions" and that "disposal could be done safely and the site regularly
inspected for possible problems" (US Council on Environmental Quality,
1980, p 30). Finally, 10% of the respondents indicated that they would
not voluntarily live at any distance from the site.
Highly consistent with these results are those from a recent study
using a similar approach (Lindell and Earle, 1983) which assessed atti-
tudes toward living near some eight different industrial facilities.
Respondents rated each on 13 different risk dimensions and indicated
the minimum distance they would be willing to live from each. The
resulting attitude structure revealed three relatively distinct clusters
(Figure 7.3). The least acceptable high-risk facility group included
the nuclear waste and toxic chemical disposal facilities and the nuclear
power plant. They were judged by respondents to pose a high threat to
workers, the public, and future generations and to have risks which
were less known and less preventable, catastrophic, with many deaths
over their operating life, and dreaded by the respondents (Lindell and
Earle, 1983, p 249).
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al., 1978).
A 1983 Massachusetts survey of citizen attitudes to a hazardous
waste treatment facility in each of five communities clearly indicated
the importance of these risk and safety issues (portney, 1983).
Whereas the survey found considerable variation among response at the
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five sites. opposition was clearly linked to concerns about safety.
Moreover. in testing some 11 different proposals designed to elicit atti-
tudes to provisions necessary to change people from opposition to sup-
port, most opponents indicated that they would not change their minds.
Among those indicating willingness to change. greater safety assurance
and more safeguards were clearly most influential. A variety of finan-
cial incentives, by comparison. had considerably less impact. Further,
opposition did not appear to be rooted in lack of information as the
opponents tended to be somewhat more knowledgeable than the sup-
porters.
Taxonomic work on hazards is not encouraging for public accep-
tance of hazardous waste facilities. The Clark University taxonomy
(Hohenemser et al.. 1983) classifies hazards by some 12 biophysical
attributes. resulting in some five major factors and a taxonomy of seven
major classes. While hazardous nonradioactive wastes are not included.
radioactive wastes score in the "multiple extreme hazards", sharing
company with such other notable hazards as nuclear war (radiation).
nuclear tests (fallout). nerve gas (accidents), pesticides (toxic effects),
and recombinant DNA (Hohenemser et al.• 1983. Table 3, p 381). Since
the taxonomy has proved quite successful in predicting public
response. it suggests that the high concern over radioactive (and prob-
ably other hazardous) wastes is rooted in "real" properties of the
hazards and is unlikely to disappear under the impact of fuller and
more accurate information.
In their taxonomy of 162 technological controversies. von Winter-
feldt and Edwards (1984) recognize three major classes: food/drug/
consumer products. industrial development, and technological mys-
teries and value threats. Contrary to the assumption held by some that
siting a hazardous waste disposal facility is akin to locating other
large-scale facilities (such as dams, airports. or the Alaskan pipeline).
it is apparent that hazardous waste facilities fall into the class of
"technological mysteries and value threats". This group contains the
most dramatic controversies. involving the potential for disaster or
possessing side effects which are dreaded and which threaten social
values. Such controversies have contents of debate which oscillate
between factual disagreements and value disputes, receive widespread
media coverage. and involve a broad spectrum of "stakeholders". This
is quite apparent in a recent study of the siting of liquefied energy gas
facilities in four countries in which it was apparent that expert
calculation of safety risks did not resolve broad conflicts in social
interests (Kunreuther et al.• 1983). In considering appropriate tools
for conflict resolution for this class. von Winterfeldt and Edwards con-
clude that compensation, bargaining, and negotiation will. because of
the shifting debate and the presence of moral considerations. be less
effective than for other controversies. and call for the creation of
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institutional mechanisms that involve stakeholders committed to resolu-
tion of the issues (von Winterfeldt and Edwards. 1984. pp 67-68).
All this suggests that perceived risk is a central problem in haz-
ardous waste facility siting, that public perceptions are rooted in
"objective" characteristics of the risks, that the risk issues interact
with related value conflicts, and that the underlying attitudes are
likely to be persistent and difficult to change. In short, hazardous
waste facility siting is one of the toughest technology problems to
manage and should be expected to strain existing institutions and
decision-making processes.
7.3.4. Equity and the ethics or risk imposition
Inequity, it is widely held. is a key underlying problem for hazardous
waste facility siting. Indeed, for many it is the problem. Consider the
following from the 1981 policy statement of the National Governors'
Association:
Once a site is identified, the community objects to being the dump-
ing ground for the state or region. It opposes the proposed facil-
ity because the benej'its will flow to the owner, operator, waste-
generating industries, and the public at-large (which fears "mid-
night" dumping), while the risks will be concentrated locally - in
their community. (National Governors' Association, 1981, p 134.)
Despite the wealth of allusion to locational equity, searching
treatments are quite rare. The current empirical understanding of
likely impact distributions from a hazardous waste facility at a particu-
lar site is quite limited. Reasons for this limited knowledge include:
(1) The relatively underdeveloped state of theory supporting analytic
approaches to social impact assessment.
(2) The lack of comparative analysis using common methodology.
(3) The limited siting experience in recent years and the fact that
some facilities will be first of a kind.
(4) The highly site-specific nature of social impacts.
In one of the few searching empirical analyscs of eqUity at a hazardous
waste site, Kates and Braine (1983) painted a complex picture of gains
and losses over more than a dozen locations stretching across the
entire USA. including Puerto Rico: benefits for some corporations,
institutions of governments, and local residents; losses for others; and
mixed balance sheets for still others (Figure 7.4). From the existing
experience, considerations relevant to the calculations of impact dis-
tributions of hazardous waste sites are:
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(1) The "special" impacts associated with the perceived risk and
social conflict arising at hazardous waste sites may exceed the
more "conventional" impacts customarily associated with locating
large industrial facilities in rural communities.
(2) The most serious socioeconomic risks are also the most likely to be
poorly understood.
(3) Many socioeconomic and (perhaps) health risks will become
apparent only during the siting process or over the long term, and
a number of them will be essentially irreversible in nature.
(4) Many socioeconomic risks, and especially those associated with
special effects, will prove extremely resistant to quantification as
a basis for calculating compensation.
(5) The residents of rural communities are among the most vulnerable
members of society (Kasperson and Rubin, 1983; National
Research Council, 1984; Seley, 1983; Murdock et al., 1983).
In the case of hazardous waste siting, equalizing the distribution
of harms and benefits may not be achievable in any real sense. The
high perceived risk and the intense associated fear together with the
small number of sites ("Why have we been victimized?") simply
overwhelms any prospect of restoring the original conditions through
the enlargement of benefits. Distrust that benefits will actually flow in
timely fashion (especially given that they cannot be well predicted in
advance) exacerbates the problem but is probably not decisive. More-
over, among at least a significant minority, substantial indication exists
that benefits at any feasible time are unlikely to change committed
resistance to a disposal facility.
In cases of risks which, as taxonomic research on risks has indi-
cated, have attributes which elicit dread and intense fears, and simul-
taneously involve difficult value conflicts, fairness may well depend
more fundamentally on the distribution of the risk (and particularly
the sharing of the risk) and on the characteristics of the process
that allocates risk than on the relationship between risks and benefits.
If this is correct. fairness is best accomplished through strategies
designed to reduce risks (even at substantial costs) and to produce
widespread sharing of the risk rather than through strategies designed
to convince some to take uncertain risks on behalf of others in
exchange for compensation. Moreover. much attention will need to be
given to the ethics of risk imposition, designed to take account of such
questions as:
(1) Under what conditions and to what ends may risks be placed upon
other persons?
(2) Who has the legitimate authority to make such decisions?
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(3) What responsibilities accrue to the risk imposer in such situa-
tions?
(4) What rights accrue to the risk bearer?
(5) How should the burden of proof be allocated?
(6) How may the process be designed to take account of differing
needs and roles yet remain protective of basic values of the sanc-
tity of human life, social well-being, and democratic principles?
7.3.5. Institutional distrust
The analysis of the siting problem to this juncture unmistakably points
to the need for institutions capable of eliciting strong confidence that
health and safety will not be compromised in the face of other needs
and that fairness will be adhered to scrupulously. Unfortunately such
confidence does not exist. Indeed, there is widespread distrust in the
institutions responsible for siting decisions and for the assurance of
safety at a particular site. This is not surprising, of course, for the
ledger clearly shows that toxic wastes have been badly mismanaged
over decades, radioactive waste disposal has been neglected, and regu-
latory agencies and industries have left a legacy of burden for future
generations to assume. Should we be surprised that there is not a
clamor to be the next site for a waste facility?
Although undoubtedly more marked in waste facility siting, the
distrust of institutions is part of a very fundamental and long-term
trend in US attitudes. This distrust is pervasive, ranging from social
institutions, to the family, to the federal government, and most strik-
ingly to industry. A 1976 poll, for example, revealed the following
somber statistics concerning those groups in whom the public had "a
great deal of confidence" on nuclear power issues: scientists, 58%;
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 39%; the heads of electric power com-
panies, 19%; and companies that produce equipment for nuclear power
plants, 12% (Harris and Associates, 1976, p 29). A 1980 survey of
Wisconsin residents revealed that most respondents did not believe
that government was moving fast enough to solve the waste disposal
problem or was interested in what local citizens thought (Kelly, 1980).
Similarly the 1983 Massachusetts survey of attitudes to hazardous
waste facility siting revealed that a significant source of concern
involved respondents' feelings that they could not trust the manage-
ment of companies that operate treatment facilities and government
regulators who oversee them or that proper procedures would be fol-
lowed (Portney, 1983, p 36). In view of these data, it is not surprising
that the OTA (US Congress, OTA, 1982, p 231) has concluded that "the
greatest single obstacle that a successful waste management program
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must overcome is the severe erosion of public confidence in the Federal
Government". The lack of credibility is likely even more profound for a
private developer and potential operator of a disposal site.
7.3.8. Summary
At this juncture in the discussion it may be helpful to summarize, in the
form of a set of six propositions, major findings concerning the nature
of the siting problem:
Proposition 1: The siting problem is not the same everywhere
and may be expected to vary from place to place according to
characteristics of the proposed facility, the siting process, and
the host community.
Proposition 2: While the siting problem is multidimensional, the
central issue is the public perception of high risk associated with
waste facilities and the intense fears which this perception of
risk engenders.
Proposition 3: Public perceptions of risk arise from some combi-
nation of misinformation about a modern waste facility, the attri-
butes of the risks involved, the record of past waste mismanage-
ment and neglect, and the memorability of particular failures, and
they are likely to persist in the face of information designed to
provide assurance or compensation to increase benefits.
Proposition 4: Hazardous waste siting disputes belong to a class
of technological controversies characterized by oscillation
between factual disputes and value conflicts, widespread media
coverage, and a broad structure of stakeholders - a situation cal-
ling for new institutional initiatives.
Proposition 5: Fairness in hazardous waste facility siting likely
depends more upon the distribution of the risk (and particularly
risk sharing) and characteristics of the risk allocation process
than upon the degree of association between the geographical dis-
tribution of risks and benefits.
Proposition 6: Efforts to reduce local concern are impeded by
the limited ability to communicate risk information effectively and
by substantial public distrust in the institutions responsible for
siting or for assuring public health and safety at the sites.
7.4. Siting Models in Critical Perspective
A large range of siting models are potentially available for locating
hazardous waste facilities. Yet several of these have clearly dominated
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the approaches developed by states and the federal government over
the past decade. Here the major options are set forth, with attention
to the validity of conceptions of the siting problem in the light of the
foregoing discussion.
7.4.1. Modell: Locational opportunism
Historically, unwanted facilities have often been sited by a developer
who has surveyed the various candidate sites and, once having met vari-
ous substantive locational needs (available land, accessibility, physical
site properties, etc.), has sought those places where the inclination or
ability to resist is minimal. These are often communities that are rural
and small, where unemployment is high and income low, and where con-
nection to the centers of political power is weak. Residents of such
places are more likely to trade safety or environmental quality for
material gain - through jobs, increased tax revenues, and improved
services. Places to be avoided are communities with high standards of
living, for whose residents jobs have less appeal, where safety and
environmental quality are highly valued. and which have an organized
capacity to resist and ready access to political power. In short, a po-
litical marketplace allocates sites for unwanted facilities.
That locational opportunism has operated in hazardous waste facil-
ity siting is apparent in a recent study which compared towns with
abandoned hazardous waste sites with similar towns lacking such sites
in New Jersey. The results were unambiguous (Greenberg et al., 1984).
The communities which had escaped such sites had more affluent popu-
lations, and lower percentages of younger, older, black, and foreign-
born people. In fact, correlation with socioeconomic status of communi-
ties was the most consistent relationship uncovered (Greenberg et al.,
1984, p 390).
Why should one object to such schemes, which deliver efficient
market solutions? First, it is apparent that such procedures are objec-
tionable on equity grounds, since burdens are disproportionately allo-
cated to poor communities which usually share little in the benefits of
waste generation, or upon places which are already so contaminated
that additional health burdens are viewed passively. Second. the pro-
cess of risk imposition is almost always objectionable: strategies of
withholding information or creating intentional ambiguity tend to be
pursued (Seley, 1983. p 34), capacity for participation tends to be
minimal, and means of redress few. Finally, political opportunism in sit-
ing carries a potential for eroding the technical criteria necessary to
assure the safety of present and future generations and the economic
efficiency of the waste disposal system.
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7.4:.2. Model2: Imposition by central authority
The underlying rationale for the exercise of centralized state author-
ity in the selection of sites in local areas is that the general well-being
of society requires the overriding of individual (or local) interests.
This may be done with or without compensation arrangements for
redressing inequities and with varying degrees of local participation.
The actual selection process frequently includes safeguards that the
decision be fair and unbiased. guided by technical criteria aimed at
protecting health and safety. A modified version of this approach is a
higher authority's overriding, usually according to specified condi-
tions, of a lower authority's decision accepting or rejecting a site in its
territory. For hazardous nonradiological waste siting, some 25 states
apply some form of preemption to site facilities (Morell. 1984. p 560).
The key assumptions of site selection through imposition by cen-
tral authority are:
(1) Local concern over risk can be abated through an unbiased tech-
nically oriented siting process using established means of public
hearings and information dissemination.
(2) Higher authorities responsible for siting and the protection of
public health possess sufficient credibility to command eventual
local tolerance of the siting decision.
(3) Committed opponents will not succeed in producing lower govern-
ment utilization of institutional means to resist the siting decision.
Although special cases may exist in which these assumptions hold.
they certainly are not valid generally. As noted above, the public per-
ception of risk evokes substantial fear of sites which is not amenable
by institutions that command low trust and confidence. In the absence
of special efforts to achieve fairness, the chosen site almost invariably
views itself as victimized. The movement of the higher authority to
preemptive actions to overcome the opposition usually succeeds instead
in escalating its intensity and broadening its scope. For these reasons,
as Morell (1984, p 560) points out, the power of central authority tends
to be illusory. It is not surprising, then. that this approach (along with
others) has failed to produce site successes.
7.4:.3. Model 3: Bartered consent
The reaction to the evident problems with site imposition by central
authority has produced a swing of the pendulum to a strategy of local
acceptance for sites through intergovernmental bartering. The central
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problems of siting, in this view, are (1) the geographical dissociation of
benefits and harms, and (2) the inability of the host area to share in
the siting decision. This conception of the siting problem leads readily
to a clear solution: provide compensation to the residents of a pros-
pective host site and give them the means to bargain for the appropri-
ate amount. Used in this way, compensation purportedly serves four
purposes:
(1) It changes local motivation to oppose the facility "by reducing the
costs each neighbor expects to suffer should the facility be built ..
(O'Hare et al.. 1983, p 70).
(2) It helps to redress inequity.
(3) It increases efficiency of facility planning because all costs and
benefits are better accounted for (O'Hare et al., 1983, p 70).
(4) It promotes "negotiation, as opposed to confrontation, in the reso-
lution of siting decisions" (O'Hare et al., 1983. p 74).
In the case of hazardous waste, eight states have enacted compen-
sation plans coupled with state preemption whereas four others
(Colorado, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin) have coupled
compensation with shared authority, the classic bartering approach.
The case of Massachusetts is particularly interesting since it was
closely informed by the conceptual work of O'Hare et al. (1983). The
Massachusetts approach has a number of key ingredients: it gives the
primary siting roles to the developer and the host community. requires
a negotiated or arbitrated settlement between the two, includes impact
mitigation and compensation to the host community as key features of
the siting agreement, limits the basis on which the community may
exclude the facility, and submits impasses between developer and host
community to an arbitrator (Bacow and Milkey, 1983, pp 4-5).
Bartered consent as an approach to hazardous waste facility sit-
ing rests upon four key assumptions:
(1) The underlying problem which drives local opposition is the geo-
graphical dissociation of benefits and risks.
(2) Voluntary consent is achievable through sufficient provision of
incentives and through direct bilateral negotiations that define
the terms of community acceptance.
(3) The long-term impacts of the facility can be defined with suffi-
cient precision to formulate an appropriate compensation package
prior to siting.
(4) The developer and state regulatory bodies can command sufficient
social trust to reassure local fears over the facility and to with-
stand a conflict-laden community consideration process.
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All four assumptions are in doubt. if not outright wrong. As indi-
cated above. the classic equity problem associated with large industrial
facilities is not simply an accurate guide to that associated with haz-
ardous waste facilities. Because perceived risk so dominates public
response, risk minimization, risk allocation. and risk sharing questions
become the dominant equity problems. Accordingly, and as growing
experience confirms, the prospect of compensation does not effec-
tively lower the degree of perceived risk and nor does it engender a
propensity among local residents to "trade off" concerns. Rather, it
tends to be viewed as a "bribe", exacerbating the risk sharing issue
and increasing suspicion and distrust of the developer and state agen-
cies. Negotiations, as Raiffa (1982. p 311) notes, depends upon a per-
ception that the process is fair and that there is more to be gained by
cooperation than by noncooperation. Such a reaction was particularly
striking in a recent siting dispute in the Federal Republic of Germany
(Kunreuther et al., 1984, p 482). Further. although not widely recog-
nized, it is also the case that locational opportunism, with its objection-
able ethical elements, remains operative in the bartered consent
approach because it is the developer (often in the private sector) who
seeks out the potential sites. Finally, although the bartered consent
model envisions a community social dynamic geared to growing commu-
nity consensus on the terms necessary for residents to accept a facil-
ity, the dynamic that actually occurs is one which shows the classic
features of social protest: local efforts to mobilize social resources
and to identify institutional opportunities by which to resist the facil-
ity (Lipsky, 1968).
7.5. Fashioning an Improved Siting Paradigm
More effective approaches to hazardous waste facility siting depend
upon a clear conceptualization of the siting problem, a sound ethical
base to guide the design of siting strategies and to begin the recovery
of social trust, and a set of policy tools by which the strategy can be
realized. Each is considered in turn.
7.5.1. Conceptualizing the siting problem
Current approaches to siting are prone to predictable failures because
of misconceptualizations of the siting problem. It is crucial to under-
stand that this is a systems-level, not a facility-level, task. Waste
management must be undertaken with an understanding of the relation-
ships between disposal strategies and opportunities for reducing the
generation of waste. It is also clear that what is at stake is not the
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deployment of a facility but a network of waste generation, waste pro-
cessing, waste movement, and waste storage or disposal - a system
which needs to be integrated with land-use planning. Relative risks
associated with alternative designs need to be assessed and built into
decisions on system design. High levels of perceived risk and associ-
ated public concern will accompany the deployment of this system -
fears that are almost certain to persist in the face of assurances,
technical studies of risk, and the offering of compensation. Equity will
be centrally concerned with risk sharing and the process by which
risk allocation occurs. Substantial distrust of the institutions respon-
sible for siting facilities and overseeing safety will occur.
7.5.2. An ethical base tor siting
Since hazardous waste facilities involve the imposition of uncertain and
feared risks upon certain peoples for the general benefit of society,
siting is inherently, and centrally, an ethical problem. Improved
approaches that have potential for winning public trust must therefore
build upon ethical principles.
Five such principles are proposed:
Principle 1.: The general well-being of society requires that some
individuals will have to bear risks on behalf of others.
Principle 2: Wherever feasible, such risks should be avoided
rather than mitigated or ameliorated through compensation.
Principle 3: Reasonably unavoidable risks should be shared,
rather than concentrated, in the population of beneficiaries.
Principle 4: The imposition of risk should be made as voluntary
as reasonably achievable within the constraints of deploying sites
in timely manner, and the burden of proof for site suitability
should be on the developer.
Principle 5: Reasonably unavoidable risks should be accompanied
by compensating benefits.
These principles provide a sound ethical base for siting stra-
tegies. Principle 1 makes clear that, from all we know. the location of
hazardous waste facilities cannot be made a voluntary activity if con-
ducted in a socially responsible way (thereby prohibiting, for example,
locational opportunism). It also recognizes that the benefits of associ-
ated technological products and activity (e.g. chemical products,
nuclear medicine) outweigh the risk associated with well-designed waste
management programs. Principle 2, arguing from the widely accepted
duty to avoid human harm, states the obligation (within technological
and economic restraints) to avoid risks rather than to mitigate them (as
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through insurance. for example) or compensate for them once they
have occurred. Principle 3 recognizes that, for reasons cited earlier.
distributional equity depends principally upon broad sharing of the
reasonably unavoidable risks among those who benefit from the tech-
nology or activity. Principle 4 addresses the ethical attributes of the
process of risk imposition and, although recognizing that purely volun-
tary means are not possible, calls for the enlarging of the degree of
voluntarism of risk assumption through, for example, full information
(including uncertainty) to risk bearers, full participation in public
proceedings, due process protection. and allocation of burden of proof
to the site developer. Finally, Principle 5 sets forth the obligation,
once risks have been reduced as much as is feasible, to compensate for
the residual risks (to restore, to the degree possible, the original con-
dition).
7.5.3. Policy tools
A large array of policy tools exist for erecting siting strategies based
upon these ethical principles. A number of the more prominent are
noted below.
Authority and the Systems Approach
The allocation of authority needs to be consistent with the systemic
scale of hazardous waste management. Since hazardous waste facility
siting is demonstrably contentious, sufficient concentration of author-
ity must occur so that the actual deployment of sites in timely manner
is possible. Widespread dispersion of authority in the face of a volatile
siting process guarantees failure. But it is also essential that the level
of the system be properly defined. The management of high-level
radioactive waste is clearly a national-scale problem; the management
of nonhazardous solid waste clearly is not.
Risk Reduction and Safety Assurance
The hazardous waste management system must be designed so that all
elements. and stages, are sufficiently integrated so that risk reduction
can be maximized. For hazardous wastes, this means a clear emphasis
upon strategies and incentives designed to encourage reductions in
waste generation and greater use of waste recycling and conversion, as
called for by a recent National Research Council, Environmental Stud-
ies Board (1985) report. Specifically this should include banning or (at
minimum) increasing the costs for land disposal sites to a level con-
sistent with the total social costs of land disposal of wastes.
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Institutional opportunities exist to enlarge the role of risk bear-
ers in assuring their own protection. Local impact assessment commit-
tees can participate directly in the identification of relevant impacts,
advice as to how they should be weighted, and strategies for avoiding
and mitigating them. A formal local capability to monitor the facility
and any potential releases linked to a means for corrective action can
provide improved assurance of long-term health protection. Similarly,
a direct local role in the design of the facility is a more appropriate
sharing of authority than one centered on the siting decision. Postclo-
sure trust funds can be developed to pay judgments arising from future
harms caused by a facility owner or operator who is judgment-proof or
otherwise not amenable to suit (Baram, 1982, p 215).
Risk Sharing
Several systems designs and institutional options exist for achieving a
wider sharing of risk among the beneficiaries. First. the size and
number of facilities can be altered to conform to a general plan of
equity. Whereas a large multipurpose hazardous waste treatment facil-
ity may have economies of scale. several smaller more limited purpose
facilities provide enhanced equity opportunities. Second. facilities may
be regionally sited to make visible that all benefiting areas will share in
the risk. Such siting strategies may also reduce the costs and risks of
the waste transportation system. Finally, the siting strategy may also
be arranged so that facilities begin operations simultaneously (rather
than being staggered. as in the high-level radioactive waste program).
Deployment of the overall waste system. of course, requires centralized
planning but may be designed so that the network of facilities visibly
demonstrates that each area will be expected to share in the waste
burdens and risks (Morell, 1984).
The Role oj Compensation
To conform with problem conceptualization and the ethical principles
enumerated above, compensation would function as a means of providing
distributional equity. Compensation may be of three major types:
(1) Means of reducing or mitigating anticipated adverse impacts of
normal construction and operation of waste facilities through
preventive or ameliorative actions.
(2) Payments for actual damage due to normal or abnormal events.
(3) Rewards for assuming burdens or risks for society as a whole
(Carnes et al., 1983, pp 330-333).
To these should probably be added the function, as perceived in the
bartered consent modeL of reducing local opposition.
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Except for the last added function, all are appropriate purposes
of compensation - with preference for the first because of its higher-
order value of avoiding harm - and should be employed as policy tools.
Explicit recognition is required that compensation levels are difficult
to establish at the time of facility development because (1) effects
often cannot be predicted in advance, (2) many effects are qualitative
and difficult to measure, and (3) values are difficult to assign to human
or environmental harm. Compensation should, in the view advanced
here, be assigned by central authority through standardized pro-
cedures applied equally to all cases and should provide assurance that
uncertainty and unforeseen events will not go uncompensated.
Risk Communication and Public Participation
The last set of policy tools relate to ethical principle 4, making the
assumption of risk as voluntary as is reasonably achievable. The fact
of the matter is that we do not know how best to do this, and programs
need to be designed as research and dem::mstration efforts, with a sub-
stantial commitment of funds and command of expertise. A sound
approach will recognize that:
(1) The developer has a conflict of interest in risk communication, so
that risk and project communication should be vested in a more
independent source (the author is partial to the League of Women
Voters).
(2) Effective communication must take account of the social dynamic
of how a community considers and debates the facility and its
impacts.
A key objective of compensation arrangements should be the creation
of a local technical capability, perhaps modeled after the Technical
Advisory Committee to the Governor of New Mexico in the case of the
siting of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in that state.
The paradigm outlined in this final section does not guarantee suc-
cess, of course. If success were easy this would not be such a tough
policy problem. But in the face of growing evidence that the current
wisdoms are failing, new paradigms are needed.
Notes
[lJ The aulhor is indebled lo Jeanne X. Kasperson and John Lundblad for
commenls and suggestions. I have also benefiled from long-slanding
collaborative work on equily problems wilh risk wilh my additional col-
leagues Palrick Derr, Roberl Goble, Dominic Golding, Jay Himmelslein,
Roberl W. Kales, and Mary Melville.
[2J See Arlhur D. Liltle (1982). The projection was given by Dr Joan B.
Berkowilz, Vice Presidenl al Arlhur D. Liltle.
Reth.1:nlc1.ng th.e S1.t1.ng 01Hazardous Waste Fac1.t1.t1.es
References
ZZ5
Art.hur, D. Lit.tle (1962), Transcript oJ Arthur D. Little Biennial Forum,
Boston, MA, June 6-9 (Art.hur D. Lit.tle, Inc., Acorn Park, Cambridge,
MA).
Bacow, L. and Milkey, J.R. (1962), Overcoming local opposition t.o hazardous
wast.e facilities: The Massachuset.ts approach, Harvard. Environmen-
tal Law Review, 8 (2), 265-305.
Bacow, L.S. and Milkey, J.R. (1963), Responding t.o local opposition to haz-
ardous waste facilities: The Massachusetts approach, Resolve,
Winter/Spring, 3-6.
Baram, M.S. (1962), Alternatives to Regulation (Lexington Books, Lexington,
MA).
Carnes, S.A., Copenhaver, EoV., Sorenson, J.H., Soderstrom, E.J., Reed, J.H.,
Bjornstad, D.J., and Peelle, E. (1963), Incentives and nuclear waste sit-
ing: prospects and constraints, Energy Systems and. Policy, 7 (4),
323-351.
Greenberg, M.R., Anderson, R.F., and Rosenberger, K. (1964), Social and
economic effects of hazardous waste management sites, Hazard.ous
Waste, 1 (Fall), 367-396.
Harris and Associates (1976), A Second. SUrvey oJ Public and. Lead.ership
Attitud.es toward. Nuclear Power Development in the United. states,
SUmmary (Ebasco Services, New York, NY).
Hohenemser, C., Kates, R.W., and Slovic, P. (1963), The nat.ure of technologi-
cal hazard, Science, 220, 376-364.
Kasperson, R.E. and Rubin, B.L. (1963), Siting a radioactive waste reposi-
tory: what. role for equity?, in R.E. Kasperson (ed), Equity Issues in
Rad.ioactive Waste Management, pp 116-136 (Oeigeschlager, Gunn, and
Hain, Cambridge, MA).
Kates, R.W. and Braine, B. (1963), Locus, equity, and the West Valley nuclear
wastes, in R.E. Kasperson (ed), Equity Issues in Rad.ioactive Waste
Mangement, pp 94-117 (Oeigeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, Cambridge,
MA).
Kelly, J.Eo (1960), Testimony on behal.f oJ the state oJ Wisconsin regard.ing
the statement oJPosition oJ the United. states Department oJ Energy
in the Matter oJ the Proposed. Rulemaking on the storage and. Dispo-
sal oJ Nuclear Wastes, Docket No. PR50-51 (US Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC).
Kunreuther, H., Linnerooth, J., Lathrop, J., Atz, H., Macgill, S., Mandl, C.,
Schwarz, M., and Thompson, M. (1963), Risk Analysis and. Decision
Processes: The Siting oJ Liquefied. Energy Ga.s Facilities in Four
Countries (Springer-Verlag Publishers, Berlin).
Kunreuther, H., Linnerooth, J., and Vaupel, J.W. (1964), A decision-process
perspective on risk and policy analysis, Management Science, 30,
475-465.
Lindell, M.K. and Earle, T.C. (1961), Comparative Analyisis oJRisk Charac-
teristics oJ Nuclear Waste Repositories and. other Disposal Facili-
ties, BHARC-411/61/005 (Battelle HARC, Seattle, WA).
Lindell, M.K. and Earle, T.C. (1963), How close is close enough: public per-
ceptions of the risks of industrial facilities, Risk Analysis, 3 (4),
245-253.
226 I1Lsur1.1Lg a1Ld: Ma1Lag1.1Lg Ha8ard:ous R1.sks
Lindell, M.K., Earle, T.C., Hebert, J.A., and Perry, R.W. (1978), Radioactive
Wastes: Public Attitudes Toward Disposal Facilities, BHARC-411-D04
(Battelle HARC, Seattle, WA).
Lipsky, M. (1968), Protest as a political resource, American Political Sci-
ence Review, 82, 1144-1158.
Morell, D. (1984), Siting and the politics of equity, Hazardous Waste, 1 (4),
555-571.
Murdock, S.H., Leistritz, F.L., and Hamm, R.R. (eds) (1983), Nuclear Waste:
Socioeconomic Dimensions of Long-term storage (Westview Press,
Boulder, CO).
National Governors' Association (1981), Siting hazardous waste facilities,
The Environmental Professional, 3, 133-142.
National Research Council (1984), Social and Economic Aspects ofRadioac-
tive Waste Disposal (National Academy Press, Washington,DC).
National Research Council (1985), Reducing Hazardous Waste Generation:
An Evaluation and a Call for Action (National Academy Press, Wash-
ington, DC).
O'Hare, M., Bacow, L., and Sanderson, D. (1983), Facility Siting and Public
Opposition (Van Nostrand, New York).
Popper, F.J. (1983), LP/HC and LULUs: the political uses of risk analysis in
land use planning, Risle Analysis, 3 (4), 255-263.
Portney, K.E., (1983), Citizen Attitudes toward Hazardous Waste Facility
Siting: Public Opinion in Five Massachusetts Communities, Mimeo
(Lincoln Filene Center for Citizenship Public Affairs, Tufts University,
Medford, MA).
Raiffa, H. (1982), The Art and Science of Negotiations (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA).
Ryan, A.S. (1984), Approaches to Hazardous Waste Facility Siting in the
United states, Report to the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility
Site Safety Council, Boston, MA.
Schwartz, S.P., White, P.E., and Hughes, G. (1985), Environmental threats,
communities, and hysteria, Journal of Public Health Policy, 8 (1),
58-77.
Seley, J.E. (1983), The Politics of Public-Facility Planning (Lexington
Books, Lexington, MA).
Shabecoff, P. (1985), Toxic waste threat termed far greater than U.S. esti-
mates, New Yorle Times (March 10), 1 and 31.
US Congress, OTA (1982), Managing the Nation's Commercial High-Level
Radioactive Waste (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC).
US Congress, OTA (1985), Superficial strategy (US Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC).
US Council on Environmental Quality (1980), Public Opinion on Environ-
mental Issues (US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC).
US Environmental Protection Agency (1979), IJraj't Environmental Impact
statement for Subtitle C (US Environmental Protection Agency, Wash-
ington, DC).
von Winterfeldt, D. and Edwards, W. (1984), Patterns of conflict about risky
technologies, Risle Analysis, 4, 55-68.


CHAPrER 8
The Inexact Science of Chemical
Hazard Risk Assessment: A Description
and Critical Evaluation
of Available Methods
V T. Covello and M. MerkhoJer [1 ]
8.1. Introduction
In this chapter we describe and evaluate some of the more prominent
methods of chemical hazard risk assessment. The methods are orga-
nized according to the component of the risk assessment process that
they are meant to address (Table 8.1). Discussed first are methods
designed for characterizing a source of risk, followed by methods use-
ful for assessing exposures, methods for dose-response assessment,
and, lastly, methods for risk estimation. Consideration is given both to
methods used directly for the development of probability distributions
over health and environmental consequences and to methods that pro-
vide information that would support this task. Methods useful for
either continuous or discrete risks are also discussed.
8.2. Methods for Characterizing the Source of the Risk
Methods for characterizing the source of risk are directed at quantify-
ing and describing the characteristics of chemical industry technolo-
gies, products, processes, or systems that have the potential for creat-
ing risk. Sources of risk (Le. hazards) may involve chemical substances
that are inherently flammable, corrosive, explosive, or toxic. For
these chemical hazards to produce a risk, (1) chemicals must be
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Table 8.1. Calegorles of chemical risk assessmenl
melhods.
Melhods for characlerlzlng lhe source of risk:
monllorlng melhods
performance lestlng
accldenl investigation
statistical melhods
modeling melhods
Melhods for exposure assessmenl:
monllorlng melhods
modeling melhods
Melhods for dose-response assessmenl:
animal research
epidemiology
lesls on humans
modeling melhods
Melhods for risk estimation:
melhods adopting a perspective of classical slatistics
melhods adopting a Bayesian perspective
melhods based on modeling
present in sufficient quantities or intensities, and (2) the natural or
technological systems that contain or limit the hazard must be less
than completely effective. If a chemical hazard is regarded as con-
tained by some boundary that separates it from the general environ-
ment then risk-source characterization may be regarded as the study
of the events or processes that may happen within that boundary that
affect the level of risk.
Risk-source characterization has tended to focus on industrial or
transportation accidents that may cause hazardous chemical sub-
stances or energies to be released into the environment (Health and
Safety Executive, 1978; Rijnmond Public Authority, 1982; Lees, 1980;
Bendixen and O'Neill, 1984). Routine activities (e.g. maintenance
operations at a chemical plant) can, however, produce significant
releases that can also be subject to characterization in a comprehen-
sive chemical risk assessment.
Some examples can be provided to clarify the types of chemical
hazard risk assessment methods that relate to risk-source characteri-
zation. If a chemical plant is regarded as providing a source of risk,
then risk-source characterization will include the specification of the
types, amounts, and timing of all toxic substances emitted into the air
and water. If the concern is the failure of a chemical containment,
risk-source characterization will include the probability of various
failure modes and the volume of toxic substances that would be
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released under each mode. If the concern is a pesticide used in agri-
culture. risk-source characterization will include the quantities used,
and when and where they are applied. The various subcategories of
methods considered under risk-source characterization include moni-
toring methods. methods for performance testing and accident investi-
gation. statistical methods, and modeling methods. Each subcategory is
described below.
8.2.1. Monitoring methods tor characterizing the source ot risk
Monitoring methods are widely used to provide the basic data to sup-
port risk-source characterization. Monitoring refers to "the assem-
bling of data sets, usually for the purpose of detecting some change in
status of some variable of interest" (Hayne. 1984). Examples of moni-
toring activities for risk-source characterization include the collection
of data on the operating parameters of a chemical plant's control sys-
tems and chemical analysis of residues from soil samples collected at a
toxic waste disposal site.
Monitoring is usually a sampling process: rather than measure the
status of some variable at all times or locations. selected measurements
are taken. Issues that need to be addressed in designing a monitoring
approach include:
(1) Decisions as to where and how to take representative samples.
(2) Decisions as to how to handle the samples en route to the labora-
tories.
(3) Decisions on which analytical methods to use, and investigation as
to the presence or absence of certain conditions of interest.
(4) Decisions on which procedures and formats to use for aggregating
and presenting the results of the analysis and for setting the
degree of confidence in the data.
(5) Determination of how to interpret the monitoring data as to pres-
ence, quantity. transformation. migration. etc. of conditions of
interest (Schweitzer, 1982).
Because monitoring focuses on current and past status. it is most
useful in chemical hazard risk assessment for situations in which the
regulatory options under consideration either will not significantly
affect the risk source or will affect it in some well-defined way (e.g.
eliminating it altogether). The first situation occurs if the regulatory
decisions under consideration acoomplish risk reduction through alter-
ing exposure or dose-response processes rather than the risk source
itself. For example. if the decision involves restricting people from
entering or residing near a hazardous site. data regarding the level of
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danger presented at the site (in terms of degree of toxicity, magnitude
of potential energy stored, etc.) could be of direct use in the risk
assessment, since regulatory actions would not be expected to affect
this component of the risk chain. Monitoring is also of direct use to
chemical hazard risk assessment if the regulatory action under con-
sideration is directed at the risk source, but can be expected to alter
the danger presented by it in a predictable way. For example, if regu-
lation would require the installation of technology for purifying the
emissions produced in some production process, and the technology is
known to have some level of efficiency, then extrapolation using moni-
toring data might readily be used as the basis for assessments of risk
with and without the proposed regulation.
strengths
Monitoring provides a means for quantifying the current and historical
status of the risk source. It thereby establishes a necessary base for
identifying problems and for projecting the future. Most significantly,
monitoring data may be used to help calibrate models, and this is its
main value for chemical hazard risk assessment.
Limitations
An important limitation of monitoring is its focus on the past: it pro-
vides data on what has happened but cannot, in the absence of assump-
tions concerning the extrapolation of the past to the future, provide
direct evidence of what will happen. For many chemical risks, the
principal concern is not the continuation of the status quo, but a funda-
mental change that produces substantially greater risk. Monitoring can
sometimes identify trends that foreshadow a significant increase in the
risk posed by a hazardous chemical system. However, monitoring will
be less useful if the principal cause of increased danger is a discrete
event (e.g. an operator error or a terrorist act) that is not easily
detectable from the behavior of the system prior to the event.
Another significant limitation is the usefulness of monitoring for
rare events. If the source of risk is the extreme natural hazard which
occurs once in 100 or 1000 years, then monitoring will provide too few
observations to be of much use. Another limitation deals with the need
to monitor a quantity that is readily measurable (a so-called indicator
event) rather than a more difficult-ta-measure quantity that may be of
more direct interest. For example, while it might be desirable to moni-
tor the transport of all hazardous waste, only those shipments properly
documented and recorded will be available.
It is also important to note that monitoring can be an expensive
and time-consuming activity. For example, determining the exact
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amounts and nature of the atmospheric emissions from a chemical plant
can cost several hundreds of thousands of dollars. If. as is often the
case. monitoring requires the use of complex measurement devices and
depends on the collection of data over a long period of time, the
development and implementation of a monitoring program can produce
considerable capital and operating expense.
8.2.2. Performance testing and accident investigation
Monitoring systems are usually designed to collect multiple measure-
ments of the status of the system while it is functioning in its normal
environment. Sometimes it is useful to gather information by investi-
gating the behavior of the system under stress. Le. to subject the sys-
tem deliberately to conditions that are of special concern.
Performance testing is a method for risk-source characterization
that involves collecting data about a system under controlled condi-
tions. In some situations. such as is the case with electrical or mechan-
ical components that are produced in large quantities, sufficient data
can be generated from performance testing to permit statistical
methods (discussed below) to be used to derive conclusions concerning
the operating and failure characteristics of similar components used in
large chemical systems. In other situations. only limited tests can be
performed, and engineering reliability and analysis is needed to esti-
mate the characteristics of concern to risk assessment. In these latter
cases, judgment plays a major role in deducing the implications of the
results of performance tests.
Another method that rarely provides sufficient data for statistical
analysis, but nevertheless can provide important information for chemi-
cal hazard risk assessment, is accident investigation. An important ele-
ment of accident investigation is the determination of exactly what
caused the system to fail. For example. although the cause of death in
a chemical accident may have been contact with the chemical, the
cause of the accident nlUY have been an operator error coupled with a
breakdown in the safety control system. Performance testing and
accident investigation provide additional methods for augmenting infor-
mation needed to understand and describe the source of risk.
strengths
Performance testing and accident investigation can provide important
information and understanding for chemical hazard risk assessment
that are not readily obtainable from standard monitoring methods. In
particular, methods based on investigation under unusual conditions,
such as those causing failures and accidents. can allow the root causes
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of accidents to be better understood. Such methods provide important
understanding, and aid the development and application of the statisti-
cal and modeling methods used in the development of risk estimates.
Limitations
A principal limitation in performance testing is the difficulty of deter-
mining and simulating the conditions that are likely to be of greatest
concern in chemical hazard risk assessment. The applicability of the
results depends on the assumption that the items or systems being
tested and the conditions under which the tests are conducted are
those relevant to the chemical risk under investigation.
In the case of accident investigation, a principal difficulty is the
episodic nature of accidents, which denies investigators the opportu-
nity to prepare their investigation in advance. Identifying the under-
lying causes can be difficult because the evidence required for such
inferences is often obscured or lost during the accident. Controls may
not exist, so the systematic comparison of factors in situations that did
and did not produce accidents may not be possible. Furthermore, it is
often difficult for the investigator to conduct the investigation in a
timely and orderly way, since emergency treatment of those injured
must take precedence over research.
8.2.3. statistical methods tor characterizing the source ot risk
Because monitoring or performance testing often provides repeated
measurements for a system creating a source of risk, statistical infer-
ence may be used to infer from past data what the future will hold. In
cases where exposure and dose-response processes are very simple
(e.g. an event that produces the same health consequences every time
it occurs), statistical methods for characterizing the risk source are all
that is needed for chemical hazard risk assessment. The most impor-
tant example is accidents producing a fatality. If every time the
accident occurs there is one individual present and the result of the
accident is nearly always death, then it is not necessary to decompose
the risk into a source, exposure process, and dose-response process:
the frequency of the accident provides a measure of the risk of dying.
A similar situation arises in the case of frequent accidents and common
debilitating agents, as basic injury and fatality data may be available
which can be analyzed directly to characterize the risk source. This
type of analysis is often termed "actuarial risk assessment" or "histor-
ical risk assessment .. (Vesely, 1984). The statistics that are usually
estimated are the fatality rates (frequencies) for different population
cross sections and for different causes. Actuarial data and other
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statistical records rarely identify the prerequisite causative factors,
but they have the advantage of being relatively reliable.
In the more general case in which hazardous events produce dif-
ferent consequences, chemical hazard risk assessment requires an
explicit accounting of exposure and dose-response processes. The
statistical analysis of available data may. however, still be useful for
characterizing the source of the risk. For example. monitoring data
such as failure rates. temperature. and wind velocities can provide use-
ful information for understanding the risk source.
The underlying assumption in statistical methods is that the vari-
ables of concern are random variables with probability distributions
that can be derived from the collected data. The frequencies of risk-
causing events are often assumed to be constant with time. The Poisson
probability model for event occurrences. often used in statistical
methods, makes this assumption. In some situations, however, frequen-
cies are not constant. To model time behavior. various methods can be
used, such as assuming a parametric function and estimating the values
of the parameters from past data using standard statistical estimation
techniques. If the underlying event produces varying characteristics
or consequences, and adequate data are available. then the frequency
of all events having a given range of consequences can be calculated.
By choosing successively larger consequence values and calculating fre-
quencies of events having consequences greater than these values, a
plot of frequency versus consequences magnitude can be obtained. This
type of curve is often constructed in engineering risk assessments and
is called the "complementary cumulative distribution" or "risk profile".
(This and other means for displaying risk estimates are discussed
further in Section 8.6.1.)
Since statistical inference methods require a data base. applica-
tions to areas where data are limited require the use of constructed or
surrogate data bases. For example, statistical inference is widely used
in risk assessments dealing with the transportation of hazardous wastes
(Philipson and Gasca. 1982). The data base supporting such an applica-
tion is often less than ideal. Records of shipments of the hazardous
material of interest are often not kept or are not accessible. Thus,
estimates are based on samples of shipment data that are often of un-
certain accuracy and validity and subject to considerable judgmental
interpretation. For rare accidents, such as liquefied natural gas (LNG)
tanker accidents, adequate data for a meaningful statistical inference
may not exist. In such cases, surrogate samples are often used (e.g. oil
tanker accidents as a surrogate for LNG tanker accidents).
A related problem for statistical methods occurs when the avail-
able data are for events with typical characteristics and the risk of
concern relates to events having extreme characteristics. For exam-
ple. the concern may be the frequencies of extremely high wind
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velocities when the bulk of the statistical data relates to winds of
lesser velocities. Extrapolation methods. or "distribution techniques".
as they are sometimes called. are a body of methods that estimate the
frequency of severe events by smoothly extrapolating from less severe
events which have occurred in the past. In applying such methods. the
more severe events are assumed to be caused by the same physical
mechanisms and processes which caused the less severe events.
Extreme value theory (Vesely, 1984) is sometimes applied if there
are a large number of processes whose maximum (or minimum) states are
involved in producing the risk and if there is not strong dependency
among the processes. Extreme value theory has been used to predict
frequencies of catastrophic floods, and similar methods have been used
to predict maximum fire. maximum tornado. and maximum hurricane
consequences in given time periods. The basic estimation process
involves fitting a frequency versus consequence curve to past data.
The function is specified except for one or more unknown parameters.
Having observed past events with measured characteristics, the param-
eters are estimated and the resulting specified function is used to
predict the frequencies of events with large consequences that have
not yet occurred. Critical considerations for selecting the form of the
function are the physical and engineering justification of the functional
form. the assumption of smooth continuous behavior from less severe
consequences to catastrophic consequences. and the availability of
measurements of the past events.
To depict the uncertainty inherent in estimates derived from sta-
tistical data, probabilities or confidence intervals for the estimates
can be computed. Since these and many other issues surrounding the
use of statistical methods are independent of whether the methods are
being applied to risk-source characterization or to some other com-
ponent of the risk assessment process. more discussion of the
strengths and limitations of statistical methods appears in Section
8.5.2.
8.2.4. Modeling methods for characterizing the source of risk
While even the most simple statistical methods for characterizing a
source of risk are in effect "models", risk-source models can be quite
sophisticated. For the case of continuous risks, models are frequently
used to estimate the characteristics, amounts, and locations at which
some toxic substance is emitted into the environment, and how these
might change over time and location or with various controls. For
example, to support a regional risk assessment of the effect of higher
oil prices on emissions of sulfur oxides from electric power plants, a
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model might be developed to estimate the geographic distribution of
emissions over time under different control scenarios. A variety of
approaches are available for constructing such models (for an overview
of basic analytic modeling approaches. see Gass and Sisson. 1975). For
example. an econometric model (a model based on economic and empiri-
cal data) might be used to assess the effect of increased prices on
high-sulfur coal due to a shift in use by the energy industry to oil and
other low-sulfur energy sources (by comparing supply. demand. and
price with interfuel competition, for example). Another approach
might be to use engineering and process models based on judgment to
estimate the effectiveness of new technologies in reducing harmful
emissions from representative plants.
For discrete risks, such as accidents at chemical plants, models of
the risk source are generally based on a specification of the cir-
cumstances and sequence of events that must occur for the accident to
take place. For example, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is
often undertaken during the planning and construction of a facility to
characterize hazards associated with possible system failures. The
approach involves developing a functional block or logic diagram relat-
ing the various system processes and components, postulating possible
failure models, identifying possible causes of failures, describing the
consequences of the possible failures, and estimating the probabilities
of each failure's occurrence.
Several modeling methods used in risk-source characterization
involve the development of graphic structures. For example, the
digraph, originally developed for safety analyses of chemical process-
ing systems, is a deductive logic diagram that describes the interrela-
tionships among process variables. The diagram displays the various
system control loops, with the loops classified according to their abil-
ity to cancel a system disturbance of a given size.
Fault tree analysis (Gottfried. 1974: US Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, 1981) is based on a specialized model that may be represented
as a diagram of binary (yes-no) logic that traces backward in time the
different ways that a particular event could occur. Figure 8.1 illus-
trates the structure of a fault tree diagram. To construct a fault tree,
the final, undesired (top-level) failure event (for example, off-site
release of toxic substances from a chemical plant) is defined. Using a
functional description of the system, the events that could logically
cause the failure are identified. These events are related to lower-
level events and the diagram is expanded until a level of basic events is
reached - for example, the failure of individual subsystems or com-
ponents (e.g. pressure relief systems, pumps, electrical components).
The failure rates for the basic events are either assumed to be known
with certainty or are assumed to be described by probability distribu-
tions derived from available failure-rate data. The uncertainty in the
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failure rate for the top-level event is derived from a calculation based
on the equivalence between the fault tree diagram and a corresponding
set of Boolean algebraic expressions for the manipulation of probabili-
ties.
Event trees (see, for example, Rasmussen, 1975; McCormick, 1981)
are also graphic tree structures. An event tree starts with some par-
ticular undesired initiating event (e.g. failure of a valve or pump) and
projects all possible plant responses to that event. Each branch in a
event tree, with associated probabilities, represents a possible state
(often simply success or failure) for the plant's subsystems which would
be called upon as the accident progresses. Such states might include
the status of containment safety and mitigation systems. The probabili-
ties associated with the individual branches may be obtained through
statistical methods or fault trees, and a series of probability calcula-
tions permits the assessment of the probabilities of occurrence of the
final plant accident states. Although event trees have been most prom-
inently applied in the area of nuclear reactors, they have also been
applied in risk assessments of chemical facilities, such as that at Can-
vey Island in the UK (Health and Safety Executive, 1978).
When fault trees and event trees are used to model accident
sequences, additional models are needed to calculate the physical
consequences of each accident sequence. This consequence calculation
is in essence accomplished by determining the physical processes and
phenomena that are associated with each accident sequence. In a
risk-source characterization of an accident at an industrial facility. for
example, containment analysis (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
1984) can be used to identify and assess a variety of containment-
failure modes and to predict the amount of hazardous materials
released to the environment under alternative accident sequences.
This method combines the results of engineering analyses (based in
part on performance testing) with models composed of fault trees and
event trees.
Many of the issues concerning modeling methods are independent
of whether the methods are applied to risk-source characterization or
to some other component of the risk assessment process. One such
issue is that. while it is often relatively easy to develop models of
physical cause-effect processes, it is much more difficult to apply
modeling when critical uncertainties relate to the behavior of humans.
Important examples are the potential for operator error and sabotage.
These are recognized to be significant sources of risk, yet the methods
available for modeling these events are not as well developed as those
for component and system failures (see. for example, Swain and Gutt-
man. 1983). These and other general limitations of modeling are dis-
cussed in more detail in later sections of this chapter.
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8.3. Methods for Exposure Assessment
Exposure assessment is the process of measuring or estimating the
intensity, frequency, and duration of human or other exposures to a
risk agent (National Research Council, 1983). Exposures may occur in a
variety of ways: e.g. through direct external contact (produced, for
example, in the industrial setting), air and water transport (as is the
case with many industrial effluents), or ingestion through the food
chain (such as occurs with mercury). The appropriate methods for
exposure assessment depend on the pathways for exposure that are of
greatest concern for the situation under study.
Gauging exposure is usually difficult because numerous factors
must be considered and because information is often incomplete. Even
for the special case of the worker population, only rarely is there ade-
quate information about who is exposed and the degree of their expo-
sure. Large chemical manufacturers, for example, generally keep
records on workers exposed to potential hazards, but data on the level
of exposure to particular chemicals usually are not precise. The situa-
tion with respect to the general population is often even worse, owing
to lack of data on exposure levels. To regulate a pesticide used on
citrus fruit, for example, officials would want to know not only how
many oranges are consumed by a typical person, but also how many peo-
ple are fond of eating large numbers of oranges, because the latter
group would be the population at greatest risk.
If the chemical hazard is associated with food or consumer prod-
ucts, personal habits may have a large bearing on the nature of the
exposure. For example, differences in food storage practices, food
preparation, and dietary habits influence the fraction of a hazardous
substance present in food that individuals actually ingest. Similarly, if
the hazardous agent is absorbed when a consumer product is used, pat-
terns of use affect exposure. A solvent whose vapor is potentially
toxic, for example, may be used outdoors or in a small, poorly ven-
tilated room. Thus, for risk assessments associated with consumer prod-
ucts, exposure assessment is concerned with understanding how the
products may be used and the implications for estimating exposures.
If exposure is through the air or water, then consideration must
be given to how the hazardous substance moves from its source through
the environment and how it degrades or reacts with other substances.
In this instance, exposure assessment has been defined as the determi-
nation of the concentration of toxic materials in space and time at the
interface with target populations (Travis et at., 1983). Pathways of
exposure for consideration must include atmospheric and aquatic sur-
face and groundwater transport and transformation.
Another important aspect of exposure assessment is the determi-
nation of which groups in the population may be exposed to a risk
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agent; some groups may be especially susceptible to adverse health
effects. For example, in the case of toxic chemicals, pregnant women,
very young and very old people, and persons with impaired health are
particularly sensitive. Some regulatory laws (such as the United States
Clean Air Act provision regarding promulgation of primary air quality
standards) have been interpreted to require consideration of the
impact of pollutants on "sensitive or susceptible individuals or groups".
Exposure to multiple chemical hazards often results in portions of
the population becoming more sensitive to any single chemical hazard.
Exposure to chemical hazards that act synergistically greatly compli-
cates the chemical risk assessment because most assessments are con-
ducted on individual chemical hazards. Synergisms also often make it
necessary for exposure assessment to consider the activities that
exposed individuals are engaged in and other substances to which they
might be exposed. For example, strenuous activity often increases the
magnitude or likelihood. of adverse reactions to exposures to many air
pollutants. Similarly, exposure to asbestos results in a cancer rate
incidence that is much greater than indicated by carcinogenicity data
on the substance individually (National Research Council, 1983). The
number of sources also complicates exposure assessments. An indivi-
dual can be exposed to a single chemical hazard from multiple sources.
Exposure to lead, for example. can come from breathing air, eating
food. and drinking water.
Thus, to be comprehensive, an exposure assessment must describe
the levels of exposure and all conditions that might be needed to assess
the effects of those exposures, including the magnitude, duration,
schedule, and route of exposure; the size, nature and classes of the
human populations exposed; and, of course, the uncertainties in all of
these estimates.
Given the variety of pathways by which hazardous chemical sub-
stances can be transmitted, a comprehensive exposure assessment must
account for the cumulative effects of simultaneous exposures via dis-
tinct media. Thus, multimedia exposure assessment is generally neces-
sary to account for all significant exposure processes.
8.3.1. Monitoring methods for exposure assessment
As in the case of risk-source characterization, exposure assessment
relies heavily on monitoring measurements. For any given risk assess-
ment. monitoring activities can be used to provide a variety of relevant
information. For example, to support the assessment of the risks posed
by a site at which hazardous wastes have been disposed of, the air. soil,
surface water, and groundwater contamination levels at various dis-
tances from the site may be monitored using conventional field
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measurement techniques. Remote techniques, such as aerial photogra-
phy and multispectral overhead imagery, might also be used to de-
lineate waste site problems. Ground penetration remote sensing tech-
nologies might be used to estimate the subsurface distribution of waste
materials and to help target monitoring activities (Schweitzer, 1982).
Biological monitoring (Gompertz, 1980) may be used to clarify possible
food-chain problems, for example, by taking measurements dealing with
food crops, livestock, or local fish. In addition. wild animals and indi-
genous vegetation might be sampled to find indications of local contami-
nation.
Individual exposure monitoring can provide the most accurate
information for exposure assessment. The method is employed in cer-
tain occupational settings and involves routine monitoring of exposed
individuals (e.g. radiation workers. who carry dosimeters, film badges,
or other radiation-sensitive devices) to measure their exposures to the
risk agent in question. Site monitoring techniques also involve actual
measurements of exposure levels. In this case the measurements are
not specifically for individuals. but for locations. Site monitoring tends
to be a more practical method when the numbers of people or areas of
exposure are very large. and where the risk agent released is either
routine (as in continuous risks) or where the release occurs over a suf-
ficient period of time to allow a monitoring system to be established.
An issue that is frequently relevant for site dose monitoring is the siz-
able variation of concentrations of a risk agent often found in media
(such as air and water) over space and time. Thus, selection of a par-
ticular dose-measurement interval, or, more generally. the selection of
particular sites or measurements. can have a strong impact on the
numerical results obtained.
In addition to the direct monitoring of exposure levels, biological
monitoring can provide useful information for exposure assessment by,
for example. measuring the levels of chemical residues in human tis-
sues. in food, or in tissues or food of specific animal species. Such data
may be used to estimate exposures provided that there is some under-
standing of the preferential biological absorption and retention
processes of substances in the particular organs or organisms (e.g.
strontium in bone. iodine in the thyroid. and mercury in fish). together
with knowledge of the physical decay processes of the hazardous
material (e.g. radioactive decay or biodegradation). In addition to the
use of chemical residue measurements in biological monitoring, some
indication of exposure can also be obtained through measurements of
individual physiology, such as the effect of cholinesterase inhibition on
fertility, as with birds, or on growth, as with fish (Hayne. 1984). Popu-
lation effects that may be measured for indicator species include
altered population. numbers. or biomass; altered population processes.
such as survival or productivity; and altered parameters. such as age,
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structure, or sex ratio. Biological community effects include changes in
such parameters as species diversity and the ratio of food to consumer
organisms.
Limitations
The most important limitation in monitoring for exposure assessment
relates to its ability to provide the basic data needed to apply statisti-
cal methods. The logic of most statistical methods is based on an
assumption of random samples: the data are assumed to provide an
unbiased representation of the larger universe of values from which
the measurements were taken. In many monitoring systems, costs and
practicality demand that sampling be carried out at convenient sites
and times. Thus, monitoring often producers an "index", not an
unbiased estimate. Common examples include restricting sampling to
daylight hours.
8.3.2. Models for exposure assessment
For most chemical hazard risk assessments, individual and site dose
monitoring data are insufficient to charact.erize exposures sufficiently
for the development of frequency distributions describing the doses
actually received by individuals. Even if site exposure measurements
are available and an individual's activities are highly structured (such
as in the workplace), the risk agent may be present at various locations
and occupational settings not covered by the site monitors. Further-
more, because individuals are likely to move between locations covered
by monitors, computations require estimates of levels between monitors
and models for the movement of individuals between sites. Thus, chemi-
cal hazard risk assessments generally require the use of models to esti-
mate exposures.
Increasingly sophisticated environmental models are being used in
exposure assessment to describe the environmental transport and
conversion of chemical substances. These include models of the chem-
istry, transport, and deposition of acid rain; models of the photochemi-
cal processes associated with materials disposed of at sea; models of
wind directions and velocities and precipitation patterns that might
affect the transport of pollutants from normal or accidental industrial
or power plant emissions; and models for the leaching and runoff of
chemicals to streams. The various models differ significantly from one
another in terms of their approximations and the assumptions used in
characterizing the source (e.g. point source or area source, instantane-
ous or continuous release), the media of transport, and the manner of
spreading and entrainment considered.
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In the case of exposures produced through the transport of
materials through air, transport modeling has reached a relatively high
degree of sophistication. One of the more straightforward of the avail-
able approaches is to develop regression or time series models based on
least-squares fitting to monitoring data. Another approach, which
allows more flexibility for investigating alternative assumptions, is the
Gaussian plume model. This model assumes that the plume from an emis-
sion source spreads laterally and vertically in accordance with a Gaus-
sian statistical distribution. Although Gaussian models have limited
applicability in instances of complex terrain and variable release rates,
they have been used for many years to predict ground-level concentra-
tion where reasonably flat terrain exists and where an average, fairly
stable. release rate can be assumed (Travis et al., 1983). Another, more
computationally demanding, approach is based on computing trajec-
tories that released material might follow. The trajectories are typi-
cally composed of segments estimated for fixed intervals of time and
based on historical wind data. Trajectory models are often used for
long-range predictions of atmospheric concentrations. To represent
rapid short-duration emissions, such as might result from containment
failures or explosions. "puff" models have been developed. The models
share many of the same principles as continuous release models, but
the applications are quite different.
In addition to transport, many atmospheric models account for
transformations of pollutants (e.g. photochemical transformations) and
are useful in situations where transformation products may exhibit
greater or less bioactivity than the parent pollutant. Chemical
transformation processes are often approximated by first-order rate
reactions. Frequently, air transport models will estimate long-term
average concentrations, while short-term concentrations are assumed
to follow some specified frequency distribution (usually lognormal).
Aquatic transport models. although not as highly developed as
atmospheric models, are also frequently used in exposure assessment.
In the case of surface water, such models will attempt to account for
the major source of contaminants either as point sources (e.g. indus-
trial wastes) or as a normal rainfall runoff process or storm water run-
off to water bodies from urban and agricultural areas. Surface water
transport may be an important factor in situations where a principal
exposure pathway is through drinking water or where aquatic food is
ingested. Steady-state models are most frequently employed to account
for the transport of chemical pollutants in surface water. For example.
a river may be represented as a series of completely mixed reaches in
which steady-state contaminant concentrations are estimated based on
dilution and physical/chemical removal of contaminants from volatiza-
tion, net absorption, net settling, photolysis, microbial degradation.
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etc. (Travis et al., 1983). To represent spills (e.g. oil spills from tank-
ers) dynamic models are available.
Groundwater transport is important in risk assessments of toxic
waste disposal sites. More generally, toxic materials can enter ground-
water by deposition from the atmosphere onto the ground, with subse-
quent infiltration into the water table. In modeling groundwater flow it
is important to account for the interaction of the contaminants with
soil: in many cases, a large proportion of contaminants in groundwater
will be absorbed into the soil, thus greatly retarding their movement
relative to that of groundwater. Very simple models tend to be used to
represent these processes: (e.g. a linear absorption model is often
used to predict the relative concentrations of a compound in the soil).
Food-chain models are sometimes used in chemical hazard risk
assessments where there is a concern that contaminants that have
been released may enter food chains and pose health risks to man via
ingestion of contaminated food. Aquatic food chains, for example, can
be important in producing bioconcentration of harmful compounds. To
estimate risks to man via the food-chain exposure pathway, intake
rates for contaminants in the various food categories must be calcu-
lated based on the consumption rate of food. Three elements are
required for such calculations:
(1) The concentration of the component in question in each item of
the diet.
(2) The amount consumed of each item that contains the component.
(3) The frequency with which each item is consumed.
Generally, very simple models are used to represent such effects.
Market basket analysis involves an analysis of contaminants in
prepared foods and typically produces an average or representative
intake. Per capita consumption is based on dividing the sum of annual
production plus imports of a given food item by the number of people in
the country. Since these methods fail to reveal special groups with
high intake rates, reliance is sometimes placed on dietary surveys, in
which consumers are asked to recall what foods they ate with what fre-
quency and with what amounts (portion size) over a defined period of
time (Food Safety Council, 1980).
To estimate populations at risk from a given pathway of exposure,
it is necessary to determine who works or lives at various sites, and
who breathes air, drinks water, eats food, or uses products coming from
a particular place. This inference is generally painstaking, but usually
straightforward. Demographic models developed to support this task
may include models for the population distribution within a geographic
area surrounding a source of potential risk (e.g. dams, power plants,
aircraft flight paths), models of the age distribution of a given
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population, and models of mobility and activity patterns of sensitive
population groups.
8.4. Methods for Dose-Response Assessment
Dose-response assessment methods are concerned with characterizing
the relationship between the dose of the risk agent received and the
health and other consequences to exposed populations. These conse-
quences can include early fatalities and injuries, latent cancer fatali-
ties, genetic effects, environmental degradation, and economic losses.
Most of the effort devoted to developing methods for dose-response
assessment have been directed at understanding human health rather
than on the more general ecological consequences of exposures to
hazardous chemical substances. The discussion in this section there-
fore emphasizes methods related to human health.
8.4.1. Animal research for dose-response assessment
Since ethical considerations generally preclude the deliberate expo-
sure of humans to risk agents, animal tests provide the largest experi-
mentally derived data base on relationships between doses of hazardous
substances received and their subsequent impact on health. To con-
duct an animal study, the chemical in question is administered to a
population of laboratory animals and various data on their health status
are then collected both before and after death. Concurrently, a con-
trol group is established and treated in an identical manner, except
that the animals in this group are not exposed to the chemical. Data
collected while the animals are still alive include observations of fac-
tors such as size, weight, condition of external features (skin, hair,
eyes, etc.), gross evidence of internal abnormalities (such as bone
deformation), reproductive capacity (including fertility, reproductive
frequency, litter size, changes in frequency of spontaneous abortion or
live births, and other abnormalities), life span, behavior (food intake,
sleep habits. aggressiveness, problem-solving ability, etc.), body func-
tions, and genetic changes (as evidenced by subsequent generations)
(Marcus, 1983). As the animals die or are killed during the course of
the study, additional information is obtained through pathological
examinations, which are conducted to determine the cause of death and
the nature and extent of any morphological abnormalities (e.g. tumors)
in internal organs or tissue samples. The measurements obtained for
the test group are then compared and contrasted with those for the
control group.
The Ine3:act Science alChemicaL Hazard. Risk Assessment 247
In assessing the results of animal research, an important distinc-
tion is made between administered dose and effective dose. Because
animal studies often must rely on relatively high exposure levels to
improve the sensitivity in the detection of a response, the reaction may
differ significantly from the mechanisms expected to be important in
human exposures. Therefore, the effective dose, Le. the fraction of
the administered dose that impacts the animal in ways thought to be
similar to that expected in humans, must be determined.
Strengths
Animal tests offer the researcher a considerable degree of experimen-
tal control. Critical experimental factors, such as dose, can be varied
in a systematic way to perform scientifically rigorous studies. The con-
trolled laboratory setting permits isolating effects from a specific sub-
stance. Because animals can be permitted to get a disease and die, the
full effects of the substance can be examined. In addition, experimen-
tal results can be replicated to confirm their validity or to ensure the
elimination of extraneous factors.
Limitations
The major limitation of animal research is the comparability of the
results of research conducted on animals to humans. The complexity of
biological organisms and biochemical interactions creates a great many
difficulties for inference. Because of the inherent differences in sus-
ceptibility among different species, differences in biological or
biochemical pathways, and variabilities in the sensitivities of individual
agents, exposures to the same hazardous substance may produce dif-
ferent effects in different species, or a significant effect in one
species and no apparent effect in another. Although the most reliable
information might be expected to be produced through the selection of
animals that are the most biologically similar to man, the choice of
animals is. for practical reasons, largely influenced by such factors as
cost. ease of care, shortness of life span, ease of breeding, ease of han-
dling in large numbers, and genetic homogeneity (Le. inbred strains).
This is why small rodents - rats, mice, hamsters - are most often used
for these studies.
Properly scaling doses to obtain comparability between test
animals and humans is much more difficult than simply accounting for
relative body weights. Metabolisms, respiration rates, organ uptake,
elimination, etc. also influence the effective dose. In situations where
the mechanism of effect is not well understood, the appropriate scaling
factors to obtain comparable dose levels will be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to determine.
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Even if the proper scaling factors for dose are known, dosage lev-
els must generally be set at levels different from those that are of
greatest concern to humans. Usually it is necessary to increase the
dose to ensure that a limited sample size will be capable of detecting an
effect. Sometimes it is necessary to diminish the dose. This would be
the case. for example, if the agent in the form administered is toxic to
the test animal in ways not of direct interest to the study. It may also
be necessary to reduce the dose level if the desired dose would
prevent the adequate uptake of necessary nutrients or if it would cause
the animal to reject it owing, for example, to its alteration of the taste
of food.
8.4.2. Epidemiology for dose-response assessment
Epidemiology, the study of the distribution and determinants of disease
in human populations, can be used to detect patterns of risk and estab-
lish statistically significant associations with risk agents. Epidemiology
is also a powerful method for hazard identification. For example, 20 out
of 26 agents causing cancer in humans were first identified using epi-
demiological evidence (Tomatis et al., 1978).
Two types of epidemiological studies that playa major role in
dose-response assessment are cohort studies and case-control stud-
ies. Cohort studies involve the comparison of groups of people
(cohorts) who have different dispositions with regard to some risk fac-
tor. For example, the comparison may involve a group of individuals
who have been exposed to a substance with a group of individuals who
have not. Similarly, cohort studies may involve comparisons of several
groups having distinctly different levels of exposure. or groups pos-
sessing different personal attributes or behavior. Following the selec-
tion of the groups. each is studied over time to observe and compare its
health status. Any excess incidence of disease or disability is
regarded as a potential response to the risk agent.
Case-control studies involve the comparison of people with a given
disease (cases) with individuals without the disease (controls). The
objective in case-control studies is to identify and compare differ-
ences in characteristics of the groups that might be expected to be
risk factors. In this case, a relationship or pattern might be regarded
as an indicator of a cause or contributor to the disease. In both types
of epidemiologic studies, the results are analyzed using statistical
methods to determine the nature and significance of any identified
relationships.
In any epidemiologic study, proper experimental design requires
that the groups be similar with respect to all characteristics except
for the specific factors under investigation. Thus, in cohort studies
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the categorization of groups must not result in preselection according
to state of health, and case-control studies should not produce a
preselection according to exposure to any given risk agent. Cohort
studies hope to randomize over noneontrolled factors; however, when-
ever a comparison is made that the study was not specifically designed
to handle, care must be taken that the relevant factors are controlled
or randomized (Le. do not vary in a systematic way that could distort
the results). For case-control studies. statistical control is used (Le.
selection may attempt to match individual cases and controls for com-
parability, or standard statistical adjustment procedures may be
employed). Demographic variables (age. sex, race. etc.) are most com-
monly used for adjustment or matching.
Epidemiologic studies have successfully been used to identify:
(1) The relationship between duration and level of exposure and bio-
logical or biochemical health effects.
(2) Disease incidence or mortality differences between geographic
and socioeconomic regions.
(3) Time trends in disease incidence and mortality associated with the
introduction or removal of a specific agent.
strengths
Epidemiological studies can be used to provide direct evidence of the
nature of the relationship between various risk agents and the
occurrence of human health effects. Well-conducted epidemiologic
studies showing a positive association between a risk agent and disease
provide the most convincing evidence about risks to humans. Human
studies also eliminate many of the problems encountered in conducting
animal studies, including those arising from interspecies extrapolation.
Additionally, since the exposure is already in the human dose-response
range, the choice of an extrapolation model may be less critical than
for animal studies.
Limitations
Although epidemiology is the only means of assessing directly the risks
of environmental agents on humans, the method has several limitations
that are difficult to overcome. These include:
(1) Difficulties in detecting relationships at low exposure levels.
Epidemiologic evidence of an environmental hazard is usually
obtained from persons with high or intermediate levels of expo-
sure. As in laboratory animal studies. detecting causal relation-
ships at low exposure levels is difficult, since the observed
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associations with disease are usually less pronounced; they may
also have alternative explanations. including those related to
chance. errors. biases. or confounding factors. To provide a valid
basis for risk estimates. large numbers of human subjects are
often needed, especially if the exposure is low or rare, or if the
excess risk is small compared to that of the baseline incidence
rate.
(2) Difficulties in measuring lifetime risks from partial lifetime
data. In most epidemiologic studies, the groups of people studied
are exposed for a limited period of their lives and are then fol-
lowed up for periods up to. but rarely exceeding. 30 years. As a
result, in many cases the exposure duration is short compared to
the long latency period between exposure and the development of
certain diseases such as cancer. Since cancer incidence
increases with the length of exposure and age. epidemiologic
studies usually only detect a fraction of the lifetime risks result-
ing from exposure. The problem is to estimate full-lifetime risks
from partial-lifetime data. There is no generally agreed-upon solu-
tion to this problem. This complicates the detection of a relation-
ship and makes it impossible to identify the risks to humans of
agents newly introduced into the environment.
(3) Difficulties in measuring exposure and estimating dose. Epi-
demiologic studies. unlike animal laboratory studies. are not based
on controlled experiments. The induction of the disease is not
under the control of the researcher; instead. the investigator is
limited to the study of disease cases occurring naturally or
accidentally. As a result. it is difficult to obtain precise measure-
ments of the duration and intensity of past exposures. Several
specific factors compound or contribute to this difficulty. First,
since the exposure of interest often cannot be measured directly.
surrogate measures of uncertain reliability may be used (e.g. occu-
pation. place of residence). Second. since exposure data are usu-
ally derived from historical records generated for other purposes
or from the recollections of subjects. opportunities for either
random or biased misclassification of exposure are frequently
encountered. Third. appropriate study groups are often simply
unavailable or inaccessible.
(4) Difficulties in eliminating biases and excluding confound-
ing factors. It is often difficult to implicate specific risk agents
when environmental hazards involve complex exposures to a
variety of agents. the effects of which are difficult to disentangle.
Moreover. in epidemiologic studies it is often difficult to adjust for
unknown risk factors, since control can be introduced only when
the risk factors are already recognized. Thus. when a particular
factor is related to exposure and disease outcome. it may be
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confounding and give the appearance of an association when in
fact none exists. or it may inflate or decrease the magnitude of
the association. In view of these difficulties, it is not surprising
that epidemiologic data exist for only a small number of chemicals.
8.4.3. Modeling methodB tor health dose-reaponae aBsessment
A dose-response model is a functional relationship between the dose of
an agent or biological stimulus administered and the response of a test
subject. Dose-response models are most prominent when the risk
agent is a hazardous chemical, but dose-response models have also
been developed to estimate injuries and other effects from accidents or
exposures to other forms of kinetic energy.
Most often, dose-response models are obtained by selecting
parameter values for some specified model form to "fit" the model to
toxicological or epidemiologic data. The model form used mayor may
not be based on plausible cause-effect mechanisms. A dose-response
measurement may be quantitative (a measurement of the magnitude of
the effect). quantal (a determination of whether or not a specific effect
is elicited), or time-to-response (measurement of the time required to
produce a specific condition). In some situations. sufficient epidemiolo-
gic data exist to permit a dose-response estimate to be developed
directly from statistical analysis of observations of exposure and
health effects in humans. In these situations. regression analysis in
one form or another is the usual technique for estimating a quantitative
relationship. Because the data are generally insufficient to distinguish
among alternative functional forms. simple relationships. such as a
linear form, are usually fitted.
Even when epidemiologic information is available. however. extra-
polations based on theoretical models and expert judgment are gen-
erally needed to obtain appropriate dose-response relationships. For
example. extrapolations from the exposures observed in an epidemiolo-
gic study of workers receiving occupational exposures to lower expo-
sures experienced by the general population are often necessary to
make use of epidemiologic results. Adjustments may also be necessary
to account for the fact that the general population includes some peo-
ple. such as children, who may be more susceptible than the people in
the sample from which epidemiologic data were developed.
Animal-to-human extrapolation is generally based on standardized
dosage scales for making interspecies comparisons, such as milligrams
per kilogram body weight per day. The logic for such conversions must
depend on the circumstances. For example. it is sometimes observed
that the effective dose, expressed in milligrams per day of direct-
acting chemical substances, is proportional to the body surface area.
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Because a rough approximation to body surface area is the body weight
raised to the two-thirds power, it can be shown that in these cases the
equivalent doses to humans are higher than those in animals by the
ratio of human body weight to animal body weight raised to the one-
third power.
Because exposure assessment often calculates media contamina-
tions to which individuals are exposed, an important issue for
dose-response assessment is the relationship between exposure and
dose. If dose is interpreted as what is adsorbed or absorbed at a tar-
get organ from an exposure, then different individuals might be
expected to experience different doses from the same exposures,
owing to differences in physiology, personal habits, etc. This is of par-
ticular importance for lead and other cumulative toxicants. Phar-
macokinetics, which deals with the absorption. distribution. metabol-
ism, and elimination of compounds in humans and experimental mammals,
is the necessary source for information for the validation of
dose-response models, including animal-to-human extrapolations.
In general, dose-response models are based on some assumed
functional form for the relationship between dose and response. Sim-
ple relationships that are used include linear, linear with a threshold,
quadratic, or sigmoidal (S-shaped) curves. More elaborate threshold
distribution models are based on the assumption that each individual in
the population has his or her own threshold tolerance for the haz-
ardous substance. Specification of a functional form for the distribu-
tion of tolerances then determines the shape of the dose-response
curve. For example, because the proportion of responses in a toxicity
test generally exhibits a sigmoid relationship when plotted against the
logarithm of the dose level. the frequency distribution of tolerances
within a population is often assumed to be lognormal - the so-called
probit model. This model has primarily been used for estimating within
the range of empirically observed responses (interpolation) rather
than estimating outside the range (extrapolation). Modifications are
generally employed to extrapolate responses at low dose levels from
the responses induced experimentally at high dose levels. One modifi-
cation, the Mantel-Bryan equation. assumes a conservative slope (a
slope of 1, which is shallower than is generally seen in experimental
data sets) in order to correct for the steeper dose-response relation-
ships that homogeneous strains of laboratory animals are more apt to
exhibit than the heterogeneous human populations for which the
dose-response is generally extrapolated.
Another commonly used tolerance distribution model is the log
logistic, or logit function. Like the probit, it reflects an assumption
that the proportion of response increases with dose and exhibits a
symmetric sigmoid shape, but it approaches the extreme (0% and 100%
response) levels more gradually than the probit. In the normal range of
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the dose-response curve, the legit and probit models appear so similar
that it is nearly impossible to distinguish them. In the range of low
doses. however, the legit model may predict doses producing no observ-
able effects that are more than an order of magnitude lower than those
produced by the probit model.
Depending on the level of understanding available. more sophisti-
cated dose-response models may be developed based on theoretical
assumptions for the biological processes involved. These can include
known or suspected processes that control the uptake or residence
time of the hazardous substance. mechanisms of cellular or organ dam-
age or dysfunction. mechanisms of repair, and so forth. A description
of several such mechanistic dose-response models is provided below.
The discussion follows that provided by Fares et al. (1983) and Park
and Snee (1983).
One class of mechanistic dose-response models is based on the
premise that a positive response is the result of the random
occurrence of one or more biological events. The one-hit model. also
known as the linear model (even though it is not linear, but concave),
has often been used to estimate the production of tumors from expo-
sures to radiation. The model assumes that only one interaction
between the target site and the hazardous substance is sufficient to
produce an adverse condition. and that the probability of an interac-
tion is directly proportional to the degree of initial exposure to the
substance. This assumption is made regardless of the age of the
exposed organism or the pattern of the exposure. The dose-response
curve implied by the one-hit model is almost linear at low doses, but it
actually has a concave slope over the entire dose range. The model is
insensitive to minor fluctuations in the data, but ignores no-effect lev-
els and thresholds (doses low enough to assume a negligible probability
of an adverse effect in the lifetime of a population). It is therefore not
a good predictor at very low exposure levels and has generated results
that have been invalidated by good epidemiologic data (Gehring et al.,
1979; Ramsey et al.• 1979; Reitz et al.. 1978).
The "multihit" model. also called the "gamma multihit" model,
assumes that two or more "hits" of a substance are required to induce a
response. and that the number of hits over time follows a Poisson dis-
tribution. The dose-response curve predicted by the multihit model at
low doses may be linear, concave, or convex, depending on the values
selected for its parameters. At higher doses. differences between the
multihit and probit models are difficult to distinguish. One major prob-
lem with the multihit model is that it may estimate doses producing no
observable effects that are much higher than the doses that produce
an observed effect in laboratory experiments from which the evalua-
tion was made. Furthermore, even when there is no evidence of a con-
founding background level of exposure, the model may estimate a
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background rate, so that a possibly significant increase in an adverse
health condition may be dismissed as being consistent with the
estimated background levels of a substance.
The multistage model, also called "the Armitage-Doll function". is
based on the assumption that an adverse health effect originates as a
predisposed cell which must undergo a series of mutational stages. In
addition. it also assumes that the timing of transitions between stages
is expressed by a probability function that is approximately propor-
tional to the dose rate. The multistage model, like the one-hit model, is
considered a conservative extrapolation function because the curve
approaches linearity at low dose levels. It tends to work well in the
experimental dose range. but at low doses it ignores changes in kinet-
ics. metabolism, and other potentially confounding or modifying
mechanisms.
Pharmacokinetic dose-response models are based on the principle
that biological effects are the result of biochemical interactions
between foreign substances (or metabolites) and parts of the body.
These models generally assume so-called Michaelis-Menten nonlinear
kinetics, which. like many of the dose-response models, produce
estimated effects that are linear when extrapolated to low doses. Like
the multihit and multistage models. pharmacokinetic models can
describe convex or concave curvature in the dose-response relation-
ship; but. unlike the former models, they do not assume that nonlinear
behavior is similar at both high- and low-dose levels.
Limitations
The major problem associated with the use of dose-response models in
risk assessment is the difficulty of determining which of the models is
appropriate for a given situation. The question is of considerable prac-
tical importance if the risk assessment requires extrapolations to dose
levels lower than those represented in the supporting animal or human
data. For example, as illustrated by Figure 8.2. at responses between
2% and 98%, the probit, logit, multihit, and similar models produce
dose-response curves that have very similar shapes. Thus. all of these
models give essentially identical fits to the observed data. All are also
biologically plausible. At low doses, however. the doses estimated by
the various models to yield no observable effects (virtually safe doses)
can differ by three to four orders of magnitude (Interdisciplinary
Panel on Carcinogenicity, 1984). Of the various tolerance distribution
and mechanistic models discussed in this section. the virtually safe
dose estimates, in order of increasing estimates, are one-hit, multi-
stage, logit. multihit. and probit. when the data suggest convexity.
When the data suggest concavity, however. the order of the virtually
safe dose estimates is reversed (Park and Snee, 1983).
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8.5. Methods for Risk Estimation
Risk estimation is the process of producing overall summary measures
of the level of the health, safety, or environmental risk being assessed.
This component of the risk assessment process has also been referred
to as risk characterization (National Research Council, 1983). Because
people's perceptions of the magnitude of the risk associated with an
event depend on how likely they think the event is and how serious
they feel its occurrence will be, risk must be regarded as (at minimum)
a two-dimensional entity comprising the probability and magnitude of
adverse consequences. Thus, although a variety of single-number sum-
mary statistics for the level of risk are often used (e.g. the probability
of damage, the probability of an individual death, and the expected
number of fatalities per year), displays of probability distributions
over consequences are generally regarded as providing a more complete
characterization of risk. Because single-number summary statistics can
be computed from a probability distribution representation, probabil-
ity distributions provide the most comprehensive means for summariz-
ing the results of a risk assessment.
Despite their advantages, displays of probability distributions
over consequences are in many cases the exception and not the rule:
many chemical hazard risk assessments are conducted without explicit
estimations of probability. For example, the risk assessor might simply
acknowledge the existence of uncertainty but compute quantitative
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estimates of health and environmental consequences that are inter-
preted as "nominal" or "best estimate" values. Another approach is to
specify a range of two or more alternative values for the consequences
of concern (e.g. low, medium, and high values). If uncertainty is not a
concern for decision-making - for example, if the consequences are
almost certain to occur at the predicted level- then estimating proba-
bilities may not be important. In the vast majority of risk problems of
current concern, however, uncertainty is important. In these cases, it
is frequently efficient to use simpler methods in the preliminary stages
of a full-fledged risk assessment. Sensitivity analysis, for example. is
extremely useful for the initial testing of the risk model. A complete
chemical hazard risk assessment. however, should include estimates of
both the probabilities and the magnitudes of possible consequences and
suffers when estimates are collapsed into single-number summary
statistics.
Although probability distributions over consequences provide a
more complete characterization of risk than do single-number summary
statistics. a variety of probability distributions are needed to describe
the different aspects of risk that may be of concern. To reflect total
(aggregate) societal risk. for example. the analyst might estimate a
probability distribution over total adverse health and environmental
effects (e.g.. total number of fatalities). To represent individual risk.
it might be desirable to estimate the probability of consequences to
representative individuals (e.g. the probability of an individual dying).
Other probabilistic representations of risk might also be important in
certain situations. For example, for the purpose of aiding evaluations
of the equity of the distribution of risk, it might be useful to compute
measures of group risk consisting of probabilities and consequences to
individuals grouped by occupation, geographic iocation. sex. race, etc.
Developing useful measures of risk is a complicated problem for chemi-
cal hazard risk assessment. No single means for defining and displaying
risk captures all of the aspects of risk that are of concern.
Generation of a probability distribution over environmental or
health impacts requires the establishment of measures for quantifying
the outcomes of concern and the determination of the uncertainty of
these outcomes. Outcomes of concern are the health and other effects
whose estimations are the objective of dose-response assessment. For
example. health effects might be expressed as number of immediate and
delayed fatalities. injuries of given severity levels, and health degrada-
tions of specific types or severities. Environmental effects might
include reductions in abundance or production of commercial or game
fish populations, reductions in timber yield and undesirable changes in
forest composition. reductions in agricultural production. and reduc-
tions in wildlife populations.
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Because the estimation of uncertainty in outcomes logically
requires accounting for uncertainty in each component of the risk
chain. methods for risk characterization involve integrating models for
the risk source, exposure processes, and dose-response relationships.
Ideally, the methods selected to account for each link in the risk chain
ought to achieve compatibility in their costs and accuracies.
The scientific and technological uncertainty inherent in the risk
situation can be reflected in risk-source, exposure, and dose-response
models in several ways, depending on the nature of the uncertainty.
Two possibilities are:
(1) The processes involved are sufficiently well understood that func-
tional relationships among important variables can be presumed.
but the values of some of the variables are not known (type 1).
(2) The physics, chemistry, biology, or other science and engineering
aspects of the problem are so poorly understood that the func-
tional relationships among important variables cannot be
presumed to be known (type 2).
Morgan (1982) summarizes the available means for dealing with each of
these cases. In the first situation, the functional relationships among
the various important variables are known or knowable so that the risk
assessor can build appropriate hazard, exposure, and dose-response
models, using the various methods described in the previous sections.
The problem of dealing with uncertainty then becomes one of how to
characterize and propagate the uncertainty in the coefficients and
variables through these models. The second situation is more difficult
to handle. Typically, uncertainty in the form of appropriate models is
addressed in one of three ways:
(1) By performing the analysis using the model form judged on the
basis of current information to be most likely or the best of the
available options. Uncertainty in the value of the model's coeffi-
cients is used as a crude way of capturing uncertainty in model
form.
(2) By performing an order-of-magnitude bounding analysis that is
designed to determine the extent to which changes in model form
affect the assessment results so as to establish bounds on the
range of possible answers.
(3) By performing a separate analysis using a variety of competing
model forms, assigning probabilities to these alternative forms,
and then combining the results probabilistically (this essentially
converts a condition of type 2 above to one of type 1).
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8.5.1. "Classical" VerBUB "Bayellian" methods
Risk assessment methods for quantifying and propagating uncertainty
through models differ according to the degree to which the methods
reflect an objective or judgmental perspective of risk. The objective
perspective of classical statistics views risk as a measurable property
of the physical world. A method with a strong objective perspective
will adopt a definition of probability related to the frequency with
which events occur. will rely heavily on empirical data and empirically
validated models. and will develop conclusions based on statistical
inference. The outputs of a risk assessment adopting an objective per-
spective include both computed outcome values and probabilities, and
measures of the uncertainties in these estimates.
The judgmental perspective, associated with the eighteenth-
century mathematician, the Reverend Thomas Bayes, regards risks as a
product of perceptions. A method with a strong judgmental perspec-
tive will adopt the Bayesian definition of probability: Le. uncertainty
is a degree of belief, and probabilities depend on the information,
experience, theories, etc. of the individual. Bayesian risk assessment
methods tend to make explicit use of expert judgment and theoretical
models based on conjecture. Bayesians generally do not provide error
bands or probability estimates to measure uncertainty in reported
probabilities, because assigning a "degree of belief" to a "degree of
belief" has little meaning. The "quality" of the outputs produced by a
Bayesian analysis can, however, be reflected by a variety of computed
measures, such as the sensitivity of those values to the range of judg-
ments provided by different experts and measures that reflect the
extent to which judgmental estimates might change in the face of new
evidence.
Both the classical and the Bayesian views of risk assessment have
merit, and there is no easy answer to the debate over which perspec-
tive is most appropriate for regulatory decision-making. Bayesians
regard the models and assumptions inherent in the classical approach
(linear models, normal probability distributions, independence among
variables, etc.) to be arbitrary and as not reflecting the best informa-
tion available for the analysis. They therefore attempt to incorporate
all of the available data, including soft data and experience, in order to
make maximum use of knowledge and expert judgment. Classicalists
object that such an approach leaves too much to the idiosyncratic judg-
ments of the analyst and produces analyses that cannot be fully con-
firmed or validated by others.
Although the classical and Bayesian perspectives represent polar
points of view, the needs and constraints of applications generally
force most risk assessments to adopt a perspective that lies somewhere
between the objective and judgmental extremes. Assessments of
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chemical risks are generally derived indirectly using causal models
designed to represent real-world systems. The validity of these models
is determined both by empirical data and by their subjective credibil-
ity to experts. Nevertheless. the classical versus Bayesian distinction
provides a useful framework for distinguishing risk assessment methods
for quantifying and propagating uncertainty through models.
8.5.2. Methods adopting a claBBi.cal perspective
Some methods attempt to develop probability distributions describing
risk directly. without formally modeling the risk source. exposure
processes. or dose-response processes. Such methods may be applica-
ble when a sufficient data base is available for the outcomes of con-
cern. and the objective is to estimate the risks as they exist - Le. the
risk assuming that no changes occur.
In this case, standard statistical analysis (e.g. as applied in epi-
demiologic studies) may be used to estimate probability distributions.
Thus, for example. if over a number of years an average of 0.5% of a
worker population has annually developed a certain form of cancer, and
if no changes are made to the work environment. then the estimate of
the inferred risk is that 0.5% per year will continue to develop this
cancer. An appropriate confidence interval (or probability distribu-
tion) for such an estimate can also be developed.
More generally, statistical methods can be used to quantify uncer-
tainty in the variables represented in the models developed to
represent a risk source, exposure, or dose-response. The basic
approach in such statistical methods, including those discussed in Sec-
tions 8.2.3 and 8.3.1. is to interpret empirical data as providing a sam-
ple from which "true" or "population" probability functions can be
developed. These distributions are "named" probability distributions
(e.g. the normal distribution), and they are specified by one or more
parameters (e.g. a mean and variance). The "population" probability
functions are developed through the estimation of their associated
parameters.
The simplest case results if an event (such as an accident at a
chemical plant) is assumed to occur with constant probability per
opportunity, at any given opportunity, independent of whether or not
it has occurred at any other opportunity. In this case, the number or
frequency of occurrences of the event. n. for any given number of
opportunities, N, is represented by a binomial probability distribution.
The probability of occurrence per opportunity. P. is the parameter
that. together with N, defines this distribution; and the empirically
measured fraction of times that the event occurred. n / N. provides a
point estimate for p. Confidence intervals for the estimate of p (based
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on an assumed probability distribution for p) may be easily calculated
and are tabulated in statistics tables. Analogous methods exist for
more complicated assumptions and for continuous variables.
Limita.tions
To be usefuL, statistical methods all require the existence of an ade-
quate data base. Their application permits quantification of both the
uncertainty associated with randomness reflected in the data base (e.g.
the hourly variability of ambient air pollution concentrations) and the
uncertainty associated with the limited sample size of the data base
(the fact that samples provide only a limited indication of what might
be learned if many more samples were taken). They do not reflect
uncertainty over possible changes that may have occurred since the
data were collected and cannot readily be updated to reflect changing
information. Furthermore. the methods are predicated on a wide range
of assumptions or underlying models for the processes by which out-
comes occur.
Some of the pitfalls related to the assumptions commonly used are
subtle. For example, it is customary in reliability estimates to use log-
normal distributions to represent uncertainty in failure rates. The log-
normal distribution is convenient mathematically, but, regardless of
how its parameters are set, it has a "tail" that indicates finite proba-
bility of an actual failure rate that exceeds any finite value. In reality,
a maximum failure rate exists for all items (e.g. a true failure rate on
demand cannot be greater than unity). In most applications the pres-
ence of this tail can be regarded as a mathematical artifact that will
not significantly distort the results of the analysis. However, as noted
by Apostolakis and Kaplan (19B1), there are situations in risk assess-
ment where this common assumption can introduce errors into com-
puted mean values and variances.
8.5.3. Methods based on the BayeBian perspective
The Bayesian view of risk assessment maintains that probabilities
represent an individual's degree of belief about the world, not a
specific property of the world (Lindley, 1970). Methods adopting a
judgmental perspective for risk characterization rely heavily on the
elicitation of probabilities from experts. Bayesians believe that
relevant information for risk assessment is generally held by those
individuals with the greatest knowledge and familiarity with the situa-
tion under study, and that this information is not entirely captured by
the hard data of statistics. Hence, experts provide the logical source
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for admittedly subjective opinions and judgments regarding scientific
and technical matters.
A variety of encoding procedures are available for eliciting judg-
mental probability estimates (see, for example, Stael von Holstein and
Matheson, 1979). The basic types of encoding procedures are: proba-
bility methods, which require the subject to respond by specifying
points on a probability scale corresponding to fixed values of the un-
certain variable: value methods, which require the subject to respond
by specifying points on the value scale while the probabilities remain
fixed: and probability/value methods, which ask questions that must be
answered on both scales simultaneously (the subject essentially
describes points on a probability distribution).
Each of these encoding methods may be presented in either a
direct or an indirect response mode. In the direct response mode, the
subject is asked questions that require numbers as answers - for exam-
ple, "What is the probability that the number of health effects is less
than X?" Probabilities may be expressed directly or in terms of odds
(e.g. 1:99 rather than a probability of 0.01). With the indirect method.
the subject is asked to choose between two or more imaginary bets.
Fixed-value methods are generally regarded as preferable to fixed-
probability methods because they tend to produce more diffuse proba-
bility distributions and are, therefore, less likely to reflect overconfi-
dence on the part of the experts (Morgan et al., 1980). A widely used
probability-encoding procedure is an indirect, fixed-value method
involving a reference gamble. The reference gamble is frequently a
series of intervals defined over the range of uncertainty (the "interval
method") or a "probability wheel".
Spetzler and Stael von Holstein (1975) first described a detailed
encoding process designed to help the analyst identify and reduce the
effect of cognitive and motivational biases held by the subject. This
process, which makes use of a probability wheel as well as other encod-
ing devices, consists of five stages: motivating, structuring, condition-
ing, encoding, and verifying. As part of the process, the analyst
describes to the subject how biases can arise and the implication of
those biases for estimating probabilities. Once subjects have some
understanding of the biases introduced by common thought processes,
they are typically willing to take steps to avoid those biases so as to
improve the internal consistency of their judgments. In addition to
educating subjects, the analyst also actively tries to reduce biases.
For example, probing is used to help identify hidden assumptions on
which the assessment might be implicitly conditioned. This may suggest
better disaggregations in which the probability of these conditions may
be considered explicitly in separate assessments. The process also
attempts to use known cognitive biases to counteract one another.
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To address special problems that arise in probability assessment,
several methods have been devised. For example, the Delphi method
(Dalkey. 1968) is sometimes used as a means for promoting consensus
when probability distributions are assessed from more than one indivi-
dual. The method is designed to reduce the pressures associated with
interpersonal interactions typical of group assessments. Several
methods, such as the modified Churchman-Ackoff method and the nor-
malized geometric mean method (Williams and Crawford. 1980), are avail-
able for resolving inconsistencies in probabilistic estimates. Other
judgmental methods discussed in the literature include cross-impact
analysis, study of precursor events, scenarios. surprise-free and
canonical projections. authority forecasting, surveys of intentions and
attitudes, divergence mapping, modes and mechanisms of changes.
synetics, and contextual mapping (Mitchell, 1977). In general. such
methods range from a casual assertion that "such and such will happen"
(for whatever unstated reasons) to sophisticated computerized models
in which judgmental weights are quantified and cross-correlated in com-
plex ways and on many levels.
An oversimplification that has hampered the acceptance of even
the most formal and systematic of the Bayesian methods is the belief
that "objective" quantities are preferable to "judgmental" or "subjec-
tive" quantities. While Bayesian probabilities are "subjective" in the
sense that they describe a state of knowledge rather than any pro-
pertyof the "real" world, they are "objective" (Le. independent of the
observer) in the important sense that two "idealized" individuals faced
with the same total background of knowledge WOUld. presumably. assien
the same probabilities.
8.5.4. MethodB based on modeling
Since models are developed to characterize the risk source, estimate
exposures. and represent relationships between doses and responses.
methods used for risk estimation involve combining these models to pro-
duce an overall model of the risk process. Measures of the uncertain-
ties in the parameters of these models are then propaeated through
the overall model to obtain measures of the uncertainty over health and
other consequences. Figure 8.3 illustrates the process. Uncertainties
may be quantified either by probability distributions or confidence
bounds. If a Bayesian approach is taken, probability distributions will
be encoded directly from experts; however, if the expert prefers and
adequate data exists. some distributions may be generated from fre-
quency data. In this way uncertainties due to variabilities of nature
and due to lack of knowledge are combined to obtain quantitative
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measures of the overall uncertainty in outcomes. An approach more
consistent with classical statistics might elect to retain a clear distinc-
tion between probabilities generated from data and those based on
judgment. Such a method (e.g. Spencer et al., 1965) might propagate
frequency distributions generated from empirical data and then super-
impose judgmental bounds to reflect additional uncertainties related to
lack of knowledge.
Decision alternatives
Outcome uncertainties
~tL~
Source
model
Model for
exposure
processes
Dose-response
model
I
I
to,.L
--
b]JJ
Parameter and model uncertainties
F'Lf/ure 8.3. Combining models for the risk source, exposure, and
dose-response to obtain a risk model.
The logic of combining and processing probability distributions
depends on the situation. For example, a method commonly used for
risks associated with the release of hazardous chemical substances
involves calculating probability distributions for the physical effects
suffered by representative individuals located within particular geo-
graphic regions surrounding the source, then combining these distribu-
tions with population density data to calculate a probability distribu-
tion over the number of various adverse health effects. The same data
may also be used to compute the annual probability that each exposed
individual may become a fatality or suffer a particular adverse health
effect. The average over all individuals provides a measure of indivi-
dual risk, whereas the average over various groups of individuals classi-
fied by location, occupation, health characteristics. etc., provides a
measure of the risk faced by different population groups.
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Several methods are available for converting the uncertainties
about the inputs to a model (obtained through one of the methods
described above) to the uncertainties that they induce on the outputs
of interest. One method commonly used is probabilistic analysis. Here,
probability distributions of the relevant input variables (derived from
statistical data, fault trees, or event trees) are fed into a computer,
and a simulation program selects values for each variable on the basis
of their relative likelihood of occurrence. Through a sample of simula-
tion runs of the combined risk model, the program estimates the distri-
bution of overall outcomes. In Monte Carlo simulation, input values are
sampled at random from their specified distributions, and each
scenario is given equal weight. In other methods, values of particular
importance (e.g. the extreme tails of probability distributions
corresponding to quantities that might cause a catastrophe) are sam-
pled more often and given reduced weight, so as to obtain improved
resolution for important parts of the distributions. In Latin Hypercube
Sampling, sample values are constrained to cover the distribution uni-
formly, one from each equal probability interval. This can increase the
stability of the output probability distribution if the uncertainty is
dominated by only a few sources.
Because the estimation of outcome distributions often requires a
very large number of simulations, Monte Carlo and related forms of
analysis can be costly if the risk model is complicated. Response-
surface methods are sometimes used to overcome this problem. The
idea here is to replace the complicated risk model with a simplified
approximation called a response surface. Typically, the approximation
is a Linear combination of certain simple functions whose coefficients
are determined by least-squares fitting. Because the response surface
is much simpler to evaluate than the original model, it is less expensive
to implement.
If the model is simple enough (including situations where response
surfaces are used), outcome variables can occasionally be expressed as
explicit analytic functions of the input variables. In this case, analytic
methods (such as Taylor series expansions) can be used to express sum-
mary statistics (e.g. means and standard deviations) in terms of the
parameters that define the distributions of the input variables. Thus,
analytic methods provide another means for uncertainty analysis.
If the Bayesian perspective is taken, probability trees, rather
than simulation methods, may be used for analysis because they permit
the dynamic nature of events and probabilistic dependencies (charac-
teristics to which Bayesians often attribute great importance) to be
more easily addressed. Probability trees are .generalizations of event
trees: whereas the latter typically are composed of events with two
possible outcomes (the event does or does not occur), the former may
represent uncertainties with multiple outcomes whose probabilities of
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occurrence are quantified in a discrete probability distribution.
Bayes' theorem [2] is used for "node flipping" (deriving posterior
probabilities from prior and conditional probabilities in order to inter-
change probability nodes in the tree). A combinatorial scenario
analysis is performed to compute the outcome of values for all combina-
tions of uncertain values. The probability of each scenario is computed
as the product of the appropriate input probabilities as represented in
the tree. Tabulation and cumulation of the probabilities of the various
endpoint consequences in the tree permits the development of proba-
bility distributions representing risk.
A major issue in the development of probability distributions using
models is representing partial dependence or correlation among quanti-
ties. Accounting for correlation among continuous probability distribu-
tions can be mathematically difficult, except for certain standard
named distributions, such as the normal and binormal, for which there
exists much multivariate theory. If the probability distributions are
assessed from experts, the encoding process for a given uncertainty
may entail assessing separate distributions that are each conditioned
on certain distinct values for the quantity on which the uncertainty
depends.
Limitations
The major concern surrounding models is their accuracy or validity.
Unfortunately, the validity (or invalidity) of a model is generally diffi-
cult or impossible to prove. Modeling uncertainty arises from the fact
that the model is only a simplified version of the real world and must
employ approximations to ease data requirements and computational
burdens. Examples of the latter include limited disaggregation, such as
the finite grid size for modeling spatially or temporally varying values,
the use of discrete probability distributions to represent continuous
distributions, and the finite number of runs used in a Monte Carlo simu-
lation. Although in principle the effect of such approximations could
be investigated by changing the level of detail (e.g. by decreasing the
grid size or time steps), this usually would demand rather fundamental
reprogramming of the model. Thus, it is relatively rare for this sort of
sensitivity analysis to be conducted in a systematic way.
In practice, the validity with which a model is viewed rests as
much on the acceptance of its assumptions by those most knowledge-
able in the areas that it represents as on any quantitative test. It is,
however, often possible for a model to be constructed so that it can
simulate past history, and this approach is frequently employed as a
means for validation. While models can often serve as good display and
communication devices, detailed models generally require extensive
examination and explanation to provide understanding.
266 17u'uri~glI~a MII~lIg1.~gHlIrJrllTaOUS R1.sks
Developing models generally requires a large amount of data (for
those methods adopting an objective perspective) or a skilled and
experienced modeler and considerable input from experts (if a Baye-
sian perspective is taken), or both. Computer costs for running models
are typically small compared to development costs. Small probability
trees may be analyzed by a hand calculator for a simple model. but the
number of scenarios required increases exponentially with the number
of uncertain quantities represented in the tree. Thus, the methods can
become infeasible even for a computer if the probability tree is too
large. Contrary to common perceptions, probabilistic simulation can be
more efficient than analysis of probability trees for large models.
Many simulation schemes have the added advantage that the modeling
uncertainty due to the finite number of runs may be estimated statisti-
cally.
8.6. Outputs of Risk Assessment
There are two principal outputs of a chemical hazard risk assessment:
(1) quantified measures of possible outcomes and their uncertainties
(e.g. probability distributions, confidence intervals, judgment bounds)
and appropriate summary statistics (e.g. expected values of risk), and
(2) information on the relative importance of different sources of
uncertainty.
8.6.1. Risk estimates and displays
As noted previously, probability distributions or other measures of
uncertainty in risk should ideally be estimated for each of the poten-
tial health and other consequences that are of concern. These conse-
quences may be estimated from a variety of perspectives to clarify the
nature of the risk involved. For example, individual risk might be
estimated from the probability distributions describing possible conse-
quences to a typical or highly sensitive individual. An aggregated meas-
ure of risk is reflected by the probability distributions for conse-
quences for the total population.
The probability distributions developed as the overall output of a
risk assessment may be displayed in a variety of ways. A concise
method of display is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) or com-
plementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). F'igures 8.4(a)
and 8.4(b) illustrate a CDF and a CCDF, respectively. With the CDF the
height of the curve denotes the probability that the actual value of the
uncertain quantity will be less than or equal to any value along the hor-
izontal axis. The CCDF is simply the complement of the CDF. With the
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CCDF, the height of the curve at any point gives the probability that
the actual value will be greater than or equal to any value on the hor-
izontal axis.
1.0
0.8
.~ 0.6
:0
ca
J:l
e 0.4a..
0.2
a
Uncertain quantity X
(a)
Uncertain quantity X
(bj
PLgure 8.4. Probability distributions displayed as (a.) a CDF and (b) a CCDF.
F'igure 8.5 shows a more familiar form for representing a probabil-
ity distribution that may be derived from the CDF. The form, called a
"probability density function" (PDF), has the property that the height
of the curve at any given point is proportional to the relative likelihood
of the uncertain quantity having that value. Thus, in the PDF, the
probability of a value between any range is represented by the area
under the curve within that range. The relationship between the PDF
and the CDF is such that the former is the first derivative of the
latter: Le. the height of the PDF at any point is proportional to the
slope of the CDF at that point. Although the PDF has the disadvantage
that it is more difficult to use to read off numerical probabilities. its
shape provides an intuitive feel for the nature of the uncertainty
involved.
Since it is often desirable to distinguish uncertainty due to the
inherent random nature of the situation under study (e.g. the variable
failure rate of components) from modeling and analysis uncertainties
(not knowing the appropriate forms for models or the values of their
parameters), displays such as F'igure 8.6 are often useful. The figure
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F'igure 8.5. Probability distribution displayed as a PDF.
shows a series of CCDF curves, each generated according to a set of
assumptions with associated (judgmental) probabilities. The numbers in
the display represent cumulative probability. As indicated in Figure
8.6. such curves can easily be reduced to a form that makes explicit
the state of knowledge or degree of belief behind each frequency
curve. The conversion is based on the concept of a "cut curve". If a
vertical line is drawn at any consequence level. then the intersection of
this line with the family leads to a cumulative probability distribution
for the probability of the actual frequency of occurrences of conse-
quences with levels less than Xo' Such cut curves can also be drawn to
decompose a family of risk curves into its various sources of risk.
A variety of summary statistics may be computed to summarize
probability distributions. The expected value (or mean or average) is
the sum (integral) of all values weighted by their probabilities. It is
also the average value that would occur given a very large number of
experiments if each were characterized by the given curve. Another
popular summary statistic is the median, which is the point at which a
vertical line would bisect the area under the PDF. The median is the
point for which the odds are 50:50 that the variable lies above or
below. Another useful statistic is the mode, which is defined as the
value where the PDF is a maximum (and the CDF has the greatest slope).
A symmetric (unimodal) PDF will have the mean, median, and mode
occurring at the same value. while a skewed PDF will have the mean
removed from the mode towards the skewed side of the PDF. The
amount of uncertainty expressed by a PDF is often summarized by the
standard deviation. The amount of skewness may be measured as the
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Figure 8.6. Using families of risk curves to represent both statistical un-
certainty and uncertainty due to lack of knowledge.
difference between the mean and the mode values divided by the stan-
dard deviation.
While these and other standard statistical measures are fre-
quently used to summarize important characteristics of probability dis-
tributions developed in risk assessments, special statistics are also
often used. For example, one such statistic is the average risk per
person, defined as the probability of death; another is the total
accident rate, defined as the number of deaths in every 10-8 hours of
exposure to risk. Keeney et al. (1979) suggest that, at a minimum, the
analyst should compute the following measures to characterize risk in a
way that is sensitive to social concerns:
(1) Total expected fatalities per year (to measure aggregate societal
risk).
(2) Probabilities of fatality for each exposed individual (to permit
comparison of the risk with other risks, such as the risk from
smoking, driving a car, etc.).
(3) Probabilities of fatality for individuals grouped by occupation,
geographic location, etc. (to allow equity issues to be addressed).
(4) Probabilities of exceeding specific numbers of fatalities per year
(to allow sensitivity to catastrophe).
Care must be taken in presenting summary statistics as they may
be misleading. For example, "maximum lifetime risks" are sometimes
computed for assessments of industrial facilities. Such estimates may,
in effect, assume that an individual is located at the fenceline of the
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"worst" facility continuously for 70 years, even though it may be
unlikely that any such individual actually exists. Furthermore, such
estimates may assume incorrectly that the last year of exposure (the
70th) contributes as much to the individual's health risk as earlier
years of exposure. Since for effects such as cancer there is generally
a long latency period between exposure and effect, such estimates may
be unrealistically high.
8.6.2. Analysis of uncertainty
One of the main reasons for conducting a Quantitative chemical hazard
risk assessment is to be able to answer Questions about the relative
uncertainty contributed by various sources. Such information allows
comparison of the practical importance of different sources of uncer-
tainty, and, hence can guide the allocation of further analytical
resources to reduce modeling uncertainty, or the design of research
programs to reduce scientific uncertainty.
Given a risk model, there are several ways for analyzing and attri-
buting sources of uncertainty. The simplest approach is point sensi-
tivity analysis, in which the derivative of elasticity of outcome mea-
sures is computed with respect to each input evaluated at nominal input
values. Because this method ignores the relative range of uncertainty
in input Quantities. more elaborate means are generally used. For
example, parametric sensitivity analysis involves plotting or establish-
ing a range of output values as each selected input Quantity is varied
from its extreme low to high values, while holding all others at nominal
(or other) values. Another approach involves partitioning the uncer-
tainty in the output according to a Gaussian approximation: the vari-
ance in the outcome distribution is divided among the inputs in propor-
tion to the point derivative with respect to that input multiplied by its
variance. Where the linear approximation is not too inaccurate, this
method may be useful for initial screening to identify the major contri-
butors to uncertainty.
Computing rank correlations between outputs and inputs is also
used as a method for analyzing the relative contributions to uncer-
tainty. In this method, the output and input values are ranked and the
values are replaced by their ranks before correlation is computed in
the usual statistical way. An advantage of correlating ranks rather
than the values of the Quantities is that it makes the results indepen-
dent of the metric chosen to Quantify the variables. Another advantage
over the previously mentioned methods is that it does not require all
other inputs to be held at their nominal value, but averages the effect
as other Quantities vary probabilistically over their entire range. The
most comprehensive means for analyzing sources of uncertainty using
Th.e [ne~a.ct Science 0/Ch.emica.l Ha.8a.rcl R1.$k A$$e$sment Z73
the risk model is stochastic sensitivity analysis, in which changes in
the probability distributions or their summary statistics (e.g. expected
values and variances) are explored as various input values are fixed or
varied across their range [3].
6. Summary
Table 8.2 summarizes the discussion of chemical hazard risk assessment
methods by displaying some of the methods described in this chapter
together with a number of other widely used risk assessment methods.
The identified methods are arranged in such a way that their vertical
and horizontal locations in the table reflect two of the dimensions for
distinguishing risk assessment methods. Each method is placed in a
column which indicates the element of the risk chain that it addresses.
Whether the method is located near the top or bottom of the table
reflects a judgment as to whether it adopts primarily a classical or
Bayesian perspective in its view of risk.
As noted in the table. there are a great many chemical hazard risk
assessment methods. The methods vary widely and illustrate the large
number of analytic options available to the chemical hazard risk asses-
sor. Selecting the methods that are most likely to be useful in any
given situation requires experience, good judgment, and a careful con-
sideration of several factors, including the aspect of risk assessment
that they address, their input requirements, the outputs that they
produce, and the underlying assumptions.
Notes
[1] The views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the views of their organizations.
[2] In extreme cases, Bayes' theorem is not of much practical value: if a
new piece of information adds only insignificantly to existing
knowledge, then it will not affect subjective probabilities much; if it is
very much belter than previous knowledge, then probabilities can
often be calculated directly from the data. In the in-between cases, in
which existing knowledge and new information must both be taken into
account, Bayes' theorem provides a logical and consistent way for
revising subjective probabilities: if P(H) is the prior probability that
hypothesis H is true, P(D) is the probability that datum D will be
observed, and P(DIH) is the conditional probability that D will be
observed given that H is true, then the posterior probability that H is
true given that D has been observed is:
P(H ID) = P(D IH)P(H)
P(D)
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[3] Such methods are closely related to computations of the expect.ed
value of perfect information. The met.hod requires a loss function -
I.e. a means for valUing risk - and, t.herefore, lies in t.he domain of risk
evaluation as well as risk assessment.. Alt.hough not. st.rictly a risk
assessment. method, it offers a way of comparing t.he importance of dif-
ferent. sources of uncertaint.y in terms of a common met.ric of value.
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CHAPTER 8
Methods of Risk Analysis
NG. Lind [lJ
9.1. Methods of Risk Analysis
The risk associated with a hazard can be studied by many different
approaches. Some methods serve to detect the presence of a hazard.
others to judge the likelihood of undesirable events and their possible
consequences. The methods range from qualitative to quantitative. and
each may be useful for a particular purpose or a particular stage of the
study of a project (design. construction, approval, or licensing). There
is a need to develop risk analysis towards precision and objectivity.
Risle a.nalysis is here defined as the formal, quantitative evaluation of
malperformance of a system.
Engineers have always had to consider the risks among all other
consequences of their designs. and they are quite at home with risk
analysis. Quantitative studies of risk were first employed in aeronauti-
cal engineering where. in the form of quantitative reliability analysis. it
has been practiced for half a century. The reliability of multi-engine
aircraft may, for example, b.:: derived on the basis of slngle-engine
failure rates. Some procedures of risk analysis are now routine,
prescribed for certain complex, costly, or hazardous projects (e.g.
nuclear power plants). Henley and Kumamoto (1981) have given a sum-
mary of the history of risk analysis up to the present decade.
Since risk analysis involves the forecasting of events, it is not
strictly a scientific discipline. Nevertheless, it is not an arbitrary
procedure or a free art form; it employs logical analysis and operates
on data obtained by the scientific methods that are usual for the con-
text.
But risk analysis has been called a "pseudoscience", perhaps
because it calls for complex numerical procedures and employs
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scientific data. yet Is not subject to verification by the scIentific
method. Indeed. a statement about the risk involved in a project Is.
like an engineer's prediction of lifetime maximum stresses in a girder.
not verifiable. However. risk analysis is no more a pseudoscience than
is bridge design. for instance. The proof of pragmatic disciplines is to
be found in the practical performance of their products.
Moreover. risk analyses are scrutinized by critique from within
the profession. by the clients. and by engineers and scientists in con-
tiguous disciplines. This process is analoeous to the way in which new
knowledge is accepted in science. and high standards of skepticism are
applied. ideally. The assessment of risks. by analysis or judgment. is an
appropriate prerequisite for all prudent action. whether it is a matter
of a pedestrian crossing the street or the siting of a hazardous facility.
The product of a risk analysis is a set of outcomes. each with an
associated probability. Accordingly. there are requirements of con-
sistency that must be satisfied in risk analysis: there is a right way to
perform the analysis and it can be subject to rational dispute.
Risk analysis stops at this assignment of probabilities: it is not
concerned with what values may be attached to the space of outcomes.
It is value-free (unlike risk assessment).
Many different methods are available to analyze risk. Some exam-
ples are threat analysis. event trees. reliability analysis. and fault
trees. These methods are not different means to the same end.
although the same end result may sometimes be obtained by alternative
methods. Each method is appropriate for particular purposes. It is
useful to begin with a brief overview of this variety to provide a back-
ground for the discussion of fault trees. a popular and highly developed
tool.
8.1.1. System reliability IlIUlIyBiB
Some systems are so simple that an adequate mathematical description
can be made in terms of a finite number. n. of basic random variables
Xi' Xz..... x,... The system has a finite number m of failure modes and
falls in mode i if. and only if. a given failure function Fi{Xi • Xz....• Xn.)
is negative or zero. The reliability of the system. then. is the probabil-
ityof survival. and may be expressed as
Pr [ ~ F i (Xi' ... ,Xn.) > 0I
i "'1
ViE: t. 2, ... , m (g.t)
A graphic representation of equation (g.t) is shown in Figure 9.1.
There are two basic random variables. Xl and Xz• and three failure
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modes. To fix ideas. X1 may be the temperature and Xz the humidity of
a sensitive hazardous material mixture in storage. Mode 1 may be
spoilage due to freezing. mode 2 may be fire, and mode 3 may be hygro-
scopic decomposition of one component. The survival event is an out-
come in region S, which represents the intersection of the sets F1 > 0,
Fz > 0, ...• Fm > O. The boundary curve 1 ls the locus of F1 =0 and
represents limit state 1, I.e. failure in mode 1. and so on.
x,
Figure 9.1. Rel1abiUt.y (schematic) of a system in t.wo random variables X1
and Xz wit.h t.hree failure modes.
The state variables X1 and Xz usually vary as functions of time for
a particular realization of the system. The point (Xl' Xi> in time traces
a curve in the plane, oscillating around a mean or target state near the
optimum. The probability of deviation from the target is assumed to be
known and is indicated by the level curves of probabillty density shown
by the broken lines. The reliability is calculated as the integral of the
joint probability density of X1 and Xz over region S. Methods to calcu-
late reliability have been surveyed by Madsen et at. (1986).
The modes of failure are sometimes related in a simple way to the
elements of the system and to the basic random varlables. For exam-
ple. in a weakest-link system such as a chain. the strength of each link
is a basic random variable. and each mode is a failure of one of the
links. Many engineering systems are of this type, such as correctly
made or proof-loaded structures: pressure vessels. dams. building
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structures. or airframes. These systems are subject mainly to the
forces of nature and the influence of blind chance. while human influ-
ences (interventlon. human error, or human factors) are neglected.
The calculated reliability of such a system is conditional upon the
absence of human influences. An example of the reliability analysis of
a simple system ls given at the end of this section.
T
Tank A Tank B
T: Top event, no water in the main system
A, B, C, D, E: Failure of individual components
OR gate
AND gate
~
Q
Output
~
Inputs
Ff.gure 9.2. Wat.er supply system and associat.ed fault. tree (after Pat.~­
Gornell, 1984).
Figure 9.2 gives a more complex example. The failure, loss of
cooling water, wili occur if both tanks are empty and/or if both pumps
fail to operate. Pump D needs a supply of power C to operate. There
are five state variables :e A' :eB' ••• , %B' % A equals 0 if tank A is empty
and is otherwise equal to 1; %c equals 0 if power to pump D is off and is
otherwise equal to 1; and so on for the remaining basic random vari-
ables. The state of the system is represented by a point with coordi-
nates (% A' % B' .••• % B ... ) in a five-dimensional space of binary variables.
Only a finite number of states (32) are possible. Each of these states is
reached with known probability of departure from the target state (1,
1. 1, 1, 1). There are three failure modes. For example, simultaneous
failure of C and E, represented by the point (1. 1. O. 1. 0) is one failure
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mode. Since the number of states of the system is finite, the probabil-
ity of failure can be calculated by enumeration. For systems of the
complexity met with in practice, efficient computer programs will nor-
mally be required to carry out the calculations.
9.1.2. Innuence~
A useful tool to gather and represent most of the information contained
in fault trees and event trees in a compact form is a diagram listing all
the variables of a system to display their relationships graphically.
Intermediate variables are included together with parameters and
input and output variables. The relationships can range from qualita-
tive to quantitative.
9.1.3. Scenarios
Risk is of interest only in relation to systems that are subject to
change by uncontroliable forces and subject also to our intervention.
The important concept of a scenario [2] is appearing more and more in
quite different fields, all concerned with forecasting, prediction, con-
trol, risk or management of resources. The scenario label indicates
that the discourse is about a modsl, which is neither the reallty of the
future nor a complete description of the set of possible futures. The
scenario concept reminds us that all analysis (of the past, present or
future) applies to modeis and not directly to reality. This is of little
consequence in everyday science, but it is very important in disciplines
of prediction or control, such as risk analysis or engineering: every
conclusion is based on a background set of scenarios.
Here is an example of a scenario: "There is a sudden temperature
drop on a mUd winter day, and ice forms on a brid8e, with probability
P(l) per bridge per year. A tanker truck brakes, jackknifes, and over-
turns over the two-lane underpass, P(211). A passenger car with N
passengers, P(N), N =1, 2, ... collides with the tank, P(312). The tank
ruptures, PeR 14) and the contents ignite, P(514). There are m (= 1, 2 •
...) severe burns and n (= 1. 2, ...) fatalities." This is actually a collec-
tion of scenarios each generated by assigning particular values to N. m.
and n. Each particular scenario in this collection is possible but quite
improbable, but the collective scenario is quite believable.
As Hawksley points out in his discussion at the end of this
chapter. a scenario should be qualified by indication of the likelihood
of occurrence. Thus. numerical values of the probabilities, or at least
some indication of their maenitudes, are necessary. Moreover, the
large number of possible outcomes of the scenario makes it necessary
282 Insur1.ng Gnd MGft.Gg'l.ng HGsGrdous R1.sks
to consolidate the scenario (e.g. by assigning typical or expected
values to N, m, and n) and let the result vicariously represent the
entire collection of scenarios.
A scenario is defined for a system by assigning definite values to
the set of variables of choice and chance. The scenario concept
prompts the important question, "What if ... ", and permits the partial
study of the future by analytical methods that are similar to those used
in the study of the past or present. The scenario is conditional upon
the values assigned to the parameters - as is always the case in
analysis - but the ensemble of scenarios can be used to make reliable
predictions about the system under study. The scenario approach can
serve to demonstrate that the operator has an appreciation of the
risks of a facility or operation, and is incorporated, for example, into
European Economic Community (EEC) legislation for the control of
chemical hazards.
The decisive advantage of scenario thinking is that it liberates
the analyst from the concern that the results have to be "true".
Instead, attention can be concentrated on the rational analysis of the
scenarios, permitting a freedom of imagination essential to good fore-
casting and design. The advantage is gained at the expense of a need
for interpretation of the results - since there is no pretense of
representing future reality directly. Risk analysis is often carried out
without explicit interpretation of the results, and it is often criticized
for not predicting what actually happened. The analyst is then likely
to defend any discrepancies on grounds of insufficient data, being
unaware of the model character of the analysis.
9.1.4. 'nlreat IlIUlIyIU
Threat analysis is a recent and perhaps the most comprehensive formu-
lation that encompasses risk analysis together with the analysis of
crime, armed conflict, etc. It grew out of experiences in the area of
computer security and has recently been presented in generalized form
[3]. It is a technique to quantify hypothetical threats to any collection
of assets. Although still in its infancy, threat analysis contributes a
unified philosophy to the analysis of risk in its most general form. For
many processes (e.g. nuclear power), the public perception of risk
quite appropriately encompasses such hazards a sabotage, armed con-
flict, and proliferation, which risk analysis in the conventional sense
often leaves out by assumption.
Threat analysis follows a sequence of seven stages:
(1) Enumeration of the assets.
(2) Evaluation of the assets.
Methods qfR1.d: AftAtlls1.s 283
(3) Listing of all scenarios for the threats.
(4) Determination of the loss expectancy rate for each event.
(5) Proposal of protective mechanisms.
(6) Recalculation of loss expectancy rates.
(7) Performance of a cost-benefit analysis for each protective
mechanism.
The analysis is supported by computer procedures and reflects a
more complete concept of analyzing risk not in isolation but in conjunc-
tion with a slate of protective mechanisms, presenting the sensitivity
to each mechanism in a form that prepares for a rational selection.
Indeed, there are many risks that we have no protective mechanism
against. Such risks are of little interest and we choose to ignore them
as a result [4].
Threats are classified into accidental and intentional threats, and
the analysis unifies the approach to protection against malicious agents
(war, crime, competition), natural hazards. and accidents.
The most important assumptions and limitations of threat analysis
are as follows. There is no universal way to evaluate assets. and some
intangible losses (e.g. "leakage of information") can be difficult to quan-
tify. Although the threat analysis method yields a complete set of
threats to all asset categories, no exhaustive method to generate a
complete set of threat scenarios is known. Finally, there is no sys-
tematic way to prescribe mechanisms for protection. Threat analysis is
not a panacea, but a conceptual framework for thoughtful management
of a complex of risks.
9.1.5. Event trees
Change in a system is represented in terms of states, with events being
transitions between states. The linear graph suggests itself to
represent this kind of situation because it has the appropriate
mathematical structure. A tree is a linear graph without loops. The
event tree is oriented in a particular manner, such that only one
branch enters each node. The event tree is a straightforward way to
account for the various possible processes of change. Each edge
(branch) in the event tree represents a possible state or trajectory in
time, with time flowing in the direction of the orientation.
A probability is associated with each edge, conditional on the
preceding edge. Each vertex (node) represents a possible transition to
alternative states or trajectories and marks the introduction of a new
state variable. The state variables are usually discrete-valued or
discretized; however, they may be continuous. in which case the graph
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becomes an infinite manifold without much resulting complication. A
scenario is a path from the initial state to a final state. There is a
correspondence between scenarios and final states. The probability of
the scenario and of the associated final state is simply the product of
the probabilities of all the edges in the scenario [5].
9.1.8. Fault trees
In a fault tree the edges are oriented and represent binary events that
can take two values (on or off. 1 or O. true or false. and so on). Only
one edge exits from each vertex, and its value is a Boolean function of
the values of the events represented by the edges that flow into the
vertex. The Boolean function represented by a vertex may be a union,
and the vertex is then called an "or" gate. Or the function may be an
intersection of the input events, in which case the vertex is called an
"and" gate. Other logical functions, though less common, can also
occur. Each type of gate has a specific symbol as shown in Figure 9.2.
The tree represents the output, the top event. as a logical function of
the input, called the basic events. The tree is used to calculate the
probability of the top event as a function of the probabilities of the
basic events [5, 6].
The fault tree is an appropriate representation of a system when
the state of the system and of each component is a binary variable.
such as electrical or mechanical components that are either on or off.
available or not. failed or survived. Figure 9.2 is an example. If the
state of the components is properly described by multilevel variables,
or even continuous variables, the fault tree methodology can be gen-
eralized by using appropriate logical functions. provided only that the
system state can be obtained as a function of the component states.
The probability of the top event is a function of the probabilities
of the basic events. These probabilities depend on external cir-
cumstances, and may vary with time, location, or the state of the other
variables. The fault tree is therefore not a complete representation
for the reliability of the system. The fault tree must generally be sup-
plemented with other techniques, such as reliability analysis or event
tree analysis.
The literature is full of examples of applications of fault trees and
event trees: see. for example, Henley and Kumamoto (1981). To provide
an introduction to the subject as well as a basis for reflection by those
more experienced in risk analysis, two specific but simplified examples
of hazards related to materials and transportation are discussed from
different viewpoints in the next section. Section 9.2 is somewhat
technical in nature and may be skipped without loss of continuity.
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A reactor vessel has a seal that may fail at pressure X1 and a relief
valve that normally allows the dangerous substances in the vessel to
vent into a holding tank if the pressure exceeds a safe low threshold.
Seal and valve are drawn independently at random from their respec-
tive populations. A fault tree is shown in F'i.gure 9.3. The probabilities
of failure of the seal and the valve are P1 and Pz respectively. The
probability of failure of any other component of the system is negligi-
ble.
Relief valve
l- ~', -j Holdingtank
Valve
fails
Leakage
F'tgure 9.3. Pressure test example: system and fault tree.
To test the system. the valve is adjusted such that the median
value mz of the relief pressure Xz is equal to the median of the seal
failure pressure ml' The vessel is then pressurized to the pressure m
= m1 = mz· We wish to predict the probability P L of leakage of the
seal in the test. At the test pressure p 1 and p z both equal 112. Since
the two components are independent. the probability of leakage is cal-
culated formally as (112) x (112) = 1/4.
F'i.gure 9.4(a) shows an event tree for the same system. If the
relief valve fails, it means that the pressure will reach the value m and
leakage will occur with probability 1/4. However. if the pressure at
which the relief valve operates. Xz' takes a value that is less than m.
the seal is tested to a smaller pressure. and leakage will occur with
probability P L(X1 < Xz>/2. giving a total probability of leakage that is
greater than was found by the fault tree.
A reliablllty analysis of the system considers the space of out-
comes (X1.Xz> shown in F'i.gure 9.4(b). There are three compound
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events: survival of the test. S; pressure relief, R; and leakage, L. The
figure also shows level curves of the joint probability density function.
(a)
Leakage
L
-
L
X2
L
(b)
R
s
Xl
Figure 9.4. (a) Event tree and (6) event space of rellabillty analysis for
pressure test example.
! 1(Xi)!2(XV. of Xi and X2' The probability of leakage is calculated as
P L =J J 1(X1)!2(X2)dX1 dX2
L
(9.2)
Equation (9.2) shows that the reliability of the system cannot be deter-
mined from the reliability of the components. The probability distribu-
tions for the two random variables have to be taken into account to
solve the problem. Numerical integration is generally necessary to
determine P L, If we assume that the variables are lognormally distri-
buted with coefficients of variation Vi and V2• the result is easily cal-
culated (Madsen st al.. 1985) as
P L =1/4 + [1/(211')] arctan (V1/VV (9.3)
Thus. even for very simple mechanical systems the fault tree must
be employed with care, and the conventional information on the failure
rates of the components may be insufficient to determine the risk.
While the relief valve is an important component of the system. it is
observed that leakage occurs if and only if the seal fails.
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It is instructive to consider a model of a simple collision between a
vehicle and another object: see Figure 9.5(a). The vehicle may be a
hydrofoil boat while the object is a floating log, or the vehicle may be a
movable offshore platform and the object an iceberg, and so on. In any
case, the probability Pc of a collision depends on the probability of
detection (among other parameters). which at any time depends on the
distance % between the vehicle and the object [Figure 9.5(b)]. Pc also
depends on the probability of a successful evasion given that detection
occurs, which depends on % [Figure 9.5(c)].
(a)
(b)
(e)
=i+ · 1-/ r-
oll
x
dx
]- =S:I' '0 L
Figure 9.5. (eI) Collision of a vehicle V wit.h an object. 0; (b) probabilit.y of
detection per unit. of distance; (c) probabilit.y of success of evasion
maneuver initiated at. distance %.
A fault tree is shown in Figure 9.6(a). Collision occurs if either
the detection system or the evasion system fails. The probability that
the detection system fails is denoted by Go(%)' where % is the distance
between object and vehicle.
Let J 0(%) dz denote the probability of occurrence of detection
between % and % + dz given that prior detection has not occurred.
The probability of no detection before the distance is reduced to % is
-
G 0(%) =1 - J J 0(%) d%
21
(9.4)
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Collide
Evade
Collide
,/0
,
I
.
Ix =xox =x,
Collision
(a) (b)
Ftgure 9.8. (m) Fault t.ree and (6) event tree for the collision example.
The probability that detection occurs between distances % and % + d%
equals GD{%)!D{%) d% , and the probability of colllsion equals
-
Pc =1 - J Fs{%)GD{%)!D{%) d%
o
(9.5)
An event tree that also leads to equation (9.5) is shown in Figure
9.6{b).
This example illustrates the need to account explicitly for time in
dynamical systems. Most of the systems employed in the production
and transportation of hazardous substances are dynamical. Fault trees
may be an aid in the analysis of such systems. but the problem must be
solved by integration of probability functions of time as reflected in
the event tree.
The example also gives an appreciation of the degree of complex-
ity that may be encountered in alarm and warning systems [7] and in
real collision problems as they occur in the transportation of hazard-
ous materials. Frequently, serious collision situations involve three or
more vehicles in relative motion, and they involve the interaction of
several detection and evasion systems with incomplete information
about the state of relative motion and about each other's future
response.
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If we had ample statistical data on all the modes of failure of a system,
we would not need to perform a risk analysis. However, data are
scarce, particularly on catastrophic malperformance of very hazardous
systems. The reliability must be inferred deductively from the
behavior of the components which typically'have higher failure rates.
"Probabilities do not exist", as Barlow (1984) has observed. Prob-
abilities cannot be determined, measured, or assessed. Probabilities
are assigned. and inserted into modeis. The outputs of these modeis
are risks, Le. probabilities associated with elements of sets of undesir-
able outcomes. Risk analysis thus amounts to the calculation of top
event probabilities on the basis of assigned probabilities.
In the public debate over the risks of hazardous systems, discus-
sion often arises over what the "true" (meaning "objective") risks are.
Such "true" risks do not exist. however. and the dlscussion can become
fruitful only if it is understood that a believable consensus on the
probabilities is all that can ever be established. To reach such a con-
sensus among professionals is the central objective of risk analysis,
and the search for consensus is prominent when the analysis is used as
a tool in design. Consensus among professionals is fundamental in the
licensing process for a hazardous facility (e.g. nuclear power plants).
which continues until the team of designers have convinced the licens-
ing authority that the risk is acceptable.
Consensus is not easily achieved when data are scarce. It is often
necessary to rely on experts' opinions, when data cannot be bought at
any price. This happens in siting decisions and design of hazardous
plant in earthquake zones in the absence of long-term records.
Experts differ not only quantitatively. One may be a specialist on local
soil, another on regional geology, a third on earthquakes, and it is
necessary for the designer or licensing authority to weigh and com-
pound somewhat conflicting information. One straightforward approach
is to treat expert testimony as observations of random variables, and to
compound it using Bayesian processing. In a different approach, the
weights are generated by the team of experts themselves; in yet
another approach the experts are calibrated against independent evi-
dence [8]. One approach formally minimizes the weighted distribution
between the experts (whose role is only to provide evidence) and the
professionals (who design and certify the plant in the public interest
and among whom quantitative risk is established by consensus).
Normally there ls no communication between the professionals and
the public concerning risk. Civil engineering structures, for example,
are formally considered "absolutely safe" by the public, in the sense
that the public has normally no fear of failure. no sense of risk. Thls
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myth is sustained in part by an excellent performance record, in part
by the familiar and unglamorous nature of the facUities, and in part by
the profession's reaction to any failure which usually terminates in the
assignment of cause to one or several human errors. Individuals. rather
than facilities. are seen to cause failures. The absence of some of
these attributes in the case of nuclear or chemical plant may contri-
bute to the more skeptical public attitude encountered. and points out
the great complexity of the question of communication of risk between
the engineering profession and the public.
A paradigm for risk analysis in this role is available in the tradi-
tional engineering design process. For example. reinforced concrete
highway bridges are produced to perform in a known and accepted way
on the basis of a few fast compression tests of concrete samples (among
other data). There are many reasons why such tests give an incorrect
value of the strength of the concrete. The concrete in the cylinders
has cured under conditions that are significantly different from the
concrete in situ. The concrete further changes between the date of
the test and the time that the most critical loading occurs. Moreover.
the prescribed standard statistical procedures to process the test
results are quite primitive and may even violate a basic "principle of
reliability consistency" (Lind and Chen. 1985). Nevertheless. the trad-
itional procedures to verify the adequacy of the structure are success-
ful, acceptable to the public. and beyond serious dispute with regard to
risk. Although these methods are less than rational. they are a suffi-
cient basis for engineering consensus and public trust.
Figure 9.7 illustrates some of the difficulties with conventional
statistics when they are applied to the risk analysis context. For a
simple system of random capacity R versus demand S the random sam-
ple data on capacity are shown as points in a normal probability plot.
and a conventional estimate of the capacity is made (see Gumbel, 1954).
The result is known to be an optimum estimate within the class of nor-
mal distributions. A variety of other distribution functions can be
obtained by a homogeneous linear transformation of the normal distri-
bution (as. for example. lognormal distributions). and classical optimal
estimation of such distributions can be done In the same way.
Figure 9.7 shows on the left a typical demand density function
!s(z), The probability of failure is
..
P y = J FR(z)!s(z) dz
o
(9.6)
That is. Pyequals the value of the capacity distribution function FR ( )
weighted by the density function of the demand. Consider now what
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F'i.l1ure 9.7. Rellabll1ly Inconsistency of classical mean-and-varlance estima-
tion.
happens if one of the high observations of capacity (labeled "a" in Fig-
UTe 9.7) is increased. This causes a change in FR {) as shown by the
broken line. For some demands it can therefore happen that the
probability of failure inferred from equation (9.6) will increase when
observations of high values of resistance increase. This result is
absurd. violating the principle of reliability consistency. As Ofverbeck
(1980) has suggested, a remedy is to apply differential weighting to the
observations, giving greater weight to the low (high) observations in
the case of capacity (demand). For further discussion see Lind and
Chen (1986).
When data are scarce. legitimate questions can be raised about the
accuracy of the calculated probabilities. Top event probabilities are
complicated functions of many random variables. namely the estimators
of the input probabilities. A reliability analysis is not complete without
an estimate of the uncertainty in the result. Monte Carlo methods may
be appropriate for this purpose. particularly when ample computing
power is available and the number of basic random variables is small.
Otherwise, the more powerful point distribution methods can be used
(Rosenblueth. 1981; Lind. 1983).
Here is an example. Suppose that Vi and V2 in equation (9.3) are
random varlables with means 0.4 and 0.2 respectively. both with stan-
dard deviation 0.1 and correlated negatively with correlation coeffi-
cient -D.6. Then the failure probability is given by four point estimates
with weights as follows (Rosenblueth, 1981):
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p -- =1/4 + Arctan [(0.4 - 0.1)/ (0.2 - 0.1)]/2" •
w -- =(1 - 0.6)/4
p -+ =1/4 + Arctan [(0.4 - 0.1)/ (0.2 + 0.1)]/2" •
w -+ =(1 + 0.6)/4
p +- = 1/4 + Arctan [(0.4 + 0.1)/ (0.2 - 0.1)]/2" ,
w +- =(1 + 0.6)/4
p ++ = 1/4 + Arctan [(0.4 + 0.1)/ (0.2 + 0.1)]/2" .
w ++ = (1 - 0.6)/4 .
(9.7)
From these the mean and standard deviation of the failure probability
are calculated to be approximately 0.4237 and 0.0427 respectively.
These values compare with p = 0.4133 and sp = 0.0757 obtained by
5OO-point Monte Carlo simulation, assuming normally distributed vari-
ables.
Uncertainty in data and models eventually translates into risk
uncertainty. Uncertainty in the calculated risk is irrelevant if a single
decision-maker aims to maximize expected utility. However, it may be
important if a collective (public sector) safety decision is to be made,
unless the decision-maker is pledged to make rational decisions on
behalf of clients or a constituency. In extreme cases of risk uncer-
tainty it is often suggested that risk analysis is inapplicable. Such
suggestions carry little weight unless accompanied by a justifiable
alternative.
9.4. Concluding Remarks
Quantitative risk calculation can be done effectively for systems that
are not subject to major human intervention. Risk can be calculated.
on the one hand. for hazards beyond human control (e.g. natural
hazards) and, on the other hand, for highly controlled systems (e.g.
chemical plant) where human intervention is programmed and con-
trolled. However. even very simple systems may behave in a fashion
that defies routine risk analysis except by experts with a knowledge of
the hardware as well as of risk analysis techniques. The systems
involved in the production, transport. storage. and (to a lesser extent)
the disposal of hazardous substances rely on human monitoring and
intervention for risk control. The risks depend on factors that are not
so easily quantified. This does not imply that risk analysis is impossi-
ble or useless. Indeed. risk analysis remains an effective tool in the
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design of such systems. Rlsk ls then assessed conditional upon a speci-
fied human behavior (e.g. "normal workmanship" or "design according
to the pressure vessel code").
Such conditional risks reflect the fact that probabilities are not
system properties but are assigned quantities that reflect available
knowledge and are relative to a, conceptual system model. Probabilities,
and hence risks, cannot be "true" (in the sense of "objective") but
remain a matter of consensus. As such, they may be effective in com-
munication among professionals who share a specialized body of
knowledge and beliefs (e.g. in engineering design). They are also suit-
able in the comparison of policies or projects, when errors and uncer-
tainties in the quantities assigned to the alternatives tend to be com-
pensated.
Risk analysls. then, may be appropriate in selecting policies and
in the design of facilities involving hazardous materials. Considerable
development is desirable to make risk analysis an effective tool in com-
munication to the public. Also risk analysis must be developed and
made more "scientific" if it is to serve as evidence of compliance in the
regulatory process. Apart from the development of more effective
analytical tools and data bases - processes which are well under way
and destined to bear fruit in the long run - there is a need for
development of a broad basis for consensus between the public and the
professionals. This can take the form both of better professional
understanding of the nature and structure of values entertained by the
public, and of increased public education in matters of technology,
probability, and risks to life and health.
Notes
[1] Findings reported in this chapter were obtained in the course of
research projects supported financially by the University of Waterloo
Institute for Risk Researoh, the Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council of Canada, and the Canadian Committee for the Inter-
national Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Thanks are due to
Hans Bohnenblust, J.L. Hawksley, Paul Kleindorfer, Howard Kun-
reuther, Elisabeth Pat~-cornell, and Emilio Rosenblueth for useful dis-
cussion and suggestions.
[2] The usefulness of the scenario concept in structural engineering is
currently being studied by various international bodies. The ideas
expressed here follow unpublished contributions by the Swiss
engineers W. Bosshard and J. Schneider. See also Ericksen (1975).
[3] The generalized presentation of threat analysis and a description of
the computer program to support the analysis is as yet unpublished
Canadian work (Canadian National Railways, and D. Bonyon).
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[4] An example is the impact of a meteor of a size sufficient to destroy Ufe
over an area the size of Canada, whioh has been estimated to ocour
with an annual probability of 10-18. Catastrophes, perhaps of oosmic
origin, sufficient to exterminate a large proportion of the species in
existence have a reourrence rate of less than 108 years (Calder,
1963).
[5] An introduction to event tree analys\S and fault tree analysis with a
comparison of their salient features has been provided by Pat~-eornell
(1964).
[6] See also Barlow and Lambert (1975) or Henley and Kumamoto (1961).
[7] Pat~-eornell (1966) has oonsidered such systems.
[6] Barlow (1964) and Rosenblueth (1961) discuss this and related prob-
lems on the processing of experts' opinions from a Bayesian perspec-
tive.
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The following comments on the chapter by Lind are made by someone
who applies risk analysis in his daily work for an engineering firm,
where risk analysis is mainly used to help decision-making on safety
measures for hazardous systems. The framework of risk analysis, how-
ever, can be used to address problems in many different areas. Hence,
it is naturally of interest to people from various fields as represented
by those attending the conference on Transportation, Storage, and
Disposal of Hazardous Materials. When I first read Lind's contribution,
I concluded that I basically agree with everything stated there. How-
ever, in the area of risk analysis there still remain many points that
Lind touches on that need to be discussed in detail and that are of
relevance to a broad audience. I would like to draw attention to some
essential points which do make difficulties in the practical application
of risk analysis methods.
9.D1.1. Risk analyaiB as a tool in the political deciBlon process?
To start with, let me point out that we encounter a lot of encourage-
ment in our practical work. Actually, we feel quite enthusiastic about
the use of risk analysis and believe it to be the best way to solve most
safety problems. With respect to the practical performance of risk
analysis methods, we are even more optimistic than Lind. who in his
chapter considers them to be useful in the design of policies and facili-
ties but not yet applicable either in regulations or in communication
with the public. I would maintain that risk analysis - even in its
present use - can be an effective tool in aiding management decisions
on safety measures as well as in the political decision process on ques-
tions of acceptable risks. And, of course, it may also serve as a basis
for insurance decisions.
Our firm has been involved in the analysis of risky systems for
about 20 years and there have been a lot of successful applications. In
this context, "successful" means that risk analysis has been of great
importance in the process of deciding about the safety precautions
required for hazardous systems (Schneider, 1978). In Switzerland, for
example, there do exist regulations which are based on a risk concept.
They concern storage, handling, transportation, and manufacture of
explosives and ammunition. Also, in many cases, local authorities
ground their decisions concerning safety measures on a risk analysis.
In this sense, our optimism is founded on the practical performance of
risk analysis methods. And, as Lind says, this is the only way risk
analysis can prove itself.
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But what makes risk analysis an effective tool In the decision pro-
cess? Lind emphasizes that it needs to be value free. I agree with
that. Moreover, I would say that one can hardly stress this enough.
But at the same time one needs to underline that risk analysis has to be
linked to the appraisal of risk. We like to think of risk analysis as
being a plug - a plug which helps to express the risk of various haz-
ardous systems In comparable terms. And, like any plug, this one has
to fit into an outlet. In this case, the outlet is supposed to be the pro-
cess of risk appraisal. To be useful, any risk analysis has to be struc-
tured in such a way that it fits into risk appraisal (Bohnenblust and
Schneider, 1983). This finding has consequences for how a risk analysis
is conducted. Reading Lind's chapter, lay people might get the impres-
sion that the task of such an analysis is fulfilled by establishing the
probabilities of undesirable events and the extent of the correspond-
ing consequences. We think that there is much more information
needed to allow for a serious appraisal of risk. We do not only need a
two-pole plug merely supplying probabilities and consequences but a
more sophisticated one fittlng into the multiple-pole outlet of risk
appraisal.
9.D1.2. RiBk analysis in a det8DlliYe attitude?
Stlll, even the best risk analysis cannot offer a guarantee of its accep-
tance In decision processes. There are many examples where it has
been forced. into a defensive position. Obviously, assuming this attitude
it cannot be of much help. Many people accuse risk analysis because it
is not part of the exact sciences. However, as Lind says, bridge design
and most other engineering disciplines are also pseudosciences. Actu-
ally, no analysis can claim to be able to capture reality. It can never
be more than a model of reality. This is especially true when we are
concerned with events possibly happening in the far future. In that
sense, the public, the politicians, and all those involved In safety deci-
sions need to realize the nature of risk analysis. Conducting a risk
analysis does not alter a safety problem at all. Also, it will not change
anything concerning the knowledge of the physical data and the back-
ground information of a problem. The only thing we are able to change
by analyzing risks is the way we are investigating the problem. Tradi-
tional engineering methods do not explicitly express how safe or how
risky a system is. Risk analysis, however, does address this question in
a clear-cut way.. Performing a risk analysis is an attempt to make one
step in the directlon of getting a better grasp of a safety problem. It
is the effort to handle and examine complex problems in a more trans-
parent and consistent way.
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9.D1.3. RiIIk: analyaiB withoutco~data?
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There is another point which misleads many people. They often forget
that each risk analysis consists of two parts. The first one is the
model, the methodology, and the conceptual framework; the second
part is its content - the quantitative knowledge or the data. People
often argue that it is not possible to perform a risk analysis when
there are not enough data available. In contrast with this, we would
suggest reflection on the following thought: the less data, the less
knowledge we have, and the more we are in need of a good risk analysis.
In the first place, risk analysis helps to disclose the structure of
a problem and its interconnections in a clear and logical way. Even
without data we gain insight into a problem. Also, it is much more valu-
able to capture the basic elements of a problem in a simple but correct
and transparent way than to do some fancy mathematical modeling.
The ultimate goal of a risk analysis is to assist in a decision pro-
cess. To achieve this goal we do not only need a qualitative but also a
quantitative result. Of course, it is very nice and makes things easy if
we can evaluate statistics, make tests and experiments, etc. in order to
obtain confirmed data to calculate risks. It is quite a hard work to per-
form a risk analysis if we lack data. But again, I believe that it is
better to do an analysis mainly based on estimates than to do no
analysis at all. Some readers may know the saying "It's better to be
roughly right than exactly wrong". Certainly, we will not be able to
calculate "true" risks but I agree with Lind that people have to be
ready to realize that there are no "true" risks anyway. Even after a
system has failed or after an accident we do not know these true risks.
In this sense, a risk analysis cannot ever be checked for its correct-
ness. However, that is not the point. The aim of risk analysis is to
facilitate a decision to be made. For that purpose we need a broad con-
sensus on the risk estimates and the assumptions leading to them. It is
easier to achieve a consensus if you can confront people with confirmed
data. But, where such data are lacking it is legitimate and meaningful
to base your risk estimates mainly on subjective consensus data. This
even has some positive aspects. Applying risk analysis, experts are
forced to come to a consensus on the basic assumptions of a safety
problem. Without using this method, discrepancies in expert opinions
are rarely eliminated, and mostly they are not even recognized. Con-
sider the expression "to the best of one's knowledge and belief". I
think this expression applies very aptly to the way one has to perform
risk analysis. We have to make use of all information available, be it in
terms of "hard" data or "soft" beliefs. Utilizing all information avail-
able will ultimately lead to the best decision.
In most of the cases we are fortunate enough to dispose of statis-
tical or experimental data. As Lind shows, the interpretation of these
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data can be tricky sometimes. He also points out that a risk analysis is
not accomplished without an estimate of the uncertainty of the results.
In our firm we sometimes have a hard time to make it clear to our
clients that there is any uncertainty at all. Many people would prefer
to believe that there is only one deterministic and correct answer to
each question. But it is indispensable that people accept this uncer-
tainty in the result of a risk analysis. And perhaps it is even more
important that they become conscious of the uncertainty in the nature
of most safety problems.
9.01.•. Different typn or riJIk ana1yIriII_thodII
Clearly, Lind's chapter touches on many fundamental questions. I shall
make just one more comment. Lind discusses five examples of risk
analysis methods. I would like to emphasize that not all of them are of
the same level. Rather we can distinguish three different types:
(1) Reliability analysis, ja.ult tree analysis, and event tree
analysis. These methods can be referred to as techniques of
risk analysis. They are more or less mathematical tools.
(2) Scenarios. The concept of scenario is somewhat different from
the techniques of risk analysis. It is, rather, a conceptual aid for
the analyst who investigates the risks of a system as well as for
the decision-maker.
(3) Threat analysis. Of the five methods discussed, threat analysis
is the most comprehensive tool which forms a framework for cap-
turing a safety problem as a whole. I would put threat analysis on
the same level as decision analysis and game theory. All these
concepts go beyond the analysis of risk and enter the area of risk
appraisal. Possibly, threat analysis should be considered not
merely a method of risk analysis but rather a method for analyzing
risky systems.
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I do not intend to comment on the mathematical or theoretical rigor of
Lind's chapter. Rather I shall make some remarks of support and qual-
ification based upon some experience of risk analysis in the chemical
industry.
I would agree that fault tree analysis along with other techniques
of risk analysis, can be an effective tool to aid the design of facilities
for handling hazardous materials. This is widely accepted, although the
extent of use varies. What is more contentious is the extent to which
risk analysis can or should be used as an aid to judging the acceptabil-
ityof the siting of hazardous activities. For that purpose the analysis
would concentrate on high-eonsequence low-probability events and, in
the chemical industry, would tend to center on the severe failure of
pipework and vessels. Many would argue that risk analysis of that sort
is subject to too great an uncertainty to be validly useful.
Risk analysis of some form or other is a necessary part of risk
management, which in simple terms requires:
(1) Identification of hazards.
(2) Analysis of the risk of hazards occurring.
(3) Decision on course of action.
The first step is vital and could be said to be the most important. It
does not seem to appear in these Proceedings and I am tempted to
digress slightly from the subject of Lind's chapter to give a reminder
that formal techniques of hazard identification are far more widely
used in the chemical process industries than are formal techniques of
risk analysis. Typical are hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies and
failure mode and effect analysis. Both are inductive procedures involv-
ing the postulation of failures or deviations and examination of the
consequences that might result. Rigorous hazard identification is seen
as an essential cornerstone of a system for hazard control. Its use in
Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), for instance, has contributed to a
significant improvement in safety performance over the last two
decades.
For the safe management of a hazardous activity, hazard identifi-
cation has to be carried out and needs to be thorough. Risk analysis,
however, can be more variably applied. Indeed. it may be bypassed if
the decision is to apply an accepted standard or code of practice to
avoid the identified hazard. Of course, risk analysis may have contri-
buted towards establishing that standard. I would not agree with Lind
that risk analysis is by definition both "formal" and "quantitative"
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(Section 9.1, first paragraph). Much informal and qualitative risk
analysis takes place in a design process. Also I would submit that not
all formal risk analysis need necessarily be quantitative. Indeed,
although quantification may give an additional dimension to add per-
spective to an analysis, I would contend that getting the logic right is
the more important. In many cases a qualitative evaluation of, say, a
fault tree can be sufficient to identify the main contributors to a risk.
Only in selected cases is formal quantitative analysis necessary.
Turning to the methods of risk analysis reviewed by Lind. I read
first the abstract of his paper which spoke of comparing fault tree
analysis with other methods. I reacted to this as it tended to imply
that the various methods might be alternative ways of tackling the same
problem. I think this is rarely the case and. as Lind does point out,
(Section 9.1) "each method is appropriate for specific purposes". In
practice a combination of methods is used depending on the nature of
the risk analysis to be done.
In the chemical industry there are two broad areas in which risk
analysis is used. Its application to hardware design (e.g. safety shut-
down systems) is well established. Its application to choice of site and
determination of separation distances is developing. Fault tree
analysis is the most widely used technique for the former together with
some form of reliability analysis. Event trees and the scenario
approach are more suited to the latter. For instance. in an analysis of
the off-site risks from two installations handling toxic gases about 60
scenarios involving about 100 failure cases were considered. For only
two of the failure cases was fault tree analysis found appropriate. It
really is a case of "horses for courses".
I would like to make a few comments on some of the "horses":
(1) System reliability analysis. I have no personal experience of
this technique. I do not think it is widely used in the chemical
industry in relation to the safety problems of hazardous
processes. Some of the more complex control and instrumented
protective systems may be analyzed in this way but these are the
exception rather than the rule (as opposed to the nuclear indus-
try for instance). As a safety man I tend to be wary of techniques
that are largely mathematical and highly specialist. In my experi-
ence, developing the failure logic of a system in an analytical
exercise involving both designer and operator adds more to their
understanding of the system and awareness of the hazards than
rather esoteric calculations.
(2) Scenarios. The scenario approach is now incorporated into legis-
lation in the European Economic Community for the control of
major industrial accidents involving chemicals. An operator is
required to demonstrate that he appreciates the scale of the
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hazard that might arise from his activity. This is, of course, a
necessary step towards proper control of the hazard. The
scenario approach focuses more on the consequences of a hazard
than on the likelihood of that hazard being realized and so has the
disadvantage of possibly concentrating attention on, say, the
"maximum conceivable accident" or the "worst possible accident"
and diverting attention from the more credible accidents.
Scenarios should always be qualified by some indication of likeli-
hood of occurrence whether in qualitative or quantitative terms.
(3) Threat analysis. This is not a term that I have come across. The
various steps in the technique as listed by Lind put me in mind of
the technique of hazard analysis that we use in the design of
chemical plant: Figure 9.D2.1 illustrates the general procedure.
While in applying this technique we can interpret hazard in its
broadest sense - Le. danger to life, material assets, production.
and profits - threat analysis is clearly even broader in its scope
in seeking to cover "malicious agents" as well as accidents. This
leads to a question that is sometimes asked in risk analysis:
should any account be taken of possible terrorist activity and, if
Take plant, design, proposal etc.
t
Hazard identification
I
Analysis of
cause and
frequency
\
and
Assess risk
1
\
Analysis of
consequence
I
Comparison with criteria
I
Accept
\
Reject: redesign, modify as necessary
F'igure 9.nz.1. Generalized model for hazard analysis.
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so, how? I wonder if threat analysis could be useful where that is
a concern?
Of more general and perhaps greater interest is the concept
of unifying the approach to protection against threats from any
cause. It occurs to me that this procedure could perhaps be a
useful way of displaying to the public the various risks to which
they may be exposed together with protection costs. benefits,
etc., so that, for instance, the risks from a chemical hazard could
be put into perspective. In other words, could threat anaiysis be
a useful communication tool?
(4) Event trees and fault trees. I will comment on these together.
Firstly, I had some difficulty with the descriptions! I would not
doubt that they are strictly correct but the rather mathematical
terminology obscures the appealing basic simplicity of the tech-
niques which makes them so useful. I would recommend two book-
lets: Risk Analysis in the Process Industries (Institution of
Chemical Engineers. 1985) and Methodology for Hazard Analysis
and Risk Assessment in the Petroleum Refining and storage
Industry (CONCAWE. 1982).
One might be left with the impression from Lind's examples
that event and fault trees are always alternative ways of analyzing
the same problem. That is by no means the case because of the
fundamental differences between the techniques that I would like
to make clear. Event tree analysis is a "bottom up" procedure
that takes an event (cause) and seeks to analyze the various out-
comes possible. It does not generate other causes of those
outcomes. Fault tree analysis. conversely, is a "top down" pro-
cedure that starts with a specific outcome (the top event) and
seeks to analyze the various causes of that outcome. It may gen-
erate other outcomes but that is not necessarily a prime objec-
tive. It is not an analysis of all system failures but only of those
that could cause the specified outcome. The techniques are com-
plementary so that the outcome of a fault tree may be further
analyzed by an event tree (see Figure 9.D2.2).
I will take Lind's pressure test example to illustrate an
important point. That is, it is vital to define adequately the start-
ing point of the analysis, the various branch points of the trees.
and the events and causes embodied in the trees. I drew up the
fault and event trees shown on Figures 9.D2.3 and 9.D2.4. The ad-
ditional definition, I would claim, significantly clarifies the
analysis. An attraction of these techniques is that they are vivid
methods for communication of information as well as analysis of
problems.
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·1 Analysis of consequences(Event tree)
Figure 9.D2..2. Complementary use of faull lree and evenllree analysis.
Fluid leaks from
reactor sea I
Pressure in
reactor rises
toX,
Seal leaks
Pressure in
reactor rises
Relief valve
fails to open
Figure 9.D2..3. Expanded fauillree for pressure lesl example.
I would now like to make a few general points. In his concluding
remarks Lind says that some systems may defy risk analysis except by
experts with a knowledge of the hardware as well as risk analysis
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Flgurfl 9.De.4. Descriptive event. t.ree for pressure test. example.
techniques. This might be taken to suggest that nonexperts might han-
dle some analyzes. There are. of course, degrees of expertise but I
would suggest that for a.ny risk analysis to have credibility it has to be
done by persons with adequate training and technical experience of
the systems, both hardware and software. that are to be analyzed.
He describes threat analysis as not being a panacea. I would ex-
tend that to all methods of risk analysis. The various procedures can
be a powerful aid to the safe operation of hazardous activities but none
can be a substitute for experienced engineering and management judg-
ment.
A major limitation of risk analysis is the difficulty of allowing for
the human influence. Lind clearly recognizes this, and it is worth
highlighting some statements: e.g. in Section 9.1.1, "calculated reliabil-
ity ... is conditional upon the absence of human influences "; the open-
ing words of Section 9.4. "Quantitative risk calculation can be done ef-
fectively for systems not subject to major human intervention" (we do
not have many of those!); and later in Section 9.4. "Risk is then as-
sessed conditional upon a specified human behavior (e.g.... 'design ac-
cording to the pressure vessel code')". To summarize this in general
terms. risk analysis might be able to show that a hazardous activity
ca.n be safe but it cannot show that it will be safe. That is dependent
on satisfactory management to ensure. among other things, that the as-
sumptions implicit in the risk analysis are valid and remain so. Perhaps
the Bhopal disaster provides the most recent example. On paper the
plant would seem to have had adequate safety systems. but in the event
they did not work. Some would use this to argue that risk analysis has
little value. I would not agree. Risk analysis. involving those who will
manage an activity, can be an effective means of highlighting those as-
pects that are vital for safe operation and of increasing the awareness
of where stringent management control is required.
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Further problems with risk analysis that Lind rightly ack-
nowledges are the inadequate availability of failure data and uncertain-
ties in calculation procedures - both for event frequencies and, more
particularly, for the consequences of accidents. This problem becomes
more acute for risk analysis of 10w-probabiUty/high-consequence
events, Le. the consideration of risks to the public. An estimate put
the uncertainty in a recent risk analysis of that type at about ±30
times. Such levels of uncertainty seem to severely limit the usefulness
of risk analysis in the public domain although this is an application
being pursued by a number of state regulatory authorities primariiy for
planning control purposes - notably in the Netherlands and the UK.
The acceptability of this application of risk analysis depends on the
approach adopted. The approach in the UK of seeking to use risk
analysis to establish broad guidelines for planning control with flexibil-
ity to judge specific cases on the merits of the local situation is to be
preferred to the setting of fixed numerical criteria against which to
judge the results of a risk analysis as seems to be being pursued in the
Netherlands.
This is an appropriate aspect on which to finish as it is perhaps
the most contentious and where there are problems to be resolved.
A consensus needs to be reached on the extent to which risk
analysis can be validly applied to risks in the public domain. This
needs to recognize that the uncertainty in the technique is such that
only relatively large differences in risk can reliably be identified, so
that analysis might, at best, be only justified in selected cases. Also
techniques are in almost a continuous state of development and many
aspects require judgment so that any statutory, say, requirement for
risk analysis has to be flexible. The public remains to be convinced of
the validity of risk analysis and is more inclined to believe Murphy's
Law, Le. if it can happen it will. A recent example is the rejection of
Union Carbide's plan to open a factory at Livingstone in Scotland that
would handle small quantities of toxic gases (e.g. arsine) in cylinders. A
risk analysis by an independent consultant that estimated very low
risks to local people was rejected; the worst likely accident that was
assumed in the analysis was the escape of the whole contents of one
cylinder oniy, whereas local opinion was that it should be assumed that
the total inventory of gases might escape despite being distributed in
many separate cylinders. Admittedly there were emotive issues with
Union Carbide's involvement and had the matter been dealt with prior
to December 1984 there might well have been a different outcome. It
does raise a final question, though: How can the validity of a risk
analysis be tested?
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CHAPTER 10
Informing and Educating the
Public About Risk
p. Sovic [1]
To effectively manage ... risk, we must seek new ways to involve
the public in the decision-making process.... They [the public]
need to become involved early, and they need to be informed if
their participation is to be meaningful. (William Ruckelshaus,
19B3, p 102B.)
10.1. Introduction
In a bold and insightful speech before the National Academy of Sci-
ences at the beginning of his second term as administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), William Ruckelshaus called for
a government-wide process for managing risks that thoroughly involved
the public. Arguing that government must accommodate the will of the
people, he quoted Thomas Jefferson's famous dictum to the effect that
"If we think (the people) not enlightened enough to exercise their con-
trol with a wholesome discretion. the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion".
Midway into his tenure as EPA administrator, Ruckelshaus' experi-
ences in attempting to implement Jefferson's philosophy led him to a
more sober evaluation: "Easy for him to say. As we have seen, inform-
ing discretion about risk has itself a high risk of failure" (Ruckelshaus,
1984. p 160).
This chapter attempts to illustrate why the goal of informing the
public about risk issues, which seems easy to attain in principle, is
surprisingly difficult to accomplish. To be effective, risk communica-
tors must recognize and overcome a number of obstacles that have
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their roots in the limitations of scientific risk assessment and the
idiosyncrasies of the human mind. Doing an adequate job of communi-
cating means finding comprehensible ways of presenting complex
technical material that is clouded by uncertainty and inherently diffi-
cult to understand. Awareness of the difficulties should enhance the
chances of designing successful informational programs.
10.2. Limitations of Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a complex discipline, not fully understood by its
practitioners. much less the lay public. At the technical level, there is
still much debate over terminology and techniques. Technical limita-
tions and disagreements among experts inevitably affect communication
in the adversarial climate that surrounds many risk issues. Risk com-
municators must be fully aware of the strengths and limits of the
methods used to generate the information they are attempting to con-
vey to the public. In particular, communicators need to understand
that risk assessments are constructed from theoretical models which
are based on assumptions and subjective judgments. If these assump-
tions and judgments are deficient, the resulting assessments may be
quite inaccurate.
Nowhere are these problems more evident than in the assessment
of chronic health effects due to low-level exposures to toxic chemicals
and radiation. The typical assessment uses studies of animals exposed
(relatively briefly) to extremely high doses of the substance to draw
inferences about the risks to humans exposed to very low doses (some-
times over long periods of time). The models designed to extrapolate
the results from animals to humans and from high doses to low doses are
controversial. For example, some critics have argued that mice may be
from 3 x 104 to 109 times more cancer prone than humans (Gori, 1980).
Different models for extrapolating from high-dose exposures to low
doses produce estimated cancer rates that can differ by factors of
1000 or more at the expected levels of human exposures (which them-
selves are often subject to a great deal of uncertainty). Difficulties in
estimating synergistic effects (interactions between two or more sub-
stances, such as occur between cigarette smoking and exposure to
asbestos) and effects on particularly sensitive people (e.g. children,
pregnant women, and the elderly) further compound the problems of
risk assessment. In light of these various uncertainties, one expert
concluded that "Discouraging as it may seem, it is not plausible that
animal carcinogenesis experiments can be improved to the point where
quantitative generalizations about human risk can be drawn from them"
(Gori, 1980, p 259).
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In the adversarial climate of risk discussions, these limitations of
assessment are brought forth to discredit quantitative risk estimates.
To be credible and trustworthy. a communicator must know enough to
acknowledge valid criticisms and to discern whether the available risk
estimates are valid enough to have value for helping the public gain
perspective on the dangers they face and the decisions that must be
made. On the positive side. there are some hazards (e.g. radiation,
asbestos) whose risks are relatively well understood. Moreover, for
many other hazards, risk estimates are based on a chain of conserva-
tive decisions at each choice point in the analysis (e.g. studying the
most sensitive species. using the extrapolation model that produces the
highest risk estimate, giving benign tumors the same weight as malig-
nant ones, etc.). Despite the uncertainties. one may have great confi-
dence that the "true risk" is unlikely to exceed the estimate resulting
from such a conservative process. In other words, uncertainty and
subjectivity do not imply chaos. Communicators must know when this
point is relevant and how to make it when it applies.
Parallel problems exist in engineering risk assessments designed
to estimate the probability and severity of rare high-consequence
accidents in complex systems such as nuclear reactors or liquefied
natural gas (LNG) plants. The risk estimates are devised from theoreti-
cal models (in this case fault trees or event trees) that attempt to de-
pict all possible accident sequences and their (judged) probabilities.
Limitations in the quality or comprehensiveness of the analysis, the
quality of the judged risks for individual sequences. or improper rules
for combining estimates can seriously compromise the validity of the
assessment.
10.3. Limitations of Public Understanding
Just as they must understand the strengths and limitations of risk
assessment, communicators must appreciate the wisdom and folly in
public attitudes and perceptions. Among the important research find-
ings and conclusions are the following.
10.3.1. People's perceptions or risk are otten inaccurate
Risk judgments are influenced by the memorability of past events and
the imaginability of future events. As a result, any factor that makes a
hazard unusually memorable or imaginable, such as a recent disaster.
heavy media coverage, or a vivid film. could seriously distort percep-
tions of risk. In particular, studies by Lichtenstein et al. (1978), Mor-
gan et al. (1985), and others have found that risks from dramatic or
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sensational causes of death, such as accidents, homicides, cancer, and
natural disasters, tend to be greatly overestimated. Risks from
undramatic causes such as asthma, emphysema, and diabetes, which
take one life at a time and are common in nonfatal form, tend to be
underestimated. News media coverage of hazards has been found to be
biased in much the same direction, thus contributing to the difficulties
of obtaining a proper perspective on risks (Combs and Slovic. 1979).
10.3.2. Risk information may frighten and frustrate the public
The fact that perceptions of risk are often inaccurate points to the
need for warnings and educational programs. However, to the extent
that misperceptions are due to reliance on imaginability as a cue for
riskiness, such programs may run into trouble. Merely mentioning pos-
sible adverse consequences (no matter how rare) of some product or
activity could enhance their perceived likelihood and make them
appear more frightening. Anecdotal observation of attempts to inform
people about recombinant DNA hazards supports this hypothesis
(Rosenburg, 1978) as does a controlled study by Morgan et al. (1985).
In the latter study people's judgments of the risks from high voltage
transmission lines were assessed before and after they read a brief and
rather neutral description of findings from studies of possible health
effects due to such lines. The results, shown in Figure ro.t, clearly
indicated a shift toward greater concern in three separate groups of
subjects. Whereas mere mention and refutation of potential risks
raises concerns, the use of conservative assumptions and "worst case
scenarios" in risk assessment creates extreme negative reactions in
people because of the difficulty of appreciating the improbability of
such extreme but imaginable consequences. The possibility that imagi-
nability may blur the distinction between what is (remotely) possible
and what is probable obviously poses a serious obstacle to risk informa-
tion programs.
Other psychological research shows that people may have great
difficulty making decisions about gambles when they are forced to
resolve conflicts generated by the possibility of experiencing both
gains and losses, and uncertain ones at that (Slovic, 1982; Slovic and
Lichtenstein, 1983). As a result, wherever possible, people attempt to
reduce the anxiety generated in the face of uncertainty by denying
that uncertainty, thus making the risk seem either so small that it can
safely be ignored or so large that it clearly should be avoided. They
rebel against being given statements of probability, rather than fact;
they want to know exactly what will happen.
Given a choice, people would rather not have to confront the gam-
bles inherent in life's dangerous activities. They would prefer being
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Figure W.t. Comparison of the direction and magnitude of shifts In mean
scores on nine risk characteristics and two evaluative measures before (tall
of vector) and after (point of vector) receiVing specific Information on pos-
sible health effects of transmission lines. Results from three separate
groups of respondents are shown for each scale. (Source: Morgan et al.•
1985.)
told that risks are managed by competent professionals and are thus so
small that one need not worry about them. However, if such assurances
cannot be given, they will want to be informed of the risks, even though
doing so might make them feel anxious and conflicted (Alfidi, 1971;
Fischhoff, 1983; Weinstein, 1979).
10.3.3. strong beliefs are hard to modify
It would be comforting to believe that polarized positions would
respond to informational and educational programs. Unfortunately,
psychological research demonstrates that people's beliefs change
slowly and are extraordinarily persistent in the face of contrary evi-
dence (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Once formed, initial impressions tend
to structure the way that subsequent evidence is interpreted. New evi-
dence appears reliable and informative if it is consistent with one's ini-
tial belief; contrary evidence is dismissed as unreliable. erroneous, or
unrepresentative.
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10.3.4. Naive news are easily manipulated by presentation format
When people lack strong prior opinions. the opposite situation exists:
they are at the mercy of the way that the information is presented.
Subtle changes in the way that risks are expressed can have a major
impact on perceptions and decisions. One dramatic recent example of
this comes from a study by McNeil et al. (1982). who asked people to
imagine that they had lung cancer and had to choose between two
therapies. surgery or radiation. The two therapies were described in
some detail. Then, some subjects were presented with the cumulative
probabilities of surviving for varying lengths of time after the treat-
ment. Other subjects received the same cumulative probabilities
framed in terms of dying rather than surviving (e.g. instead of being
told that 68% of those having surgery will have survived after one year,
they were told that 32% will have died). Framing the statistics in terms
of dying dropped the percentage of subjects choosing radiation
therapy over surgery from 44% to 18%. The effect was as strong for
physicians as for lay persons.
Numerous other examples of "framing effects" have been demon-
strated by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Slovic fit al. (1982). The
fact that subtle differences in how risks are presented can have such
marked effects suggests that those responsible for information pro-
grams have considerable ability to manipulate perceptions and
behavior. This possibility raises ethical problems that must be
addressed by any responsible risk information program.
10.4. Placing Risks in Perspective
10.4.1. Choosing risk measures
When we know enough to be able to describe risks quantitatively, we
face a wide choice of options regarding the specific measures and
statistics used to describe the magnitude of risk. Fischhoff et al.
(1981) point out that choosing a risk measure involves several steps:
(1) Defining the hazard category.
(2) Deciding what consequences to measure (or report).
(3) Determining the unit of observation.
The way the hazard category is defined can have a major effect on risk
statistics. For example, statistics on the risks from coal mining would
look very different depending on whether or not they combined under-
ground and strip mining. Deaths. injuries, and illnesses are the most
commonly measured consequences; these can be assessed as a function
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of age, cause, type, or severity. Sometimes aggregate measures are
created such as person-days lost from work or loss of life expectancy.
Units of measurement can range from population values to risks indexed
according to some unit of exposure or unit of work produced.
Crouch and Wilson (1982) provide some specific examples of how
different measures of the same risk can sometimes give quite different
impressions. For example, they show that accidental deaths per million
tons of coal mined in the USA have decreased steadily over time. In
this respect, the industry is getting safer. However, they also show
that the rate of accidental deaths per 1000 coal mine employees has
increased. Neither measure is the "right" measure of mining risk.
They each tell part of the same story.
The problem of selecting measures is made even more complicated
by the framing effects described earlier. Thus, not only do different
measures of the same hazard give different impressions. the same meas-
ures, differing only in (presumably) inconsequential ways, can lead to
vastly different perceptions.
Sharlin's case study of the communication of information about the
risks of the pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB) points to an important
distinction between macro and micro measures of risk (Sharlin, 1986).
The EPA, which was responsible for regulating EDB, broadcast informa-
tion about the aggregate risk of this pesticide to the exposed popula-
tion. While the media accurately transmitted this macro analysis. news-
paper editorials and public reaction clearly indicated an inability to
translate this into a micro perspective on the risk to the exposed indi-
vidual. In other words, the newspaper reader or television (TV) viewer
had trouble inferring an answer to the question, "Should I eat the
bread?", from the aggregate risk analysis.
10.4.2. Basic statistical presentations
In this section, we shall describe a few of the statistical displays most
often used to educate people about general and specific risks. We do
not mean to endorse these presentations as optimal. They simply
represent the favored formats of statisticians and risk assessors [2].
To date, there has been little systematic effort to develop and test
methods for maximizing clarity and understanding of quantitative risk
estimates. As a result, we know of no "magic displays" that guarantee
understanding and appreciation of the described risks at the "micro
level".
Among the few "principles" in this field that seem to be useful is
the assertion that comparisons are more meaningful than absolute
numbers or probabilities, especially when these absolute values are
quite small. Sowby (1965) argued that to decide whether or not we are
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responding adequately to radiation risks we need to compare them to
"some of the other risks of life" and Rothschild (1979) observed,
"There is no point in getting into a panic about the risks of life until
you have compared the risks which worry you with those that don't,
but perhaps should. "
Familiarity with annual mortality risks for the population as a
whole or as a function of age may provide one standard for evaluating
specific risks. Sowby (1965) took advantage of such data to observe
that one hour riding a motorcycle was as risky as one hour of being 75
years old. Table m.t provides annual mortality rates from a wide
variety of causes.
Table 10.1. Annual fatalily rales per 100000 persons al
risk.
Risk
Molorcycling
Aerial acrobatics (planes)
Smoking (all causes)
Sporl parachuting
Smoking (cancer)
Fire fighting
Hang gliding
Coal mining
Farming
Molor vehicles
Police work (nonclerical)
Boating
Rodeo performer
Hunting
Fires
1 dlel drink/day (saccharin)
4 lbs. peanul buller/day (aflatoxin)
Floods
Llghlning
Meleorile
Source: Adapted trom Crouch and Wllson (1982).
Ra.te
2000
500
300
200
120
80
80
63
36
24
22
5
3
3
2.8
1.0
0.8
0.06
0.05
0.000006
Mortality rates fail to capture the fact that some hazards (e.g.
pregnancy, motorcycle accidents) cause death at a much earlier age
than others (e.g. lung cancer due to smoking). One way to provide per-
spective on this consideration is to calculate the average loss of life
expectancy due to the exposure to the hazard, based on the distribu-
tion of deaths as a function of age. Some estimates of loss of life
expectancy from various causes are shown in Table m.2.
Yet another innovative way to gain perspective was devised by Wil-
son (1979), who displayed a set of activities (Table m.3), each of which
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Table 10.2. EsUmaled loss of life expectancy due lo
various causes.
Cause Days
Cigarette smoking (male) 2250
Hearl disease 2100
Being 30% overweighl 1300
Being a coal miner 1100
Cancer 980
Slroke 520
Army in Vlelnam 400
Dangerous jobs, accldenls 300
Molor vehicle accidents 207
Pneumonia, influenza 141
Accidents in home 95
Suicide 95
Diabeles 95
Being murdered (homicide) 90
Drowning 41
Job wilh radiaUon exposure 40
Falls 39
Nalural radiaUon (Beir) 8
Medical X rays 6
Coffee 6
All cataslrophes combined 3.5
Reaclor accidents (UCS) 28
RadiaUon from nuclear Induslry 0.028
8These Items assume that all US power Is nuclear. UCS Is
the Union of Conoerned Scientists, the most prominent
group of critics of nuclear energy.
Source: Cohen and Lee (1979).
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was estimated to increase one's chance of death (during any year) by
one in a million.
Comparisons within lists of risks such as those in Tables W.1,
W.E., and 10.3 have been advocated not just to gain some perspective on
risks but as guides to decision-making. Thus Cohen and Lee (1979)
argued that "to some approximation, the ordering [in Table W.E.] should
be society's order of priorities" and Wilson (1979) claimed that the
comparisons in Table W.3 "... help me evaluate risk and I imagine that
they may help others to do so, as well. But the most important use of
these comparisons must be to help the decisions we make, as a nation,
to improve our health and reduce our accident rate." However, Slovic
et al. (1980a) argued that such claims could not be logically defended.
Although carefully prepared lists of risk statistics can provide some
degree of insight. they provide only a small part of the information
needed for decision-making. As a minimum, inputs to decision-making
should include a detailed account of the costs and benefits of the avail-
able options. as well as an indication of the uncertainty in these
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Table 10.3. Risks estimaled lo increase chance of dealh in any year by
0.000001 (1 chance in 106).
Activity
Smoking 1.4 cigarelles
Spending 1 hour in a coal mine
Living 2 days in New York or Boston
Traveling 10 miles by bicycle
Flying 1000 miles by jel
Living 2 monlhs in Denver on vacation
from New York
One chesl X ray taken in a good hospital
Eating 40 tablespoons of peanul buller
Drinking 30 12-oz cans of diel soda
Drinking 1000 24-oz soft drinks from
recently banned plastic boltles
Living 150 years wilhin 20 miles of a
nuclear power planl
Risk of accidenl by liVing wilhin 5 miles
of a nuclear reaclor for 50 years
Source: Wilson (1979).
Ca.use oj d.ea.th
Cancer. hearl disease
Black lung disease
Air pollution
Accidenl
Accidenl
Cancer caused by cosmic radialion
Cancer caused by radialion
Liver cancer caused by aflaloxin B
Cancer caused by saccharin
Cancer from acrylonilrile monomer
Cancer caused by radialion
Cancer caused by radialion
assessments. As we have seen, uncertainties in risk estimates are
often quite large. Failure to indicate uncertainty not only deprives the
recipient of information needed for decision-making, but it spawns dis-
trust and rejection of the analysis.
Some hazards, such as radiation, are present in nature and in
many commonplace activities. For these hazards, comparisons of "non-
natural" exposures (e.g. medical X rays) with the natural or "everyday"
exposures may prove instructive.
10.5. Beyond Numbers: A Broader Perspective
on Risk Perception and Communication
A stranger in a foreign land would hardly expect to communicate effec-
tively with the natives without knowing something about their language
and culture. Yet risk assessors and risk managers have often tried to
communicate with the public under the assumption that they and the
public share a common conceptual and cultural heritage in the domain
of risk. That assumption is false and has led to failures of communica-
tion and rancorous conflicts.
10.5.1. The psychometric paradigm
Evidence against the "commonality assumption" comes from sociological.
psychological, and anthropological studies directed at understanding
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the determinants of people's risk perceptions and behaviors. In
psychology, research within what has been called the "psychometric
paradigm" has explored the ability of psychophysical scaling methods
and multivariate analysis to produce meaningful representations of risk
attitudes and perceptions (see, for example, Brown and Green. 1980;
Gardner et cU.• 1982; Green, 1980; Green and Brown, 1980; Johnson and
Tversky, in press; Lindell and Earle, 1983; Macgill, 1983; Renn, 1981;
Slovic et cU. 1980b, 1984; Vlek and Stallen, 1981; von Winterfeldt et a.l.,
1981).
Researchers employing the psychometric paradigm have typically
asked people to judge the current riskiness (or safety) of diverse sets
of hazardous activities, substances, and technologies, and to indicate
their desires for risk reduction and regulation of these hazards. These
global judgments have then been related to judgments about the
hazard's status on various qualitative characteristics of risk, some of
which are shown in Ta.ble 11J.4.
Table 10.4:. Characteristics examined in psychometric
studies of perceived risk.
Volunlary - Involunlary
Chronic - Cat.astrophic
Common - Dread
Injurious - Fatal
Known to those exposed - Not known to those exposed
Known to science - Not known to science
Controllable - Not controllable
Old - New
Among the generalizations that have been drawn from the results
of the early studies in this area are the following:
(1) Perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. Psychometric
techniques seem well suited for identifying similarities and differ-
ences among groups with regard to risk perceptions and attitudes.
(2) "Risk" means different things to different people. When experts
judge risk. their responses correlate highly with technical esti-
mates of annual fatalities. Lay people can assess annual fatalities
if they are asked to (and produce estimates somewhat like the
technical estimates). However, their judgments of risk are sensi-
tive to other characteristics as well and, as a result, often differ
markedly from experts' assessments of risk. In particular, per-
ception of risk is greater for hazards whose adverse effects are
uncontrollable. dread. catastrophic. fatal rather than injurious,
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not offset by compensating benefits, and delayed in time so the
risks are borne by future generations.
(3) Many of the risk characteristics are highly correlated with each
other, across a wide domain of hazards. For example, hazards
rated as "voluntary" tend also to be rated as "controllable" and
"well known"; hazards that threaten future generations tend also
to be seen as having catastrophic potential. etc. Investigation of
these interrelationships by means of factor analysis has shown
that the broader domain of characteristics can be condensed to
two or three higher-order characteristics or factors, as shown in
Figure W.E.
The factor space presented in Figure W.E has been consistently
replicated across groups of lay persons and experts judging large and
diverse sets of hazards. The factors in this space reflect the degree to
which a risk is understood. the degree to which it evokes a feeling of
dread, and the number of people exposed to the risk. Most important
is the factor "Dread Risk". The higher a hazard's score on this factor
(Le. the farther toward the right a hazard lies in the space). the
higher its perceived risk. the more people want to see its current risks
reduced, and the more they want to see strict regulation employed to
achieve the desired reduction in risk.
Another useful concept that has emerged from this research is
the notion that the societal cost of an accident or mishap is determined
to an important degree by what it signifies or portends (Slovic et al.,
1984). An accident that takes many lives may produce relatively little
social disturbance (beyond that caused the victims' families and
friends) if it occurs as part of a familiar and well understood system
(e.g. a train wreck). However, a small accident in an unfamiliar system
(or one perceived as poorly understood), such as a nuclear reactor or a
recombinant DNA laboratory, may have immense social consequences if
it is perceived as a harbinger of further and possihly catastrophic
mishaps [3]. The informativeness or "signal potential" of a mishap, and
thus its potential social impact, appears to be systematically related to
both Dread Risk and Unknown Risk factors (see Figure W.3).
10.5.2. other paradigms
other important contributions to our current understanding of risk
perception have come from geographers, sociologists, and anthropolo-
gists. The geographical research focused originally on understanding
human behavior in the face of natural hazards. but it has since
broadened to include technological hazards as well (Burton et al., 1978).
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Controllable
Not dread
Not global catastrophic
Consequences not fatal
Equitable
Individual
Low risk to future
generations
Easily reduced
Risk decreasing
Voluntary
Doesn't affect me
FACTOR 1
)
Not observable
Unknown to those exposed
Effect delayed
New risk
Risks unknown to science
--~v-----'
I
I
/ A~ ~"
Observable
Known to those exposed
Effect immediate
Old risk
Risks known to science
FACTOR 2
Uncontrollable
Dread
Global catastrophic
Consequences fatal
Not equitable
Catastrophic
High risk to future
generations
Not easily reduced
Risk increasing
Involuntary
Affects me
FACTOR 1
Figure W.2.(b) Each faclor in Figure W.2.(a) is made up of lhese combina-
lions of characleristics. (Source: Slovic et al., 1985).
The sociological work (Moatti et al., 1984; Mazur, 1984) and anthropolo-
gical studies (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) have shown that the percep-
tions of risk that have been identified within the psychometric para-
digm may have their roots in social and cultural factors. Mazur argues
that, in some instances, response to hazards is caused by social influ-
ences transmitted by friends, family, fellow workers, and respected
public officials. In these cases, risk perception may form afterwards,
as part of the ex post facto rationale for one's own behavior. In a simi-
lar vein, Douglas and Wildavsky assert that people, acting within social
organizations, downplay certain risks and emphasize others as a means
of maintaining the viability of the organization.
10.5.3. Implications for risk communication
Risk perception research has a number of direct implications for com-
munication efforts. Psychometric studies imply that comparative exam-
ination of risk statistics, such as those in Tables 10.1-W.3, will not, by
themselves, be adequate guides to personal or public decision policies.
Risk perceptions and risk-taking behaviors appear to be determined
not only by accident probabilities, annual mortality rates or mean
losses of life expectancy, but also by numerous other characteristics
of hazards such as uncertainty, controllability, catastrophic potential,
equity, and threat to future generations. Within the perceptual space
defined by these and other characteristics, each hazard is unique. To
many persons, statements such as "the annual risk from living near a
nuclear power plant is equivalent to the risk of riding an extra three
miles in an automobile" appear ludicrous because they fail to give
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adequate consideration to the important differences in the nature of
the risks from these two technologies.
FACTOR 2 Unknown risk
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• FACTOR
Dread risk
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• •
•
Figure W.3. Relation between signal potential and risk characterization for
30 hazards in Figure W.Z. The larger the point, the greater the degree to
which an accident involving that hazard was judged to "serve as a warning
signal for society, providing new information about the probability that simi-
lar or even more destructive mishaps might occur within this type of activi-
ty." (Source: Slovic et at., 1964.)
Psychometric research indicates that attempts to characterize,
compare, and regulate risks must be sensitive to the broader concep-
tion of risk that underlies people's concerns. Fischhoff et al. (1984)
have made a start in this direction by demonstrating how one might go
about constructing a more adequate definition of risk. They advocated
characterizing risk by a vector of measures (mortality, morbidity, con-
cern due to perceived uncertainty, concern due to dread, etc.).
The concept of accidents as signals indicates that. when informed
about a particular hazard, people's concerns will generalize beyond the
immediate problem to other related hazards. For example, with regard
to the EDB scare, one newspaper editor wrote: "The cumulative effect
- the 'body burden count' as scientists call it - is especially worrisome
considering the number of other pesticides and carcinogens humans are
exposed to" (The Sunday Star - Bulletin and Advertiser, Honolulu. 5
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February 1984). On the same topic, another editor wrote: "Let's hope
there are no cousins of EDB waiting to ambush us in the months ahead"
(San Francisco Examiner, 10 February 1984).
As a result of this broad (and legitimate) perspective, communica-
tions from risk managers pertaining to the risk and control of a single
hazard, no matter how carefully presented, may fail to alleviate
people's fears, frustrations, and anger. If people trust the ability of
the risk manager to handle the broader risk problems, these general
concerns will probably not surface.
Whereas the psychometric research implies that risk debates are
not merely about risk statistics, the sociological and anthropological
work implies that some of these debates may not even be about risk.
Risk may be a rationale for actions taken on other grounds or it may be
a surrogate for social or ideological concerns. When this is the case,
communication about risk is simply irrelevant to the discussion. Hidden
agendas need to be brought to the surface for open discussion, if possi-
ble (Edwards and von Winterfeldt, 1984).
Perhaps the most important message from the research done to
date, is that there is wisdom as well as error in public attitudes and
perceptions. Lay people sometimes lack certain basic information
about hazards. However, their basic conceptualization of risk is much
richer than that of the experts and reflects legitimate concerns that
are typically omitted from expert risk assessments. As a result, risk
communication efforts are destined to fail unless they are structured
as a two-way process (Renn, 1984). Each side, expert and public, has
something valid to contribute. Each side must respect the insights and
intelligence of the other.
10.6. Role of News Media in Informing People About Risk:
10.6.1. Critics of the lDedia
The mass media exert a powerful influence on people's perceptions of
the world, the world of risk being no exception. Each morning's paper
and each evening's TV newscast seems to include a report on some new
danger to food, water, air, or physical safety. It is not surprising,
given the actual and perceived influence of the media and the stakes
involved in risk issues, that media coverage of risk has been subjected
to intense scrutiny and harsh criticism. Content analysis of media
reporting for specific hazards (DNA research, nuclear power, cancer)
and the domain of hazards in general (e.g. diseases, causes of death)
has documented a great deal of misinformation and distortion (Burger,
1984; Freimuth et al., 1984; Combs and Slovic, 1979; Kristiansen, 1983);
this distortion has caused critics such as Cirino (1971) to assert: "No
one can be free from the effects of bias that exist in the mass media ...
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Decisions based on distorted views of the world resulting from [such] ...
bias have resulted in tragically mistaken priorities, death and suffer-
ing" (p 31).
More than a few observers have blamed the media for what they
see as public overreaction to risk. Among the most vehement is physi-
cist Bernard Cohen who argued that:
Journalists have grossly misinformed the American public about
the dangers of radiation and of nuclear power with their highly
unbalanced treatments and their incorrect or misleading
interpretations of scientific information. This misinformation is
costing our nation thousands of unnecessary deaths and wasting
billions of dollars each year. (Cohen, 1983, p 73.)
10.6.2. In defense of the media
A balanced examination of media performance needs to consider the
difficulties faced by the media in reporting risk stories. Journalists
operate under many constraints, including tight deadlines, the pres-
sure of competition to be first with a story, and limitations on space or
time (for TV reports). But the major difficulty stems from the inherent
complexity of risk stories as outlined in Section 10.2. Because of the
technical complexity of the subject matter, journalists must depend on
expert sources. But a risk story may involve such diverse problems
that the journalist might need to interview specialists in toxicology,
epidemiology, economics, hydrology, meteorology, emergency evacua-
tion, etc., not to mention a wide variety of local, state, and federal offi-
cials. Even then, there is no assurance of completeness. No one may
know what all the pieces are or recognize the limits of their own under-
standing (Fischhoff, 1985a). Few journalists have the scientific back-
ground to sort through and make sense of the welter of complex and
often contradictory material that results from such a search.
10.6.3. Improving media performance
Despite the difficulties, there seem to be a number of actions that
might help the media to improve their performance in communicating
risk information. Some of these actions are professional, others involve
research. At the professional level, the following steps may be useful.
Acknowledge the problem
The first step in addressing any deficiency is to recognize it as an
important problem. We now know that an understanding of risk is cen-
tral to decisions that are of great consequence to individuals and to
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society, that risk and uncertainty are inherently difficult to communi-
cate. and that the media are a dominant source of risk information. The
combination of these factors highlights the role of the media as a prob-
lem worthy of explicit, sustained attention. in high level meetings
between journalists. scientists, and risk managers.
Enhance science writing
Reporters obviously need to be educated in the importance and
subtleties of risk stories. Fischhoff (1985a) suggests a number of
checklists and protocols that a reporter might use as a guide to under-
standing and clarifying risk issues. One of these, titled "Questions to
Ask of Risk Analysis". is shown in Table W.5. There should be scholar-
ships to induce students and young journalists to pursue science writ-
ing as a profession, accompanied by awards and prizes to recognize and
reward good science journalism when it occurs.
Table 10.5. QuesUons lo ask of risk analyses.
Reporlers should consider lhe following quesUons whenever a risk analysis
is produced for use in policy decisions:
(1) Does lhe risk analysis slale lhe probability of lhe polenUal harm as
well as lhe amounl of harm expecled?
(2) Does lhe risk analysis disclose forlhrightly lhe points al which il is
based on assumptions and guesswork?
(3) Are various risk faclors allowed lo assume a variely of values depend-
ing on uncerlainUes in lhe dala and/or various inlerprelaUons of lhe
dala?
(4) Does lhe risk analysis multiply ils probabiliUes by lhe number of peo-
ple exposed lo produce lhe number of people predicled lo suffer dam-
age?
(5) Does lhe risk analysis disclose lhe confidence limils for ils projections
and lhe melhod of arriving allhose confidence limits?
(6) Are consideraUons of individual sensiUviUes, exposure lo multiple ha-
zards, and cumulative effects included in lhe risk analysis?
(7) Are all dala and processes of lhe risk analysis open lo public scrutiny?
(8) Are quesUons of (1) involunlary exposure, (ii) who bears lhe risks and
who reaps lhe benefils, and (iii) allernaUves lo lhe hazardous acUvily
considered in lhe risk analysis?
(9) Are lhe processes of risk analysis and risk policy separale?
If lhe answer lo any of lhese quesUons is "no", lhen lhe use of lhal risk
analysis should be quesUoned.
Source: Adapted from Flsohhoff (1965a).
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Science journalists need access to knowledgeable and cooperative
scientists. A few organizations. such as the Scientists' Institute for
Public Information, have performed an important service along this
line. and some professional societies. such as the American Psychologi-
cal Association, maintain offices that provide journalists with the names
of scientists knowledgeable about specific topics. More needs to be
done to help journalists obtain reliable information about risk topics.
10.7. Research Directions
Although much progress has been made toward understanding risk atti-
tudes, perceptions, and behaviors. we still lack definitive understand-
ing of many important issues relevant to risk communication. Some
recommended research directions are described in this section.
10.7.1. Informed consent
The right of citizens, patients. and workers to be informed about the
hazards to which they are exposed from their daily activities, their
medical treatments. and their jobs provides the motivation behind much
of the efforts to communicate information about risks. Within the con-
text of any information program, research is needed to determine what
people know and what they want to know about the risks they face and
how best to convey that information. Moreover. there is need for a
deeper understanding of the concept of consent (MacLean. 1982) as
well as for a theory of informed consent that sets out criteria for
evaluating the adequacy of information presentations. Fischhoff (1983.
1985b) has made a start in the latter direction by characterizing the
pmblem of informed consent as a decision problem. In this view. the
goal of informed consent is to enable the individual to make decisions
that are in his or her best interests. Fischhoff points out that there
are both cognitive and institutional barriers to achieving informed con-
sent. Research is needed to understand these barriers and overcome
them.
To facilitate the process of informed consent. we need better
ways to convey quantitative risk information. There is widespread
agreement that casting individual risks in terms such as lO-x per year
is not helpful to people. We need creative new indices and analogies to
help individuals translate risk estimates varying over many orders of
magnitude into simple. intuitively meaningful terms. The task will not
be easy. Ideas that appear. at first glance. to be useful. often turn
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out. upon testing, to make the problem worse. For example. an attempt
to convey the smallness of one part of toxic substance per billion by
drawing an analogy with a crouton in a five ton salad seems likely to
enhance one's misperception of the contamination by making it more
easily imaginable. The proposal to express very low probabilities in
terms of the conjunction of two or more unlikely events (e.g. simultane-
ously being hit by lightning and struck by a meteorite) also seems
unwise in light of experimental data showing that people greatly
overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive events. Perhaps we can
learn, by studying people's understanding of commonly used measures
such as distance. time and speed, whether and how their understanding
of quantitative risk can be improved.
The sensitivity of risk communications to framing effects points to
another avenue for research. We need a better understanding of the
magnitude and generality of these effects. Are people's perceptions
really as malleable as early results suggest? If so. how should the com-
municator cope with this problem? One suggestion is to present infor-
mation in multiple formats - but does this help or confuse the reci-
pient? Finally, the possibility that there is no neutral way to present
information, coupled with the possibility that people's preferences are
very easily manipulated. has important ethical and political implications
that need to be examined.
Because of the complexity of risk communications and the subtlety
of human response to them, it is extremely difficult, a priori, to know
whether a particular message will adequately inform its recipients.
Testing of the message provides needed insight into its impacts. In the
light of the known difficulties of communicating risk information, it
could be argued that an informer who puts forth a message without
testing its comprehensibility is guilty of negligence. This assertion
raises a host of research questions. How does one test a message? How
does the communicator judge when a message is good enough in the light
of the possibility that not all test subjects will interpret it correctly?
Can testing be used against the communicator by providing evidence
that not everyone understood the message?
Risk is brewed from an equal dose of two ingredients - probabili-
ties and consequences. But most of the attention pertaining to
informed consent seems to focus on the probabilities. It is assumed
that once the potential consequence is named - lung cancer, leukemia.
pneumoconiosis - one need say little else about it. We believe that
neglecting to educate people about consequences is a serious shortcom-
ing in risk information programs. For example, an adequate discussion
of risk cannot assume that people have good knowledge of what it is like
to experience a certain disease - the pains, the discomforts, the treat-
ments and their effects, etc. This sort of information might best come
from those who are the victims of such diseases. Research is needed to
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determine how best to deepen perspectives about the novel, unfamiliar
consequences associated with the outcomes of illnesses, accidents, and
their treatments.
10.7.2. Intormation relevance
What lessons do people draw about their own vulnerability to a hazard
on the basis of risk information? For example:
(1) What do residents living near the Union Carbide pesticide plant at
Institute. West Virginia. infer about their personal risk as a result
of the Bhopal accident?
(2) What does a heterosexual individual infer about personal vulnera-
bility to AIDS from statistics based on homosexuals?
(3) What does a resident of the West Coast infer about his or her risk
from cancer due to polluted groundwater upon receiving risk esti-
mates for residents of the East Coast?
Obviously, the personal message one draws from risk information
will depend upon the perceived relevance of that message - but the
determinants of relevance are by no means understood.. There are
always differences between the time and place and population (or
species) from which risk information is derived and the time, place, and
population with which the recipient identifies. When are these differ-
ences magnified into barriers justifying denial of relevance ("those
statistics don't really pertain to me") and when are the barriers made
permeable and the message assimilated? Such questions are fundamen-
tal to the process of risk communication, yet we know virtually nothing
about them.
10.7.3. Cognitive representations of perceived risk
People's cognitive representations of risk dictate the sorts of informa-
tion they will find necessary for participating in risk management deci-
sions. Thus. if we believe in the two-factor representation shown in
Figure W.E. we will need to provide people with information about how
well a hazard is known to science. the extent of its catastrophic poten-
tial, etc. If people examine accident reports for their signal value,
then methods are needed to assess this factor and communications
techniques are needed to express it meaningfully.
However. we still lack a full understanding of the ways in which
people characterize risk. There is evidence that the representation
ar·ising out of factor analytic studies is not unique. Johnson and
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Tversky (in press), for example, have shown that applications of mul-
tidimensional scaling or tree analysis to judgments of similarity between
risks produce very different representations from those obtained by
factor analysis. Research is needed to provide a clearer picture of the
multiple ways to represent perceptions and the variations of these
representations across different individuals and groups (Harding and
Eiser, 1984; Kuyper and Vlek. 1984; Kraus, 1985).
The multivariate characterizations that have emerged from
psychometric studies demonstrate that there are many things to be
considered when thinking about risk and many (possibly incommensur-
able) factors to bear in mind when assessing the riskiness of different
hazards. The need for some convenient general summary measure of
risk seems apparent. Reliance on multiattribute utility theory to con-
struct such an index (Fischhoff et al., 1984) provides one approach.
but research is needed to determine if people can provide the explicit
judgments needed to create such an index. Given an index, can people
absorb the information it summarizes in a way that is meaningful and
will they make or accept decisions based on it? Would they feel more
comfortable being shown, in matrix or vector form, the component
information it summarizes?
10.7.4. Risk and the media
We need a theoretical framework to understand and improve the
media's role in communicating risk. Some theorists, such as Gans (1980)
have proposed that one major role of journalism is to report events that
threaten or violate important values - such as preserving a stable
social order. In this light, things that "go awry". and thereby threaten
naturaL technological, social or moral disorder, become prime news
topics. The relation between hazard characteristics and news coverage
should be examined to discern more precisely how the media interpret
their responsibility to warn society.
One possibility is that coverage of risk incidents is systematicaliy
related to threat potential or signal value. If so, such coverage (as
measured by frequency, size, and prominence of reports) should be
related to the same risk factors that predict other risk perceptions
and attitudes. Thus, incidents involving hazards perceived as unknown
and dread (potentially catastrophic) would be expected to receive
much greater coverage than incidents involving hazards with other
characteristics. Data reported by Kristiansen (1983) provide some
support for these notions. Her study of seven British daily newspapers
found that threats with high signal value, such as infectious diseases,
food poisoning, and rabies, were disproportionately reported relative
to their frequency of occurrence.
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Content analyses of media reports need to be supplemented by
more controlled studies. An intriguing example of a controlled study
was done by Johnson and Tversky (1983) who asked subjects to judge
the perceived frequency of death from various causes after reading a
single newspaper-style story about a tragic incident involving the
death of a young man. The cause of death was either leukemia, homi-
cide or fire, depending on the story. They expected to find that a
story would increase perceived frequency most for the specific hazard
involved in the story, with somewhat smaller increases for similar
hazards. Instead, the results indicated large increases in perceived
frequencies for all hazards, with size of increase being unrelated to
similarity. They hypothesized that the stories aroused negative effect
which had a general influence on perception. This hypothesis is an
important one, in need of further study, because it implies that media
coverage might influence our perceptions of threat in subtle and per-
vasive ways.
Other topics that could be studied by means of controlled news
simulations are the reporting (or deletion) of uncertainties in risk esti-
mates and the treatment given to expert disagreements. How, for
example, would journalists report a story in which 20 experts argued
one way and one argued another? Would it matter if the ratio were
higher or lower or if the dissenter had more or less prestigious creden-
tials? Would experienced journalists or their editors treat the story
differently from inexperienced reporters? Would the type of medium
(TV, radio, print) make a difference? In sum, studies like these could
point out biases or inadequacies in reporting about which journalists
need to be informed.
10.8. Conclusions
Some observers, cognizant of the communication difficulties described
above, have concluded that they are insurmountable. This seems an
unreasonably pessimistic view. Upon closer examination, it appears
that people understand some things quite well, although their path to
knowledge may be quite different from that of the technical experts.
In situations where misunderstanding is rampant, people's errors can
often be traced to biased experiences, which education may be able to
counter. In some cases, people's strong fears and resistance to
experts' reassurances can be traced to their sensitivity to the poten-
tial for catastrophic accidents, to their perception of expert disagree-
ment about the probability and magnitude of such accidents. to their
knowledge of serious mistakes made by experts in the past, and to
their sensitivity to many qualitative concerns not included in technical
risk analyses. Even here, given an atmosphere of trust in which both
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experts and lay persons recognize that each group has something to
contribute to the discussion, exchange of information and deepening of
perspectives may well be possible.
Notes
[1] The text of this chapter draws heavily on the author's joint work with
his colleagues, Baruch Fishhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein. Support for
the writing of this chapter was provided by the National Science Foun-
dation under contract No. PRA-8419168 to the University of Southern
California.
[2] We make no allemptto defend the validity of the statistics presented in
Section 10.4.2. We take them directly from published studies. In Sec-
tion 10.4.1 we printed out the problems that one must be aware of when
using and interpreting risk data.
[3] The concept of accidents as signals was eloquently expressed in an edi-
torial addressing the tragic accident at Bhopal, India:
What truly grips us In these accounts [of disaster] Is not so
much the numbers as the spectacle of suddenly vanishing com-
petence, of men utterly routed by technology, of fall-safe sys-
tems failing with a logic as Inexorable as It was once - Indeed,
right up until that very moment - unforeseeable. And the spec-
tacle haunts us because It seems to carry allegorical Import,
like the whispery omen of a hovering future. (The New Yorker,
18 February 1985.)
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1D.D1. Discussion
TR. Lee
In discussing the chapter by Slovic, I begin by drawing attention to its
stance - an orientation so pervasive and so thoroughly compatible with
the scientific culture that it is very easily overlooked.
In spite of his even-handedness and characteristic modesty in dis-
cussing what he refers to as the "wisdom and the folly" of the public,
both his explicit title and his implicit stance suggest that someone, or
some institution with expertise, should "inform and educate" the pub-
lic. With a little diligent searching, one can find acknowledgment that
each side, expert and public, has "something valid to contribute" and
"must respect the insights and intelligence of the other". But these
are not up front. In this position, we find reference to the "idiosyn-
crasies" of the human mind, implying the existence elsewhere of a dif-
ferent kind of mind, one which is not prey to these peculiar irrationali-
ties - like, for example, the mind of the scientist. We find a one-way
communication of scientific risk information from scientist to public.
Risk assessment, though properly described as an approximate
science, is presented as if the "true risk" actually has an existence out
there. where its appearance as reality is veiled only by the limitations
of our present methods of analysis. If the risk could only be quantified
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more accurately, then one major facet of our problem would. it seems,
be resolved. The other, of course, is how to educate and inform the
public about what we have ascertained.
My first thesis, then, is that this superordinate stance, from
which even social and behavioral scientists find it hard to deliver them-
selves, is at the root of the many social misunderstandings and confron-
tations over hazards. I plead personally guilty in full measure but it is
easier to see the mote in my brother's eye. There is every indication
that the physical and biological scientists and engineers who play the
leading role in risk assessment and management also have their vision
occluded by some pretty sizable beams.
Communication about hazards, I would suggest, is intractable for
two reasons: firstly. because while modestly acknowledging that as
scientists we can only make estimates of reality, we believe that this
reality actually exists; secondly, because we believe that our task is to
communicate this reality from the scientist to the public.
I repeat that there are signs that Slavic is not wholly fettered by
this way of thinking, for he refers approvingly to the "other para-
digms" that are beginning to emerge from sociology and anthropology.
These emphasize that our attitudes towards hazards may be even
further from "reality" than the psychometrician would suppose. It is
not merely that people's perception of the "true risk" is biased by
faulty estimates or imperfect heuristics - instead, perceptions of risk
are governed by and transmitted through the total culture in which we
are embedded. They are subject to selective exposure and then to
group pressures to conform to risk norms; they are dependent on the
view of reality we are obliged to adopt as part of our roles within
society.
Moreover, I would submit that we do not actually need to turn to
these "other paradigms" to confirm such an approach. for it can be
found within the later developments of the psychometric approach, of
which Slavic and his group are preeminent exponents.
I stress "later developments" because the earliest scalings of per-
ceived risks were made on the assumption of unidimensionality. They
were based on a strong principle propagated by the probabilistic risk
assessors, Le. that riskiness is a unidimensional function of severity,
measurable mainly by mortality per unit of exposure. Thereafter. how-
ever, perceived risks began to be "unpacked" by investigators to show
that each one had many attributes and that some of these attributes
(e.g. perceived voluntariness, catastrophic potential) were correlated
with the severity dimension while others (e.g. familiarity, delayed
versus immediate effect, etc.) were relatively independent. The fact
that principal components analysis can be used to discern the
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underlying vectors of our cognitive structures should not blind us to
the fact that the ordinary antagonist or protagonist has a cognitive
profile composed of a particular set of these attributes.
Some of the attributes already mentioned have a flavor of social if
not cultural determination, but they are based on comparisons between
many risks and they are restricted to the potentially adverse qualities.
What about the beneficial aspects of the hazardous objects or activi-
ties? These most assuredly have some influence on people's evaluations
of hazards and the behavioral decisions they make, even if it is possi-
ble to abstract comparative severity perceptions as a cognitive
phenomenon.
This aspect becomes strongly evident if we move from comparative
scaling to place a single hazard under the microscope, to examine the
mental representation which is organized around such concepts as
nuclear power or pesticide spraying.
People are found to harbor much more than an anticipated likeli-
hood that things could go wrong, with associated degrees of anxiety;
they anticipate also that things could go right and have ideas about
these more benign consequences. It must be acknowledged that Slovic
recognizes that communicators should take benefits into account, but
we must surely go further to say firmly that researchers must not stop
at providing the public's counterpoint to scientific risk assessment and
assuming that the debate hinges on the gap between them. They need
at least to elicit the attitude profiles of the main groups of actors, the
pros, antis, and uncommitted. Only then can an "attitude change" stra-
tegy be appropriately designed and implemented.
10.D1.1. Attitudes to hazards
An attitude may be defined as a constellation of knowledge, beliefs,
feelings. and potential actions in relation to some aspect of the
environment. It is only in respect of nuclear power that much progress
has been made in decomposing attitudes into these elements with the
aim of improving understanding and deciding effective communications.
The joint International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis/
International Atomic Energy Agency (IIASA-IAEA) Group, under the
leadership of Harry Otway, blazed the trail. They adopted the attitude
model constructed by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), who aver that the main
constituent elements of an attitude are beliefs of differing degrees of
salience, which combine in characteristic packages. The most detailed
study to emerge from IIASA was an application of this approach to a
comparison of a small range of energy systems (Thomas et al., 1980) and
this is reproduced in Figure 10.m.1.
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My own group (Lee et al., 1983, 1984) has attempted to extend this
approach by including perceived risks and benefits as well as beliefs,
and by adding people's factual knowledge and their predisposition to
act in various ways (e.g. whether they know the main fuel used in
nuclear reactors and whether they would be prepared to sign petitions
or join marches).
We found that our samples' beliefs were more likely to discrim-
inate between pros and antis than their perceived risks and benefits,
that knowledge levels hardly differed, and that the pros strongly
endorsed the more passive forms of involvement in the nuclear debate,
while the antis would, of course, go much further.
A smallest space analysis using the Guttman-Lingoes multiple
discriminant analysis (MDA) program is illustrated in Figure m.M.2.
This computes a correlation matrix for all the items in the analysis and
then seeks an optimal resolution for the distribution of these items in a
two-dimensional space so that similarity (correlation) is represented by
spatial proximity. Two items close together are likely to be endorsed
in the same way by the respondents, while those placed wide apart
bear no relation to each other.
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Figure m.m.t. Beliefs about five energy systems held by those pro (a) and
con (b) the use of nuclear energy. Subgroups of Austrian public sample:
pro nuclear group, n =48; con nuclear group, n =47. (Source: Thomas et
al., 1980.)
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These and other studies have led us to several conclusions which.
although they apply to the limited area of nuclear power. can probably
be generalized. They suggest that although it is necessary and com-
mendable to provide information which places technological risks in
comparative order, we could go further than this.
For example, for both the establishment and the opposition com-
municators. it is the "uncommitted" group that is most amenable to
change. Slovic points out that established attitudes are extremely
intractable; the reason is that they do not live (I use the verb inten-
tionally to convey a dynamic existence) in isolation. but in a complex of
related attitudes with which they must retain some kind of harmony.
Brenot et al. (1984) have shown that for the French people. support
for nuclear power is part of a right-wing "sacred mission of France"
cluster of attitudes, against strikes and pornography, and in favor of
God and of censorship, while the opposition is located at the profane
end of this dimension where people are also in favor of abortion and the
abolition of marriage, and against military service and the death
penalty, etc.
The whole complex of such attitudes, as mentioned earlier.
depends for its existence on continuous sustenance from the community
of people who share the same set of attitudes. Change means estrange-
ment at best and betrayal at worst.
Another argument that underlies the whole approach to "public
relations" in the nuclear industry is that if only people understood the
technology they would accept it. Hence. many information pamphlets
and films give clear, accurate, and often multicolored accounts of parti-
cle physics or the main engineering alternatives for nuclear power sta-
tions. But, although we found the public's factual knowledge of the
technology to be sparse indeed. with much room for education. it did
not differ between the pros and the antis. and it seems likely that a
knowledge of particle physics can be used to support either a pro or an
anti posture.
The differences between the three positions on the perceived
risks and benefits associated with nuclear power was also less than
might be expected. The pros are not indifferent to the risks. by any
means. As others have also found, it is their expectation of economic
benefit that mainly distinguishes them. These perceived risks and
benefits are not included in the analysis shown in Figure W.D1.2 but
they overlap with the sets of beliefs which are shown there.
For these beliefs, we asked our respondents to endorse one from
each of a number of pairs of opposing belief statements. It will be seen
that these were highly discriminating. These beliefs were about the
likelihood of more jobs. the potential of "alternative sources" of
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energy, and the likelihood of safely managing terrorism and radioactive
waste. They may be called "nonfactual" or "nonverifiable" beliefs,
though it has to be pointed out that beliefs are, in a sense, nonverifi-
able by definition. Anyway, it is these beliefs that distinguish people
and it is about these rather than numerical probabilities of mortality
that people wish to receive communications. In making this point, I am
underlining rather than supplementing Slovic's argument, for he points
out that, although Cohen and Lee (1979) advocate that clear and
comprehensible communication tables should be the basis for risk deci-
sions. he himself accepts this only as a beginning and asserts that the
communication should include Ii detailed audit of costs and benefits.
Sadly, if the costs in risk terms are hard to quantify. the benefits are
even more elusive. It has to be reiterated that benefits are also mul-
tidimensionaL personaL and intangible.
Unfortunately, matters which may be classified as moral questions
about the future of society, or even as political issues, are not ones
with which scientists feel comfortable. Even for political administra-
tors. there are sensitive thresholds between the advocacy of policy,
mass media persuasion, and propaganda - dreaded word! These intangi-
bles are by no means restricted to nuclear power: they apply just as
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forcefully to major developments in pharmaceuticals, food additives,
chemical plants, and LNG containers. They often have to do with the
kind of society that people envisage for their children.
One further point about the "unpacking" of attitudes before we
leave this theme. Very little progress has been made in identifying the
emotional or "feeling" aspects of attitudes to hazards. It is ack-
nowledged that some people may experience anxiety or fear from a
raised level of autonomic nervous system activity, but such effects are
extremely difficult to measure in their milder forms, either with phys-
iological transducers or by means of "state anxiety" questionnaires. It
can certainly be speculated from psychotherapy that communications
can change cognitions and hence emotions, but no evidence of this
exists so far in the risk field. although anxiety is postulated as an
important element. It seems likely from our own researches on nuclear
power that the large majority of people have attitudes which are almost
exclusively cognitive and motivational, concerned with the moral.
"future of civilization" aspects of the technology and with the means of
expressing views on these issues. This does not exclude the possibil-
ity, of which our only evidence at present is derived from the qualita-
tive observation of active protesters. that some people experience a
sense of personal danger and associated anxiety.
What is clear is that one of the areas where this is most likely to
occur is in respect of the central theme of this Conference. Le. in rela-
tion to the storage of hazardous materials. In a national survey in the
United Kingdom (UK) which we have recently completed, it was found
that no fewer than 50'7. of our sample perceived it as "possible" that
something would "go seriously wrong" within five years. Just under half
of these thought it "likely" or "very likely".
10.D1.3. Some renections on the social
psychology of communicating
There is an extensive literature in social psychology on the effects of
communication (Lee, 1986). Changes in some attitudes in response to
some communications undoubtedly take place and are measurable. This
is reflected in Slovic's chapter where, although pointing out that
entrenched attitudes are resistant, he refers to newly formed or
"naive" attitudes that are "easily manipulated". For example, imagina-
bility, as he puts it, "may blur the distinction between the possible and
the probable".
There is a tendency, here and elsewhere, to believe that attitudes
towards risks cannot easily be changed positively by the establish-
ment, but that they are highly susceptible to negative change by
irresponsible journalists. I would question this, but more on this below.
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What is mainly needed, in my submission, is communication
research which uses an experimental mode and is specifically in the
area of risk. The paper Slovic quotes, by Morgan et al., is an excellent
example (Morgan et al.• 1985).
Researchers have found it useful to distinguish between the
source, the message, and the medium, and to manipulate each of these
as independent variables while measuring attitude change as the depen-
dent variable.
The structure of the message is well covered by Slovic, but there
are some findings from research that are worthy of additional mention.
For example, messages may be presented "logically" or "emotionally".
McGuire (1969) usefully distinguished as logical "... those appeals which
argue for the truth of a given belief by presenting evidence in favor of
the probable truth and premises (antecedents) from which the given
belief follows" and as emotional "those appeals arguing for a given
belief by pointing out the desirability of consequences that would fol-
low from the given belief". The success of these alternatives cannot be
judged in isolation from the issue, but it is worth noting that where
they have been compared, they are either equally effective or the emo-
tional message is more effective. Although emotional communications
and especially their extreme form, Le. "fear appeals", may be better
suited to activist groups, it is not inconceivable that messages arguing
in the opposite direction. Le. advocating the adoption of technology,
could have more emotional flavor than is currently the case, if our ear-
lier analysis is valid.
One message factor where results are unequivocal relates to the
use of implicit versus explicit conclusions. It appears that the conclu-
sions of an argument should be made absolutely explicit and that there
is no special virtue in allowing the public to arrive at them by the
"discovery" route. It is easy to overestimate the grasp that others may
have of matters that are strongly evident to ourselves. A risk table,
however clear, may not be enough to convey a message about a particu-
lar risk, and the inference needs to be brought out and put on the
table in simplistic terms, even if this is an uncomfortable process for
the scientist who wishes to draw attention to a whole set of reserva-
tions and caveats.
Again, there is an option to mention only one or both sides of the
argument and, on balance, research comes out in favor of the latter. Of
course the message is strongest if the opposing arguments are specifi-
cally refuted and, other things being equal, when the positive argu-
ments are presented first in order. This approach will evoke or set up
a schema or frame of reference in the receiver which is then consoli-
dated by successive evidence. When the opposition arguments are men-
tioned, their refutation strengthens rather than weakens this emer-
gent structure.
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This generalization may have to be modified in circumstances
where there are pro and anti speakers presenting their cases in suc-
cession, as in legal advocacy. In such circumstances, there is a special
advantage in criticizing the exposed arguments of the previous speaker
and this may favor speaking last. The complexities are. of course,
great. For example. the balance between presenting one's arguments
first or last will depend upon when the audience has to make a decision.
There is some advantage in presenting arguments close in time to the
decision point.
10.Dl.4. The credibility of the communicator
Turning to the communicator him/herself. the credibility of the source
of a message strongly influences its acceptance. For example. the per-
ceived expertise of a communicator is a highly relevant aspect of infor-
mation dissemination about risks. The recipient has to ask him/herself
two questions. Firstly, does the source possess relevant expertise?
Secondly. is the expertise being honestly purveyed? The scientist gen-
erally receives a high rating from the public on both scores. However,
the lay person has a healthy skepticism and is familiar enough with
examples of fallibility, bias, or ineptitude to be able to reject evidence.
even from this source. If the scientist is seen as wholly independent,
then perceived bias is reduced. but otherwise the lay person is well
aware that people select themselves for occupations and are then
molded to the accepted belief system of their organization and depend
on it for much of their reward. Hence, a university scientist has more
chance of credibility than one employed by a hazardous industry.
Another important aspect of a communicator's credibility is
his/her attractiveness. People want to share the same attitudes as
those they like and admire. a finding duly exploited by advertisers.
This is not to suggest that an industry whose activities are perceived
as hazardous should employ TV stars to improve their image but they
should certainly consider carefully who are their most charismatic and
personable representatives.
Similarity to the target group is another crucial aspect of credi-
bility. If a communicator appears to share the same human needs and
goals, then his propositions are more likely to be perceived as "right
for us", "right for our sort of people". Conversely, if he is clearly a
member of an "out group" of remote, blue-suited. well-off technocrats
from the capital city. then it will be assumed that he has "out group"
motives and his arguments are less likely to be trusted.
This identification with the target audience can be promoted by
employing a style and method of communication which is a dialogue
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between equals. Those who are equal are more likely to see each other
as similar and hence to share the same goals. The method is called co-
orientation, employing an interactive exchange, a consultative model
as distinct from a pedagogical one.
In our South West Study, we asked our respondents which commu-
nicators were perceived by them as credible: the results are shown in
Table w.m.t.
Table 10.D1.1. Perceived credibility of providers of information.
In
Rank All favor Against Uncom m ittecl
order Provider of inJ'ormation8 (X) (X) (X) (X)
1 UKAEA 45 52 30 37
2 Secretary of State 40 44 29 37
for Energy
3 NRPB 31 32 31 26
4 Physicist 27 30 25 15
5 Local MP 21 21 19 30
6 Conservationist 21 19 30 17
7 CEGB PR Department 21 24 14 15
8 Chairman of CEGB 20 24 12 18
9 National anti group 18 15 30 16
10 CEGB engineer 18 22 10 13
11 Local anti group 15 13 22 13
12 Pro nuclear group 14 15 12 13
13 Local GP 9 9 10 13
14 Local Councillor 9 7 12 15
15 Reporter 9 7 16 7
8UKAEA, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority; NRPB, National Radiation Protec-
tion Board; MP, Member or Parliament; CEGB. Central Eleotrlclty Generating
Board; PR, Public Relations; GP, general practitioner (medical).
10.Dl.5. The medium for risk communication
The most effective medium for communications about risk raises ques-
tions for which we have few answers at present. It is known that direct
face-to-face interaction is relatively highly effective but, of course,
extremely limited in scope. The nuclear industry makes much use of
pamphlets, but our evidence suggests that this medium is least pre-
ferred by the public. Newspapers and TV are most preferred. but we
have seen that the newspaper or TV reporter is given very low credibil-
ity. However. distinction should be drawn between newspaper informa-
tion attributed to journalists and that which reports high-credibility
scientific sources.
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While the vivid and dramatic report often appears to be influen-
tial, there is a real dearth of evidence that journalism has more than a
very temporary effect on attitudes. People may overvalue certain
kinds of hazards and this may be the cause of newspaper overreporting
and not vice versa. Also, people buy the newspapers that conform to
their existing attitudes; they are therefore rarely exposed to contrary
views through this medium and are usually able to deploy good reasons
for rejecting them when they occur. The TV is more intrusive, but
easily switched to another channel. Local newspapers are bought non-
selectively and are correspondingly important, but this applies mainly
to local siting issues.
The area where mass media may be most influential is when atti-
tudes are newly formed and in a highly labile state. e.g. in relation to a
new hazardous technology such as the irradiation of food (currently not
allowed in the UK) or the spraying with a new pesticide of an unex-
pected infestation.
Also, we know from our South West Study that the uncommitted
read certain tabloid newspapers and watch TV channels which at
present contain zero communications on environmental hazards; also,
that the forms of pamphlets produced to persuade them contain too lit-
tle information on their particular concerns and are couched in a
language and form that is hard for them to understand, even if it were
interesting enough to capture their attention. (The respondents' pre-
ferred information sources are presented in Table W.In.2.) People are
not passive and labile targets for information campaigns: they are
Table 10.D1.2. Preferred information sour-
ces.
Ra.nk All
orcjer Source (%)
1 TV program 48
2 Newspapers 36
3 Radio program 29
4 Books 26
5 Governmenl While Papers 24
6 CEGB 8 pamphlel 24
7 Technical Journal 22
8 Public meeting 22
9 Exhibition 21
10 Casual discussion 16
11 Antinuclear lileralure 16
12 Publicily posler 13
13 Film 8
14 Phone-in 7
8CEGB, Cenlral Eleolrlclly Generating Board.
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Table 10.D1.3. Most frequently chosen information units.
Ra.nk
order Providers8 Issues Medium
TV
TV
TV
TV
TV
Newspapers
Technical Journal
Government While Papers
Government While Papers
TV
Government While Papers
Government While Papers
TV
TV
Conservationist
Secrelary of Slate
UKAEA
NRPB
UKAEA
Secrelary of Slate
Physicist
UKAEA
Secrelary of Slate
Secretary of Slate
Secretary of Slate
UKAEA
Secretary of State
UKAEA
5
6
1
2
3
4
7
B
9
10
11
12
14
13
Effects on wildlife
Security of slation
Security of slation
Health and safety
of workforce
Health and safety
of workforce
Health and safety
of workforce
Security of station
Cost
Cost
Security of slation
Health and safety
of workforce
Health and safety
of workforce
Health and safety
of workforce
Security of power
slation
15 Conservationist Effects of wildlife Public meeting
8UKAEA. United Kingdom Atomlo Energy Authority; NRPB, National Radiological Pro-
tection Board.
active and selective seekers after what concerns them and selective
filterers against what does not. Respondents were asked to combine
their preferred providers of information, issues of concern, and source
of information, Le. to say what they wanted to hear, from whom. and in
what form. These are given in Table W.D1.3. In all, 1470 combinations
were possible, but in the event 15 accounted for 53% of choices.
10.D1.8. The need for evaluation
Although there is a useful stock of generalizations available from com-
munication researchers, the permutation of variables of source, mes-
sage, medium, and target means that there is no substitute for evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of particular communications or campaigns. This
kind of research can be ex post facto or "formative". We have. for
example, explored the impact for five United Kingdom Atomic Energy
Authority (UKAEA) pamphlets, using questionnaires and group discus-
sions with ordinary members of the public. Also, the information gain
has been measured of a small sample of the public who watched a film
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entitled Using Radioactivity. Another study was conducted of a
UKAEA exhibition stand on nuclear power, where comparisons were
made between a sample of the public who were approaching the stand,
one which was leaving, and a third who were not attracted at all. This
research showed that people with more than average concern over
nuclear power were inclined to enter the exhibit, but, on leaving, their
concern was measurably greater.
Finally, we have evaluated a video tape entitled Uranium the
Magic Metal at the formative stage. A draft script addressed to 11-
year old children had been prepared and the intended film sequences
and animations were "mocked up" with hundreds of artists' drawings
which were made into a tentative prototype tape with the script
dubbed over. This early version was then taken into the schools and
shown to children and science teachers, leading to many recommenda-
tions for a change in content, terminology and level. For example, the
original version was found to be pitched at a level suitable for 15-year
aIds instead of 11-year aIds. This is a common fault in all communica-
tions which are designed by sophisticated highly educated science
information staff. This video is now available from the UKAEA Informa-
tion Services Branch.
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lO.D2. Discussion
O. Renn
10.00.1. Results of and conclusions from risk perception studies
In general people are doing a good job in assessing the magnitude of a
risk that is familiar to them. They underestimate high risks and
overestimate low risks, but otherwise they are quite aware of the
threats and dangers which they are exposed to.
The perceived degree of severity of risks is almost independent of
the perceived number of expected losses. The disaster potential
(dread) and the degree of uncertainty (individual familiarity and scien-
tific knowledge) are two of the key factors in determining the per-
ceived level of risk. In addition, the perceived justice in the
risk-benefit distribution. the potentials for individual and societal
control of the risk, and voluntariness of the risky activity influence
personal judgment on how society should deal with risks and what regu-
lations are required.
Social psychological and sociological studies show that judgments
on risky technologies or activities depend not only on psychological
factors like the ones mentioned above but also on reference group judg-
ments, salient beliefs about the risk source, perception of the pro-
ponents and opponents of the risk source, degree of loyalty toward
official policymakers, and commitment to social values and cultural
goals. Since all these factors, including the psychological ones. are
interrelated and sometimes reflect mere post-rationalizations of
unconscious feelings and social constraints, it is very difficult to set up
a reliable model of how people actually perceive risks and evaluate
them. What we know - and to what degree we know it - is what
matters; but analysts are still searching for a theory that can explain
the process of people's judgment on risks.
We certainly do know that people make judgments on technologies,
events, or activities, and not on an abstract notion like risk. There are
indications that people assess the potential for threat in a similar way
and that similar mechanisms of processing and evaluating information
about risk are operating under the psychological premises of common
sense. But the meaning of risk differs not only among individuals: it
differs also among technologies and activities perceived by one and the
same individual.
Hence, there is no universal risk threshold which allows distinc-
tion between accepted and nonaccepted risks. What kind of risks are
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acceptable Dr nDt differs amDng peDple and risk SDurces cDnsiderably
and is almDst independent Df the actual probabilities Df being affected.
A cDmpDund model Df psychDIDgical, grDup-related, and value-oriented
factDrs can best predict the individual judgment Dn the acceptance Df
technDIDgies Dr activities.
10.00.2. Lessons for risk communications
Risk cDmparisDns usually fail tD cDnvince anYDne except the prDfes-
siDnal risk analyst. Since risk has a different meaning in different CDn-
texts, cDmparisDns make little sense tD the public. Only in cases where
risk SDurces have a very similar structure and serve the same purpose
shDuld cDmparisDns be used in cDmmunicatiDn.
Risk cDmmunicatiDn shDuld nDt cDncentrate Dn cDnveying prDbabil-
ities and their meaning tD the public. PrDbabilities will be intuitively
learnt by experience (althDugh biased by persDnal perfDrmance) Dr can
be indirectly cDmmunicated by describing the safety measures taken tD
prDtect individuals and society.
Risk cDmmunicatiDn shDuld focus Dn the key aspects Df risk per-
ceptiDn: Dn the disaster pDtential, Dn the management Df uncertainty,
Dn the means Df societal cDntrDI and mDnitDring, and, Df course, Dn the
benefits which are given tD the society and/Dr the individual.
Acceptance Df risk SDurces is highly influenced by the trust in
the fairness and .ratiDnality Df the decisiDn-making procedure and the
credibility Df the actDrs invDlved. PsychDIDgical barriers Df perceptiDn
can easily be DverCDme if those tWD cDnditiDns are met. UnfDrtunately
Dr fDrtunately - depending Dn which side Dne stands - all tricks and
recipes fDr retaining Dr gaining trust and credibility usually fail in an
Dpen society with a pluralist value structure and a free press. Trust
and credibility are dependent Dn hDnesty, transparency, cDmpetence,
and a good past recDrd.
Risk cDmmunicatiDn can Dnly be effective if the cDmmunicatiDn
process is structured as a two-way infDrmatiDn exchange. RegulatDrs
can learn sDmething frDm the public and vice versa. It is alsD essential
that the cDmmunicatiDn process allDws fDr alteratiDns Df the final deci-
siDn. NDbody is mDtivated tD cDmmunicate if he cannDt change parts Df
the issue.
10.D2.3. Lessons for compensation
Since there is nD universal risk acceptance threshDld and peDple's
judgments vary Dver the severity Df risk pDsed by a technDIDgy Dr
activity, risk perceptiDn studies provide nD recipes fDr determining
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how much compensation is needed to level off the exposure to a
specific risk.
Because of the different marginal utilities of income and variations
of perceived danger among individuals. compensation on the basis of
perceived personal loss will inevitably lead to different compensational
sums being handed out to individuals with respect to the same risk
taken. Since people demand that risk spreading as well as compensa-
tion should be just. variations in payment will not be accepted.
Taking the mean value of all revealed demands for compensation
would probably be rejected by those persons whose compensation was
lower than originally demanded and would enhance the distrust of those
who were overpaid ("if they pay me more than I demand, there has to
be something wrong"). Choosing the upper limit of all revealed demands
would exceed any financial limits.
Compensation might be a viable and acceptable means of risk
management if it were comprised of better or cheaper access to ser-
vices (e.g. electricity) - disregarding marginal utility - or collective
goods (e.g. improvement of the infrastructure). Although people use
the community infrastructure in varying degrees, the axiom of per-
ceived justice is met, since anyone has the same chance of using the
facility.
Since the exact amount of compensation cannot be calculated on
the basis of perceived risk and will run into acceptance problems if the
sum is calculated only on the basis of "objective" probabilities, either
an open bargaining process with representatives of the community
(which will work best if alternative sites are available and compete for
this specific risk source) should be initiated or a panel group of
selected citizens (in particular ones not directly affected by the risk
source to avoid strategic responses) should determine the amount of
compensation which they feel just and fair (after being informed about
the risks involved).
The above points concerning compensation do not apply if risks
can be reduced by compensating measures (e.g. rebuilding houses to
increase protection).
CHAPTER 11
Value Tree Analysis:
An Introduction and an Application
to Offshore Oil Drilling
D. von WinterJeldt [lJ
11.1 Introduction
11.1.1. Background and motivation tor value tree analysis
One of the most common difficulties when solving complex public policy
problems is the existence of multiple interest groups that are affected
by the policies and who therefore have a stake in their outcomes. Dur-
ing siting of a hazardous waste facility, for example. nearby residents
will express their concerns with pollution and property values;
environmentalists are likely to question the impacts of the facility on
the flora and fauna; government agencies may raise issues of health and
safety; and members of the local chamber of commerce will probably
point to the facility's employment and business benefits.
These interest groups or stakeholders typically meet in hearings
of local governmental agencies. at council meetings, at the negotiation
table, and ultimately, in the courts to resolve their differences. The
discussions in these arenas vary, but they are usually about facts:
issues center on whether a particular environmental impact is likely to
occur, what types of laws and regulations are applicable to a proposed
project. whether dangers and risks have been overestimated or
underestimated, and whether someone's rights have been violated.
These factual debates are, however, often merely the surface of
more deeply rooted differences in the values of the stakeholders. In
the example of siting a hazardous waste facility, value differences
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appear in a variety of shades: in disputes about the relative impor-
tance of providing employment versus protecting the environment; in
the "not in my backyard" phenomenon; in concerns with inequities; and
in fundamental moral or ethical issues about the value of life.
Unfortunately, while our technical and institutional tools for
addressing and resolving factual disputes are adequate, our tools for
resolving value conflicts are feeble. On the institutional side, arbitra-
tion and mediation have been explored as alternatives to the often
costly and unsatisfactory legal procedures. On the technical side, a
variety of new models and techniques are being developed to assist
stakeholders in understanding each others' positions and in resolving
their disputes. In this chapter, I will describe and illustrate one such
technique, called "value tree analysis".
11.1.2. A brief history of value tree analysis
Value tree analysis originated in several applications of multiattribute
utility techniques (MAUTs) to controversial public policy problems.
MAUT, as originally conceived, was designed to aid an individual
decision-maker in making a choice among alternatives that vary on
several value-relevant dimensions (attributes). The MAUT process usu-
ally consists of carefully laying out the decision alternatives. defining
objectives and attributes, assessing the impact of each alternative for
each objective. and weighting the objectives. In its most common form
alternatives are evaluated by a weighted additive model (see, for exam-
ple. Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; von Winterfeldt and Edwards, 1986).
When decision analysts began to apply MAUT to controversial pub-
lic policy problems like the siting of nuclear power plants (Keeney,
1980) or the evaluation of desegragation plans for the Los Angeles Uni-
fied School District (Edwards, 1980). they soon recognized that the
existence of multiple stakeholders required modification of the MAUT
process in at least two ways: at the front end. a much more detailed
process for structuring the opposing stakeholders' values was needed;
and, at the tail end, new procedures for using the MAUT results for
conflict analysis and resolution were required.
Independently of each other, several researchers began to exper-
iment with approaches to the "front end" problem. Keeney and Raiffa
(1976) - building on Manheim and Hall (1968), Miller (1970), and Raiffa
(1969) - developed the useful concept of objectives hierarchies. These
are tree structures that logically layout the ends that a decision-
maker would like to achieve when choosing among the decision alterna-
tives (means). At the top of the tree are general value categories like
"environmental quality" or "cost". Below, at increasing levels of detail,
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are the definitions of what these value categories mean in terms of
objectives like "reduce S02 pollution", "minimize visual impact", or
"minimize investment cost". At the bottom are so-called attributes
which specify in detail how the upper level objectives and values should
be measured.
Edwards (1980) found that objectives hierarchies could be con-
structed together with several stakeholders. even if they disagreed
strongly on the issues. In his study of Los Angeles School Desegrega-
tion plans, a very large common objectives hierarchy, which he called a
"value tree", was a central part of the evaluation. Saaty (1983) found
objectives hierarchies, which he calls "analytic hierarchies", useful in
thinking about such conflicts as the Falkland Islands crisis or
apartheid politics.
Today, value trees have become a common tool for the initial stage
of structuring a conflict among multiple stakeholders. An example of a
value tree for evaluating offshore oil development plans is shown in Fig-
ure 11.1. This tree reflects the concern of fishermen with oil develop-
ment. After building several individual trees, the analyst combines
them into a joint, or common, value tree.
Having built a common value structure, it is possible to construct
MAUT models separately for each stakeholder group, and subsequently
analyze the conflicts as expressed in the MAUT models. Because of the
extensive use of value trees in this type of application of MAUT, the
term value tree analysis is often used. At its present stage it is
merely a diagnostic tool, Le. it allows the pinpointing of the nature of
the factual and value conflicts in the value trees, impact assessments,
and weights assigned by stakeholders.
Recent research on bargaining and negotiation processes (e.g.
Raiffa. 1982) as well as studies of compensation mechanisms (Kun-
reuther et al.. 1984) could make value tree analysis useful for conflict
resolution too. In particular, the process of generating and inventing
new compromise solutions, guided by the value structures of the oppos-
ing stakeholders, seems to be a promising direction. Applications of
MAUT to assist in negotiations (e.g. Ulvila and Snider, 1980) as well as
several, as yet unpublished, value tree analyses involving direct
interaction between stakeholders clearly show the potential for con-
flict resolution inherent in the process.
11.1.3. Value tree analysis: an overview of the technique
Value tree analysis goes through the following generic steps:
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Figure ~1..~. A value tree reflecting the concern of fishermen with offshore
oil development.
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(1) Structure the problem as a decision one.
(2) Identify stakehqlders.
(3) Build separate value trees in interviews with leading representa-
tives of each stakeholder group.
(4) Construct a combined value tree.
(5) Construct a multiattribute utility model for each stakeholder
group.
(6) Carry out sensitivity analyses for each stakeholder model.
(7) Analyze stakeholder agreements and disagreements and generate
compromise options.
While these seven steps appear quite linear and sequenced, they
are, in fact, recursive, with frequent feedback, restructuring, and pos-
sibilities for change in repeated consultations with the stakeholder
representatives. Anonymity and stakeholder control of the outputs of
the analysis should be assured at each stage.
The following sections will briefly discuss each of the seven steps.
The first step is to identify what decisions are to be made and what
alternatives exist for that decision. Typical classes of decisions prob-
lems are choosing a location for a production facility, selecting the
best transportation route or mode of transportation, or selecting an
acceptable waste disposal site. Although sometimes phrased in terms
of accepting or rejecting a particular decision or proposal, the problem
is usually much more complex, and different stakeholders often have
quite different problem formulations. In the problem of siting a
hazardous facility, residents may prefer a simple yes-no formulation:
either the facility is located in "our backyard" or it is not. Public offi-
cials, having responsibility for resource allocation with a wider per-
spective, tend to formulate the problem as a choice among alternative
specified sites each having its own pros and cons. Environmentalists,
concerned with the environmental constraints, often impose such
severe restrictions that the "choice" simply boils down to a search for
the one site that can meet these restrictions. And, to complicate
matters, some political groups see the problem, not in the siting issue
at all, but rather in the design of equitable and fair decision-making
processes such as having public participation in the siting debate.
Creating a common problem formulation can therefore be quite an
accomplishment by and of itself. It may be useful to include innovative
options as well as some process options in order to accommodate the
different problem perspectives of the stakeholders. For example,
when siting a hazardous waste facility, it might be useful to explore
participation and compensation options. It is recommended to consult
with some of the stakeholder representatives early in the process to
generate a common understanding of the problem.
354 huur1.ng and Manag1.ng Hazardous R1.sks
Identification of stakeholders (step 2) is usually a straightforward
task. In many disputes involving hazardous materials or facilities,
stakeholders emerge who voice their opinions loudly, and they fre-
quently meet in public hearings or comment on official proposals.
Environmental impact statements are a good source for the identifica-
tion of stakeholders. While stakeholders are usually numerous (a list of
200 would not be excessive), they usually cluster around common issues
or common values. This clustering allows reduction of most stakeholder
lists to between five and ten typical classes.
Building separate value trees (step 3) is still an art. The process
of constructing these trees is highly interactive and should be itera-
tive. It begins with an initial interview with one to three leading
representatives of the organizations whose values are to be structured.
One analyst should pursue the questioning, while a second analyst
should take notes and interject on occasions to pursue missing values
or to review the discussion. The analysts ask questions like the follow-
ing: What are your general concerns with this or that particular site or
several sites? Why are these concerns important? What does this or
that concern or value category mean? How does this or that value
differ from others? What makes this or that particular option better
than another one? By pursuing the explication of general values of the
respondents the analyst typically assembles a long list of values and
concerns, roughly ordered by broad categories. At the end of the
interview the analyst probes for missing values, and asks respondents
to stretch their imagination and think of good aspects of the least pre-
ferred option and of bad aspects of the most preferred option.
After the interview, the analyst constructs a value tree and sends
it back to the stakeholder group for comments and possible revisions.
Usually, the revisions consist of additional values or of wording
changes. In some instances the complete tree is revised. Since the
interview partners are likely to be skeptical about the uses of the
interview material and their trees, it is critical that they be assured
complete confidentiality until they accept a revised and finalized ver-
sion of the initial tree.
Building a combined value tree (step 4) is again done in the
analysts' office. Stress should be on comprehensiveness while main-
taining the internal logic and structure of each individual tree. All
stakeholders should be able to identify all their values and concerns in
the tree. Ideally, each stakeholder tree should be identifiable as an
overlay over the combined tree.
The separate and combined trees are products in themselves and
often can be quite useful in structuring the debate and pinpointing
areas of agreement and disagreement. Often they help stakeholders to
understand each other's concerns better.
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The fifth step, building a multiattribute utility model for each
stakeholder, is carried out using standard MAUT methods. It begins
with building of an impact matrix in which the alternatives that are to
be evaluated are crossed with the attributes derived from the value
tree. The analyst summarizes the relevant data and knowledge in each
cell of the impact matrix. Wherever he discovers expert disagreement,
it should be noted in the respective cell by outlining ranges of impacts.
The impact matrix, complete with expert assessments and data. is
discussed in a meeting with stakeholder representatives who are
encouraged to change any of the data based on their own expertise.
Subsequently they are asked to rate the impacts in each attribute and
to weight attributes. Combining ratings and weights, the analyst can
then calculate an aggregate utility for each of the alternative sites.
Formally, the result of this analysis is expressed by
n
vk(Xj) = ~ wikvik(xijk) •
i =1
(11.1)
where Xijk is the impact of the j th alternative on the ith attribute
assessed by (or agreed upon by) the k th stakeholder, v ik is the rating
of that impact in the i th attribute by the k th stakeholder. wik is the
weight of attribute i assigned by the kth stakeholder, and v k is the
aggregate utility function that evaluates the jth alternative Xj for the
k th stakeholder.
After completing step 5 of the analysis, the analyst typically dis-
covers some disagreement between the model-based evaluation (the
"v k lOS) and the direct rankings of the alternatives supplied by the
stakeholders. Thus. the first part of the sixth step consists of helping
stakeholders to straighten out their own inconsistencies. The goal is to
gain insights into the reasons for inconsistencies and to produce what
ultimately amounts to a satisfying logical formulation of the stakehold-
ers' evaluations of the alternatives.
The model thus should capture the essence of the stakeholders'
arguments and consequently can be used to perform "dialogues" with
the stakeholders in the form of sensitivity analyses. Sensitivity
analysis programs are very useful for this purpose.
A coherent model for each stakeholder having been produced, the
seventh and final step of the value tree analysis is to compare stake-
holder models, diagnose the sources of the conflicts, and. if possible,
invent options or versions of existing alternatives that help reduce the
conflict. In most applications of this technique the conflicts have been
predominantly in values expressed as disagreements in value structures
and weights. In contrast, surprising agreements have existed on the
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"factual" side of the model, namely the impact estimates x ijk and the
ratings v ik associated with them. Overall, value tree analysis discovers
more agreement than disagreement. since the procedure. unlike adver-
sarial processes and techniques, encourages discussion of both, and
since most reasonable people tend to agree on a good number of issues.
The conflict having been diagnosed, the remaining task is conflict
resolution. At this point it is useful to bring the stakeholders
together, present the model results, and discuss the outstanding
issues. Resolution of the conflict probably lies in the joint exploration
of novel alternatives like compensation schemes or option packages.
11.2. An Application of Value Tree Analysis
to Offshore Oil Drilling
Soon after his appointment as Secretary of Interior in 1981, James Watt
developed a long-term strategy to reduce oil imports into the USA.
Part of this strategy was an ambitious and aggressive offshore oil leas-
ing plan that was to speed up oil and gas exploration and development
in virtually all federal waters off the coast of the USA (see US Geologi-
cal Service. 1982). Not surprisingly. this expansive offshore oil leasing
plan soon met with opposition from many groups. including local coun-
ties and cities. which were concerned with overcrowding and unbal-
anced growth. and fishermen. who objected to the likely interference
with their fishing activities.
A particularly interesting and heated case of opposition to
offshore oil development occurred in Southern California. which is rela-
tively rich in offshore oil resources but also has a very beautiful shore-
line and many environmentally valuable marine resources. The following
study focused on the debate surrounding offshore oil lease no. 80 which
was scheduled for February 1984. and which considered leasing almost
the complete area outside of a three-mile zone off the shore of South-
ern California, between Point Conception and the Mexican border (see
Figure 11.2).
As originally proposed by the Minerals Management Service of the
Department of the Interior. lease sale 80 was to exclude only a few
tracts in the ecological preserves surrounding the Channel Islands,
Santa Barbara. and San Nicholas Islands (Minerals Management Service,
1983).
If the sale were held as planned, oil companies could place bids on
any of the 4-square-mile tracts. and. upon winning a bid. could begin
exploration, followed by development. and then later production of oil
and gas. Thus, the lease sale is the starting point of a 20-30 year
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process that is likely to result in construction of oil platforms, pipe-
lines, and processing facilities.
Southern California had its share of offshore oil developments
prior to lease sale 80. Previous lease sales were held in the 1960s, the
1970s, and in 1980, 1981, and 1982; these led to exploration and pro-
duction mainly in the Santa Barbara Channel. In addition, several
tracts had been leased and developed in the State Waters within the
three-mile zone, in the Santa Barbara Channel and off the Coast of Long
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Beach and Newport Beach. Although offshore oil development was not
new to Southern California, the scope of the planned lease and develop-
ment was quite dramatic. If the whole area were offered for sale, an
expected 270 million barrels of oil was likely to be produced over a 25-
year life of the oil development. Between five and ten drilling plat-
forms would be erected temporarily, and also between five and ten pro-
duction platforms would likely be constructed and operate for some 20
years. Many of these production platforms would be seen from the
shore.
Environmentalists, county and city officials, the Coastal Commis-
sion of California, and the fishermen started to fight lease sale BO as
soon as it appeared on the drawing board. This opposition was voiced
in the courts by arguing that this lease sale was inconsistent with the
Coastal Management Act, in public hearings about environmental
impacts, and in Washington, where Southern California representatives
fought Watt's plan with a series of moratoria.
Our study team entered this controversy in June 19B2, after lease
sale 6B, the most recent Southern California lease sale, had been com-
pleted. Lease sale 68 was somewhat less controversial, since it only
offered some 200 tracts as opposed to the more than 2000 tracts that
were offered in lease sale BO. In addition, lease sale 6B had carefully
excluded tracts in the Santa Monica Bay and off the coast of San Diego,
both highly disputed areas. Nevertheless, lease sale 6B had encoun-
tered stiff opposition. It appeared that the battle about lease sale BO
would be even hotter.
11.2.1. Identifying the decision
The alternatives that define the decision problem are listed in Table
11.1. The "complete sale" alternative (1) and the "cancellation" alter-
native (5) were analyzed by the Minerals Management Service in its
Environmental Impact Statement (Minerals Management Service,
19B4). Alternative (2) deletes the "hottest" tracts which had encoun-
tered stiff opposition. Strong and powerful opposition existed in Los
Angeles and San Diego, with support from the mayors of these cities
and backing in Washington by Senators Cranston and Wilson. Deletion
of tracts in the Santa Monica Bay and off the shore of San Diego would
have gone a long way to address that opposition. Minerals Management
Service considered these deletions as separate alternatives in the
Environmental Impact Statement and, in addition, considered dele-
tion of environmentally sensitive tracts and a few tracts that could
interfere with shipping off the Los Angeles Harbor. All these "hot"
tracts are deleted in alternative (2).
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Table 11.1. Lease sale alternatives.
No. Description of alternatives
(1) Hold complete lease sale 80 as planned (area to be offered
is marked by the outer heavy line in Figure 11.2)
(2) Delete holly disputed tracts: off the shore of Santa Monica
and San Diego, and around San Nicolas Island and in front of
Los Angeles Harbor (area marked by a square grid
in Figure 11.2)
(3) Delete all tracts in the Santa Barbara Channel (area
described by heavy line around Santa Barbara Channel in
Figure ~~.2)
(4) Delete all tracts in Santa Barbara Channel and in the Inner
Basins (area marked by heavy lines around the Santa Bar-
bara Channel and Inner Basins in Figure 11.2)
(5) Cancel lease sale 80 or delay indefinitely
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Alternatives (3) and (4) were created somewhat artificially in
order to tap the underlying conflict. Alternative (3) was meant to be
equitable to the counties of Santa Barbara and Ventura which had
already shared a large part of the burden of offshore oil development.
Alternative (4) was meant to be the "beach lovers'" choice, so to speak.
It put the possible development out of sight and out of mind.
11.2.2. Identifying stakeholders
A survey of several environmental impact statements, the responses
provided to them, and about 20 interviews identified some 100 stake-
holders' groups involved in and/or affected by offshore oil development
in Southern California. Most stakeholders had made public statements
and expressed their overall attitude towards the development (pro,
anti, or neutral), and had formulated their main arguments and the
values that drove these arguments.
These lists were used to identify a generic structure of
opponents, proponents, and regulatory stakeholders, as shown in Table
11.2. Opponents are grouped into five classes: environmentalists, local
communities and governmen ts, beach residents and "beach lovers".
fishermen, and "special issue" opponents. Environmentalists were
mainly concerned with oil spills, water and air pollution, preservation
of endangered species, and protection of environmentally valuable
coastal areas. Many local communities and governments opposed oil
development because of the impacts it would have on land use and
infrastructure and because it might lead to pollution and unbalanced
growth. Beach residents and those who like to spend time at the
beaches feared that oil development would alter the recreational and
beach life-styles, especially in those large stretches of the California
T
ab
le
11
.2
.S
la
ke
ho
ld
er
gr
ou
ps
a
n
d
a
s
e
le
ct
io
n
o
ft
h
e
ir
m
e
m
be
rs
.
O
pp
on
en
ts
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
la
lis
ts
:
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
lD
ef
en
se
C
en
te
r
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
la
lC
oa
lit
io
n
S
ie
rr
a
C
lu
b
G
re
en
pe
ac
e
C
en
te
r
fo
r
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
la
l
E
du
ca
tio
n
F
ri
en
ds
o
ft
he
Se
a
O
tt
er
W
ha
le
C
en
te
r
C
iti
es
a
n
d
c
o
u
n
tie
s:
C
ity
o
fA
va
lo
n
C
ity
o
fH
un
tin
gt
on
B
ea
ch
C
ity
o
fL
os
A
ng
el
es
C
ity
o
fS
an
la
M
on
ic
a
C
ou
nt
y
o
fS
an
la
B
ar
ba
ra
C
ou
nt
y
o
f
V
en
tu
ra
Sa
n
D
ie
go
C
ou
nt
y
F
is
he
rm
en
S
pe
ci
al
in
te
re
st
o
pp
on
en
ts
:
P
a
ci
fic
P
al
is
ad
es
H
om
eo
w
ne
rs
'A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
P
o
rt
o
fL
os
A
ng
el
es
A
u
th
o
ri
ty
D
ep
t.
o
fN
av
y
B
ea
ch
re
s
id
en
ts
a
n
d
be
ac
h
lo
ve
rs
:
O
ce
an
P
a
rk
C
om
m
un
ity
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
(M
ai
nl
y
c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
fr
om
in
di
vi
du
al
s)
&n
ol.
D
ep
ar
t.m
en
t.
o
f
In
t.
er
io
r.
P
ro
po
ne
nt
s
O
il
c
o
m
pa
ni
es
E
xx
on
U
ni
on
S
he
ll
W
es
te
rn
O
il
a
n
d
G
as
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
C
ha
m
be
rs
o
fc
o
m
m
e
rc
e
:
C
al
ifo
rn
ia
C
ha
m
be
ro
fc
o
m
m
e
rc
e
:
G
re
at
er
B
ak
er
sf
ie
ld
C
ha
m
be
r
o
fC
om
m
er
ce
S
pe
ci
al
in
te
re
st
pr
op
on
en
ts
:
In
te
rn
a
tio
n
a
lU
ni
on
o
fO
pe
ra
tin
g
E
ng
in
ee
rs
R
eg
uL
a.
to
rs
(J,
F
ed
er
al
a
ge
nc
ie
s:
B
ur
ea
u
o
fL
an
d
M
an
ag
em
en
t(
Do
l)
U
S
D
ep
t.
o
fF
is
h
a
n
d
W
ild
lif
e
(D
ol
)
N
at
io
na
lO
ce
an
og
ra
ph
ic
a
n
d
A
tm
os
ph
er
ic
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n
(D
ol
)
M
ar
in
e
M
am
m
al
C
om
m
is
si
on
D
ep
ar
tm
en
to
ft
he
A
rm
y
C
or
ps
o
fE
ng
in
ee
rs
B
ur
ea
u
o
fM
in
es
(D
ol
)
US
C
oa
st
G
ua
rd
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
lP
ro
te
ct
io
n
A
ge
nc
y
F
ed
er
al
E
ne
rg
y
R
eg
ul
at
or
y
C
om
m
is
si
on
U
S
G
eo
lo
gi
ca
lS
ur
ve
y
N
at
io
na
lP
a
rk
S
er
vi
ce
S
la
te
a
ge
nc
ie
s:
S
ou
th
C
oa
st
A
ir
Q
ua
lit
y
D
is
tr
ic
t
D
ep
ar
tm
en
to
fW
at
er
R
es
ou
rc
es
A
ir
R
es
ou
rc
es
B
oa
rd
C
al
ifo
rn
ia
C
oa
sl
al
C
om
m
is
si
on
P
ub
lic
U
til
iti
e
s
C
om
m
is
si
on
D
ep
ar
tm
en
to
fF
is
he
ri
es
a
n
d
G
am
es
D
ep
ar
tm
en
to
fL
an
ds
a
n
d
R
ec
re
at
io
n
S
la
te
La
nd
s
C
om
m
is
si
on
Value Tree Analysts 361
Coast that have not yet experienced any development. Fishermen were
concerned about interference with fishing activities, loss of equipment,
and economic losses. Finally, a series of special issue opponents were
opposed for diverse reasons like interference with port entry and
departures (Los Angeles port authorities), reduction of property values
(property owners), or interference with military training activities
(Department of the Navy).
Supporters of offshore oil development fall into three main
groups: oil companies, business communities, and special issue support-
ers. The interest of the oil companies in offshore oil development is
self-evident. Business communities and some chambers of commerce
expressed favorable attitudes towards oil development because of the
business stimulation and growth it provides, and also because of the
general idea of providing for more national energy independence. Spe-
cial issue supporters range from those who stand to profit indirectly
from the oil development (e.g. subcontractors) to those who have pro-
fessional interests in oil exploration and production (e.g. the Society of
Petroleum Engineers).
Regulators mix support and opposition typically in a way that is
highly predictable from their statutory mandate. The California
Coastal Commission was opposed to lease sale 80 unless many tracts that
their members perceived as threatening the coastline were deleted.
The Minerals Management Service of the Department of Interior plays
an interesting role as joint regulator and promoter of offshore oil
development. Since it is the federal lead agency in the leasing process,
it should be viewed, in principle, as the final balancer and decision-
maker. The general impression, however, was that Minerals Management
Service was clearly in the support group.
Two additional stakeholder groups played interesting roles. Dur-
ing Governor Brown's tenure the state government tended to be
opposed to offshore oil development, but this attitude changed during
the Deukmejian administration. The new administration favors offshore
oil development but is eager to stress that it would like to see pollution
and other detrimental effects reduced. In Washington, several
congressmen representing coastal regions combined to create a federal
opposition to offshore oil development. For all practical purposes the
reasons for their opposition coincide with the concerns of their consti-
tuencies.
11.2.3. Building value trees tor selected stakeholders
Interviews were conducted with one or two individual representatives
of five stakeholder groups that seemed to span the range of conflicting
values and opinions: the Environmental Defense Center, the County of
Santa Barbara, the City of Los Angeles, the Santa Barbara fishermen,
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and oil companies. From the interview materials and from related
materials and comments on the environmental impact statements, five
separate value trees were constructed. These trees reflect the biases
and inclinations of the interview partners as well as the analysts and
therefore should not necessarily be interpreted as "the tree" of the
organization or group that our respondents belonged to.
The first drafts of these trees were returned to the stakeholders
for comments and revisions. The revised trees for the environmental-
ists and the oil companies are presented in Figures 11.3 and 11.4. The
revised tree of the fishermen is shown in Figure 11.1. The only tree
that points clearly in the direction of favoring oil exploration and pro-
duction is the tree constructed from interviews with oil company
representatives. All other trees include a majority of concerns that
tend to oppose oil development. In fact, in most discussions the posi-
tive aspects of oil development were only brought out after some prob-
ing by the analyst.
The trees emphasize the particular concern of the different
stakeholders, but they do not seem incompatible with each other. All
trees include environmental concerns, although they appear at dif-
ferent levels of detail, ranging from very detailed for the environmen-
talists to a "mentioned only" for the oil companies. Air quality impacts
emerged as a major concern in many interviews, and it takes some prom-
inence in the trees for Los Angeles City, Santa Barbara County, and the
environmentalist group. Santa Barbara County officials had main con-
cerns with onshore socioeconomic impacts (housing, water supply, etc.)
and the possible regional inequities resulting from offshore oil develop-
ment. Aesthetic impacts were not mentioned very often, and sometimes
were explicitly called "unimportant".
The oil company's tree reflects concern with amounts of oil that
are recoverable. By meeting legal and regulatory requirements the oil
company representatives felt that they addressed environmental con-
cerns. Our team did not interview any organizational units represent-
ing a combination or association of oil companies like the Western Oil
and Gas Association (WOGA). The values of WOGA are likely to be some-
what broader than the tangible exploration and production concerns of
the individual managers of oil companies, and probably include national
economic concerns as well as environmental and other values.
11.2.4. Building the combined value tree
It proved not to be difficult to combine the four "anti" oil development
trees; because of some difficulty in incorporating the oil company's
values in that combined tree, oil company values were simply added.
The combined tree is shown in Figure 11.5.
VlIlue Tree A?l.lIlysts
Exploration and
production parameters
Profit and
loss factors
Investment and cost
parameters
Geological
Risk factors
Terrain and
Climate
Public and legal
problems and delays
Estimated size of reservoirs
Distance from shore and
from supply facilities
Type of oil/gas
Estimates of rate of recovery
over time
Availability of funds
Economic trends
Oil prices
Cost of equipment, and O&M
Uncertainties about E&P
parameters
Uncertainty about
recovery of oil/gas
Weather conditions
Currents
Waves, winds
Vicinity to active earthquake faults
Public opposition
Regulatory delays
Legal delays
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Figure 11..3. Value t.ree reflecUng t.he concerns of oil companies in offshore
oil development..
Perhaps owing to the selection of the stakeholder groups (four out
of five were opposed to lease sale 80) the larger number of values in
this combined tree reflects anti-oil sentiments. However, the combined
tree appears to represent a broad spectrum of values and concerns.
The next task was to determine an appropriate level of values in
the combined tree which could be used for an evaluation of the alterna-
tives described in Table 11.1. The task should be simple, and. in par-
ticular, it should not overburden the stakeholder representatives with
large numbers of detailed elicitation questions.
For these reasons the evaluation was constructed at the level of
the eleven main value categories of the combined value tree. First an
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1mpacts on the
marine environment
From small and
medium oil spills
From large and
very large oil spills
Insuring and Managing Hazardous Risks
Reduction of fish/shellfish
Relocation of fish/shellfish
Changes in ecobalance
Killing of birds (seagulls)
Threats to endangered species
(otters, whales, sea lions)
Threats to ecobalance in
sanctuaries
Air quality impacts -
From drilling muds
and chronic discharges
On human health
On agricultural
business
Reduction of species
Th reats to ecobalance
Possible food-chain impacts
From CO
From SO"
From NO"
From hydrocarbons
From particulates
--E acid rain
~inals
~r support facilities
Onshore impacts
Interference with
fishing industry
Disturbance of
land-use patterns
Air quality on land
Impacts on tourism industry
Impacts on recreational and
sports fishing activities
Restriction of movements
of fishermen
Economic losses of fishermen
Aesthetics
(minor concern)
~al
~onbeaches ~actson birds~cts on people
Figure 11.4. Value tree reflecting t.he concerns of environmentalists about.
offshore 011 development..
impact matrix of five alternatives by eleven criteria was constructed.
Subsequently, the analysts began to collect the materials relevant for
describing the impacts in each cell of the matrix, using mainly pub-
lished materials and relying strongly on the environmental impact
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Housing availability
Freshwater availability
Land-use conflicts
Bureaucratic burden
on local government
National economic
and political
benefits
Regional and
local economic
benefits
Impacts on
regional and
local public
faci Iities,
supplies, and
land use
Fomic
~ical
~base impacts
~omic growth
Price of oil
Balance of trade
Federal revenues
, Employment
~rsityof energy supplies
~endence of foreign oil
Property taxes from onshore
developments
~s from increased employment
~nessstimulation
~Ioyment
With agricultural use
With residential use
With parks/recreational use
Interregional
inequities
and imbalances
Risks of a major
oil spill
Inequitable distribution
of oil development
among regions
Inequ itable distribution
of risk and benefits
Danger of imbalances,
loss of controlled growth
Impacts on local beaches
Impacts on birds
Impacts on endangered
species
Impacts on ecolog ica lIy
sensitive areas/sanctuaries
~licks
~ands
seaotter
Whales
Sea lion
Impacts on fish and
marine life
Operational
risks - marine
environment
Tainting and chronic toxicity
of fish/shellfish
Morbidity of fish/shellfish
~cation of fish/shellfish
Impacts on human health ~ food-chain impacts~pational safety
Aesthetics
Riparian habitat
Rocky intertidal areas
Dunes
Wetlands
Figu.re 1.1..5(a). Joint value tree reflecting concerns of various parties with
offshore oil development.
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Operational
risks - air
pollution
r.",surt.",g m.",d Mm.",mgt.",g HmBmrdous Rtslcs
Aggravation of existing
air pollution (NOx ' 0 3)
Health impacts
Impacts on
beach and
recreational
life-styles
Impacts on
fishery
Impacts on
other users
of the marine
environment
Aesthetics
Recreational life-styles
Beach culture
Special community styles
(research ,reti rement,etc.l
Restriction of fishing
activities
Economic losses
Increased "hassles"
Safety
Pleasure boaters
Navy
Commercial vessels
Tourism industry
Reduction of fishing territory
Restriction of navigational
flexibility
Increased competition for
~orspace
I Reduction of fish catch
---------j~age or loss of gear
Bureaucratic hassles
Hassles th rough interference
~normal activities
______--j~ationalaids
~gencyaids
Oil company
benefits
Profit and
loss factors
I R;,k~s
Type of find
Cost-(Jetermining E&P
parameters
Geological uncertainties
Terrain and climate
Public and legal
uncertainties
Estimate size of
oil/gas reservoir
Type of oil/gas
Economic trends
Depth of reservoir/water
Distance from shore, supply
and refinery facilities
Currents
Waves
Winds
Public opposition
Regulatory delays
Legal interference
Environmental and
other restrictions
Figure 1:1.~(b). Joint value tree renectlng concerns of various parties with
offshore oil development.
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Table 11.3. Segment of the impact matrix.
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Interregional
National political inequities and Risks ola
economic benfV'i,ts imbalancesa major oil spillb
Option 1: 270 M bbl of oil = Relatively ineq- P =30%
Hold lease 2-3% and uitable: large # = 0.36
sale 80 as 510 B fl3 of gas = share of burden S8 + VENT = 2%
planned in 7% of imparl reduction al in SB and Vent SD + LA = 4%
February peak production, resp. Possibilities of
1984 Very minor (positive) imbalanced
impacts on oil prices, growth in SB
federal revenues and Vent
Option Z: 170 M bbl of oil = 1% Inequitable: no P =15%
Delete tracts and share of burden # = 0.18
in Santa Mon- 470 B fl3 of gas = 6% in SD and LA SB + VENT = 2%
ica Bay, off import reduction at Possibility of SD + LA =2%
San Diego, off peak production, resp. imbalanced
San Pedro, Extremely minor (pos- growlh in SB
and around itive) impacts on oil and Vent
San Nicolas prices, federal
Island revenues
Option 3: 180 Mbbl of oil = 1% More equitable: P =2%
Delele all and puts burden on # = 0.24
tracts in 250 B fl3 of gas = 3- counties that SB + VENT =0%
Santa Bar- 4% of import reduction at have litUe share SD + LA = 2%
bara Channel peak production, resp. now (SD, LA)
Extremely minor (pos-
itive) impacls on oil
prices, federal
revenues
Option 4:
Delete all
tracls in
Sanla Bar-
bara Channel
and inner
basins
Option 5:
Cancel lease
sale or delay
indefinitely
110 Mbbl of oil = < 1%
and
280 B fl3 of gas = 4%
imparl reduction al
peak production, resp.
No discernible impacl
on oil prices, federal
revenues
No reduction of oil
and gas imports below
baseline
No positive impact on
oil prices
No additional federal
revenues
Relatively ineq-
uitable: gives no
special relief to
SB and Ventura
Relatively ineq-
uitable: leaves
inequity status
quo
P =11%
# = 0.12
SB + VENT = 0%
SD + LA = 0%
No additional
risk of oil spill
but 92% existing
risk from tank-
ers, 96% existing
risk from leases
#=6
aSB, Sant.a Barbara; Vent., Vent.ura; SD, San Diego; LA, Los Angeles.
bp • probabiUt.y ot 1 or more very large 011 spills (>10000 bbl); I, expect.ed number ot very
large 011 spllis over 25-year Ute; SB (VENT, SD, LA), probabil1t.y ot a very large 011 spll1
t.hat. hit.s Sant.a Barbara (Vent.ura, San Diego, Los Angeles).
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statement of the Minerals Management Service. In some cases the
analysts added their own judgments, when "hard" data were missing.
Three columns of the impact matrix are shown in Table 11.3. They
represent a heroic attempt to compress more than 1000 pages of
environmental impact assessments onto a few pages of text, and thus
presented a condensed factual side of the offshore oil problem. In
addition to impacts. relative ratings of the impacts on a 0-100 scale
were provided by the analyst team. This turned out to be relatively
easy, since all criteria but one are either monotone increasing or mono-
tone decreasing with the amount of oil resources that are likely to be
recovered under the given option. The relative spacing reflected judg-
ments about how the numerical differences in impacts would translate
into value-relevant differences.
11.2.5. Multiattribute utility models for five stakeholders
In a second round of interviews stakeholders were presented with the
impact matrix including the analysts' ratings and they were asked to
criticize impacts and ratings. Very few changes were requested by the
stakeholders and the necessary modifications were relatively minor. In
some instances the stakeholder representatives asked how the analysts
had obtained a particular datum. The matrix was left with them for
further comments.
Thus the analysis produced a fair amount of agreement about the
"factual" shades of possible conflicts. The remaining conflicts were
likely to be on the value side.
To operationalize the value conflicts in the weights of the multiat-
tribute utility models a two-stage procedure was used. First. respon-
dents considered only the risk attributes. They were presented with a
profile of all the "best" (smallest-risk) and all the "worst" (highest-
risk) impacts and were asked to consider a situation in which they were
"stuck" with all the worst impacts. For practical purposes this is the
situation created by the complete lease sale option 1. Subsequently,
respondents picked the one impact that they would most like to elim-
inate. Presumably that impact that was considered the most severe and
thus the value difference (improvement) by stepping from the "worst"
to the "best" impact was largest. They then picked the second most
severe impact, and so on, thereby rank ordering the value differences
in the eight impact categories. Having rank ordered the impact differ-
ences, respondents then assigned a value of 100% to the impact
category that they had ranked the highest and expressed as a percen-
tage less than 100% the relative difference in the impacts for the
remaining impact categories. The 0% point was meant to characterize a
hypothetical "no difference" impact category. The resulting "raw"
weights for the risk categories were then normalized to add to 1.
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Similarly, respondents were asked to rank order the benefit
categories in terms of the difference between the "smallest" and "larg-
est" benefits in the impact matrix. After rank ordering they again
assigned 100 points to the benefit category that they felt represented
the largest improvement in impacts, and assigned relative weights were
normalized to sum to 1. Respondents then assigned weights to the com-
bined risks versus the benefits. They were asked to assume that all
the "worst" negative impacts were stacked up on one side and all the
"best" positive impacts were stacked up on the other side. They were
reminded that, for practical purposes, this is like considering the com-
plete sale option 1 versus the cancellation of the sale, option 5. They
were then asked whether they preferred all the benefits and all the
risks (option 1) or neither (option 5). The answer to this question indi-
cated whether the benefits outweighed the risks or vice versa. Finally,
they were asked to assign a factor by which risks outweighed the bene-
fits or by which benefits outweighed the risks. The risk-benefit
weight ratio was then converted into weights for risk and benefits that
sum to 1. Final weights for each of the eleven impact categories were
obtained by multiplying the risk or benefit weight with the weight on
the particular impact category.
The results of the weighting analysis are shown in Table 11...4.
They clearly show that by far the main difference is the relative
Table 11.4. Weights for five stakeholder groups.B
Environ- Santa Los
mentalists Barbara Angeles F'isher- Oil
Impacts lists Cou.nty City men company
Benefits: 17% 17% 25% 50% 75%
National economic 11% 9% 15% 36% 21%
Local economic 6% 7% 7% 14% 25%
Oil company 0% 2% 3% 0% 28%
Risks and negative 83% 83% 75% 50% 25%
impacts:
Local infraslruclure 3% 14% 1% 12% 1%
Regional inequities 13% 14% 2% 4% 1%
Oil spill risks 10% 14% 16% 7% 7%
Marine pollulion 13% 7% 6% 7% 5%
Air pollution 16% 14% 20% 4% 3%
Beach and recrealion 2% 8% 10% 1% 5%
Fishery impacts 13% 9% 8% 13% 2%
Impacls on olher users 0% 4% 12% 1% 3%
(ConservaUon)b 13% 0% 0% 0% 0%
BAli weights are percentages (rounding effects cause the apparent discrepan-
cies).
bConoern added by the environmentalists.
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(High) 100
Complete sale
Delete "hot" tracts
• •
'"...~
..
c
..
ell
50 +-- • •Delete Santa Barbara Channel
Delete 25 miles
• •
100
(Low)
50
Risks
o I I Cancel J
o •
(High)
(Low)
Figure 11.6. Negative correlation between risks and benefits: circle, en-
vironmentalists; square, oil company.
weight put on overall risks versus benefits. This weight also strongly
determines the rank ordering of the options derived from the weighted
additive model. This sensitivity can be demonstrated as follows. Fig-
ure 11.6 shows the two dimensional plot of the five options on aggre-
gated risks and aggregated benefits. The two aggregated variables are
almost perfectly correlated. This is understandable, since the main
variable that mediates both risks and benefits is the amount of oil
resources that can be developed as a result of the lease.
As a consequence, whenever the overall risk weight is signifi-
cantly larger than that of the benefit weight (e.g. 75% versus 25%) the
model prefers the cancellation option followed, in the order of the
amount of oil resources, by the other options. The least preferred
option would be the complete sale option 1. Whenever benefits strongly
outweigh the risks the rank ordering is reversed.
Several sensitivity analyses determined the effects, for example,
of deleting air pollution or of reducing concerns about fishing impacts.
In general, such deletions had little effect whenever the overall
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weights on risk versus benefits were highly skewed but could have a
substantial effect when they were between 60-40 and 40-60. For
example. eliminating some concerns of the fishermen would swing the
fishermen's model to prefer the full lease sale 80, while elimination of
air pollution would not swing any of the other stakeholders.
11.2.6. Multiattribute utility models tor residents
ot Santa Monica and Ontario, Calitornia
Similar results were obtained in a small written survey of residents of
Santa Monica and Ontario, an inland city of California, using an abbrevi-
ated version of the multiattribute utility models that was developed
with the stakeholders (Marks and von Winterfeldt, 1984). It included
only three risk attributes (oil spills, water pollution, and aesthetic
impacts) and three benefit attributes (independence of foreign oil,
employment, and government revenues). Sixty-three respondents in
Santa Monica and Ontario carried out the steps of a multiattribute util-
ity analysis, similar to that described in the previous section, to evalu-
ate a single proposal for developing offshore oil resources in the Santa
Monica Bay. That proposal envisioned a development of about 50 million
barrels of oil in total and construction of 2-3 drilling and production
platforms. These platforms would be constructed within viewing dis-
tance of the Santa Monica shoreline and would operate for about 25
years. Separate samples in Santa Monica and in Ontario were asked to
evaluate a similar proposal that was to occur in Mobile, Alabama, to test
how judgments would change when the oil development occurred in
"somebody else's backyard".
The results were quite striking, and are interpretable in spite of
the fact that the samples were small. The percentage of respondents
opposing the development are shown in Table 11.5. Residents of Santa
Monica generally judged the development as undesirable when it was to
occur in their own backyard, the Santa Monica Bay. They were evenly
divided between pro and anti development attitudes when the develop-
ment was to occur in Mobile.
Ontario residents favored the development and did not distinguish
between locations. When analyzed in terms of the parameters of the
multiattribute utility models, the most striking result was a difference
in the relative weights of the risk versus the benefits, as shown in
Table 11.5. Residents of Santa Monica placed a weight of 79% on the
risk attributes when the development was to occur in their backyard,
but only 45% when it was planned for Mobile, Alabama. Ontario
residents placed about equal weights on risks versus benefits,
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Table 11.5. Results of a queslionnaire survey of California residents. a
Residents of Residents of
Location of Santa Monica Ontario. CA
development (n =30) (n =33)
Santa Monica Bay 81 (0.79) 33 (0.43)
Mobile, Alabama 43 (0.45) 21 (0.49)
BThe table gives the percentage of residents opposing development and, in
parentheses, the weight they attach to the risks.
independently of the location of the development. Thus the "backyard
effect" manifests itself mainly in an exaggeration of the weight put on
risks.
11.2.7. Discussion
The analysis shows that different value structures and different
weights for the risks versus the benefits are the most important reason
for the conflict about offshore oil drilling. It also indicates a strong
"not in my backyard" phenomenon that manifests itself in accentuating
the weights for the risk attributes over the benefit attributes. On the
whole, there was substantial agreement among stakeholders about the
factual side of the problem.
Because of the large weight differences and because of the corre-
lation between risks and benefits, small manipulations of the options
(e.g. reducing air pollution or eliminating a particular environmentally
valuable tract) will not generate any compromises. The option to delete
all tracts within a 25-mile zone seemed attractive to most opponents,
and it may be possible to develop a compromise based on it.
The fishermen are the only opponents who could possibly be con-
vinced to accept an altered version of the complete lease sale alterna-
tive. Elimination or reduction of some of the more severe fishing
impacts coupled with generous compensation mechanisms for loss of
catch or equipment will, according to the models, go a long way towards
a compromise between the oil industry and the fishermen.
A Final Note
After Watt's resignation, a temporary moratorium was imposed on
offshore oil lease sales. Currently, a modified and much smaller lease
sale has been proposed by Interior Secretary Hodel. The plan still
encounters stiff opposition, and the arguments have changed little
since 1983. The stakeholder models described in the previous sections
could provide a blueprint for designing compromise solutions for a new
lease sale.
VlIlue Tree Anlllysts
11.3. Lessons. PiUalls. and Recommendations
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In this concluding section we will discuss some of the insights gen-
erated by the application of value tree analysis to the offshore oil con-
troversy and by other recent applications. First, some of the possible
uses of value tree analysis in diagnosis and resolution of conflicts are
described. Subsequently, possible pitfalls of value tree analysis are
discussed together with some recommendations for overcoming them.
11.3.1. Does value tree analysis help in diagnosis
and resolution of conflicts?
In most applications, the main contribution of value tree analysis has
been in the improvement of the understanding of the stakeholders'
positions in the debate. The value trees appear to be the main vehicle
for improving understanding and it is not uncommon to find stakehold-
ers express surprise when confronted with other organizations' values.
In the oil application. for example, the concern with air pollution
expressed by several groups was surprising to some. Similarly, the
clear distinctions between fishermen's and environmentalists' values
was not completely anticipated. The fishermen, in particular, had been
concerned with a lack of empathy on the side of the oil companies and
felt that "they just don't listen to our concerns". Value trees thus
could provide a useful mechanism for exchanging value-relevant infor-
mation.
Often the value trees lead to improved understanding and clarity
of values and concerns within an organization. After interviews car-
ried out to structure the FRG's energy objectives (Keeney et al., in
press) almost all respondents expressed appreciation of the process in
which their values were brought out and they felt that they had
learned something.
The joint value tree, while necessarily an abstraction, can be use-
ful in defining the scope of the discourse about a controversial prob-
lem, and for identifying areas of agreement and disagreement. It also
provides a legitimate structure for discussions and defines agendas.
Missing elements in a value tree can be just as interesting as the listed
ones. For example, the joint FRG value tree had no values related to
national image and national prestige, and the joint value tree in the oil
study includes aesthetic concerns only in a very minor way, in spite of
the analysts' probing.
In the past, most conflicts were found in the value structures or,
when the joint value tree was considered, in the weights attached to its
branches. This was not only true in the offshore oil study, but also in
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Edwards' (1980) school desegregation study, Rozelle's (1982) Arizona
water project study, and in a follow-up study to the FRG energy
analysis. If weights are in conflict, there are no simple solutions to the
problem, since weights are expressions of legitimate value differences.
The formal sensitivity analysis can merely indicate the extent to which
a particular stakeholder may be "swayed" either by option invention or
by changes in the weights.
While the usefulness of value tree analysis for conflict diagnosis
has been established, its use for face-to-face conflict resolution has
still to be proven. The main use of the analysis may be in facilitating
communication in mediation processes, in setting agendas, and for
investing compromise options or packaging options that are attractive
to the opposing stakeholders. There is, however, one major obstacle to
this kind of analysis: very few arenas can accommodate this type of
rational display of facts, values, and conflicts. The adversarial nature
of the courts appears to hinder analytical processes more than it facil-
itates them. Arbitration is often aided by power brokerage. and
rational analysis may not be the most useful activity. Only mediation
arenas, which are still fairly rare in the kinds of disputes discussed
here, seem directly amenable to implementing value tree analysis.
11.3.2. Pitfalls and recommendation
The lack of an appropriate arena often couples with lack of stake-
holder interest to create an atmosphere of benign neglect of value tree
analysis. One of the first pitfalls of value tree analysis is this inability
to generate involvement and problem focus for the stakeholders. The
oil study clearly suffered in this respect, and to a lesser degree the
FRG energy study as well. On the other hand, Rozelle's (1982) study of
alternative flood control projects in Arizona appeared to have gen-
erated much involvement. We believe that this project was more suc-
cessful in this respect because it created its own arena. because there
was a responsible decision-maker who was committed to taking the
analysis results seriously, and because it was sponsored by a neutral
government agency.
The following precautions are recommended to users of value tree
analysis in order to avoid the "irrelevance" pitfall:
(1) Assure that the analysis is linked to a real arena and a real deci-
sion.
(2) Obtain sponsorship from agencies that are perceived to be neutral
in the issues, or obtain a balanced sponsorship from several agen-
cies.
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(3) Work in close consultation with the real decision-making agency
whether or not it is the sponsoring agency.
The second most common pitfall in value tree analysis is the
refusal of some stakeholders to cooperate. or the loss of some stake-
holders after initial cooperation. In Edwards' school desegregation
study, the two most extreme groups (one antibussing and one probuss-
ing group) refused to participate at all, and some individuals did not
provide weights for the final value tree. In the FRG energy study, an
association of environmental and peace activists, after initially agree-
ing to a meeting, did not further participate in the value tree process
after this initial meeting. Usually the refusal is a result of strong ideo-
logical positions and assumptions that their involvement could be con-
strued as co-option.
To make participation appealing to a broad range of stakeholders,
it helps to:
(1) Obtain sponsorship from several sides in the debate and stress
the fact that all sides can learn something from the process.
(2) Create a broad range of alternatives that accommodate even radi-
cal views.
(3) Be very frank about one's own and one's sponsors' objectives in
pursuing the analysis.
(4) Assure confidentiality at each stage of the process and allow
stakeholders to reassess the value of their participation at each
stage, before their responses are made public.
While the foregoing pitfalls had to do with the process of the
analysis, the next two address pitfalls in the techniques themselves.
The first is well known to analysts: settling too quickly on a problem
definition and structure. It cannot be stressed too much that the ini-
tial structuring stages of value construction of the separate value trees
are crucial and should be carried out with many iterations and with
much flexibility toward restructuring if necessary. In particular, the
definition of inappropriate alternatives can become a major stumbling
block. Analysts should keep an open mind and define a broad range of
initial options. As a rule. the options should include the most pre-
ferred alternative of each stakeholder.
The second class of technical pitfalls involves biases in value tree
structuring and weight elicitation. One such bias is a result of "selfish-
ness", which would eliminate any values and concerns that favor an
alternative that the stakeholder group does not like. The same bias
may lead to a lower weighting of those branches of the joint value tree
that favor undesirable alternatives. This type of bias has been rare in
value tree analysis. but it has been reported in other contexts (see
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Dyer and Miles, 1976). The opposite bias seems more common: to
express a broader range of values than those that truly represent the
stakeholders' position and to state a more balanced set of weights.
This "social desirability" bias poses no problem for the purpose of
building value trees, but in weighting it may lead to an artificial agree-
ment among stakeholders (see, for example, Stillwell et al., 1981).
To counter these biases the analysts should:
(1) Emphasize that the role of the analysis is to create a realistic
portrayal of each stakeholders' value systems.
(2) Stress the diagnostic value of the activity.
(3) Assure confidentiality until the results are accepted by the
stakeholder representatives.
Value tree analysis is still in its infancy. Whether or not it
becomes an acceptable tool for diagnosing and resolving conflicts about
social issues like hazardous materials transport and storage depends
largely on the analysts' skills in avoiding the pitfalls described above.
Note
[1] The research reporled in lhis chapler was conducled joinlly wllh Ward
Edwards and Richard John of lhe Universlly of Soulhern California
under lhe sponsorship of lhe Nalional Science Foundalion (granl No.
PRA-8108683). The views and opinions expressed here are solely lhose
of lhe aulhor and do nol necessarily reflecl lhe opinions of lhe US
Governmenl or any of U.s agencies.
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11.D1. Discussion
H. Otway [1]
Having little experience of writing discussion papers, I did not quite
know how to begin this. So I went to the library to see how discussion
papers are usually written. I soon realized that they pose a problem
for most of us, being a sort of peer review without the benefit of
anonymity. The general format seems to be an awkward attempt, such
as this, to start on a friendly tone, followed by something vaguely posi-
tive about the paper, after which one engages in the serious business
of mild criticism.
Fortunately, I came across a discussion paper on the application
of risk analysis, buried in the proceedings of a conference held in Ger-
many in 1979, which had solved the problem. It tackled the business of
discussion by addressing four astute, and still quite topical, "theses"
posed by the discussant. I decided to use the four theses of that
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paper (von Winterfeldt, 1980, hereinafter referred to as "DvW, 1980")
as a basis for this discussion.
However, this proved to be unexpectedly difficult since von Win-
terfeldt had cleverly anticipated my criticisms and had dealt with them
in this chapter (hereinafter referred to as "DvW. 1985"), which I dis-
cuss here: therefore, I will quote liberally from DvW (1985) when
addressing the four theses put forward by DvW (1980). I will follow this
with a general discussion of value tree analysis and conclude with
remarks praising both von Winterfeldt and his paper while expressing
reservations about the application of value tree analysis in practice.
11.01.1. Four theses on the application or value trees
Thesis 1
The first question should be ... for whom and for what purpose?
Failure to answer this ... can lead to the most common pitfall of
analysis - addressing the wrong problem. (DvW, 1980.)
As far as "for whom?" goes, DvW (1985) recognizes this problem. Cau-
tioning about the '''irrelevance' pitfall" he advises us to:
(1) Assure that the analysis is linked to a real arena and a real
decision.
(2) Obtain sponsorship from agencies that are perceived to be
neutral in the issues, or obtain a balanced sponsorship from
several agencies.
(3) Work in close consultation with the real decision-making
agency, whether or not it is the sponsoring agency.
Point 1, at least at a superficial level, is under the control of the
analyst if we assume that he can refuse to lend his skills to unreal are-
nas and nondecision contexts, although this may not always be true in
practice.
Points 2 and 3 are more problematical. It can be difficult indeed
to find an agency that is perceived as being neutral by all parties to a
controversy. Further, the turf-protecting instincts of organizations
with overlapping areas of interest and responsibility might outweigh
the possible benefits to them of multiple sponsorship of studies. It
might be even more difficult to work with the "real decision-making
agency" if it is not the sponsoring agency. An organization with
decision-making responsibility is unlikely to lend its support and
cooperation to a study over which it has no control and where it has
not defined the terms of reference. This may be no more than a simple
matter of protecting its decision-making prerogatives.
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"For what purpose?" is a rather more difficult question. A general
problem with multiattribute techniques lies in the elicitation of objec-
tives: it is not that decision-makers do not know what their objectives
are. but rather that their true objectives often cannot be stated for
organizational or personal reasons. However, the needs and values of
the sponsor do help shape the outcome of research. This was foreseen
by DvW (1980) who says: "The different purposes of risk assessment
for ... clients include satisfying intellectual curiosity, legitimizing
already made decisions ... ". Clearly the legitimization of decisions
already taken cannot be stated as the objective of a study. DvW (1985)
admits that "very few arenas can accommodate this type of rational
display of facts. values, and conflicts .... Only mediation arenas, which
are still fairly rare in the kinds of disputes discussed here seem
directly amenable to implementing value tree analysis. "
On balance. I think it would be difficult for a real decision-making
agency to use value tree analysis in practice in a way that would be po-
litically defensible.
Thesis 2
Risk assessment should aid specific institutions in solving real
and complex decision problems. Risk assessments for pure infor-
mational or comparative purposes are likely to be irrelevant for
decision-making purposes. (DvW, 1980.)
There seems little doubt that value tree analysis, structured to provide
information on the issues important to stakeholder groups, is designed
to provide information relevant to complex decision problems. How-
ever. we must also consider how valid the information obtained actually
would be in practice: Le. could it represent the values of all relevant
groups accurately enough to form a basis for policy? Kerry Thomas and
I, in a paper which questioned the premises of risk perception
research. discussed the need for "depth interviewing with as many dif-
ferent public groupings as is possible", raising "the issue of whether or
not the public is willing to cooperate", and speculating that "politically
active groups are directly relevant to policy makers (if not policy) ...
but that such groups might well be the least inclined to collaborate
with researchers who want to investigate their motives" (Otway and
Thomas. 1982.)
This concern has also been anticipated by DvW (1985):
The lack of an appropriate arena often couples with lack of
stakeholder interest to create an atmosphere of benign neglect
of value tree analysis. One of the first pitfalls ... is this inability
to generate involvement and problem focus for the stakehold-
ers. . .. The second most common pitfall... is the refusal of some
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stakeholders t.o cooperat.e, or t.he loss of some st.akeholders after
initial cooperation.... Usually t.he refusal is a result. of st.rong
ideological positions and assumptions t.hat. t.heir involvement. could
be const.rued as co-option.
DvW (1985) then goes on to identify another problem which can affect
the validity of the data:
One ... bias is a result. of "selfishness", which would eliminat.e any
values and concerns t.hat. favor an alternative t.hat. t.he st.ake-
holder group does not. like. The same bias may lead t.o a lower
weighting of t.hose branches of t.he joint. value t.ree t.hat. favor
undesirable alt.ernatives.
Von Winterfeldt recommends ways in which the analyst can try to
avoid these pitfalls, but they are not very convincing to me, primarily
because they mostly involve advice on how to win the confidence of
stakeholder groups and thus are not really "implementable" in the
usual sense.
In summary, I think that value tree analysis. in principle, can gen-
erate exactly the kind of information that is most relevant to the evolu-
tion of policy on controversial topics. Unfortunately, I am afraid that
it has inherent limitations in that it is precisely when there is contro-
versy that full and honest stakeholder participation will be most diffi-
cult to obtain. If this is indeed the case, then the results of value tree
analysis are primarily for "pure informational purposes", failing the
test of the second thesis.
Thesis 3
Solving complex decision problems requires a comprehensive
approach which carefully defines t.he available alt.ernatives and
assesses t.he direct. and indirect. cost.s, risks, and benefit.s of
t.hese alt.ernatives in light. of t.he objectives of t.he decision mak-
ing instit.ution ... rat.her t.han st.arting wit.h t.he question "what. are
t.he risks?" a comprehensive analysis would st.art wit.h t.he ques-
tions "what. is t.he decision problem, what. are t.he alt.ernatives,
and what. are t.he objectives?" (DvW, 1980.)
Here value t.ree analysis stacks up pretty well. It avoids the near-
sighted risk focus sometimes encountered (e.g. the simple-minded
"acceptable risk" notion), it is tied to real decisions, it prefers real
arenas, and its primar'y goal is to get stakeholders to participate in the
problem of generating alternatives. This is a significant. improvement
on most risk perception research, which is not well suited to eliciting
responses on salient. policy alternatives. In theory, at least, value tree
analysis is a good method.
Valu.e Tree Analysis
Thesis 4
Decision analysis is lhe only comprehensive and praclical melho-
dology for aiding complex decisions. However, decision analysis
needs lo be adapled lo lhe political and inslilutional realilies of
decision making on problems of lechnological risks. (DvW, 19BO.)
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The fourth thesis shows the author's sense of dissatisfaction, in 1980,
with the constraints of traditional decision analysis and his desire to
improve it:
The application of decision analysis lo problems involving large
lechnological risks is still in its infancy ... requir[ing] an adapta-
tion of lhe lraditional decision analysis process. For example,
risk problems lypically involve negotiations belween conflicling
inleresl groups. Decision analysis ... has been mainly developed
wilhin lhe single decision maker paradigm. Bul in spile of its
presenl shorlcomings decision analysis ... has lhe polenlial of
meeting lhe above requirements for a sound application of risk
assessmenl. (DvW, 19BO.)
In retrospect, we see that this was an important historical
moment, the first expression of the idea that a value tree could be
created by grafting stakeholder group values onto the still immature
decision tree.
11.D1.2. Discussion
Von Winterfeldt gives an excellent overview of value tree analysis, iden-
tifying its roots in multiattribute decision techniques, explaining
clearly how one actually goes about using it, and outlining the common
pitfalls which must be avoided. One of the more appealing aspects of
value tree analysis is that it is based on the values held by real people,
as opposed to those dreary and sterile analyses which go on about what
"rational" people would do if they were only wise enough to accept the
values of the analyst instead of stubbornly striving to achieve their
own objectives based on their own values.
Another appealing aspect of value tree analysis is that it deals
with the values of policy-relevant groups. Most risk perception stud-
ies, partly owing to financial constraints, have used opportunistic sam-
ples, such as club members or psychology students. Samples of the
general public, when they can be had, usually require that the data be
analyzed on the basis of what could be called involuntary group
memberships, Le. sorted on the basis of demographic variables. These
differences may be significant, but are difficult to interpret in a politi-
cally meaningful way. Value tree analysis, in contrast, deals with
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groups that have voluntary, real-world memberships, allowing it to more
effectively model real political processes.
Yet another appealing aspect of value tree analysis is the close
relationship between the analyst and stakeholder groups. This two-way
relationship undoubtedly facilitates a clearer understanding on the
part of the analyst of how those affected perceive the problem under
investigation. This is a drawback of psychometric pencil and paper
surveys: there is little contact with the respondents. generally no
feedback to them, and often no way to tell whether all salient items
have been addressed or whether the respondents have understood the
items as was intended. However, I wonder if we might have a bit of
"new toolism" here, an attempt by the decision analysis community to
get a piece of the risk action. This raises a few rhetorical questions.
Is value tree analysis really the best framework for establishing
what sounds like an analyst-respondent relationship based on trust
and mutual respect? Could a psychiatrist or a sociologist, not equipped
with the value tree methodology and equations. obtain an equally valid
understanding of people's concerns just by listening to them? Could it
be that the real function of value trees is to give decision analysts
something to do with their hands while they talk to people? Are the
good results obtained from value tree analysis a confirmation of the
method or a tribute to the interpersonal skills of the analysts? If this
be the case, the results may not be replicable by other investigators.
In summary. in a perfect world. where unbiased organizations
could be found, where the agencies managing the process and stake-
holders holding extreme positions were truly willing to compromise. and
where all parties would participate wholeheartedly in the process of
fully and accurately defining their value trees, the value tree metho-
dology might be more relevant to policy formation than conventional
risk analysis or risk perception studies. But its utility will also depend
on the degree to which interest groups are willing to trust unelected
analysts to solve political problems in preference to the "smoke-filled
room" dealings of elected politicians. This is an important point
because value tree analysis is basically the use of the decision analysis
framework to model political processes which, although imperfect, do
function. In practice, the contribution of value trees to the solution of
controversies will ultimately depend upon the extent to which ideal
conditions for its application can be found.
l1.D1.3. Concluding remarks
I found von Winterfeldt's paper to be very good. It is well written.
clear. logical. complete and illustrated with a real case study. More-
over, as we have seen, it quite carefully outlines the shortcomings of
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value tree analysis as well as its strengths; in all respects it is a nice
piece of craftsmanship and the author is to be congratulated.
Value tree analysis itself also deserves favorable mention. It is
descriptive, recognizes the political importance of stakeholder groups,
is structured around the evaluation of policy alternatives and. as such,
is well suited to analyze the political processes that are of most impor-
tance to policy decisions on controversial topics.
I am somewhat less optimistic about the prospects for using value
tree analysis in practice. Its success in real policy arenas seems too
dependent on a degree of altruistic behavior that is rare in interest
groups or any other organization. DvW (1985) concludes by saying that
"Value tree analysis is still in its infancy. Whether or not it becomes
an acceptable tool for diagnosing and resolving conflicts about social
issues ... depends largely on the analysts' skills in avoiding the pit-
falls ... ". It will also depend upon finding special arenas that can best
accommodate what appear to be inherent limitations of the method.
Von Winterfeldt suggests mediation as one possible application; another
might be to aid negotiation of terms of implementation once stakehold-
ers have agreed to accept a particular course of action. Despite these
reservations, I think the "infant" value tree is worthy of fertilization.
Note
[1] I am grateful to Dellof von Winterfeldt himself for his comments on an
earlier draft of this discussion.
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11.D2. Discussion
I. Rosenthal
Von Winterfeldt has presented his study on the application of value
tree analysis to offshore oil drilling clearly and objectively. In com-
menting on the problems that arose in this particular case study, von
Winterfeldt implied that, while these problems might be of generic
nature, resolution could be obtained by changes in methodology. From
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my viewpoint, that of the manager of a chemical company's Safety,
Health. and Environmental Affairs organization, the difficulties he has
experienced were not unexpected. However, I am not optimistic that
refinement of the techniques can be expected to resolve the problems
described. The fundamental problem arises when one moves MAUT or
value tree analysis from a decision tool used by a single individual who
must reconcile his different interests and values to the other extreme
of a group of stakeholders who may feel no need to take each others
interests into account.
It is difficult to see how value tree analysis can be successful
unless the stakeholders involved accept. at least implicitly, a common
utilitarian index of "goodness" and also agree. that once this "good-
ness" function has been maximized and elucidated (by value tree
analysis). they will endorse it. Von Winterfeldt himself points out that
value differences and "selfishness" both stand in the way of an agree-
ment on the "optimum goodness". Put another way, there appears to be
an unwillingness to voluntarily accept an optimum "goodness" solution if
it affects either a stakeholder's fundamental values or his basic
material interests.
Von Winterfeldt implicitly recognizes this problem of voluntary
action or selfishness when he recommends that the work be done in
"close consultation with the real decision making agency". Under such
an arrangement, one is essentially dealing with a situation that is simi-
lar to the use of MAUT in arriving at an individual decision. The value
tree process will make the decision-making agency aware of the degree
of support/opposition it faces from the different stakeholders depend-
ing on which variant of the proposition it executes. The agency and/or
decision-maker can then choose the proposition that will optimize its
own utilitarian goodness equation. It can decide which stakeholders it
can afford to antagonize, which it must carry along. and where it wants
to position itself with the remainder. In essence. value tree analysis
then becomes a tool that assists a ratioinal political decision by the
group or individual having the power to make the decision. It can pro-
mote an understanding of stakeholder concerns and stakeholders' feel-
ings about the level of benefits that the stakeholders believe they are
entitled to, and such understanding promotes the ease with which the
agency can promote "deals". It also clearly points out which are the
single issue stakeholders with whom there is no dealing. For example,
why should one expect a group that feels that expanded energy usage
is inherently bad to accept any risk associated with energy expansion?
There are no benefits to compensate for any level of risk.
In conclusion, I believe that the techniques and approaches put
forward by von Winterfeldt are a valuable addition to our search for
better techniques of resolving conflict. However, I believe they are
most valuable when used by the decision-making unit (person, agency,
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local council) in assessing stakeholder positions as part of the process
by which the decision-making unit optimizes its course of action (a po-
litical process) rather than in promoting a decision commonly arrived at
by all stakeholders.



CHAPTER 12
Regulating Environmental Risks:
A Comparative Perspective
T. 0 'Riordan and B. Wynne
12.1. Introduction
In this chapter we offer a comparative look at regulation of environ-
mental risk in industrialized economies. We argue that risk regulation
is part of a national style of government. But, while there may be a
degree of national idiosyncrasy, there are also important and growing
elements of common ground underlying contemporary developments in
risk regulation. The common features include some dependence upon
self-policing by the risk creator, an element of more formal interven-
tion through structured and often laborious consultation, a reliance on
expertise, and an uneasy relationship between specific technical
advice and judgment on the one hand, and the need to command public
confidence and credibility on the other.
These developments are leading to a degree of convergence of
regulatory styles: towards more open, externally accountable pro-
cedures, towards a greater element of politically as well as scientifi-
cally credible safety standards, and towards a more formal approach to
enforcement even when there is a greater dependency on self-policing
or at least a more collegiate approach to regulator-client relations.
These trends will not eclipse the idiosyncrasies of national regulatory
styles; but we suggest that risk regulation generally is passing through
an important transition built around the practical reconciliation of gen-
eral needs for "third party" reassurance (public credibility) and the
need to define and control specific risks.
This transition is exposing many tensions. More difficulties are in
store for the regulation and management of radioactive and other
390 Insuri.ng ana Managing Halllarao1J.s Risks
hazardous materials. These difficulties relate to mechanisms to widen
even further public participation in both the standard setting and the
disposal strategy process, to strengthen the external accountability of
monitoring and enforcement. and to ensure that "hazard face" regula-
tory action is consistent with both organizational policy and the many
variables associated with particular circumstances. This latter prob-
lem is likely to become most observable in the management of hazardous
wastes. Central control and homogeneity of regulation may not fit
easily with the realities of hazardous waste management, where flexibil-
ity and discretion are important practical factors.
The usual approach to analyzing the impact of political and cul-
tural factors upon regulation has tended to imply that facets of
national style make a uniform local imprint upon regulation whatever
the issue being regulated. While not wishing to deny the importance of
comparative cultural analysis of decision-making and public credibility,
we wish to suggest that these cultural factors create different effects
on issues according to intrinsic features of those issues. We will illus-
trate this point in outline by reference to the case of hazardous
wastes.
The policy implications of this comparative review are that in all
political cultures the general problems of institutional credibility will
continue to gain in importance. and implementation failures will only
exacerbate them. Therefore local enforcement will be subject to
increasingly stringent public attention. and new means of developing
shared authority between regulators. regulated. and the public in the
face of scientific uncertainty will have to be produced.
12.2. Environmental Risk and Regulation
To regulate means to control by authoritative rules. and to impose con-
sistent and, ideally, predictable restrictions on an activity in accor-
dance with these rules. "Authority" does not mean coercion, but vary-
ing degrees of persuasion. Environmental regulation applies to controls
over activities which could affect the well-being of third parties who
may not be in a position either to know about or to avoid the dangers to
which they are involuntarily exposed.
Risk regulation can be divided into four components (as illustrated
in F'igure 12.1):
(1) standard setting: the determination of suitable levels of emis-
sion, general environmental safety, and manufacture and mainte-
nance of equipment, judged to be acceptable to the most exposed
populations.
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Determining standards
For processes and products:
• Limits to exposure to workforce and public.
• Controls over emissions.
(Based on scientific evidence, lessons from
accidents, response to intervenor group pressure,
and response to public/political concern.)
Licensing specific risk creators
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Evaluation
(Based on effectiveness,
efficiency, cost minimization,
and fairness)
Processes or products.
(Based on design targets, established
scientific criteria, and rule-of-thumb
technical, economic, and environmental
factors.)
Monitoring activity
• Ensuring that the risk creator is
reliable and knowledgeable.
• Ensuring that the risk creator is
externally accountable.
• Monitoring ambient environmental
conditions.
• Monitoring sampling specific emissions.
Enforcing compl iance
• Advice, diplomacy, persuasion.
• Threat. sanction.
• Test cases, example setting.
• Protecting public and private image.
F'igure 1.2.1. The practice of risk regulation.
(2) Licensing: the application of specific requirements of health and
safety to particular plants, processes, or activities. Licensing is
the process of applying the general to the particular on the basis
of agreed rules. The application of these rules is, however, rarely
predictable or clear cut.
(3) Monitoring and compliance: monitoring of regulated activities
to ensure that they conform to agreed standards. targets, and
Licensing conditions. Enforcement of Licensing conditions occurs
through advice, negotiation, threats, legal action. and penalties.
There are important rules and agreed forms of behavior in the
enforcement process which are subtly changing as a result of
increased public scrutiny.
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(4) Evaluation of the efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness of regu-
lation to refine and improve the whole regulatory process. This is
usually relatively unstructured, although official inquiries, espe-
cially following failures, are a formal means of evaluation.
Of these four functions, the evaluative function is the least well
understood and followed. There are no agreed criteria for regulation,
for much of contemporary regulation has grown organically in response
to technical developments and political pressures neither of which are
always predictable. Indeed, it is important to see formal regulatory
innovations as an addition to the informal regulation which is part and
parcel of ordinary social and economic interaction. In this way one can
more clearly see formal regulation (e.g. via specific legislation and sta-
tutes) as rooted in prevailing national processes of political economy
and culture, though affected also by the specific history of given
issues and regulatory institutions.
Four overall yardsticks for regulation are normally used: effec-
tiveness; efficiency; cost-effectiveness; and fairness. Even without the
problem of public justification and credibility, it is all but impossible to
reconcile these criteria in environmental risk regulation. Indeed. as
Kasperson points out in Chapter 7 of this volume, there are as yet no
agreed rules as to fairness in environmental risk regulation and no use-
ful studies of how far equity considerations influence regulation or are
set against tests of administrative efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
In 1976 the UK Government agreed that regulation should be so
designed that the benefits of control should be more clearly related to
costs of regulation (HM Government. 1980, pp 40-41). The aim was to
make environmental regulation more economically justifiable so as to
reduce any unnecessary financial burden either on industry or on pub-
licly funded activity. The "deregulation" thrust of the Reagan adminis-
tration in the USA after 1979 was in the same direction. Subsequently,
in 1980-1982 an attempt was made to streamline the administrative
efficiency of the UK regulatory inspectorates. but initiatives proved
unsuccessful. Baram (see Chapter 13) also shows that in the USA, the
courts have ruled that cost-benefit criteria do not form a permissible
basis for regulatory action. Risk benefit justification is therefore still
in confused infancy. Moreover, administrative efficiency is not related
to the effectiveness of regulation. Equity considerations do not yet
appear on the evaluative agenda at all.
12.2.1. Difficulties in establishing a sound
risk regulatory process
Other contributions to this book suggest why environmental risk is
such a difficult phenomenon to regulate (see especially Chapter 10 by
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Slovic and the ensuing Discussions by Lee and Renn). We summarize the
problem as follows:
(1) There is no agreement as to what constitutes "acceptable" risk.
The process of determining that level of risk is just as important
as the actual safety standard finally reached. Acceptability of
regulation is about style, and trust, and confidence building (Le.
about institutional relationships of regulation). This is why
broad-based public support for the authority of regulatory insti-
tutions is such a critical factor.
(2) The whole regulatory process is characterized by uncertainty -
uncertainties about the nature and distribution of risk. as well as
about the distribution of responsibility and its possible conse-
quences. The models used for identifying and predicting hazard
are subject not only to "marginal" imprecisions (the conventional
framework of risk management) but also to fundamental ignorance.
Regulatory processes artificially process the latter into the
former.
(3) The increasing use of formal models - both statistical (in the form
of mathematical relationships based on rigorous laws) and concep-
tual (in the form of imagined combinations of circumstances and
events building up a picture of possible faults) - can be at odds
with more conventional approaches to regulation based upon
experience. tested judgment, and intuition. These conventional
approaches depend upon a regulator's empirical knowledge of the
process - social as well as technical - his/her understanding of
what technical developments could be applied to improve that pro-
cess, a sense of what is managerially and financially practicable
for the risk creator to cope with, and a diplomatic recognition of
when and how to put on the pressure. Note that none of these
factors involve particular models of risk: they relate to what the
regulator "thinks is right" and are often highly flexible to partic-
ular conditions.
(4) Public interpretations or riskiness may be at variance with the
judgments of professional regulators. This is probably the most
difficult problem facing the modern regulatory official and the
politician. nowadays responsible for determining final standards.
People do not judge risks solely in terms of physical dangers. but
regard them as part of a technology or a decision-making process
with which they feel comfortable or uncomfortable. People are
also confused by the political and technical mystification associ-
ated with expertise; in their confusion, they cling to the views of
credible authorities. Given the absence of genuinely independent
but informed commentators, these "credible authorities" may be
"public interest" pressure groups, the media, their trade union,
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or other trusted social reference groups. As science has been
increasingly (over)used as an attempted means of regulatory
authority, so it has been correspondingly "deconstructed"
(exposed and found wanting) in public by critical scientists (and
well-briefed lawyers) demonstrating the lack of any watertight
logic-bound or evidence-bound basis of official regulatory claims
for scientific justification of standards and policies. Authority
and expertise have therefore been dispersed into a confusing tan-
gle of competing claims and allegiances. This has occurred to dif-
ferent degrees in different political cultures, depending upon the
style or social use of science, and the institutional means of
reviewing its claims. We illustrate this point later by contrasting
the US and UK cases (pp 323-325, 329-330).
(5) "The public" is not a monolith of similarly behaving individuals.
There are a great variety of "publics" responding to environmen-
tal situations. What appears evident from research (see, for
example, Otway and Thomas, 1982; van der Pligt, 1985) is that two
polarized groups stand apart: one generally favors technology
and economic progress through current mechanisms of innovation,
and is quite supportive of established expertise and regulation;
the other group is suspicious of complex technology or, perhaps
more accurately, of the corporations that devise and promote it,
frustrated that they cannot halt or at least alter the development
of that technology, and determined to be part of the process of
regulation which they regard as much a political as a technical
exercise. It is wise to be cautious about any firm figures, though
it is estimated that about 30% of the population of Western nations
fall into the former category and about 20% into the latter, with
about half the population in the middle seeking reassurance. The
latter may be sceptical, but are capable of being moved in either
direction (see Milbrath, 1984). One of the most important issues in
contemporary environmental risk management is the battle for
public credibility, a major reason why risk regulation is so much
more politicized than it used to be.
(6) What emerges from all this is escalating uncertainty as to how to
proceed with the regulation of environmental risks. The feasibil-
ity of reconciling all the conflicts appears to be diminishing fast.
The technical people prefer quantifiable and predictable cri-
teria upon which to base judgements - that is the stuff of science
and the scientific method. The risk-creating industries likewise
seek clear targets and standards which lead to consistent licens-
ing procedures so that they can embark on major investments with
very long time horizons with a high degree of managerial confi-
dence. Thus industry laments the constant alteration of regula-
tory requirements in response to unpredictable political
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reactions. adverse publicity over accidents and near accidents
(some of which are unsuccessfully covered up). and developments
in scientific understanding and technological innovation.
Examples abound. In the aftermath of every environmental
disaster there are significant shifts in regulatory policing and
licensing conditions. Following the Love Canal case in 1978. the
emphasis of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
1976 switched from energy and materials conservation to toxic
waste disposal and (in theory) considerably toughened regulation
over disused and operational chemical waste sites (see Chapter 5
by Kleindorfer and Kunreuther and Chapter 13 by Baram in this
volume). Even so, RCRA had to be radically tightened by congres-
sional reauthorization in 1984. In the wake of Three Mile Island,
the worldwide nuclear industry passed through a quantum leap in
regulatory safeguards (see Chapter 7) with an estimated 8550 mil-
lion invested in retrofitting new safety equipment (Evans and
Hope, 1984). Both Lagadec (Chapter 1) and Naschi (Chapter 2)
address some of the responses likely to confront the multinational
chemical industry in the tightened regulatory climate following
the Mexico City gas explosion and the Bhopal fertilizer plant
disaster. The Seveso tragedy of 1976 has left its legacy in a Euro-
pean Community Seveso Directive (European Communities Council.
1982) which requires much more formal justification of safety and
evacuation measures from various classes of chemical works, a
more open risk assessment undertaken by industry, and more for-
mal regulatory review of both evacuation plans and information
availability both to workers and to the public (see also Chapter 13
by Baram). An important point about many of these reactions and
innovations is that they tend increasingly to be of international
scope or interest. setting precedents for attempts at standardiza-
tion across national regulatory arenas.
12.3. Risk Regulation and Governing Styles
Risk regulation is set in institutions and instruments of government
which reflect established national traditions and customary practices.
Nevertheless. there are certain common characteristics to all forms of
regulation, characteristics which become molded by national conven-
tion:
(1) Consultation is a vital part of government. It is not only wise but
politically necessary to discuss likely policy proposals with key
affected parties. This not only helps to smooth out disagree-
ments, but signals to decision-makers what is achievable, if not
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always acceptable. There will be notable differences as to what is
discussed and when, but some form of dialogue is a feature of all
regulatory approaches. What is likely is that this dialogue will
become more comprehensive, extending to greater use of advisory
committees and to well-staged forms of public participation (see
notably Chapter 11 by von Winterfeldt and the Discussion of
Chapter 10 by Renn). Nowadays many regulatory procedures
require affirmative evidence of consultation (e.g. the Seveso
Directive), while, as Cohen points out in his Discussion of Chapter
13, UK regulatory practice depends on a round of discussion and
commentary from interested parties.
(2) A dependence upon expertise is also necessary, though with
regard to environmental risk "expertise" has a changing connota-
tion. As already noted. credibility and reassurance become
equally vital as components of advice as technical competence.
Two interesting developments stem from this. One is a more expli-
cit recognition that experts have to become familiar with exper-
tise in other areas. Engineers. for example, need to know a lot
more than their predecessors about toxicology or medical diag-
nosis, while economists require a sound understanding of fault
tree analysis and cognitive psychology. This point is developed by
Covello and Merkhofer in Chapter 8, though the connection
between engineering specialisms and creative economic accounting
is far from well established. Risk regulation will have to depend
more and more upon "synthetic expertise", with a truly interna-
tional flavor.
The second development is that the expert has to devote
time and effort to the skill of being able to translate specialisms
into a language that is readily comprehensible to affected parties,
in a form that allows them to react in a way in which they feel
most effective and comfortable. This means conveying jD.itN'ully
to intelligent but lay people both technical substance and con-
cepts of uncertainty. This extraordinarily difficult task is not
one for which either the pure or the synthetic expert is
appropriately trained. Nor are regulatory bodies yet very adept
at representing uncertainty. These points are addressed by Slo-
vic in Chapter 10 and Lee in his Discussion of Chapter 10, though
neither offers specific prescriptions as to how these problems
can be overcome in practice.
(3) Regulatory compliance depends upon some degree of self-policing.
This is partly because resources are simply not available for
comprehensive scrutiny. But it is also necessary because self-
policing forms a vital element of compliance through streamlining
consultation, developing a collegiate sense of cooperation, and
sharing expertise. Without a fairly high degree of self-policing,
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enforcement could not be cost-effective: the contemporary prob-
lem is to seek a new balance between scrutiny and client depen-
dency to complement the requirements of political acceptance and
public reassurance. What is evident. however. is that the relative
degree of self-policing is a highly variable commodity. It is much
more likely to be found among large corporations with a genuine
interest in "good neighbor" relations. or where the consumer may
react to adverse publicity over certain products. and in indus-
tries where there is a publicly recognized danger (e.g. certain
classes of the chemical industry). It is least likely to take place
among small industries which are not perceived to create a hazard
or where the regulatory arm is too short to ensure adequate sur-
veillance.
(4) As has already been mentioned, the technical aspects of risk
regulation are increasingly being infiltrated by political con-
siderations. The determination of "acceptable risk" means the
adoption of standards that technical people regard as unneces-
sarily strict. The so-called "gross disproportion" yardstick of
determining at what point an additional safety measure is no
longer justified by the social benefits gained is widening. A per-
vasive feature of hazardous material regulation is the growing
strictness of safety standards at ever greater cost per statistical
life saved. For example. at the margin, the cost of saving a sta-
tistical life from, say, cancer or an especially severe explosion
can be as high as $20 million. Typical values of life in the
insurance industry rarely exceed $250000 and, even in notori-
ously high court cases of compensation over liability suits, awards
rarely exceed $3 million. Mummery (1985) suggests that the cost
of saving a life in the recent decision to install 150 million pounds
sterling of pollution control equipment at the Sellafield nuclear
fuel reprocessing plant in Cumbria. England. could be as high as
$100 million per possible life lost. Even then. however. elements
of the public remain dissatisfied. This is why the "residual risk"
phenomenon is becoming such a thorny issue.
These four common elements are. however, filtered and structured
by governing styles in different ways. For the purpose of simplicity
and illustration four differing regulatory approaches can be identified.
One is based on adversarial principles, another on consensu.a.l
lines, a third upon authoritative procedures, and a fourth upon cor-
porate characteristics. In no country is the "pure" form of any of
these approaches found. but it is interesting to note that each of these
approaches is associated with distinctive characteristics in regulatory
institutions and regulatory decision-making. Some institutions are
designed to be authoritative: they have executive powers, they are
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controlled by nonaccountable administrators and technical advisers,
and they minimize the practices of consultation and negotiation. Some
regulatory bodies are so structured as to build in representative opin-
ion. through selective and informal procedures (this is common in the
UK, for example - see Cohen's comments on Chapter 13). Others rely
extensively on varying forms of advisory committees with more or less
representation from wider interests. Others still combine technical
expertise and interest group representation so that a more corporatist
approach is pursued. Governing style, regulatory approach. and regu-
latory structure interconnect to produce patterns of commonality
within other patterns of idiosyncrasy.
We caution against too ambitious an interpretation of these
"styles". In almost all regulation. various combinations of approaches
are tried (see Brickman et al.. 1982). Indeed. examination of regulatory
approaches within each "style". such as that conducted by Wilson
(1981) in the USA. demonstrates a marked diversity of approach
between agencies depending upon such factors as their "age" in the
administrative order, their regulatory experiences. related interest
groups, and. critically. supporting regulation and statute. An ex-
deputy director of the US Food and Drug Administration (Hutt, 1983)
confirms that even within formalistic rule-making procedures a federal
regulatory agency can exert informal judgment and discretion. So.
while styles are important. in that they set contexts and establish cus-
tom and tradition, there are important variations.
Another critical reason why regulatory style will vary is because
of the structure. political relations, and modes of accountability of the
institutions being regulated. Take. for instance. the question of
nuclear power. In the USA, the utilities are disaggregated. customer
sovereignty is powerful, state bodies control the prices. and partial
competition is rife. In France, the opposite is true: the industry is
highly centralized, and it commands a high degree of state support.
and, generally speaking, public loyalty. In the UK. the industry is also
monolithic, but it is subject to far greater external accountability both
in the setting of safety and in pricing. We observe that regulatory
issues may have intrinsic properties that affect the optimal style of
regulation, but that there is no universal distinction between regulator
and regulated institutions. because both are being evaluated by critical
expertise and public prying.
12.3.1. The adY'ersarial approach
The adversarial approach to regulation is particularly associated with
the USA. but elements are becoming evident elsewhere. Its principal
characteristics are the establishment by large executive agencies of
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precise standards and detailed rules, written down so as to be capable
of precise legal interpretation. Regulation, especially in standard set-
ting and licensing, is very formal and elaborate. This is because the
agencies are constitutionally independent of the legislature (Congress),
while the judiciary is able to review the legitimacy of agency decisions.
The scope of judicial review has waxed and waned under various
doctrines, but regardless of these fluctuations litigation against admin-
istrative decisions is constitutionally far more possible than in
arrangements (e.g. those in the UK) where executive and legislature are
combined via the doctrine of parliamentary accountability of adminis-
trative decisions, and through collective ministerial responsibility.
The adversarial approach is also characterized by high levels of open-
ness of documentation and hence exposure to criticism and lobbying
from a wide array of interests, which usually have many points of
entry. The regulatory process is therefore subject to incessant con-
flict, bargaining through scientific claim and counterclaim. and formal
adjudication. This occurs most notably in the standard setting and
licensing procedures.
An important distinguishing feature of the adversarial approach to
risk regulation lies in the control of safety and design by the regula-
tory authority. The client. or risk creator, is expected to meet
predetermined conditions and to obey preset rules. The responsibility
for safety lies mostly in compliance. This is judged to be necessary
because no single risk creator is deemed big enough to have the
resources to undertake its own safety assessment. This may be true of
many of the nuclear power utilities, but it is not true of chemical cor-
porations. There is an uneasy lack of consistency in precise location of
regulatory control from one risk creator to another. This is particu-
larly evident for hazardous waste management, though less so for
radioactive waste.
Critics of this approach point out that the regulated actor is not
encouraged to be responsible for thinking about safety at all stages of
project management - concept, standard setting, design, fabrication,
and execution. As an externally imposed concept, safety does not
become part of the "mindset" of the whole process of project concep-
tion, birth, and life.
The adversarial approach tends to be found in governing systems
where a strong central institution is expected to regulate very diverse
and geographically dispersed client groups. where patterns of owner-
ship, management skills, and environmental circumstances vary enor-
mously. It also reflects a political culture of institutionalized distrust
(the separation of powers) which is suspicious of self-regulation and
expects accountability. Cultural anthropologists (see for example,
Thompson, 1982; Douglas, 1986) have also argued persuasively that the
adversarial style is most consistent with political cultures where
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pluralistic groups have a strong influence on public life. This is true of
populist political culture in the USA. The adversarial approach can be
very time-consuming and procedurally costly, and does not necessarily
result in more equitable regulations. The corresponding tendency of
regulatory bodies to try to regulate everything in standard. fashion ab
initio, rather than proceed incrementally and pragmatically, tends to
create "all or nothing" regulatory syndromes. with dramatic ups and
downs. or successes and failures. Wynne (1986) illustrates this in his
study of the regulation of hazardous wastes in the USA.
The adversarlal process is also arguably more prone to instability,
so that the risk creator is often unsure whether any particular tech-
nology or management decision. which may depend upon long lead time
and much financial investment. will be acceptable in a relatively short
time scale.
12.3.2. The conaellJlUAl approach
The consensual approach to risk regulation bears the most marked con-
trast to the adversarial. It is based on a high level of trust between
institutional actors. and on collaborative relationships between regu-
lated and regulator. As a result confidential arrangements develop.
ostensibly to protect commercial information. but also to exclude the
inflexibilities of third party access. In addition, the consensual
approach places a lot of emphasis upon the freedom of the regulator to
exercise variable judgment. Rules are expressed so as to be delib-
erately imprecise and flexible from case to case. Technical uncer-
tainty and imprecision are designed into regulations but are compen-
sated for by a sense of mutual trust and an expressed belief in the
basic competence and high ideals of all those involved. The regulator is
expected to act in part as adviser. in part as consultant. and in part as
policeman. As a consequence, the consensual approach relies more
heavily on self-regulation: indeed. the ultimate responsibility for
safety usually rests with the regulated. not the regulator. Technical
norms are usually "advisory" and carry no statutory power when stated
in precise form.
One often-stated advantage of the consensual approach is that the
risk creator is in a better position to be assured of some stability in
the pattern of regulation. He can expect gradual. negotiated evolution
of regulatory standards and licensing procedures. Long-term techno-
logical and managerial planning and commitment are therefore more
possible. However. this can create problems for the regulator when
attempting to enforce compliance if there is a political need to change
regulatory standards.
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Critics argue that the Achilles' heel of the consensual approach is
an overdependence on self-policing. This often means that practices
become established which are not easily improved without a lot of
external conflict and pressure. organizational change, and financial
investment. A classic example can be found in the recently published
report of the UK Hazardous Waste Inspectorate (1985). This points out
that many waste sites are not properly managed, that illegal dumping is
commonplace, that regulations about the practice of disposal are often
flouted, and that some waste disposal authorities are clearly incom-
petent. It will require an enormous investment in managerial capacity
and public money to improve this lamentable state of affairs, which has
been allowed to develop as a result of complacency fostered by a hith-
erto undisturbed consensual approach. It is possible that the normal
consensual UK approach will be ill equipped to cope with this and that
more formal procedures will be required, implying a more adversarial
relationship with industry (see Wynne. 1986. Chapter 6).
In the consensual approach. regulatory officials tend to regard
themselves as professionally competent and thoroughly expert. They
like to be thought of as part of an elite who share expertise, special-
ized information. and a privileged position with their industrial (regu-
lated) colleagues and who take pride in the quality of their work. This
point is well illustrated by Richardson et at. (1983) in their study of
water pollution control in the UK. Enforcement by recourse to the
courts is a rare occurrence because an inspector believes it is a sign of
failure to have to resort to litigation rather than persuasion. In his
Discussion of Chapter 13, Cohen endorses this line. Regulators also
like to believe that they are armed with the best information available,
that they can seek advice from colleagues or independent consultants
so as to be. in their opinion, in the best position to advise and to nag.
They particularly dislike external criticism, especially from those
whom they do not regard as members of their "club", and resent politi-
cal interference. There is therefore a constant danger of complacency
and an insular sense of self-satisfaction. In the contemporary politics
of environmental risk regulation, these attitudes are likely to be
increasingly counterproductive and damaging, a point which is implied
by the Tenth Report of the RoyaL Commission on Environmental Pollu-
tion (1984).
The consensual approach is also characterized by a flexible
approach to standard setting and licensing. In some important
instances maximum permissible exposures or discharges are precisely
laid down and universally applied - notably with respect to radioactive
exposure for workers and the general public. But these are regarded
as backstop outer limits, not to be even approached in normal cir-
cumstances. Discretionary practical standards of "best practical
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means" or "as low as reasonably achievable" doses are supposed to be
negotiated and fulfilled well within these precise maxima.
In most aspects of environmental risk, levels of exposure, stan-
dards of monitoring, and conditions for maintaining equipment are not
precisely laid down. The guiding principle is what is practicable -
namely, what seems appropriate to the circumstances of the risk crea-
tor within general guidelines, having regard to the quality of the
environment in the locality, the state of technology, the cost of meet-
ing regulations, and public opinion. There is no legal definition of pub-
lic opinion: the courts usually interpret it as what reasonable people
ought to expect. "Reasonable people" are those who apply "common
sense and balanced judgement". It follows from all this that litigation
in the regulatory process by intervenor groups is unusual. Indeed, it is
made almost impossible on formal legal grounds. since regulations are
administrative decisions which in the UK are theoretically accountable
to parliament, not the courts, unless a minister is thought to have over-
stepped legal (but not technical or social) propriety.
This is a key issue for trade union representatives and for public
spirited environmental groups anxious about exposure to low levels of
possibly carcinogenic materials. This point is well documented by
Frankel (1964) who is the lead campaigner for a statutory right to know
about all forms of pollution risk in the UK and who is one of the
drafters of parliamentary legislation aimed at guaranteeing a right to
information. Note, however, that the purpose is not to increase the
scope for litigation, which is not particularly relished in the consensual
culture. but to ensure a better surveillance of administration action by
scrutiny and political pressure (see Macrory, 1963).
12.3.3. The authoritative approach
In the authoritative approach, regulators are granted considerable
freedom to set standards and enforce compliance, with minimal (though
often important) consultation either with the risk creators or with the
public. The formal scope for legal redress is limited, except where
regulators can be shown to have acted arbitrarily or contrary to statu-
tory procedures.
This approach is most likely to be found in countries with strong
central government but weak legislatures, where local or regional
government is constitutionally limited to executing commands from the
center, and where the public have little tradition of militancy or dis-
trust. The closest example to this approach is to be found in France,
where the regulatory official is granted considerable freedom to act,
where rights of appeal are restricted, and where public consultation is
formal, preemptory, and one-sided (see Macrory, 1962). The most ela-
borate aspect of this style is usually negotiation in private between
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government agencies, and with industry, though even the latter is per-
formed in a climate of strong governmental elitism and paternalism.
The authoritative style is regarded as efficient and cost-effective
by its supporters, but unjust and inequitable by its critics. It is not an
approach which commands intrinsic public confidence, except by
default of issues being brought to public attention. Hitherto, it is this
ability to keep issues from the public agenda which has been its
strength, but in the area of environmental risk regulation this is
already becoming eroded. Its mode of operation is so at odds with the
public requirements increasingly demanded of risk regulation already
summarized above that it is likely to undergo further change.
Nevertheless, the point about the interconnectedness of style. and
approach and structure must not be forgotten. In France, for example,
regulatory officials in the nuclear industry believe very much in their
exclusive powers and competence: they will not give way easily to any
attempts to open up their standard setting or licensing procedures. In
the hazardous waste field too, government agencies have created what
is regarded as a successful infrastructure of waste treatment and
disposal facilities, and regulatory instruments including economic
incentives to enhance their proper use.
For the reasons already stated. there are few examples of pure
authoritarianism as associated with professional elitism, and of rela-
tively uncritical support for particular kinds of economic development.
12.3.4. The corporatist approach
In many respects the corporatist approach is an amalgam of the other
three operating in a particular structure of relationships. Corporatism
refers to ~ollegiate forms of organization in which different interests
maneuver to promote their common interests. Corporatism is found
where powerful groups have mutual advantage in acting collectively. In
the FRG, for example, trade unions and the chemical industries work
hand in hand (although somewhat formally) in the standard setting pro-
cess over chemical product regulation. Corporatism, therefore. is
appropriate for consensual and authoritative approaches to regulation
where major interests perceive a collective self-interest in establishing
alignments both with and against regulators. Corporatist structures
are difficult for "footloose" public interest organizations to penetrate,
and can also provide a powerful block to international agencies seeking
to impose internationally agreed standards on a national interest.
Corporatism as manifested in the FRG system could be regarded as
an intermingling of consensual or authoritative elements of institutional
structure with embryonic adversary elements. Thus the FRG constitu-
tional structure is formally set up on federal lines, with considerable
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state autonomy and a strong legal oversight of administrative actions at
both state and federal government levels. It was legal recognition of
protesters' claims of arbitrary government decision-making, for exam-
ple. which created a holdup in the FRG nuclear program. Yet historical
elements of elitism and informal collaboration between government and
industry mean that a strong sense of mutual. unitary responsibility
exists, even extending to labor interests. In addition, science is es-
tablished in a strongly hierarchical way which consolidates almost a
monopoly role for experts in science and technology decision making.
Thus, even with the embryonic adversary elements of government,
scientific advice tends to be consensually authoritative, being chal-
lenged far less than in the USA or the UK.
The result is a form of decision-making in which composite
interest groups nominally express their positions and negotiate in rela-
tively formal ways compared to the UK, yet not in any way like the com-
pletely public, legally ritualized, and extravagantly adversarial ways of
the USA. Corporatism means a formal structuring of composite
interests in a way alien to the UK, but with a very strong political pull
to achieve consensus in a manner alien to an adversary system. A typi-
cal example from hazardous waste management in the FRG is that pro-
vided by Wynne (1986, Ch 4) where a joint committee of technical
experts from all the states, together with a federal representative,
developed central regulations - the hazardous waste classification
scheme - through which a consensual agreement is expected. Only
then is the proposed scheme revealed to industry, who negotiate their
own revisions relatively formally, though not in public. In the UK,
industry would have been represented at the outset had such a commit-
tee even been formed; in the USA, "negotiation" would have been via
litigation, or via formal hearings procedures for "de-listing", akin to
litigation.
12.4. Convergence and Coalescence of Regulatory Styles
This discussion of the corporatist regulatory styles emphasizes the
qualification made at the outset, that these four comparative typologies
should be regarded as ideal types, none of which exists in pure form in
any system. Nevertheless they are useful in two related respects.
First, they can be treated as patterned indicators, providing
descriptive categories which point to unidentified or unclarified under-
lying structural features of political culture that affect styles of
government. The work of Douglas and WiLdavsky (1982) and Thompson
(1982) provides a promising analytical framework, using the grid group
anthropological terms of Douglas (1986) to characterize different types
of political regime or political cultural style. Even so, an ambiguity
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exists as to whether even such a fruitful framework as this can ever
hope to clarify "intrinsic" structural features as explanatory factors
of regulation; our view would be that "structural" in this sense is
inherently ill-definable because the intrinsic nature of "structure" in
social terms is always a composition of heterogeneous, partly conflict-
ing, dynamic tensions and tendencies. Therefore such typologies of
comparison, even theoretically embedded ones, will only ever be
approximations.
Second. these ideal types provide a framework within which dif-
ferent substantive elements of local "style" can be identified and
separately treated. For example, once these categories are treated as
useful analytical constraints, we can see that some features of regula-
tory style may be more identifiable than others. To illustrate this, the
Netherlands exhibits elements of "pillared" interest group pluralism
and open adversary interest conflict right into the heart of cabinet
decision-making; as such it arguably shows more approximation to the
US model of the adversary style of regulation than any other European
comparison. As discussed in Wynne (1986), the facts that the Dutch
experience probably shows a more open information circulation, that
the Dutch use highly elaborated precise numerical standards, and that
the Netherlands was the only European country to react to past haz-
ardous waste dumps crises by specific emergency legislation like in the
USA, are all circumstantial indicators of an adversarial - or what Doug-
las, Wildavsky, and Thompson call "sect-dominated. anti-hierarchical" -
political culture. Yet, when one looks at other elements of Dutch regu-
lation, this identity fails. Central government-industry relations look
more consensual, or at least corporatist, than those in the USA. There
is more effective pressure to reach inter-interest compromise among
like-minded interests. The open pluralism of Dutch decision-making is
arguably more to do with a long history of coalition government and
lack of collective cabinet responsibility than it is a function of any-
thing akin to the US history of constitutionally established mistrust
and mutual limitation of powers.
Likewise, one can take points of similarity between the Nether-
lands and the UK (e.g. close informal links between government and
industry, and informally close-knit industrial lobbying) and still find
strong differences, as on the openness of information and third party
access, and on the role of science. In the UK, for example, scientific
judgment and advice are normally in a privileged discretionary position
within or very close to government. and are incorporated with all kinds
of unquestioned value judgments into the heart of policymaking. In at
least some Dutch regulatory activity, science plays a more open and
directing role, being part of legally inflexible regulatory implementa-
tion, via "mechanical" decision rules (e.g. precise concentration limits
in hazardous waste definitions). The institutional roles of science
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reflect aspects of the history of scientific professionalization gen-
erally, yet are also consistent with other features of local political cul-
ture.
The above discussion was intended to point to the pitfalls of
simplistic readings of comparative frameworks for analyzing regl.llatory
practices in different settings. At the very least, outcomes of regula-
tion are not predictable by comparing formal regulations; and indeed
such comparison is often impossible when some systems do not in their
nature even express any formal standards. This might imply that one
should confine analysis to comparison of actual enforcement practices.
Such practices are still subject to gross variations and uncertainties
despite the recent growth of attention devoted to them. However, the
wider and more complicated comparison should be attempted.
Narrowing the parameters of comparison in regulatory practice
may give a misleading picture. A quick look at the hazardous waste
classification systems between. say, the US and the UK suggests an
enormous discrepancy: whereas the US system has over 400 items. the
UK system has about 30. Closer inspection. however. reveals that the
classification patterns systems are not comparable. Each UK category
is a composite (e.g. "mercury-containing compounds") which may equal
tens of the specific chemicals listed in the US counterpart. Even when
this discrepancy of method is clarified. it appears that the UK list
serves a different regulatory function from that served by its US coun-
terpart. Wastes on the UK list can be exempted by producers if their
waste does not meet several other criteria; it is up to the local regula-
tory agency legally to prove that all relevant criteria have been met.
Wastes on the US list are controlled in addition to any material not so
listed. which are also controlled if they meet certain specified (but
different from the UK) tests (which it is up to the pToduceT to perform
and prove). Not only this, but the UK hazardous waste list is only
meant to be for TegistTation purposes, the locus of official contTol
being site licensing of treatment and disposal facilities. The US and
FRG hazardous waste management programs are meant to restrict the
options available for treatment and disposal: Le. the restriction
applies to a given waste. not a given facility as in the UK.
From all of this one can see that in many cases it is very difficult
to compare regulations in a meaningful way. Of course. in cases where
decisions to ban. for example. aldrin/dieldrin have occurred in the US.
but not the UK. a comparative analysis is easier to undertake (Gillespie
st al., 1979). However, the point remains that in many cases what is
more comparable is how the regulatory process justifies or attempts
to justify its decisions. Le. how it tries to cultivate social authority,
rather than the substantial content or effects of those decisions.
In addition to these complications in attempting comparative
analysis of regulatory styles. it is important to remember that
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different categories of risk are not necessarily capable of being
adapted to similar regulatory mechanisms. Hazardous waste regulation
is a very different issue from, say. the regulation of food. additives or
contraceptive devices. In the latter cases, consumer interests are
much more apparent and will affect regulation; for hazardous wastes
consumer interest is at best indirect. Public interest enters at an
entirely different point. namely the proposed transportation methods
and disposal facilities. Furthermore, the role of national comparative
analysis is different. In the food. additive and contraceptive pill issues,
international comparison may be stimulated by industry if an interna-
tional production or marketing structure exists. in order to generate a
uniform regulatory environment. In the hazardous waste case, national
or international industries may prefer a state of inconsistency in
national approaches, because this may allow them to trade in wastes. in
order that cheaper disposal options might be found.
Yet international standardization may be encouraged by public
pressure reacting to loopholes. Wynne (1966) has described several
specific properties of hazardous waste which render it unsuitable for
conventional "dispersive" environmental regulation. These properties
- notably the complex physical behavioral life cycle of hazardous
wastes. the ambiguity in defining the key terms "hazard" and "waste",
the extreme heterogeneity of risk-generating materials and cir-
cumstances, and the fact that regulation per se also means cultivating a
new, hazardous industry - all mean that standardized. precise, and
inflexible regulatory approaches and techniques are unrealistic. Con-
sequently, a variety of institutional mechanisms have to be established.
These considerations cut across local elements of regulatory style and.
from country to country, will harmonize more in some systems than in
others. The same general point. though with different specific factors
and conclusions. can be made for other categories of risk. In sum. we
argue that circumstances surrounding the management of hazardous
wastes are creating pressures that tend toward convergence of regula-
tory approaches while the realities of regulation are demanding a much
more varied regulatory response in actual practice. This important
divergence has not been properly analyzed.
12.5. Conclusion: Convergence vel'BUB Di1Ierentiation
We have identified common currents underlying environmental risk
regulation regardless of the context in which it is practiced. and have
discussed the different elements and interactions of local regulatory
styles, embedded in political cultures, which sift and shape these com-
mon properties. This mix of factors is further complicated by the
increasing significance of certain "languages" used for public
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justification and to enhance credibility. The outcome is a form of dou-
ble discourse. There is the partly judgmental. flexible task of describ-
ing and controlling countless actual risk phenomena. This clashes with
the need to project reassuring images of universa! and formally
accountable scientific methods coupled with precise control instru-
ments and standards - in short. a public image of management com-
petence, fairness. and trustworthiness.
This potential dualism exists in all social encounters. but it
becomes more significant in some political cultures. notably the consen-
sual and corporatist styles. Other universal factors underlying regula-
tory change and diversity have already been described: the pressure
for accountability and explication of "internal" regulatory decision
rules; the trend in modern economic conditions towards cost-benefit
scrutiny of extending regulatory scope or rigor; the decreasing ability
of scientific evidence to command authority (Le. the dismantling of the
mysteries surrounding scientific knowledge; Rip. 1985; Wynne. 1986)
and the corresponding need to act in advance of conclusive scientific
opinion. All this tends to increase dependence upon, or to encourage
the development of a more justifiable overt defence of. informal self-
regulation.
These common factors also have to be interpreted in local set-
tings. Why is it. for example. that the interest in exposing the conven-
tions underlying regulatory science in the US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) arises from interests sympathetic to deregulation.
whereas in the UK it is associated with a demand for stricter regulation
(Millstone, 1985)? Would one find the same relationship if one examined
the regulatory science of an older. more established. and less
"environmental"~rientedUS agency than the EPA - say. the Food and
Drug Administration? This double discourse around science takes a dif-
ferent form in the UK from that in the USA. because. in the UK. a dif-
ferent image of what science really is dominates the process of legiti-
mation and social authority. In contrast to the formalistic rule-bound
image of science in the USA. in the UK the dominant symbol remains
that of a "priesthood" - of craft skill. of tacit judgment. of intuition
finely honed over years of experience. where ability to follow formal
rules of scientific method is merely competence. not expertise. This
corresponds with the central UK role of discretion. informal negotia-
tion in private. and nonspecified standards. Yet. even in the UK.
"third party" pressure. from such as the European Commission. parlia-
mentary committees. more analytically competent environmental and
labor groups. and even local authorities. is increasing the demand for
more formal justification. So formal public accounts of decision rules
are required even when these rules have not been subject to thorough
external review.
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Overall, the regulatory response to rising public mistrust has
been to intensify traditional forms of symbolic action, in order to
reiterate and rephrase scientific statements of justification and reas-
surance. This tends to heighten inflexibility and may inhibit the abil-
ity of regulatory bodies to respond flexibly to variations in the reali-
ties of risk creation and control. In many cases. the most potentially
significant dislocations exist between central and peripheral parts of
the same regulatory network. The problem here is that the center
responds to the needs of providing symbolic reassurance, while the
periphery (Le. the inspectors) actually attempts to regulate, mindful of
the need to be flexible and discreet. Add to this the growing sophisti-
cation and intensity of specialist "public interest" bodies and it
becomes evident that stability and common ground in environmental
risk management are unlikely to be allowed to flourish.
We conclude, therefore, that as "official" institutional means of
regulation fail to meet political demands, so unofficial methods will
increasingly take their place alongside formal regulation. Idiosyn-
crasy, uncertainty, and heterogeneity are likely to increase in practi-
cal regulatory issues and settings, even if, as is also likely. the official
international language of regulation becomes increasingly uniform. The
dangers are that environmental risk regulation will try to conceal its
own problems by accepting for supposed management and control
almost whatever ends up in the "back-end" of the chain, production ...
waste'" disposal'" residual risk. Tensions. uncertainties, and disorien-
tations are likely to grow while "environmental risk management"
accepts a wildly overflowing agenda of responsibilities and attendant
uncertainties without looking for the means to reflect these into their
proper arenas. We refer here to the measured and consistent social
control of all aspects of industrial production and the more rounded
justification of technological change. It is only in that "whole" context
that risk regulation can be fairly evaluated, for hazardous waste
management is really a "last frontier" in pollution control. Attempts to
internalize the full costs of production have never entirely succeeded
because. in the past. a relatively uncontrolled outlet existed. The
current challenge is to close this last externality. Whether this can be
done sporadically and inconsistently, or in more measured ways, will
test the ability of hazardous waste management to lead the regulatory
field.
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12.D. Discussion
T.J. Jones a.nd S.M. Swa.nson [1]
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In their comparative analysis of regulation of hazardous materials
across several countries, O'Riordan and Wynne posit four distinct regu-
latory styles. These are:
(1) Adversarial.
(2) Consensual.
(3) Authoritative.
(4) Corporatist.
Without considering whether these differences in style manifest
themselves in differences in regulatory outcome, they argue that the
systems are converging. The European systems are beginning to exhi-
bit some characteristics of the adversarial systems: "more open,
externally accountable procedures, ... a greater element of politically
as well as scientifically credible safety standards...... At the same
time, there are some signs of less adversarial regulatory decision-
making in the USA, which they characterize as "mediation" efforts.
In our comments, we would like to discuss our experience with the
adversarial systems in the USA as well as with less adversarial media-
tion efforts.
In preparing to comment on this chapter, we discovered a recent
comparative analysis by Brickman et a.l. (1982) which examined national
policies for regulating pesticides, food. additives, chemicals in the
workplace, and industrial chemicals subject to premarket or
premanufacture notification. This study identifies regulatory styles
similar to O'Riordan and Wynne's. Brickman et al. go on to observe that
the differences in regulatory styles do not seem to result in signifi-
cantly different regulatory outcomes for the class of problems the
study addressed. That means it does not appear to be useful to distin-
guish between regulatory styles for forecasting differences in regula-
tory outcomes or for predicting which system is likely to lead to the
"best .. regulatory decisions.
Since we cannot promote one system over the other based on the
quality of the decisions made by that system, we must search for other
factors to help us compare the systems. Here O'Riordan and Wynne as
well as Brickman et a.l. suggest that the US adversarial system is much
more time-consuming and costly than its European counterparts. Obvi-
ously we Americans see some value in the adversarial system; or else
why would we use it at considerable costs both in money and time to
make decisions which are remarkably similar to those made with less
resource-intensive systems in Europe? This question is all the more
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important for Europeans to consider if one accepts O'Riordan and
Wynne's hypothesis that Europe is moving toward more adversarial
decision-making processes.
We would like to make two principal points regarding the conver-
gence of regulatory styles toward the adversarial - and less efficient -
US system. The first point answers the question just posed: Why does
the US use the inefficient adversarial system? In addition to being an
important part of the US political tradition, the adversarial system is
well suited for making certain kinds of complex regulatory policy
choices that involve trade-offs between risks associated with hazard-
ous materials in commerce and the economic benefits of that commerce.
Our second point is that. after the broad and sweeping questions of pol-
icy have been resolved and precedents have been set. it is possible
under the adversarial system to make many decisions in a nonadver-
sarial manner.
O'Riordan and Wynne identify situations when it is difficult to
judge whether a particular regulatory process is "just. efficient, or
cost-effective". It is in just these situations where the adversarial sys-
tem is at its best. The situations they describe are:
(1) There is often little agreement on what constitutes an acceptable
risk.
(2) The whole regulatory process is characterized by uncertainty.
(3) The increasing use of models can be at odds with more conven-
tional approaches to regulation based on experience. tested judg-
ment, and intuition.
(4) Public interpretations of riskiness may be at odds with expert
judgment.
Obviously a regulatory system is in a state of transition when the above
conditions exist. The old rules do not seem to apply anymore. uncer-
tainties abound. and "credible experts" are questioned at every turn.
While the adversary system may not be efficient in terms of transaction
costs. it is effective in forcing decisions about the acceptability of
risk, resolving uncertainties, and restoring credibility to the regula-
tory process - if not to regulatory authorities.
Periods of transition are signaled by disagreements among
experts. When experts disagree. one is usually confronting issues on
the edge of science which cannot be resolved by science or expertise
alone. Nevertheless, science and expertise can often inform resolution
of these issues.
As an example. the authors have spent considerable portions of
the last seven years involved in an adversarial process aimed at
developing a new occupational exposure standard for benzene. A major
issue is whether workers exposed at the current permissible exposure
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limit of 10 ppm are at significant risk of experiencing adverse health
effects in the future. Scientists and experts from many different
backgrounds and representing many different interests cannot agree
what risk benzene-exposed workers are incurring, much less whether a
particular level of risk is acceptable or not. The critical issues which
are capable of resolution are not scientific. They are rather socio-
economic and political ones that revolve around what constitutes pru-
dent public policy in the face of considerable uncertainty. In the USA.
choices such as these are reserved for the adversarial process where
both the scientist-expert and the well-informed citizen have a part in
the decision. After all. this type of decision involves value judgments
where the ordinary citizen has as much to contribute as the
scientist-expert.
Admitting that seven years is a long time for a society to be con-
sidering whether to change an occupational benzene standard, we would
argue that once several landmark cases such as benzene are resolved.
the system will revert to a less adversarial mode to decide on appropri-
ate exposure standards for other substances. This will be possible
since many of the important policy judgments regarding estimation of
risk and its significance will apply to subsequent compounds.
The benzene example also supports our argument that. over time,
less adversarial means for resolving regulatory issues will be adopted.
Recently the authors participated in an attempt, albeit unsuccessful.
to develop a joint labor-management recommendation to the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration for a new benzene standard.
While the attempt was unsuccessful all parties to the discussions felt
that they were useful and might eventually contribute positively to
resolution of the issue through the traditional rule-making process. In
this instance. some of the broad policy issues had been resolved but
significant issues remained.
Ironically. resolution of one major issue in the 1980 Supreme Court
benzene decision contributed to the breakdown of the mediation
efforts. The court decided that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration must make a finding that a significant risk exists under
the current standard before it can change the standard. The court did
not address the issue of how large the risk was or what would consti-
tute a significant risk. The recent mediation foundered partly because
of remaining divergence of opinion about the size and significance of
risk at current exposure levels.
In general it is very difficult for industry to agree that risks exist
at current exposure levels based on theoretical models. Accepting that
some theoretical risk exists could subject industry to a flood of prod-
uct liability suits. While industry is willing to take prudent steps to
reduce risks by reducing exposure, it may find it difficult to partici-
pate in a negotiation process which assumes that a significant risk
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exists - the condition precedent to the need for a new exposure stan-
dard. Mediation efforts will be undertaken more frequently if a means
can be found to divorce the significant risk finding from the develop-
ment of the standard itself. This problem highlights a clear advantage
of the European systems. Since a rationale for a new standard may
often be unstated, industry can take prudent measures to reduce risk
without the specter of a finding of significant risk.
In conclusion. the adversarial system has its advantages for
resolving some of the complex societal trade~ff issues that will con-
front us in the regulation of hazardous material in the next decade.
While more adversarial systems will undoubtedly disturb the status quo
in Europe. we expect that in some years hence Europeans will have a
sanguine attitude about their utility. In the USA, the pendulum will
swing back toward less adversarial systems as the broad policy issues
become resolved and attention turns toward applying these policies to
individual hazardous materials.
Note
[1] The authors wish to thank Camilla Hegeler for research assistance in
the preparation of this Discussion. The views expressed in this com-
ment are the authors' and do not necessarily represent those of their
respective institutions.
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CHAPTER 13
Chemical Industry Hazards:
Liability, Insurance, and the
Role of Risk Analysis
M.S Baram [1J
13.1. Introduction
Over the last decade. toxic chemicals and other hazardous materials
have become essential features of economic growth in the USA, Western
Europe. and the "Third World". Production and trade have increased to
meet the demands of new users.
For example. the rapidly growing computer and electronics indus-
try is a major new user: a semiconductor firm may use over 2500 chemi-
cals. many of them highly toxic. in the manufacture of chips and other
computer parts. Hospitals have become major users of various
radiopharmaceuticals and radiochemicals in providing health care.
Agricultural productivity is increasingly reliant on the use of chemical
pesticides. Thus. toxic chemicals and other hazardous materials now
pervade industrial and agrarian societies.
These hazardous materials pose risks to health, safety, and the
environment throughout their "life cycle". including stages of produc-
tion, shipment. storage, interim use in industrial processes, end prod-
uct use by industry and consumers, and waste discharge and disposal.
The risks include accidental releases and spills which contam-
inate the environment (e.g. the dioxin accident at the Hoffman-La
Roche plant at Seveso, Italy; the kepone spill by an Allied Chemical
subcontractor at James Bay, Virginia; and other major accidents at
Beek, the Netherlands. and Velbert, the FRG. In some cases. accidents
inflict immediate harms to the health of workers and commupity
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residents (e.g. the methyl isocyanate accident at the Union Carbide
subsidiary in Bhopal. India, which caused several thousand deaths and
permanently impaired the health of many other people; the explosion
at a plant in Flixborough, England, which killed 28 people).
The risks also include numerous latent disease or chronic health
hazards for consumers of various industrial products, and for workers
and community residents exposed to gradual unintended releases
(e.g. from leaking storage tanks or waste disposal sites) or to routine
industrial emissions or discharges which have been permitted by
government authorities. Finally, latent disease risks have so impressed
the public consciousness that emotional distress is now increasingly
claimed as a health hazard, even in the absence of any medical findings
of physical illness or scientific proof of increased risk (e.g. no evi-
dence of biological changes as precursors of disease).
Many persons in the USA are now seeking compensation and other
remedies from industry and insurers, for actual harms and perceived
risks. Claims that various illnesses such as cancer, birth defects, and
emotional distress were caused by, or are likely to result from, prior
exposure to asbestos, herbicides, toxic wastes, ionizing radiation. and
other hazardous agents are now commonplace in federal and state
courts.
Thus, the increase in commercial production, distribution and use
of hazardous materials has led to an increase in actual and perceived
risks. and to a rising spiral of claims against industry and insurers in
the USA. In addition, it has stimulated increasing government regula-
tion and litigation to secure "clean-up" costs from industry in the USA
and the European Economic Community (EEC), and new demands by
labor unions and local communities for more effective risk reduction
efforts by industrial managers.
The result is that all sectors of industry producing and using
hazardous substances. and their insurers, are increasingly vulner-
able to economic losses from liability determinations in the USA and
from more stringent government actions in all industrial nations.
13.2. The Challenge to Industry and its Insurers
How to deal with increasing economic vulnerability has therefore
become an issue of critical importance to all manufacturers, shippers,
users, and disposers of hazardous materials. and their insurers. In
addition, persons exposed to the hazards and government authorities
have obvious concerns about this problem, concerns which include the
quality of life and the protection of their physical and emotional
health, their jobs, economic growth, and the availability of funds to
compensate injured parties.
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Firms doing business in the USA .face the greatest degree oj
economic vulnerability. The US legal system enables injured persons
and persons at risk to readily bring "toxic tort" actions against indus-
try in state courts, with increasing success in securing high monetary
compensation awards and other costly remedies from industry for
harms to their health and environmental interests (see Nothstein,
1984).
The implications of this high degree of economic vulnerability in
the USA are not confined to US firms and the US economy, however.
Many of the firms doing business in the USA are multinational corpora-
tions, and losses in their US operations affect their branches in other
countries. Further, insurance coverage for firms doing business in the
USA is provided by an international network of insurers and reinsur-
ers, many of whom are based in England, Switzerland, the Federal
Republic of Germany. Scandinavia, and Japan. Losses which occur in
the USA are therefore borne in most instances by this international
network of insurers, and affect their ability to provide insurance cov-
erage for industrial activities in all nations [2].
For example, the enormous liability awards against US firms for
injuries due to their sales of asbestos without disclosures of the health
risks, their careless disposal of hazardous wastes across the USA, the
Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident. and other accidents and
spills, have had severe economic consequences for many insurers and
reinsurers in Western Europe, and consequently on industrial firms in
many nations which rely on these same insurers and reinsurers for ade-
quate and affordable coverage. If persons injured by the 1984 Bhopal
accident are permitted to secure compensation in US courts from Union
Carbide. a US firm, the economic implications will be severe and felt in
all nations. Thus, the vulnerability of a single firm subject to the US
legal system may affect industry, insurers. and economic conditions
across most political boundaries [3].
The challenge JOT industry and its insurers is to develop the
ability to overtake increasing risk and economic vulnerability,
particularly JOT firms doing business in the USA, where vulnera-
bility is greatest, and bring about the control and abatement oj
these dynamic jorces. This view, cogently expressed by Dr Orio Giar-
ini of the Geneva Association [4]. calls for a proactive response by
industry and insurers. It is not intended to support the "negative"
approach of those industrial firms and insurers who have traditionally
sought to reduce their economic vulnerability by lobbying the US
Congress and state governments to change the legal system to lessen
the ability of injured persons to secure remedies. or by increased reli-
ance on defensive tactics in litigation. These negative approaches have
severely damaged corporate credibility, infected corporate personnel
with irresponsible attitudes, and failed to stop the spiral of liability.
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The challenge is considerable. but it can be met if the manufactur-
ers, shippers. users. and disposers of hazar-dous materials develop and
use improved methods of risk analysis, health and environmental
monitoring, and safety engineering to reduce hazards and prevent
risks and consequent liability. Insurers must participate in meeting
this challenge by using their considerable expertise and influence over
industrial firms, which need affordable insurance, to force positive
responses from industry [5].
Meeting this challenge is more than an economic necessity for
industry and insurers in the private sector: it is also supported by
many who seek public policy reforms to improve protection of health.
safety, and environment. There is growing support in the USA for the
concept of using private insurance as an alternative to govern-
ment regulation - for insurers to play the leadership role in forcing
safer industrial practices and thereby preclude the need for more
government regulation (Baram et al., 1981).
According to the Cato Institute (1985. p 1):
There are many business activities that place third parties.
employees, or consumers at risk. The traditional response ... has
been government regulation.... There remains a need to find a
better way to control business behavior '" we would raise the
hypothesis that private insurers should provide a more efficient,
effective alternative .
... insurers who protect third parties have strong incentives to
police the behavior of firms whose actions directly affect the
financial exposure of the insurer. Consequently, we would expect
insurance companies to develop risk assessment procedures and
to use these to mandate risk management strategies for their cus-
tomers.
This chapter is an attempt to develop a framework for the insurance
industry to meet the challenges before it - to force the chemical indus-
try to overtake and reduce its economic vulnerability. and. consistent
with this, to demonstrate that insurance is a viable private sector
alternative to government regulation of hazardous materials and their
risks.
Some elements of this framework for insurers are set forth in the
following sections. They include evaluations of current legal develop-
ments in the USA which impose liability on industry and insurers.
emerging industrial responses for reducing risks and economic vulnera-
bility, and several concepts and methods of risk analysis which, if
reduced to practice and applied. could benefit industry, insurers. and
the general public.
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13.3. Legal Developments Promoting the
Economic Vulnerability of Industry
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In the USA, persons who claim injuries to their health, property, and
environment from industrial activities (e.g. hazardous waste disposal)
can use the tort theories of the common law to secure monetary
remedies from the industrial firms which were responsible for the inju-
ries. By bringing a tort action in a state court, the injured person
(plaintiff) has the opportunity to prove the responsibility of one or
more industrial firms (defendants) and to secure a decision holding
such firms liable for the monetary compensation (compensatory dam-
ages; see generally Prosser, 1984; Nothstein, 1984).
The plaintiff in a tort action may also seek additional compensa-
tion to "punish" a defendant whose harmful activities involved intent,
malice, fraud, or gross negligence (punitive damages). This punitive
damage remedy, if secured, can be extremely costly to the defendants,
since it is often considerably larger than the monetary level of the
preceding compensatory damage award, and is not insurable in many
states [6].
The plaintiff (or group of plaintiffs joined in a single court action)
may also seek additional remedies with costs to be borne by the defen-
dant (which may be one or more industrial firms joined in the single
court action). These additional remedies may include court orders for
ongoing medical surveillance of the plaintiffs and their families, for
ongoing environmental monitoring, for restoration of contaminated
environmental conditions or property (e.g. groundwater), and for the
abatement of the industrial activities creating the hazards.
A case now before the state courts in New Jersey demonstrates
the array of remedies. In November 1983, the Superior Court in Tom's
River, New Jersey, awarded 350 residents of Jackson Township $16 mil-
lion in damages to compensate them for the contamination of their
water supply system (well water) caused by the operation of a municipal
waste disposal facility [7]. The contaminants included benzene, ace-
tone, and residual aircraft fuels.
At the trial, no illnesses or injuries to health were established by
the plaintiffs who had unknowingly used the contaminated water supply
for several years, but it was established that they were at risk of
future illnesses. The jury therefore awarded the plaintiffs $8.2 million
in medical surveillance costs to detect and treat any future medical
problems that might arise as a result of their exposure to the pollu-
tants, $5.4 million for impairment of their quality of life, $2 million for
emotional distress, $104000 for their expenses in securing new water
supplies, and $92000 for nuisance damages. In addition, the court
ruled that the plaintiffs would be allowed to return to court in the
future to seek additional damages. should evidence become available
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linking any specific illnesses experienced by the residents to their
exposure to the contaminated water.
This decision was appealed by the defendants, and a state appeals
court has recently reduced the damage award by nullifying the awards
for medical surveillance and emotional distress. It left the $5.6 million
remainder of the award by the lower court intact, however. This deci-
sion is now being taken on further appeal to the state's Supreme Court,
and possibly into a federal court, by the plaintiffs who seek restora-
tion of the original award [8].
Irrespective of the final outcome of this case, many tort law
experts now feel that US courts will soon allow plaintiffs to secure
remedies, such as the recovery of damages and the provision of medical
surveillance funds, for possible future injury on the theory that
increased risk of an illness (e.g. cancer) constitutes a present injury to
the plaintiff. Thus, many expect that plaintiffs who provide sufficient
evidence as to their being at some appreciable increased risk (e.g. sta-
tistical evidence, biological monitoring evidence) will soon prevail in
such cases. A similar trend is expected with regard to recovery for
emotional distress [9].
In related litigation, a New Jersey court ruled on the coverage
issue for one of the insurers. It found against the insurer by holding
that the gradual nature of the contamination did not exclude its cover-
age, that coverage for "sudden and accidental" releases provided by
the policies was not to be limited only to instantaneous releases, and
that unintended pollution damage from gradual contamination consti-
tuted an accident and qualified for coverage [10].
In addition, federal, state, and local governments are now suing
industrial polluters for millions of dollars to clean up hazardous waste
sites which threaten public interests in health and environment. This
development is also occurring in other nations [11].
Such toxic tort and other legal actions have been increasingly
common in industrial states such as New Jersey. The outcomes indicate
clearly the willingness of US courts to adapt the common law and statu-
tory principles for humanitarian purposes - to provide remedies to
persons who have been exposed to hazardous materials and who are
either ill or at increased risk of illness as a result of industrial wrong-
doing.
The courts have also been motivated to adapt the common law
because they are now faced with clusters of cases with similar and dis-
tinctive factual circumstances (e.g. workers with asbestosis or
mesothelioma, both rare diseases; residents of communities with unusu-
ally high rates of cancer or birth defects, who have been exposed to
hazardous wastes improperly disposed). The cluster phenomenon
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induces a "commonsense" response by the courts that something is
wrong and remedies are in order.
Another explanation as to why the courts now readily provide
such remedies is that the judges and juries involved in these cases are
also motivated by the desire to set forth qualitative criteria for
responsible corporate behavior in the new industrial society with its
ubiquitous industrial hazards. The desire for qualitative concepts of
responsible behavior may have been stimulated by the inability of
government regulatory actions, usually in the form of quantitative
(numerical) standards, to prevent the harms, and by the use of
cost-benefit analysis by US agencies to set standards, an approach
which brings only economic values to bear on health and environmental
problems [12].
Thus, the common law of "toxic torts" has essentially set forth a
"moral code" for industry by defining three moral principles as legally
enforceable duties for corporate managers: the duty to make a reason-
able effort to identify hazards to health and the environment; the duty
to warn persons at risk (e.g. workers, consumers, community residents)
of hazards they would otherwise not reasonably be expected to know of
(e.g. latent disease risks from asbestos); and the duty to act to abate
the hazards in a diligent and responsible manner (see Prosser, 1984;
Nothstein, 1984; Baram, 1984).
Finally, there is the influence of new scientific findings on the
courts. Studies by toxicologists, epidemiologists, statisticians, medical
researchers, and others have produced a wide variety of findings as to
health and environmental risks and disease causation. In a given case,
usually no single study provides conclusive evidence of risk, causation
and industrial responsibility. But. in the aggregate, these studies
comprise a mosaic of information from different sources which can more
readily be interpreted by fact finders (e.g. the jury) as sufficient evi-
dence to establish the liability of the industrial defendants [13].
For these and other reasons, state courts have adapted the com-
mon law to enable plaintiffs to more readily secure remedies and impose
liability on industry. The adaptations take place on a state by state
basis. but are usually stimulated by initial actions in the courts of
"leading states" (e.g. New Jersey, California, Michigan. Massachusetts).
The adaptations have had one major policy result: they have reduced
many of the "obstacles" in the tort system which had previously kept
most plaintiffs from successfully securing compensatory and punitive
damages and other remedies for injuries and risks arising from indus-
trial hazards.
For example, consider the following adaptations which have
increased the economic vulnerability of industrial firms using hazar-
dous materials:
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(1) Statutes oj limitations. These state laws define the period dur-
ing which an injured person may bring a tort action (e.g. in New
Jersey, up to six years following injury to property, up to two
years following injury to health or other personal injury: NJSA
2A, 14-1, 2). Thus, victims of long-term latent diseases, which usu-
ally become apparent to the victim some 10-30 years following the
injurious exposure, would be unable to bring tort actions after the
illness symptoms have appeared so late.
To reduce this obstacle, courts in New Jersey and other
states have adopted the "discovery" rule for purposes of inter-
preting the statutes of limitations. The "discovery rule" provides
that the period during which tort action can be brought does not
begin to run until the injured party discovers, or by reasonable
diligence and intelligence should have discovered, the illness and
other related facts which form the basis for the tort action.
Thus, the short periods during which a tort action can be brought
have now been considerably extended, and permit most tort
actions for long-term latent disease and property damage to
proceed [14].
(2) Theories oj liability. The tort system in each state provides
several theories of liability which are of potential usefulness for
the victim of exposure to hazardous substances. These include
negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability theories, with
strict liability being the newest and most favorable for plaintiffs
because of its easier evidentiary requirements (prosser, 1984;
Nothstein, 1984).
Whereas negligence generally requires the plaintiff to pro-
duce sufficient evidence of disease causation and the defendant's
failure to meet a standard of due care, and nuisance generally
requires a finding that the benefits of the defendant's harmful
activities are outweighed by the harms to the plaintiff, all that is
required of the plaintiff who relies on strict liability theory is
proof that the industrial activity was abnormally dangerous and
was the cause in fact of the harm to the plaintiff. Since the issue
of whether an activity is abnormally dangerous is now usually
deemed to be a question of law for the court, the only factual issue
for which the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence is the cau-
sation issue (Rogers, 1977, p 158).
Courts in several leading states such as New Jersey have now
adopted the doctrine of strict liability for cases involving toxic
chemicals in the environment; and courts in virtually all states
have adopted the doctrine for cases involving harmful products
which injure consumers or workers. Thus, in New Jersey v. Ven-
tron, which involved the seepage of mercury from a processing
plant into a river, the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
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A landowner is strictly liable to others for harm caused by
toxic wastes that are stored on his property and flow onto
the property of others ... [T]hose who use, or permit others
to use, land for the conduct of abnormally dangerous activi-
ties are strictly liable for the resulting damages [15].
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In so holding, the court (as have other courts) relied on the
formulation of "abnormally dangerous activities" set forth by the
American Restatement oj Torts (2nd edn), a compendium of tort
law which reflects the views of leading authorities on tort. The
Restatement provides that an activity may be considered abnor-
mally dangerous if the following elements are present:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the
person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm ... will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of rea-
sonable care;
(d) exlent to which the activity is not a matter of common
usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place ... ; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. (Restatement,
Section 520.)
After considering these criteria. the Ventron court (as have oth-
ers) found the disposal of hazardous wastes to be abnormally
dangerous, thereby affording the plaintiff the benefit of using
strict liability theory with its reduced evidentiary requirements.
Similar results have also been reached in cases involving harms
arising from the industrial storage of chemicals that were not
wastes [16].
Thus, in New Jersey and certain other states, evidence that
an activity involving toxic chemicals cannot be made completely
safe, even with the application of state-of-the-art safeguards,
does not preclude, and may even expedite, liability and compensa-
tion. This is decidedly in the plaintiff's favor, since negligence
theory would require a determination as to whether or not safe-
guards are available and should have been adopted.
Strict liability theory has been extended even further to the
benefit of plaintiffs in other cases involving harmful products and
the defendant's failure to warn. In the famous Beshada v. Johns
Mansville Products Corp. case, the New Jersey court applied
strict liability to harms resulting from risks that were unknown
and even unknowable at the time of the activity, and rejected the
state of the art defense argued by the defendants [17]. Thus, in
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New Jersey and other states following its lead, whenever a toxic
substance is spilled, leaked, discharged, emitted, or otherwise
escapes the premises of a commercial facility where it has been
stored, plaintiffs can rely on strict liability to secure compensa-
tion as well as other remedies for all harms which result.
(3) Allocation of liability among responsible parties. Toxic tort
cases typically involve multiple pollutants and polluters, but iden-
tification of which pollutants and polluters caused the plaintiff's
injury may be impossible. Traditionally, this would have thwarted
plaintiffs in such cases. But many state courts now allow a toxic
tort plaintiff to proceed against several parties whose separate
activities led to the convergence of pollutants which caused a
resulting "indivisible" harm. Again, New Jersey law illustrates
how state courts have reduced this toxic tort "obstacle" for plain-
tiffs.
The rule in New Jersey in toxic tort cases is that the parties
who are in any way responsible for the hazard are "jointly and
severally" liable for the consequences of environmental impair-
ment that results. As explained in the Ventron decision:
Damages for a lolaI injury ... are assessable againsl each of
lWO or more lorlfeasors whose wrong was a subslantial fac-
lor in proximalely causing injury ... whenever lhe lolal
injury ... cannol be subdivided and liabilily for ils several
parls attribuled and allocaled lo individual lorlfeasors
[18].
This rule of "joint and several" liability has two important conse-
quences. First, the plaintiff need not demonstrate what portion of
the harm suffered is attributable to any particular responsible
party. Second, the plaintiff can proceed against fewer than all
responsible parties, and obtain full recovery from one or more of
the parties it names as defendants. This leaves to the defendants
the task of obtaining contributions from or reallocating liability
among others who may also be responsible for the harm. (New Jer-
sey has its Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, NJSA 2A, 53A-l, et
seq., to provide a framework for apportionment of liability in such
cases.)
Even in the rare case where a plaintiff has no responsible
party to sue because they are all out of business, or financially
unable to provide damages compensation, or no longer subject to
the jurisdiction of the state court, some courts have responded by
extending liability to one or more parent or successor corpora-
tions of the firms which originally caused the harm [19].
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(4) Prooj oj causation. Proof of causation remains as the major obs-
tacle for the toxic tort plaintiff in cases involving chronic health
hazards. Causation is central to the tort system because it
assures fairness and objectivity in determining responsibility and
liability, and the courts have been more cautious in dealing with
this obstacle.
The causation requirement can be, and has been, met in toxic
tort cases, despite some difficulties:
Causation could well be established in a tort action if, for
example, the plaintiff provided proof of the presence of
toxic chemicals, a plausible route of exposure, and expert
testimony as to the cause of the injury. Moreover, the ele-
ments in the causal claim need not each be proved directly,
but ... by circumstantial evidence. It is not necessary for
the plaintiff to establish conclusive evidence of causation.
As with other elements of a tort action, proof of causation
may be by a preponderance of the evidence. (US National
Science Foundation, 1983, pp 19, 20.)
In states like New Jersey, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
causation in tort cases usually by a "preponderance of the evi-
dence", definable in terms of a "reasonable probability" [20].
This is more liberal than the standards used in other types of
cases (e.g. by "clear and convincing evidence", by evidence
"beyond a reasonable doubt"). The adoption of new rules of evi-
dence by many states (using the Federal rules as a model) has
made it easier for plaintiffs to rely on witnesses who are experts
in toxicology, epidemiology, animal studies, medicine, and statis-
tics, and to have a single expert (usually a doctor with extensive
knowledge of these other fields) draw inferences as to causation
from the evidence introduced by these other experts (provided
the evidence from these other fields of scientific expertise is
admissible, Le. it meets criteria, such as its "sufficient scientific
basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results which
contribute materially to ascertainment of the truth "; and further,
that the evidence is found to be reliable, in that it meets other
criteria, such as its "acceptance" in the scientific community)
[21].
As more expertise in these various scientific fields is
developed, and as research methods become more routine and reli-
able, the role of science as evidence in toxic tort actions will
become more important to both plaintiffs and defendants. Of par-
ticular benefit to plaintiffs will be the new factual information
that is now being made available by companies, as required by
various federal and state regulations and laws. For example, the
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federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) now
requires many employers to provide employees and their doctors
and unions with access to company-compiled employee medical and
exposure (to toxic substances) records [22].
OSHA has also recently enacted its "hazard communication"
regulation which further requires certain employers (manufactur-
ers) to disclose information to employees on the hazardous attri-
butes of the chemicals they use (OSHA, 1983). Several states
(some 24 states) have enacted laws which affirm this requirement
and, in some instances, broaden its application to additional
employers (e.g. Massachusetts extends the requirement to trans-
portation, construction, and many other industries) (see Baram,
1984). And some ten states have recently enacted laws which man-
date the disclosure of chemical hazard information by companies
to various state and local officials and, in some instances, to com-
munity residents as well (Baram, 1984). Congress is now consider-
ing enacting a federal "community right to know" law, to extend
the flow of hazard information to state and local officials and
residents in all states to the public [23].
These new US requirements for the disclosure of company-
held information on chemical hazards will provide workers, consu-
mers, and community residents with new information which will be
of use in establishing causation in toxic tort cases, and go far
beyond the requirements of the EEC's "Seveso Directive" in forc-
ing hazard information disclosure [24].
Finally, the causation issue will undoubtedly be influenced by
growing company uses of biological monitoring and medical surveil-
lance to protect workers (Baram, 1983). These new techniques for
monitoring the workforce in hazardous industries provide new
information profiles on human exposure, biological changes, and
the evolution of latent disease. This information will, in turn, be
available to workers, under the OSHA requirements discussed
above (access to medical and exposure records), and will inevit-
ably become available in various ways to community residents who
seek the data. It will therefore represent an important body of
information on disease causation, and will undoubtedly be used in
toxic tort proceedings by plaintiffs to establish causation. and by
defendants to refute causation (Baram and Field, 1984).
Thus, while causation remains an obstacle for plaintiffs, vari-
ous legal and technical developments indicate that it will be dimin-
ished in the future (unless the new information increasingly estab-
lishes the multifactorial nature of human disease - e.g. that human
life style, smoking, nutrition, and genetics play substantial roles
in promoting diseases which may have been initiated by hazardous
materials).
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This brief review of toxic tort law in the USA provides information
on some current strong trends which are enhancing the opportunities
for private party plaintiffs to secure remedies and impose liability on
industry.
In addition, other forces are at work which are already imposing
great liability on industrial firms. These other forces, in the form of
various federal and state laws for the abatement of risks from chemi-
cals, pollutants and hazardous wastes, authorize federal and state agen-
cies to establish detailed regulatory requirements for industrial
activity, including testing, disposal practices, the filing of reports, and
other disclosures of information for government use. Violations are
subject to substantial civil penalties (e.g. up to S25000 per day), to
criminal penalties for violations which involved intent or fraud, and to
civil actions in federal courts by citizens under certain limited cir-
cumstances [25].
To remedy existing and abandoned hazardous waste risks, federal
law provides that the federal government can take whatever emergency
measures are needed, and then secure compensation for the clean-up
and other "response" costs, and for contaminated natural resources
(e.g. groundwater). from the "responsible" parties (e.g. generators,
transporters, disposers of the hazardous wastes) [26].
Under this potent law, the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has identified hundreds of hazardous waste sites, and has
launched a major clean-up program. For each site, it is identifying
responsible parties and seeking, by negotiation, compensation from
these parties. At many sites, the clean-up and other response costs
exceed S10 million, and can run much higher. In addition, the costs of
natural resource damage will be imposed in the near future. and these
will also run into millions of dollars. Since hundreds of parties may be
deemed "responsible" for each site, the EPA's negotiation efforts have
been stalled. and it has resorted to litigation to secure the compensa-
tion authorized by federal law from the parties. Both negotiation and
litigation efforts have run into factual complexities (e.g. allocation of
responsibility for wastes) and have encountered the legal problem of
what liability standards are to be used.
The responsible parties include past and present owners and
operators of the site, transporters, and generators, defined as "any
person who by contract agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal
or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such per-
son, by any other party ... " [27], thereby including producers and
users of the toxic chemicals found at the site.
The issue of what liability standards to apply to the identified
responsible parties has been addressed by numerous federal courts in
the past few years, with most of the courts deciding that the strict lia-
bility theory applies [28], and finding the authorized statutory
428 Insu.ring and Managing Hazardou.s Risks
defenses (e.g. exercise of "due care") are unavailable in most cases
involving generator disposal activities conducted before enactment of
the statute [29].
These courts have also adopted a loose standard of causality.
According to one court "The only required nexus between the defen-
dant and the site is that the defendant has dumped his waste there and
that the hazardous substance found in the defendant's waste is found
at the site" [30J. This view has been extended by some courts, in their
finding that the government can rely on documentary or circumstantial
proof that the wastes were hauled to the site without proof that they
were subsequently taken away, thereby allowing a minimal showing that
the generator's wastes were at some time taken to the site [31J.
Finally, the federal courts have grappled with the crucial issue of
apportionment of liability among the numerous responsible parties
involved at each site. Every court facing the issue of whether liability
should be joint and several has construed the vague federal law and its
ambiguous legislative history to find that Congress intended to permit
joint and several liability, but did not require its imposition (OIlman,
1985, p 13).
Without joint and several liability, "the government would be able
to recover from each generator only that portion of the total cleanup
costs which it can prove was caused by the generator's wastes", a task
of enormous technical difficulty and cost. Further, "the government
would be precluded from recovering the costs of cleaning up wastes
caused by unknown or insolvent parties ... [makingJ full recovery ...
difficult, if not impossible ... " (OIlman, 1985. pp 12-13).
The result has been a split among the federal courts on the issue
of joint and several liability. All deem it legally permissible, and feel a
uniform federal approach important and necessary. But the courts
have divided into at least two camps, with some holding each defendant
who "caused a single and indivisible harm subject to the liability for
the entire harm unless there is a reasonable basis for dividing the
harm according to the contribution of each defendant", and others
holding that apportionment is a matter for the discretion of the court,
when the defendant cannot prove his contribution according to certain
criteria [32].
Thus, under federal law for hazardous waste clean-up, generators
of the waste have generally been subject to strict liability, circumstan-
tial evidence of causation, limited defenses, and the strong possibility
of joint and several liability for toxic wastes they disposed of before
the law was enacted. As noted earlier, various state laws have been
enacted and are being used to secure additional awards for state
agency clean-up costs and other remedies, imposing additional liability
on parties responsible for hazardous waste problems.
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Thus, two strong trends now converge on industry and create its
new economic vulnerability: increased use of the common law of toxic
torts by private parties in order to secure compensation and other
remedies for harms to their interests, under increasingly favorable
legal conditions; and increased use of new federal and state laws by
government agencies to recover clean-up and other costs by means of
negotiation or litigation, also under favorable legal conditions.
The economic impacts on industry have already proved substantial
and threaten to become overwhelming. However, the industrial losses
have been spread or diffused by insurance coverage. Thus, the
insurance industry has borne many of the losses due to industrial lia-
bility for harms due to hazardous materials and is now lobbying to
secure changes in tort liability rules. But various "positive measures"
are also being urged and increasingly taken by industry and insurers to
prevent health and environmental risks and their associated
losses, and these may represent the most effective approach to over-
taking and controlling economic vulnerability, to reviving the pollution
insurance market, and to facilitating the public policy goal of prevent-
ing risk to health and environment:
Companies are bolstering their risk assessment teams with
increasingly qualified personnel, and are devising sophisticated
policies that address more and more of the known pollution vari-
abIes.... For all the efforts now underway, we are barely
scratching the surface. (Borowski, 1984, p 35.)
These measures rely on increased use of risk analysis, the leadership
of industrial and insurance officials, and the cooperation of government
agencies; we shall now discuss them.
13.4. Using Risk Analysis to Meet the Challenge
13.4.1. Emerging uses of risk analysis in industry
Risk analysis can be defined in several ways. A general definition suit-
able for this discussion is that risk analysis is the process of identi-
fying potential hazards for individuals and society, and estimating their
magnitude and probability of occurrence with the aid of statistics,
experiments, analytic methods of various fields of science and
engineering, human experience, and judgment.
Industrial firms have traditionally relied on rudimentary forms of
engineering risk analysis to identify potential accidents and other sud-
den hazards with economic consequences which may arise from their
facility processes, sale of products, and other activities. Some of these
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analytic approaches have been supplemented and reinforced by safety
engineering methods developed by insurers (as in the case of analyzing
fire risks and workplace injury risks), private standard-setting groups
[e.g. CONCAWE (Oil Industry Trade Association), the National Fire Pro-
tection Association, the American Society for Testing and Materials],
and public officials (e.g. local fire marshals, state safety officials,
federal transportation agencies).
Analytic procedures developed by these other parties have often
been forced on industry, either directly or indirectly, by the law.
Thus, compliance with government methods may be directly required
for industry to secure permits to operate facilities or sell new chemi-
cals: compliance with insurer methods may be a condition of the
insurance contract and the basis for establishing the cost of insurance
coverage; and compliance with the methods of private "expert" associa-
tions is forced by the need for industry to demonstrate it met "indus-
try custom" and "state of the art" in the event of an accident and sub-
sequent litigation by the injured parties, where this defense may be
useful to the industrial defendant in avoiding liability [33].
The actual use of these analytic approaches in industrial
decision-making constitutes risk management, which can be simply
outlined as:
a logical procedure ... [which] entails:
(1) identifying and analyzing a problem,
(2) formulating alternative solutions,
(3) choosing the best solution,
(4) implementing the chosen alternative, and
(5) monitoring the results to detect and adapt for any error or
changes in conditions. (Head, 197B, p 9.)
But over the last decade of gradual pollution and latent disease
losses, the prevailing risk analytic practices based on safety engineer-
ing have been shown to be inadequate for the task of identifying,
measuring, and controlling the gradual and latent hazards arising from
the routine activities of industrial firms, such as the continuing or
repeated discharge of chemicals in small amounts into the environment.
These "routine" activities, many of which received government appro-
vals, create hazards which necessitate a greater reliance on new dis-
ciplines in risk analysis, such as the various fields of the health sci-
ences, and biostatistics and probabilistic risk theory.
The new disciplines must also be integrated into subsequent risk
management activities which rely on the analyses, in order to assure
that managers act properly on the basis of analytic findings. For the
new gradual or latent risks, the new disciplines are needed for estab-
lishing the full characterization or model of the risk problem, including
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exposure identification and analysis, and the efficacy of alternative
solutions.
Reliance on the new health science disciplines and new methods of
risk analysis is now being required for many chemical industry activi-
ties, particularly for the testing and disposal of chemicals, by recent
government actions in the USA and the EEC [34]; and it is being pro-
moted by the guidance of national and international expert groups [35],
as well as by the need of corporate officials to avoid further losses
from liability and compensation awards.
13.4.2. Basic premises of the new risk analysis for insurers
The task facing the insurance sector is threefold:
(1) To define and model industrial risk contexts.
(2) To evaluate and choose appropriate methods of risk analysis
for use in establishing coverage.
(3) To promote use of the methods in the insurance sector and by
insureds.
From the foregoing discussion of chemical industry hazards and
the wide variety of injuries and losses, two risk contexts emerge most
clearly:
(1) The context of the facility which produces, uses, or stores haz-
ardous materials (e.g. chemical manufacturer, industrial or other
user of chemicals who stores and uses them at a particular site).
(2) The less tangible context encompassing the chemical life cycle
which exists beyond any facility context already considered
(e.g. transport of chemicals to numerous interim storage and use
sites, use of chemicals outside of processing facilities as in the
case of residential and agricultural uses, disposal of the chemical).
For each of the two contexts, there are two types of potential
injurious occurrences which must then be modeled: nonroutine
events, such as explosions, spills, and other accidents: and routine
events, such as emissions, discharges, and waste generation on a con-
tinuing or repetitive basis. This approach can be summarized by the
matrix in Figure 13.1. In modeling risks of these four types (A, B, C,
D), insurers must start with the assumption that the industrial activi-
ties in question may not have been preceded by careful, objective, and
complete analyses, or by management decisions consistent with risk
analysis findings.
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For example, the industrial analysis may have been "synoptic" and
not "sequential", Le. it may have used a "once and for all" design
engineering approach to risk, and not fully considered risk as an ongo-
ing operational problem involving full consideration of personnel turn-
over, training, human factors, and other aspects of its capability for
ongoing control [36). Or the industrial approach may have deliberately
excluded consideration of liability from gradual pollution or long-term
illness (ten years and beyond) because the current managers would
only be held accountable to directors and shareholders for liability
incurred during their relatively brief tenure (commonly only one to five
years in the USA) [37).
Further, many industrial firms have chosen to operate at risk lev-
els which are higher and more prone to liability, rather than at achiev-
able lower risk levels which are more costly in the short term, but
which do not bear as high a loss potential. This may be due to one or
more factors.
For example, some industrial officials look no further than achiev-
ing compliance with government regulations. and do not confront the
more complex task of assessing risk and reducing it to even lower levels
which may be achievable. This overlooks the fact that regulations are
usually designed only to protect the general population from exposure
to levels of risk which would produce significant numbers of injuries,
and not to protect individuals who may be highly exposed or suscepti-
ble persons. In some cases, this industrial approach is due to overem-
phasizing regulatory compliance as the only goal for industry; in other
cases, it is due to the industrial desire to avoid the short-term costs of
greater risk reduction efforts, costs which may be outweighed by long-
term tort liability and other losses (38).
Further, loss potentials are being increased by industrial efforts
to reduce operating costs by deliberately avoiding full compliance with
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government regulations - efforts which will either be violations ignored
by, or unknown to, government, or be allowed as permissible excep-
tions. Many firms realize the limitations of government monitoring and
enforcement efforts, and deliberately operate with a planned number
of violations knowing that the cost savings that accrue will outweigh
any occasional government action and penalty. Finns also seek official
exemptions from government regulatory requirements, often on the
basis of economic hardship. Both circumstances reduce current oper-
ating costs but may increase long-term liability.
Finally, industrial firms which have been able to secure adequate
and affordable insurance coverage for activities which have led to risks
and losses borne over time by insurers have little incentive to conduct
their activities at reduced risk levels. This may be due to pricing of
insurance by private and government insurers that is inadequate -
inadequate in that the costs to a particular firm with a record of losses
may not be sufficiently differentiated from the costs to all other firms
with better loss records.
These factors are depicted in Figure 13.2 which is based on the
theoretical notion that one can accurately predict risks and losses
from a particular industrial activity. In the diagram, three sectors of
risk are shown: the sector mandated by government regulation, the
unreasonable risk sector prohibited by regulation, and the de minimis
risk zone in which no risks of any significance will occur. Industry is
legally required to confine its activity to the maximum risk level
prescribed by government regulation. Thus, if perfect information and
analytic capability to predict risk and loss for a particular activity are
available, one can determine the losses associated with conducting
industrial activity x at the maximum level of risk permitted by govern-
ment (L - x).
This can then be compared with the reduced losses (L - y) that
would follow from industrial activity y that is planned to be more
stringent than government regulation and protect virtually any indivi-
dual. Firms which deliberately exceed the maximum level of risk per-
mitted by government by conducting their activity at risk level z,
knowing that this will not be enforced as a violation or will be granted
official exemption, will obviously incur the highest losses (L - z).
Finally, Figure 13.2 depicts the four loss coverage sectors pro-
vided by self-insurance, direct insurer coverage, reinsurance coverage,
and, for certain types of risks, government insurance, hypothetically
relating deliberate risk taking by industry to the availability of loss
coverage, and opening up a number of options for insurers and govern-
ment to use the availability and pricing of insurance to deter industrial
risk taking [39].
Thus, some basic premises have been proposed for the develop-
ment and use of risk analysis by insurers: the differentiation of risk
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Figure 13.2. Risk, loss, and coverage.
contexts and events; the industrial failure to address risk control as an
ongoing process problem; the industrial failure to deal with long-term
losses in risk analysis because the accountability of industrial officials
is short-term; and the deliberate conduct of industrial activities at risk
levels which generate greater losses because of overreliance on govern-
ment regulations in some instances. because of lack of government
enforcement in other instances. and because of the availability of loss
coverage without pricing for deterrent effect.
Finally, new laws and regulations in the EEC and the USA already
mandate that industrial management conduct many of the elements of
the risk analyses that have been discussed. For example, under the
EEC's Seveso Directive (European Communities CounciL 1982). the UK
now requires the managers of each facility containing certain specified
hazardous substances to prepare a "safety case" for the facility (see
Advisory Committee on Major Hazards, Health and Safety Commission,
1984; Haigh. 1984).
The "safety case" is essentially a complete risk analysis for the
nonroutine facility occurrence scenario described previously. It must
contain an analysis of the installation; substances stored, used, and
produced; processes involved; accident risks and internal and external
accident triggering events (e.g. malfunction, flood); safeguards and con-
trol systems; and emergency response plans. The safety case contains
much confidential information and its disclosure is mandated. but lim-
ited to designated government officials for evaluation.
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After government review of its adequacy in protecting community
residents from accidents, any inadequacies are to be cured by indus-
trial management, and the government officials have the dual responsi-
bilities of assuring that the final outcome is adequate to protect the
public and of developing appropriate off-site emergency response plans
for additional public protection (Advisory Committee on Major Hazards,
Health and Safety Commission, 1984: Haigh, 1984; Lagadec, 1984). A
model of the UK plan for implementing the Seveso Directive is provided
in Figure 1.3.3.
on
--,
I
I
I
I
__ I
Guidance given to industry by the EEC - in the form
of lists of "dangerous substances", generic criteria for
identification of other substances, designation of indus-
tries subject to risk communication requirements, and
specification of disclosure requirements.
Development of information package ("safety case"
in the UK) integrating information of four types: I<llsubstances, installations, accident events, control
plans and systems.
Review of information package provided by each
firm, followed by official rejection or acceptance.
1 1
Development and implementation Provision of information on
of plan for off-site hazards in the "need to know" basis to community
community. residents and officials.
Figure 13.3. The UK system for controlling major accident hazards at facili-
ties, following the EEC Seveso Directive.
Other EEC nations will similarly implement the Seveso Directive by
1989, and the EEC and various nations are undertaking a major
research effort on many key attributes of facility accident hazards
[40]. Although the USA currently lacks such requirements at the
federal level. several proposals have been presented to Congress and
enactment of a Seveso-like system is anticipated [41]. Anticipating
government action, several major chemical firms in the USA have volun-
tarily adopted safety evaluation systems similar to those mandated by
the Seveso Directive (e.g. the DuPont, Monsanto, and Rohm and Haas
companies).
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Thus, a major effort is underway in the countries of Western
Europe and in the USA to have chemical firms conduct coherent and
detailed risk analyses of their facilities to evaluate and prevent
accident hazards, and to promote community response or damage con-
trol plans. The insurance industry could seize this opportunity, for
example, and require as a condition for coverage, their access to and
independent review of the safety case done by each industrial firm
seeking insurance. Independent evaluation by insurers is advised,
since the performance of companies and government officials may be of
variable and even inadequate quality; and insurers may also want to use
more stringent evaluation criteria for assuring that both risks and
losses are reduced.
The "safety case" approach also presents an opportunity for
insurers to force industrial risk analysis of routine facility
occurrences, another of the four scenarios. Admittedly more complex
because of the uncertainties about gradual pollution and chronic health
hazards, the safety case can, nevertheless, be extended to deal with
routine plant emissions and discharges.
13.5. Conclusion
The many new hazards to health and the environment that have been
created by the chemical industry have been met by developments in
the law which now assure that industry and its insurers will bear full
financial responsibility for the harms.
The result is economic vulnerability that is now so pronounced for
the industry and its insurers that it has caused the pollution insurance
market to "collapse". Many firms are therefore relying on "defensive"
strategies to try to restrict liability; but these do not prevent either
risks or the development of new loss-spreading systems by government,
both imposed on the private sector at considerable cost.
Industry and insurers also have positive options, however. They
can improve their capability to prevent risks and losses, to reduce
their economic vulnerability, and to preserve their autonomy from
further government control. The foremost of the positive options
involves striking at the root of the problem, the need to prevent risks
to health and the envir'onment by developing and using new methods of
risk analysis and management.
Risk analysis is still in its infancy; and traditional risk manage-
ment has been shown to be inadequate for the gradual pollution, latent
diseases and other special hazards of the chemical industry. However,
several factors indicate that new and powerful tools to overtake and
control risks and losses and vulnerability are imminent.
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Leading members of industry are supporting risk analysis and
management initiatives. Government and academic efforts are being
made to reduce theories to practice. And the advances in the health
sciences, safety engineering, and stochastics that are being used to
establish causation and responsibility for latent diseases, environmen-
tal degradation, and accidents that have occurred can also be used to
act prospectively on potential causes of harm.
As these separate efforts converge, the tools for controlling risks
and losses may become available for practice and systematic applica-
tion in the private sector. Insurers should therefore join with indus-
try, government, and academia in promoting this development, to pro-
tect their own interests and to protect human well-being.
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13.D. Discussion
A.V. Cohen [1]
13.D.1. Introduction
My comments are necessarily those of a nonlawyer, but one with experi-
ence in administering risk regulation in the UK. Any views I express
are personal, and do not necessarily coincide with the views of the UK
Health and Safety Executive.
13.D.2. The role of insurance in encouraging safety
Insurance can bring home to owners of plant the existence of a risk.
and spread any possible civil law liability. But insurance cannot be the
full story in improving safety because:
(1) Liability for harm done will not always rest on the insured party.
Much depends on the precise nature of the law.
(2) In any case, causation and fault may both be difficult to establish
for "delayed effect" situations. like possible carcinogens. Even if
causation can be established, and even with "joint and several lia-
bility", companies might well have gone out of business a genera-
tion after exposure.
(3) We need to examine the extent to which public liability policies
properly cover the full effects of the "high-consequence, low-
probability" situation.
(4) In some countries it has been found possible to charge differential
premiums according to the level of risk. But, within a particular
category of industry, the "spread" of financial risk can in effect
act as a tax on the safe factory, to the benefit of the risky.
(5) Premiums tend to be low. partly because of the preceding items.
partly because of competition, and' partly because they are often
part of a wider package. The premiums do not impact as sharply
as they might on the occupier's awareness and only limited credit
may be given for prevention measures.
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Something more than civil law liability is therefore needed: regulatory
and enforcement powers to ensure that occupiers reduce risks, to
workpeople or to members of the public, to what proves a socially
acceptable level. Even granting the increasing level of claims,
insurance is unlikely ever to be an alternative to government regula-
tion. The two must go together. What is regarded as socially accept-
able regulation, or fair law, will vary from country to country. Typi-
cally, one can expect:
(1) A prescription for what is needed to achieve a certain level or
standard of safety: zero risk is likely to be unobtainable.
(2) Active encouragement for occupiers to "self-inspect".
(3) Requirements to have general company safety policies, and disclo-
sure of risks to "safety representatives" nominated by unions.
(4) Inspection to ensure that the prescriptions of the law are carried
out.
(5) If the legal prescriptions are not carried out. legal (including
criminal) sanctions.
The legal powers in the UK rest mainly with the Health and Safety
at Work etc. Act 1974 [2]. The provisions of this Act are in general
terms. Section 2 places a duty on "every employer to ensure. so far as
is reasonably practicable. the health, safety and welfare at work of all
his employees". Section 3 places a similar duty to "ensure. so far as is
reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment who may be
affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or
safety". There is a Health and Safety Commission. appointed by the
Secretary of State for Employment and including. among others.
representatives of employers and trades unions, and a Health and
Safety Executive. which employs the various inspectors and which has
enforcement powers. Regulations can be made under the Act by the
Secretary of State (Section 15), usually on the recommendation of the
Commission and in any case after consulting them (Section 50).
These regulations can be considerably sharper than the general
"reasonably practicable" requirement. Thus our way of controlling
many dangerous substances. particularly carcinogens. and our pro-
posed way of controlling all substances hazardous to health, is to
require that exposure should not exceed a specified control limit. and
in any case should be further reduced so far as is reasonably practica-
ble. This latter point can mitigate many of the difficulties Baram has
identified in regulations which merely set a control limit.
The regulations are true secondary legislation made by the Secre-
tary of State and subject to parliamentary "negative approval". The
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recommendations for them arise in a forum representative both of
employers and of trades unions. There is a wide range of regulations
issued [3]. The Commission can also issue "approved codes of practice"
and the Executive can issue guidance.
Before recommending a regulation, the Health and Safety Commis-
sion (Section 50.3) has to "consult any government department or other
body that appears to the Commission to be appropriate". Consultative
documents are usually published and invite comment. The Commission
prepares its final recommendations in the light of consultation, but it
does not have to justify every difference from every comment made to
it. In principle it is possible for regulations to be ultra vires; but the
grounds for legal contesting of a regulation are very much narrower in
the UK than in the USA.
Delays are inevitable in preparing regulations, because of the
need for a "legitimizing process" rooted in the country's legal and
administrative practices. In the UK, this is consultation and is essen-
tially slow. Legal contesting of a regulation is, I gather, more common
in the USA, and will lead to "the law's delays". Either seems the inevit-
able price for forming legislation in a nonauthoritarian environment.
Enforcement of these regulations, and of the general duties of the
Act, is the responsibility of the Executive and its inspectors, and, for
some premises, of local authorities. All of these have power to
prosecute, and to issue "improvement notices" and "prohibition
notices" (Sections 21 and 22) which mean what they say: the recipient
of such a notice may appeal (Section 24) but the onus of proof then
rests on him. In a typical year there will be some 2000 prosecutions
and some 15000 notices, of which notices approximately 200 will be
appealed against, and perhaps ten appeals upheld.
Inspectors do most of their work informally by persuasion and
informal advice rather than by using the arm of the law. Firms above a
certain size are required to produce formal safety policies and, in many
circumstances, to disclose information about risks to nominated "safety
representatives" of their workforce.
Local authorities are responsible for enforcing the Act in certain
premises and, among many other matters, for planning decisions, for
emergency planning, and for licensing sites for the disposal of hazard-
ous material. The Department of the Environment·s Hazardous Waste
Inspectorate can visit and advise local authorities, and has close con-
nections with the Health and Safety Executive's general body of
knowledge. The planning function, too, has an interface with the
Health and Safety Executive: local authorities can and do seek our
advice, and the famous Canvey Report (Health and Safety Executive,
1978, 1981) arose as a result of the invitation of t.he Secretary of State
for the Environment, in connection with a planning decision.
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Recognizing that a hazard exists is relatively straightforward for nor-
mal industrial accident situations. It becomes much more difficult for
situations with delayed effects on health, and even more so for the
"high-consequence, low-probability" situation. Inevitably, many
hazards have not yet been fully identified.
The next step must be the complex process of risk estimation.
The process is considered at length in the Royal Society Report on
Risk Assessment (Royal Society, 1983). It presents a familiar set of
problems in estimating the effect of toxic substances: what weight to
place on essentially limited animal experiments, how to apply results to
the effect on man, etc. For potentially catastrophic situations. imag-
inative lateral thinking is needed, for all the ways in which things could
go wrong.
In either case. the risk estimation is not an exact science: but an
estimate that is correct to an order of magnitude is a good deal better
than nothing. The inherent uncertainties must be kept in mind and do
mean that:
(1) Tendentious criticisms of such estimates can and do arise.
(2) Risk analysis can estimate the size of the risk, and be very sug-
gestive on how to reduce it.
(3) But the decision on how far to control a situation must rest with
risk managers, overseen by a regulatory agency, and ultimately if
necessary by government.
(4) Nevertheless. risk analysis. combined with consequential manage-
ment, can be of real benefit in reducing risk. Canvey Island now
presents a societal risk perhaps 20 times less than that at the
beginning of the study.
13.D.5. The effect on industry
The growing liability to chemical firms arises from:
(1) The changing nature and scale of technology.
(2) Public expectations of safety and sensitivity to perceived danger.
both of which may have increased in recent years.
The consequential unwillingness of insurers to cover large plant with
potential for catastrophe, or for widespread harm, raises a number of
problems. including:
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(1) The fear of consequences, which may inhibit proper technical
development. The employer cannot afford to be wrong and is
reluctant to innovate.
(2) Once a major catastrophe has happened, the situation may well be
beyond insurance. The real problem to a company may then be
survival.
Risk estimation can put a scale on the hazard and thus help both insur-
ers and regulators. But a technical process cannot by itself eliminate
the above problems. Regulation (of which legitimization is an important
component) is needed to reduce risk to acceptable levels. Such a pro-
cess is unlikely to convince everyone: there will always be residual
objectors and protestors.
For large works presenting "major hazards" the pattern, con-
sistent with the Seveso Directive, is: notification, self-assessment
under scrutiny from regulators, emergency planning, and inspection to
follow up if necessary, with legal sanctions always held in reserve. A
further element is that land use planning must take account of the
"assessed residual risk".
Insurance, helped by risk assessment, thus has a role, but not an
exclusive one, in the reduction of risk, particularly for firms that own
large plants and thus have a strong financial interest in such reduc-
tions. But financial incentives may not be adequate to motivate small
and medium-size firms. The need to control these must not be over-
looked.
13.D.6. Conclusions
Insurance can well be of assistance in some areas in providing a finan-
cial incentive for reducing risk. This incentive is likely to be felt most
sharply in large and sophisticated industrial undertakings, but hazards
elsewhere should not be overlooked. In all areas legal powers for regu-
lation and enforcement are also necessary, and the process of "risk
assessment" can help both insurance and risk regulation.
The situation I have described is typically British in its style of
agency interaction, of legitimization, and of enforcement. Other coun-
tries will have their own ways of handling such mat ters so as to make
their decisions acceptable to those concerned.
Ch.emicaL Industry Hazards
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[1] Crown Copyright Reserved - reproduction in whole or in part only with
permission of Her Majesty's Stationary Office which permission to be
obtained in the first instance from the author.
[2] 1974 c. 37.
[3] Some relevant regulations are:
The Dangerous Substances (Conveyance by Road in Road Tankers and
Tank Containers) Regulations 1961 (SI 1961/1059).
The Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regu-
lations 1962 (SI 1962/1357).
The Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1964
(SI/1964/1902).
The Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Dangerous Substances
Regulations 1964 (SI/1964/1244).
Proposals for Dangerous Substances (Conveyance by Road in Packages
etc.) Regulations 1964 (consultative document, Health and Safety Com-
mission. HMSO, London. 1964).
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CHAPTER 14
Practical Aspects of Environmental
Impairment Liability
A. Klaus
14.1. Introduction
Love Canal. Seveso, the Torrey Canyon, the Amoco Cadiz, and Bhopal
are environmental catastrophes which will remain in our mind for
decades. Such incidents have made us painfully aware that many by-
products of industrial progress are threatening our environment.
Apart from the destruction of lives and irreplaceable values, such
incidents often end up with billion dollar claims. Like shock waves,
these monetary claims always shake the entire insurance industry
around the globe. Surprisingly enough, however, the losses arising out
of all these environmental disasters are low or even negligible com-
pared with all fire losses. So, why are insurers making a fuss about
these small indemnities?
The following may explain this clearly contradictory situation:
(1) Insurance of environmental impairment liability (ElL) is a branch
with a small number of issued policies.
(2) The objects insured are biased toward the higher possibility of an
incident occurring. This adverse selection is in flagrant contra-
diction to the basic rules of insurance theory.
(3) The total premium volume for the liability cover - under which
such incidents are covered - is marginal compared with the sum
for the insurance cover against fire/explosion perils.
(4) A fire occurs suddenly and accidentally, and the loss is normally
quickly and precisely assessable. In contrast, in the case of many
environmental losses, the situation is completely the reverse: the
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date of loss and the cause of the losses are hard to assess, and it
is very difficult to express the loss in terms of money.
(5) In the case of environmental impairment, loss investigation and
settlement often take on a political aspect and the public at large
is emotionally involved.
(6) The field of environmental losses is becoming more and more a milk
cow for the enrichment of lawyers, clean-up contractors, excava-
tors, waste incinerators, and others.
All in all, insurance of ElL on a full-cover basis is a branch with a very
limited capacity, with a small number of issued policies, with the prob-
lem of antiselection, and with a high degree of incertitude.
However, despite these negative aspects, this type of insurance
presents a challenging scope of work for the underwriters and the par-
ticipating engineers.
14.2. How is ElL Organized?
The insurance industry's approach is relatively new and far from uni-
form. Under many standard forms of general comprehensive liability
policies, damages arising out of a sudden and accidental pollution of the
environment are also covered. The Bhopal incident is a typical example
of such a sudden and accidental type. In contrast, the main target of
ElL insurance born in 1974 is to cover also gradual events. Incidents
like a leaking tank are normally not covered under the general
comprehensive liability policies: these incidents are typically covered
by an ElL policy.
A gradual leak or discharge of effluent may go unnoticed for a long
time before its harmful properties are realized. This makes it almost
impossible to identify an occurrence within any given policy period.
The term "occurrence" must be avoided. Therefore, as a necessity,
such an ElL policy is always issued on a claims-made basis.
One of the main problems of an ElL insurance consists in the cal-
culation of premiums. Insurance rates are normally calculated on a sta-
tistical basis. They depend on historical information about size of
claims and frequency. Unfortunately, only insufficient information on
this type of loss is available to provide a basis for rating these pollu-
tion risks. Furthermore, the historical claims situation may not be a
reliable guide for the future. In recent years there has been a growing
awareness of environmental deterioration and loss of amenity.
Improved scientific techniques give victims a greater chance of locating
the source of a specific environmental impairment.
In setting tariffs for ElL risks, insurance companies have followed
a highly subjective approach: instead of collecting information about
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claims, they have considered the likelihood of such claims. In princi-
ple, the following approach has been adopted.
Processes and substances are listed according to their possibility
of causing harm to water, land, and air. At this stage we are solely con-
cerned with the likelihood of environmental damage, not with whether
or not a claim will arise nor with what the extent of such a claim will be.
The final result is a score-table for different industrial activities. It
gives an indication of the pure risk and is the main element of the ElL
tariff system. Other elements are: country, history, degree of techni-
cal development, turnover of the client's company, claims consciousness
of the population, etc. Together with experience in the field of liabil-
ity, we finally end up with our tariff system.
To cover a particular risk with an ElL policy, an essential part is a
careful risk inspection of the premises of each client. Such a survey
serves to identify risks and to assess the likelihood and size of possible
loss scenarios. Fundamentally important is the assessment whether the
estimated loss scenarios give rise to actionable claims. Surveyors and
underwriters must discuss these points together. Underwriting a mis-
judged risk could end up disastrously for the underwriter.
Analysis, evaluation, and treatment of risks, so-called "risk
management", has become of utmost importance not only in the field of
fire insurance (where these techniques have been developed) but also
in the field of liability insurance.
14.3. Experience with ElL Insurance
Much of our know-how has been collected so far by trial and error. I
am pleased to have the opportunity to share our experiences at Swiss
Re with you. Selected areas that may be of interest to you are now dis-
cussed.
14.3.1. Clients
Our clients mainly belong to the group of "carriers" and "disposers" of
toxic or nontoxic waste. Another group of clients is involved in tran-
sportation, storage, handling, and processing of oil products. These
clients are well aware of the high risk potential they carry with their
business. However, the vast majority of plant managers, when making a
cost-benefit comparison, still decide against an ElL cover.
The high publicity surrounding ElL insurance provoked the public
to believe that thousands of clients and a tremendous premium income
must be involved. In fact, Swiss Re, as a reinsurance company, is
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involved through the ceding insurance companies in a disappointingly
low number: there are only a few dozen clients in the portfolio.
14.3.2. US shock
A few years ago, because of the very difficult situation of the liability
insurance market in the USA, we decided (also through fear of the
courts) to turn away from the US ElL market. In our opinion. this was a
necessary and vital decision: just look at North American newspapers
and read about the compensation that insurance companies have to pay.
14.3.3. Worldwide ElL insurance capacities
Today, as far as we know, there exists a national ElL pool in Italy with a
capacity of approximately US $3 million. Another national pool is in
France, with a capacity of French Francs 30 million. A most interesting
experiment has recently been started in the Netherlands, where 53
insurance companies bring in their ElL risks on a voluntary basis. The
pool has a capacity of approximately US $1.5 million. Our own interna-
tional underwriting capacity is US $3 million. There may be further
insurance capacities floating around. But, all in all, we guess that the
maximum combined limit of liability available may hardly reach US $10
million for a single risk in Europe.
Compared with the possible scenarios which may occur, this max-
imum limit of liability is in some cases not more than a drop on a hot
stone. Compared with the late 1970s when a client easily obtained a
limit of US $30 million, this is a considerably different situation.
In the USA, a dramatic ElL capacity slash has been observed dur-
ing the last few months. There, most buyers will now only be able to
purchase a maximum of US $10 million in ElL coverage, down from limits
of more than US $65 million in early 1984. This slash in ElL capacity is
caused by the lack of reinsurance capacity. An important characteris-
tic of this business is that it is heavily reinsured. The reinsurers are
obviously suffering from severe losses and have a very negative feeling
towards the US courts. To some extent the situation applies also to
Europe. The reinsurers' distaste for pollution risks is likely to con-
tinue in the near future.
14.3.4. Loss experience
The total number of losses and claims (so far) against our clients is
small. However, the average amount paid per loss is remarkably high.
This is not astonishing, since the character of the ElL cover is to
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indemnify an insured against a catastrophic event. This includes his
having to bear a considerable deductible; therefore only the costly
accidents are filed.
All the losses can be divided into two classes:
(1) Storage and transportation of oil and oil products.
(2) Waste disposals.
The loss handling philosophy is remarkable. What we learnt in the first
place is that the reinsurers are too far away from the risk to be
directly involved in the investigation and settlement of a loss.
Secondly, the insurance companies reinsured such risks to a large
extent, in some cases up to 99%. Consequently. they are not very
interested in exposing their highly Qualified expensive technical staff
for such a case when most of the risk is reinsured. In the end, both
insurer and reinsurer pay without a proper loss investigation, and the
technical staff remains in the office. This situation calls for improve-
ment in the immediate future.
14.4. Perspectives of ElL Insurance
The future of ElL coverage with retroactive cover on a claims-made
basis is not secured. Sooner or later the following actions should be
taken.
14.4.1. Reorganization of insurance technique
In our opinion, the most appropriate insurance technique for such a
business is the formation of a pool (national or international). Such
business can be done on a much more economic basis when the adminis-
trative expense is in relation to the number of policies and premium
income, respectively. Such a pool could easily get a considerable
volume and. as an additional benefit, the technical advisers could
acquire considerable experience in a short time.
Within a pool, the above-described risk management technique
and, possibly, loss investigation could be carried out much more effi-
ciently and with greater benefit to every party involved.
14.4.2. Improvement of claims/loss handling technique
From the viewpoint of insurance. the main target in the claims handling
and adjusting process is the compensation of the damages caused to the
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victims and to back unqualified claims in order to satisfy the victims
and to keep the loss figures in acceptable proportions.
Pollution of the environment belongs to the most complex and deli-
cate group of losses. Each and every case is a political issue. Whereas
catastrophic fire losses - even those with casualties - are mentally
accepted as an inevitable blow, the simplest pollution case produces
highly emotional reactions. In such situations. it is rather difficult for
the loss adjusters to keep their feet on the floor. In many cases. those
responsible are confronted with a flood of claims. To separate the
chaff from the wheat it is essential that underwriters. loss adjusters.
and the risk engineers work shoulder to shoulder. This may sound very
simple, but it is not at all obvious. There is more than one case where
these three categories of highly qualified people of one and the same
insurance company had no communication. Everyone is pottering about
in his own garden. Some new possible organizational methods are
required.
ElL business calls for teamwork between commercial and engineer-
ing specialists. It requires an interdisciplinary approach in order to
be able to cope with every accelerating change. The aspects of cause,
consequences, and special circumstances can never be considered in
isolation. With the elimination of the growing pains mentioned and the
improvement discussed, ElL should finally get off the ground.
CHAPTER 15
Recent Developments Concerning the
Legal Regime and Insurance Problems
related to the Transportation of
Hazardous Materials by Sea
E. Orlando
Transportation of hazardous goods and materials. by any means of con-
veyance, is obviously a rather risky activity. In this short chapter I
will only refer to transportation by sea. but this is certainly not to say
that transit by other means (road, rail, inland waterways. or air) may
not imply hazards or involve lesser legal and insurance implications,
albeit different ones.
My restricting this expose to maritime transport is meant to limit
a subject that is otherwise too vast, and follows the specific commit-
ment of marine insurers - and of the International Union of Marine
Insurance (ruMI) - to this singular problem, leaving any other field
open to their colleagues in the various sections of the insurance indus-
try (motor, general third party liability, and aviation respectively).
In maritime transport, however, hazards are more evident and
obvious: not for nothing was marine insurance historically by far the
first form of insurance industry. Marine underwriters find little prob-
lem in providing protection for the property (ship and cargo), for the
freight, and in respect of collision liability; at the same time, "Protec-
tion and Indemnity (P and I) Clubs" specialize in affording coverage for
all other aspects of shipowners' liability.
In contrast, no established market exists. at present for any Third
Party Liability (TPL) insurance related to cargo, since to date cargo by
itself has hardly been considered to be a target for any recovery
actions, in tort or otherwise.
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Nowadays, the ideas of ecological and environmental protection
are developing rapidly, and there is a growing feeling that general and
collective interests should somehow be entitled to full compensation
when damaged: thus, the issue of liability insurance in connection with
maritime transport of hazardous substances is an open problem. Even
before insurance is arranged, a number of legal questions need to be
answered: Where are the responsible parties to be found? What is the
nature of such liability? What limits (if any) are appropriate in respect
of that liability?
These three questions are strictly interconnected, and perhaps
the easiest one to answer is the second. According to the philosophy
presently prevailing, it is possible to predict that the issue will be
governed by the principle of strict liability - following, for example,
the liability of air carriers, or that of nuclear plant operators. I will
take this for granted here, without discussing the merits or otherwise
of this system, which would divert us from our main subject.
Once this assumption is accepted, which party shall bear the bur-
den of such liability? The various indications (jointly or alternatively)
could be: the carrier, the shipper (or receiver), the owner of the
goods, and maybe even the producer. I am inclined to believe that here
the wealth of different possibilities is far from helpful with regard to
finding a universally acceptable solution.
It is worth mentioning that in one specialized area - that of ocean
transport of oil and oil products - the solution was arrived at by mutual
agreement and cooperation among all interested parties (which include
carriers and industries): I am referring to the schemes known as CRI-
STAL and TOVALOP. backed at government level by the Civil Liability
Convention 1969 and the Fund Convention 1971.
This complex system has been positively tested on many occa-
sions. However, as it refers to a single specific and homogeneous trade,
it would appear to be of little help as a model for rules to be applied to
the transport as general cargo of the greatest variety of goods and
materials.
Yet, when in 1984 the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
held a preliminary discussion on a draft "Convention on Liability and
Compensation in connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious
Substances (other than oil) by Sea" (the "HNS Convention"), at least
one aspect of the agreement governing the liabilities arising out of the
maritime carriage of oil and oil products was taken as a model by the
drafting panel - namely, the involvement of both the carrier and the
carried goods. A two-tier liability system was suggested, with liability
falling firstly upon the shipowner up to a certain limit, and subse-
quently upon the cargo once that limit had been exhausted.
This mechanism has many merits, but I see one major disadvantage
in that at the first level the newly defined liability would coexist with
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all other shipowners' liabilities: quite understandably, shipowners and
P and I Clubs strongly dislike this solution involving a separate expo-
sure with a limit of its own. In the case of a major accident, this could
imply a number of problems and delays in view of the need to previously
establish the amounts claimed by all the damaged parties involved, and
their respective rights of priority should the statutory limit prove
insufficient to compensate all of them.
Many problems arise in connection with the second liability layer,
especially as to identification of the party having to accept liability for
the cargo: the easiest solution would appear to be to single out the
shipper, who is also the most clearly identified (both the owner and the
receiver may commonly change and change again during the course of a
sea crossing).
Marine insurers have expressed in principle their readiness to
provide the insurance capacity required. since their service in some
ways parallels cargo insurance, though there are major differences in
that both the nature of the guarantee and the amounts at stake are
very different. With regard to the latter difference in particular.
attention should be paid to the fact that goods of relatively modest
value could be required to bear extremely high liability limits.
It is common knowledge that the 1984 IMO discussions afforded few
positive results: the differing national and trade interests came into
collision on the points I have mentioned. as on many more (level of the
limitations. direct recourse of the claimants against liability insurers.
safeguard of the ultimate recourse against any party eventually at
fault. inclusion in the Convention of the liability in respect of parcel
goods as against bulk cargo only). and the issue was referred back to
the drafting committee - which. I am sorry to believe is tantamount to
saying "ad Kalendas graecas" (indefinitely postponed)! I fear that. if
this subject is taken up again under the shock of a major accident. the
solutions could be sought for by other bodies (e.g. the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development) and be influenced more by po-
litical than technical and commercial considerations. Pending all this,
marine insurers may do no more than to confirm their willingness to
contribute to the finding of the appropriate solutions in the best
interest of all parties concerned. making these solutions the least
expensive for the trade and the shipowners' industry.
I shall add a brief reference to another collateral problem which
is being currently debated. Based on a study by the Comite Maritime
International, the IMO is discussing a revision of the 1910 Brussels Con-
vention on Salvage and Assistance at Sea. This issue is closely con-
nected with the "HNS" problem, since it envisages going beyond the
traditional "no cure. no pay" principle which has been followed when-
ever the salvaged ship has been carrying hazardous substances (other
than oil and oil products as cargo): thus. the salvage operation
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would simultaneously be aimed at preventing (or minimizing) pollution
hazards.
Here again a model exists - namely, the private instrument known
as the "Funding Agreement" which was arrived at after the coming into
force of the Lloyds' Open Form 1980: this is the new standard salvage
form now in use in connection with salvage operations concerning
loaded oil tankers.
On the one hand, there is a generally felt need to encourage sal-
vors to take up such often tricky and dangerous operations, by an
appropriate enhancement of the salvage award; on the other hand, we
are presently short of a designated counterpart to share the burden of
such enhancement along with the salved property and interests - the
ship, cargo, and freight.
In view of the urgent need to maintain an active and well-equipped
salvage industry in the best general interest of the shipping commu-
nity, the various parties concerned - shipowners, shippers, P and I
Clubs, and marine insurers - are endeavoring to finalize an agreement
for the allocation of the increased salvage awards that are anticipated.
Such an understanding, once it has been arrived at, should, in my opin-
ion, be only temporary: it is an anomaly to agree that the burden of
the extra cost (the amount of which, in any case, is never precisely
identified) which is referrable to the safeguard from pollution should
be borne by insurers who have not undertaken to afford any direct
coverage for the liability arising out of the possible pollution incident.
CHAPTKR 18
Insuring Environmental Liabilities
R.M. Aickin
I shall begin by saying what I am not going to do. I am not going to dis-
cuss how to underwrite environmentai impairment and the mechanisms
of risk assessment; I am not going to address the probiems of the waste
disposal site lssue; nor am I going to discuss claims-made coverages. I
have written on these subjects elsewhere (Aickin, 1984a,b. 1985). In
this short chapter. I am going to discuss insurance in general terms -
what it can do, what it is doing, and what its limitations are. The basic
tenet of insurance is to spread the costs of the misfortunes of the few
among the many who run the same risks. In providing this service. an
insurer's overriding concern is to know his maximum exposure to a loss.
In other words, he needs to know that in the event of some misfortune
he will not have to spend more than a certain fixed sum of money.
There are restrictions to the scope of insurance. It can only deal
with pure risks. It cannot deal with risks which are so large that they
become society's problem and should be dealt with by society or the
state directly. The traditional example of this ls the "war risk" which.
except in special circumstances, is uninsurable. War damages (e.g. dur-
ing the Blitz in London in the last war) have been met by the state.
The other thing which it is important to distinguish are the
classes of property and liability insurance: these things are separate
and distinct.
In the USA, liability serves three purposes: first, to compensate
victims; second. to provide a punishment and deterrent for wrongful
acts; and. third. to provide retribution. Insurance is designed for and
can deal well with the first aspect of compensation. It deals badly with
the retribution and the deterrent aspects. Indeed. if these are dealt
with by insurance, the deterrent effect and the punishment effect are
removed from the perpetrator.
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Looking at environmental liabilities. we need to consider the
potential size of the liabilities; although I said I would not deal with the
waste problem, I must briefly refer to it here. I have talked to a
number of officials about the cost of the waste site problems over the
past several years and they admit that the size of Superfund at $1.6
billion is totally inadequate to deal with the problem. They have
privately given me numbers between $125 and $250 billion. The US
Congress Office of Technology Assessment has recently released a
report identifying the cost of the waste site problem in the USA as in
excess of $100 billion. This is a significant sum of money. It is between
two and three times the annual premium volume of the US property
casualty industry and is several times that industry's total surplus. Le.
the amount of money it has in the bank. If society or the courts are
intent on forcing this cost onto the insurance industry, they will bank-
rupt the insurance industry because it does not have the money to pay
for the loss or the wherewithal to collect it.
The insurance industry provides a vital function to millions of
individual citizens who require fire insurance so that if their houses
burn down in the night they will still be able to have a roof over their
heads. It seems to me inconceivable that society will let the insurance
industry become bankrupt; and. therefore. being an optimist, I think it
is inevitable that this problem will be solved in some other way than
forcing the cost onto the insurance industry.
I believe that the size of the potential exposure is such that it
becomes a societal risk, that somewhere a ceiling must be placed upon
the liability of individual companies, and that. if liability exceeds this
level, it will have to be borne by the state as a societal risk.
There has been a lot of talk of the insurance industry exercising
the role of policeman. There is some historical precedent for this. in
boiler machinery and lift insurance. I should emphasize that this is
essentially a first party property insurance: a lift is a discrete piece
of machinery, and it becomes fairly easy to examine this and to develop
a checklist for the examination. This is a very different proposition
from that of liability insurance.
With respect to Massachusetts. waste generators are reluctant to
come forward and say that they need waste disposal sites. I must say
that there are good reasons for this. I am sure that we all have our own
conceptions of what a waste generator is. I would also venture to sug-
gest that, whatever our individual perceptions. they do not include soft
drinks manufacturers. people making dairy products, or people
manufacturing soap.
Yet it is precisely these three industries that headed the list of
contributors to one of the major nasty septic waste disposal sites in
the USA. These industries have enormous incentives not to be associ-
ated with hazardous waste. If the public thought that yogurt was a
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major contributor to hazardous waste, they would be very likely to stop
eating it. This would be bound to be against the dairy product manufac-
turers' interest. Over and above this, there is a concern for secrecy
with regard to environmental matters. My company, ERAS (Interna-
tional), had a client, who must remain nameless, with whom we had a
serious disagreement. I have to say that they were more than coopera-
tive and free in providing us with information. Some of their facilities
were heavily contaminated. In a number of them there was
7 m of product floating on the water table beneath the facility. The
company was aware of this problem and did not wish insurance for it.
We were also aware of it and did not wish to provide insurance.
The traditional way of dealing with this is to draft an exclusion
which says that "this policy shall not apply to the following liability".
This created enormous problems. The insured or the potential insured
refused to accept such an exclusion - not because they wanted cover-
age but because they wanted the existence of the problems
suppressed. After some consideration, we countered by saying, "well,
if you won't accept this exclusion which we have drafted, we will draft
an exclusion dealing with the problems described in pages 7-10 of the
report." This produced an even worse reaction of horror. This revised
exclusion was even more unacceptable because it admitted the
existence of a report which third parties might ask to read. Eventu-
ally we amicably agreed that we would not provide insurance and they
would not buy it because of this problem of disclosure of sensitive
information. Other insureds have reacted to this problem in a dif-
ferent fashion: they have simply refused to provide information.
It is not feasible to expect an insurance industry to act as a pol-
iceman. Insureds are unwilling to provide information or wish to hedge
it around in secrecy to such an extent that it is dealt with under a
stringent confidentiality agreement where it is a private transfer of
information between an insured and an insurer. How much more will
they object and have reservations about providing this information
when the insurer is in the position to blow the whistle and to close
them down (and may have a statutory obligation to do so)?
The second point which I think is of great importance is that, if I
am lucky in dealing with one of the major companies represented at this
Conference on Transportation, Storage, and Disposal of Hazardous
Materials, I may have one day to evaluate the risks of that major cor-
poration. Certainly I will have had people go out to do inspections and
to gather information - they may even have spent a week on the cor-
poration concerned - but it is quite unrealistic economically to expect
a report of the scale or of the detail of the Canvey Island report
(Health and Safety Executive, 1978, 1981), which cost 300000 pounds
sterling, to be provided on which I can base my decision. Therefore, as
an underwriter I base my decision upon personal skills. It is obvious to
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me that this is troublesome and that both the social scientists and the
systems analysts shy away from personal skills.
They both consider that human intervention and human skills
make life difficult for them and they cannot account for it in their
modeling; yet, an underwriter is totally dependent upon these personal
skills. This means that it is very difficult to be put in the role of the
policeman and to say that I have closed someone down because I have a
personal feeling, perhaps on the basis that I do not like the color of
someone's hair.
One may ask how the insurance industry manages to get away with
this. The insurance industry manages quite simply because it is a com-
petitive free market. We were the first people providing environmental
insurance. Because we did so and were perceived to do so profitably,
other people came into the field. Some of those were better than we
were at evaluating risks; most of them were less good. However, this
allows for competition. You come to me and I decline to insure you
because I do not like the color of your hair, so you go to someone else
who may not have this aversion and obtain coverage. This means that
the insurance industry is cyclical: when we make losses as an industry,
some of those people who came in late and have made greater losses
because they are less good will leave. At that stage, competition is
smaller, rates become more expensive, and insurance becomes more dif-
ficult to obtain.
One must take into account the method by which insurance is
regulated. Insurance is regulated because it provides valuable service
to individual citizens like you and me, and it is important for our long-
term security that an insurance company should not go bankrupt and
leave us without coverage when it does so. As a result, the regulators
and legislators deal with insurance in its own terms. They take pre-
mium volume as a measure of the risk and they say that, all things being
equal, an insurance company will strive to balance its income and
expenditure and therefore will expect a total costs to income ratio of
about 100%. They then go further and say that, in the worst case, one
might make a 30% loss. As a result. one must show sufficient financial
strength for a third of one's premium volume.
While this is acceptable in personal lines business and other busi-
ness where rates do not fluctuate greatly, it is not acceptable or a sen-
sible method for regulation in commercial lines. If I were foolish
enough to write 10% of, let us say, EXXON's program at a premium of
0.1%, and in the following year when rates had hardened tenfold I could
obtain a 1% premium. then. in maintaining the same premium volume, I
would only be able to write 1% of EXXON's liability program.
For those of us who worked in the market. the signs that the
market had changed were clear between the last week of May and the
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first week of July in 1984. While it is obvious that Bhopal did not help
matters, it is quite clear that it did not have a great impact on change
in the market. as the symptoms were evident well before the Bhopal
accident.
According to Smets (Chapter 4. note [21]), Union Carbide had $200
million of capacity for liability insurance available to them at the time
of the Bhopal accident in December 1984. It is also fairly common
knowledge that Union Carbide are supposed to have turned down an
offer for a further $150 million which would have brought the total
capacity of liability insurance up to $350 million.
There were other corporations whose philosophy was to buy the
maximum insurance coverage available and who last year purchased the
$350 million or so of coverage which was available to them. One such
company that I know of. when it came to renew its coverage in 1985, was
only able to place. through its brokers. $47 million of capacity. It ls
therefore conceivable that. had Bhopal occurred six weeks later, in
January 1985. there would only have been perhaps $50 million of cover-
age available. as it is probable that Union Carbide have a 1 January
renewal date. This is not a well-known or publicized fact but it seems
to me that it is a strong support for the argument that there should be
a ceiling above which the state must take over responsibility for the
liabilities as a societal problem.
This shrinkage of capacity has been universal. The result is that
insurers do not have the capacity to write the traditional business that
they would like to. In the circumstances where they cannot write as
much business in the traditional areas that they think they under-
stand, it is very difficult to expect them to divert that capacity to
other areas where they need to talk to scientists in order to have the
risks explained to them. I do not think that we should view the shrink-
age of environmental impairment liability capacity as a running away
from environmental risks so much as a preference to devote the scarce
resources of the insurance industry to more traditional areas of
activity.
In conclusion. let me say that I believe that the insurance indus-
try has things of value to contribute in this area but that it cannot be
expected to take on the entire costs of environmental problems. nor
can it be expected to take on the role of policeman because it does not
have the resources to do so. The insurance industry cannot afford to
expend more than. say. 10-2m~ of its premium income in acquisition and
analysis of risk data. If. in the case of Canvey Island. we are dealing
with risks of the order of 1 in a 1000 and are therefore only receiving
thousands of pounds in premium for the risk. we simply cannot afford
to spend 300000 pounds sterling on evaluation.
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CHAPTER 17
The Role of Insurance
in Risk Spreading and
Risk Bearing
W. PJennigstorJ
17.1. Introduction
To describe the role of insurance in risk spreading and risk bearing is
to describe insurance - risk spreading is insurance. Insurers have
been pioneers in the application of probability theory, risk theory,
and statistical methods; using these tools, they have developed highly
sophisticated techniques for relieving the burden of most of the risks
associated with modern life and economic activities. This chapter
reviews the major factors that determine and limit the actual and
potential extent of insurance coverages applicable to the risks associ-
ated with transporting, storing, or disposing of hazardous materials.
Hazardousness is a dynamic concept: it depends on information,
and therefore changes over time. Although dynamite is capable of
causing great damage, its dangerous properties are known so well that
it is not considered too dangerous to work with, give adequate precau-
tions, and insurers have no difficulty providing coverage for the risk
that remains. The greatest difficulties arise, for insurers no less than
for engineers and businessmen, where the potential of a substance to
cause harm is not known or cannot be measured. Liability insurers also
have to accept the perceptions of hazardousness under which courts
and legislatures determine liability, even if these perceptions are not
consistent with available medical evidence.
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Insurance does not eliminate risk: it does not keep harmful events
from occurring (although the existence or availability of insurance cov-
erage and the operating practices of insurers and insureds may have
some effect, in one or the other direction. on the probability of
occurrence). All that insurance can do is to provide compensation, usu-
ally in the form of payment of money, for the consequences of harmful
events, and only to the extent that they can be expressed in economic
or monetary terms.
This is particularly significant for harms caused by hazardous
materials. No amount of money - and, for that matter, no insurance
policy - can provide adequate compensation for the emotional suffering
of those afflicted with a disabling disease or a genetic defect, or even
the irritation and inconvenience associated with minor everyday forms
of pollution, let alone the destruction of natural resources and the per-
sistent contamination of the environment.
Therefore, compensation, whether financed through insurance or
otherwise. can never be a substitute for preventive control. Nor can
insurers be relied on to control the risk in a manner that would be
equivalent to administrative control. Proposals, much discussed in
recent years, to employ insurers as "surrogate regulators" (Pfen-
nigstorf 1982), would create extremely difficult problems of cost alloca-
tion, supervision, enforcement, and conflicts of interests. As Aickin
points out in Chapter 16 of this volume, even the initial investigation
and evaluation of risks burdens insurers and insureds with consider-
able expenses and other problems that may be out of proportion to the
amount of the premium that the insured can afford to pay in view of the
volume of its business.
What insurance can do, and can do very well, is to soften the
impact of the economic consequences of random harmful events, by
pooling risks and averaging the cost of compensating losses. Most
insurers provide coverage for a fixed premium for a specified period.
The advantage for the insured is obvious; for the insurer, however,
fixed premiums involve the risk of accurately predicting the total
losses that will have to be paid from the total premiums collected. This
is much easier in some lines of insurance (e.g. life insurance) than in
others (e.g. general liability insurance). Insurers have learned to
soften the impact of large-scale loss fluctuations and of unexpectedly
large losses by establishing reserves, by maintaining a security margin
of capital and surplus funds, and especially by obtaining reinsurance
coverage.
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Despite these safeguards, it remains one of the most urgent con-
cerns of any insurer to be able to predict future losses as accurately
as possible and to obtain the widest possible spread of risks for reli-
able statistical averaging. These goals determine to a large extent
what risks an insurer will solicit or accept, and on what terms; and
they are also the reason why insurers find it impossible to provide cov-
erage for extended periods for fixed premiums.
Insurers often call the risks that they decline for such technical
reasons "uninsurable" - a term that suggests some objective standards.
Actually, perceptions and definitions of insurability are vague and sub-
jective, and differ widely among insurers, depending on, among other
things, each individual insurer's basic attitude towards risk, its finan-
cial conditions, its appraisal of market conditions, and its officers' and
underwriters' personal evaluation of the risks assumed.
The insurers' usage of the term "risk", incidentally, is anything
but precise. They use it in the meaning that it has in common language
and also in the special meaning of risk theory. In the daily practice of
the insurance business, however, the word is most frequently used to
indicate the person or object or entity in whom or in which the risk
mayor may not materialize in the form of an injury, damage, or loss. In
identifying coverages, insurers usually refer to perils or hazards,
which represent commonly perceived potential causes of loss, such as
fire, collision, or exposure to a specified substance or condition.
Despite their efforts and achievements in analyzing risk factors,
insurers must make most of their decisions on the basis of incomplete
information and largely subjective evaluations, and subject to political
and market pressures.
To some extent, concerns about insurability can be overcome by
higher premiums. Indeed, some insurers like to say that every risk can
be insured provided the price is right. Even though slightly exag-
gerated, this statement reflects a basic truth of the insucance busi-
ness, but it also serves as a reminder that the dividing line between
insurance and gambling, though clear in theory, is difficult to define in
practice. A case approaching the borderline is satellite launching
insurance, where premiums have reached 20% of the insured value and
are expected to increase to 30%.
Insurers are sensitive to the need for precise terms defining the
risks to be covered under a specific policy, and the extent to which
they are to be covered. They are also sensitive to the special risk
inherent in changes in the original risk situation on which the loss pro-
jection and premium calculation were based, and they have developed a
variety of rules and techniques to minimize the potential effect of
change. These concerns are particularly relevant for the risks of
hazardous materials.
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Although liability insurance has received primary attention recently,
losses caused by hazardous materials are among the risks covered by
several types of insurance. Most life and disability (accident and
health) insurance policies are all-risks policies - their benefits are
payable if the insured person dies, is injured, or becomes sick, regard-
less of the cause, subject to a few precisely defined exceptions, which
normally do not include exposure to a hazardous substance. Likewise,
all-risks property insurance policies cover damage caused by hazardous
materials unless this is specifically excluded. The only standard exclu-
sion in property insurance is that for exposure to radioactive materials
or radiation.
There can be problems of coordination between different types of
coverage. Chemical spills on the insured's own premises are a matter of
property insurance, not liability insurance. However, if the chemicals
reach the groundwater or otherwise pose a risk to third parties or the
environment, the question of liability and liability insurance coverage
comes into play. Liability insurers may voluntarily pay for clean-up in
such cases to avert or minimize losses. but so far they have refused,
with few exceptions, to make such payments part of the regular cover-
age.
First party accident and health insurance can have a substantial
indirect effect on liability insurance claims. Where health care costs
and loss of income due to disability are covered under a comprehensive
social insurance system, there is less incentive to sue someone else for
damages than where tort liability is the only or an important additional
source of compensation.
17.3.2. Dimensions of the risk
Insurers face uncertainties that are not limited to the random
incidence and distribution of losses but relate to the nature of the risk
and the extent of the losses that can be caused. Past experience,
which ordinarily provides the basis for at least a rough estimate of
future losses, is of no help with many types of hazardous materials.
In addition to chemical, physical, and biological factors, liability
insurers must also consider uncertainties of a legal nature - the
confusing, conflicting, and rapidly changing rules that determine who is
liable to whom under what circumstances and in what amount. This
appears to be a greater problem in the USA than in Europe, for a
variety of reasons that can only be listed here but cannot be discussed
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in detaiL. They include the absence of a comprehensive national health
insurance system, resulting in greater reliance and pressure on the lia-
bility system as a source of compensation for everyday accidents.
Other factors are: the collateral source rule, which permits a claimant
to recover more than his actual economic loss; the multitude of jurisdic-
tions; the adversary style of proceedings in civil matters; the con-
tingent fees that attorneys customarily charge for representing a
plaintiff; the American Rule, under which each party bears the cost of
its own attorney, regardless of the outcome; and the availability of
highly skilled and very aggressive attorneys specializing in represent-
ing plaintiffs in personal injury claims.
Hazardous materials pose several special problems for which the
traditional rules of tort law offer no satisfactory solution and for which
therefore new rules more favorable to injured persons have been con-
sidered necessary. These problems are:
(1) The large number of identical or similar injuries that can result
from one incident, producing a large number of claims, which, if
litigated individually and independently, could exhaust the physi-
cal resources of the judicial system, and could lead to long delays
in the disposition of claims and to unequal compensation for simi-
lar injuries.
(2) The difficulty of tracing the causal connection from the polluter's
culpable conduct through the release and the claimant's exposure
to the eventual injury and economic loss, which places extra
weight on the plaintiff's burden of proof.
(3) The fact that in many cases a causal relationship between expo-
sure to a given chemical and a specific type of health damage (e.g.
cancer) cannot be established individually but only by inference
from statistical correlations for large groups of individuals.
Liability has been expanded by court decisions and by state and
federal legislation, and it has been expanded in many directions and in
many respects. Some of the changes that have occurred recently have
already made it exceedingly difficult for insurers to estimate potential
aggregate future losses. The tendency to expand the scope of liability
is continuing, and the nature and extent of future changes are
unpredictable (Pfennigstorf, 1979).
The difficulty of anticipating changes in the risk situation, as well
as the impact of the changes on the insurer's risk, increases with the
time considered. For this reason, insurers generally issue policies only
for short periods of time, or subject to termination upon notice, which
gives them an opportunity to review their underwriting decisions and to
adjust premiums and contract terms.
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The difficuLties are further compounded by the fact that Losses
from a singLe incident invoLving hazardous materiaLs can reach cata-
strophic proportions. The disaster potentiaL of hazardous materiaLs is
even greater than that of a naturaL disaster since Losses are not spread
among many property insurers but rather are transformed into Liability
cLaims and in that form are concentrated on a small number of defen-
dants and their insurers. This means that insurance policies issued for
individuaL risks wouLd have to respond to the fuLL catastrophic amount
of the totaL Loss - with a much smaller popuLation of insured risks avail-
abLe to suppLy the necessary premium voLume and spread of risk.
17.3.3. Inherent limits or liability insurance
The generaL ruLe is that Losses caused deliberateLy by the insured are
outside the concept of risk, which impLies an event whose occurrence is
uncertain and beyond the controL of either party. Where in Life and
heaLth insurance coverage is provided for the consequences of inten-
tionaL acts, such as suicide, it does not constitute an exception in the
strict sense but reflects a different risk. In Liability insurance, cover-
age of cLaims arising from the insured's intentionaL acts has even been
declared to be contrary to public policy (Pfennigstorf, 1979). Similar
concerns about the randomness of Losses have kept insurers from pro-
viding coverage for the consequences of decisions made or actions
taken in the reguLar course of business. And further, insurers have
generally found that they are unabLe to provide security against events
such as inflation or depression, which affect not individuaLs randomLy
but society as a whoLe.
From the beginning, Liability insurance has been subject to con-
flicting demands in the market and in public policy, which have tended
to interfere with the deveLopment of a sound and consistent theoreticaL
basis and effective business practices. Furthermore, the LegaL com-
pLexity and the conflicts of interest inherent in the three-party reLa-
tionship Linking insurer, insured, and third party cLaimant have been
responsibLe for many misunderstandings and misinterpretations in the
courts.
In the USA, generaL Liability policies traditionally Limited the cov-
erage to cLaims based on bodily injury or property damage caused by an
accident. The term "accident" was Later repLaced by the term
"occurrence", which was in turn defined, awkwardLy, as an accident
(incLuding some nonaccidentaL exposures). This change was in part a
reaction to adverse interpretations of the term "accident" by the
courts and in part an effort to accommodate the demand for Liability
coverage against cLaims arising from nonsudden (though unintended and
unexpected) events, incLuding certain reLeases of hazardous materiaLs
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(e.g. from underground storage tanks) that occurred and continued
without the insured's knowledge (Pfennigstorf, 1979).
This was followed by a clause excluding all pollution claims except
those based on sudden and accidental releases. The courts, however,
have tended to disregard the exclusion except where the release was
clearly intended by the insured.
European insurers also generally base liability insurance coverage
on an occurrence or event causing bodily injury or property damage,
and they generally exclude from the coverage all claims based on the
gradual effect of exposure to substances or conditions. They have
avoided most of the problems experienced by the US insurers by leav-
ing the traditional exclusion undisturbed and satisfying the demand for
coverage of nonaccidental releases or exposures through an endorse-
ment or a separate policy (Boediker. 1980; Spiller, 19B1).
Most recently, special policies have been developed for pollution
liability. or environmental impairment liability. which typically cover
both sudden and nonsudden releases (Pfennigstorf. 19B2). In turn,
future standard general liability policies will. beginning in 1986,
exclude all pollution liability claims (Malecki and Flitner. 1985). This
will resolve the problem of distinguishing between sudden and nonsud-
den releases. It will not, however, provide a definitive answer to the
more difficult question of how to distinguish between intended or
expected releases (or injuries?) on one side and unintended and unex-
pected releases on the other side, or, more generally, between the
situations and claims that the insurer intends to cover and those that
are not meant to be covered.
European and US insurers have found it equally difficult to define
precisely the event that has to occur within the period covered by the
insurance to trigger the coverage. There are few problems in the case
of an accident in the conventional sense - a violent conspicuous event
in which all of the essential elements of a covered claim occur simul-
taneously or in short sequence. In the case of exposure to some haz-
ardous materials. however, there may be intervals of many years
between the incidence of these elements - the insured's act or omis-
sion that forms the basis for his liability under tort law, the release of
the materials into the environment, the third party's exposure, the
injury, the incidence of economic loss, and eventually the making of a
formal demand for payment.
Policies covering claims for bodily injury or property damage gen-
erally specify the incidence of the injury or damage as the crucial
event. That event itself is not easy to define or to identify in nonac-
cidental situations, however. That has become painfully clear to US
insurers in the recent controversy about asbestos-related claims.
Even among the insurers themselves there was disagreement about the
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meaning of their policy terms. The courts, not surprisingly, have
tended to resolve the disagreements in favor of the insured.
l"urther, the insurers found that the long intervals between
occurrence and eventual claim settlement all but defeated the purpose
of limiting policy periods to one year at a time. US insurers are now
being asked to pay claims for asbestos-related diseases and for the
costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites on the basis of policies writ-
ten 50 or more years ago. There is no doubt that at the time when the
policies were written no one contemplated or anticipated. or should
have anticipated. claims of this nature and amount. Nevertheless. the
occurrence formula would seem to imply coverage for all claims, how-
ever late brought, that are based on an occurrence during the policy
period. All that is needed for the coverage to be activated is for a
court to recognize the claim as well founded and timely made.
The insurers have responded by replacing the occurrence formula
with a policy that limits coverage to claims that are made within the
period specified in the policy (Malecki and Flitner. 1985). Claims-made
policies are singularly effective in dividing up the risk of long-latency
claims and thus making it. in shorter intervals. calculable and indeed
insurable. In the process. the risk of long-term changes in the risk
situation, which the insurers found to be beyond their capabilities. has
been returned to the insureds. That means that in order to be fully
protected against the risk of liability claims arising some time in the
future from a present condition or activity, an operator must be
prepared to continue a liability insurance policy in force for as long as
there is a possibility that claims may be made, and to pay potentially
increasing premiums for that coverage, even after the activity is ter-
minated and no longer produces any revenues.
17.3.4. Limitation of compensable claims and damages
Liability insurance was designed for the risk of liability arising under
the rules of tort law or, in the countries of the civil law system. the
body of statutory law known as "the law of delicts". These rules. and
the case law relating to their interpretation and application, have for
years provided relatively reliable guidance to insurers with respect to
the measure of damages payable for different types of injuries, and
with respect to the calculation of damage to property.
US insurers always had to operate with a greater degree of uncer-
tainty in this respect than European insurers. owing to the multitude of
jurisdictions and to the role of the jury in determining the amount of
damages to be paid. General or nonpecuniary damages awarded for pain
and suffering. emotional distress, and similar effects have constituted
especially volatile elements in the evaluation of potential claims.
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Recently, the tendency of courts to award punitive damages in large
amounts has added a new dimension of uncertainty.
The uncertainty produces, and is in turn increased by, a high rate
of litigation. Consequently, litigation expenses have become an alarm-
ing burden for liability insurers.
Yet another problem is presented by claims relating to expenses
incurred by government agencies or by the insured himself for clean-
up or remedial measures and for the restoration of natural resources.
These expenses can be part of the loss resulting from damage to prop-
erty within the accepted meaning of that term, as when materials
released by the insured have contaminated the property of a third per-
son, and in such cases coverage under a liability insurance policy is
usually not in doubt.
Liability insurance is not meant to cover the cost of cleaning up
spills on the insured's own premises, however. They are supposed to
be covered by property insurance. Where spills of this kind have
presented a risk of harm to others, insurers have voluntarily assumed
the cost of certain clean-up measures taken with their approval to
avert or minimize liability claims.
During the past several years, as public awareness of environmen-
tal pollution has increased and the legal and technological bases for
effective clean-up have been expanded, there has been increasing
pressure on insurers to provide coverage for such expenses. Indeed,
clean-up claims are about to exceed damage claims by individuals in fre-
quency and severity. The insurers have recognized the risk and the
need for coverage, and some of them have offered to cover it to some
extent.
There is, however, great uncertainty about the amount of the
expenses that are necessary in such cases. Among other things. the
insurers are concerned about the difficulties involved in defining what
is "clean", about the fast pace of development in monitoring and clean-
up technology, and about the vast range of discretion that environmen-
tal agencies have in selecting the targets and methods of clean-up and
remedial actions. Under some Acts, the agencies have the power to act
when there is only a threat of a release. The risk of such actions and
the resulting expenses is extremely difficult to reconcile with tradi-
tional notions of liability insurance.
17.3.5. Restraints or the insurance market
The US insurance market for commercial coverages in general is
characterized by wide fluctuations, or cycles, moving from periods
where coverages are offered freely and at low premiums to periods of
high premiums and restrictive underwriting practices. The effect of
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normal market movements is amplified by the practice of some insurers
to follow the general trend of the market not by raising or reducing
their premiums for the volatile classes of business but rather by enter-
ing the market or withdrawing from it on short notice. At times. the
reaction of the market to a series of large losses is best described as
panic. The normal delays and difficulties involved in adjustment com-
bined with sudden contractions of the market can produce temporary
shortages.
For several years in the early 1980s, there was excessive price
competition among insurers who were primarily interested in cash flow
to benefit from the prevailing high interest rates. Eventually, as rising
losses could no longer be compensated with investment returns but
started to affect the insurers' surplus, the market did turn around,
with the effect that commercial coverages of all kinds have become
more expensive and more difficult to obtain.
In the European insurance market, the fluctuations appear to be
less violent. Generally it seems that both insurers and insurance
buyers value continuity and think in broader perspectives and longer
terms in setting their pricing and underwriting policies (Boediker,
1980; Spiller, 1981). The marine insurance market also appears to be
relatively stable. This seems to be the case especially for pollution lia-
bility coverages, which are provided either by pools or by Protection
and Indemnity Clubs or similar mutual organizations (Treasury Depart-
ment, 1982).
The market for pollution liability insurance for land-based facili-
ties in the USA has been affected not only by the general cycle in the
commercial insurance market but also by extraordinary losses in other
types of liability insurance, as well as by persistent concerns about
the tendency among courts and legislatures to extend the range of pol-
luters' liability.
17.4. 'Outlook
Since the limitations just discussed affect only certain situations, they
suggest a discriminating approach. It should be possible to provide
insurance protection subject to appropriate definitions and limitations
relating to situations, substances, types of occurrence, type of injury,
type and amount of remedy. etc. To some extent. also. the availability
of insurance coverage is influenced by traditional differences in the
nature and attitudes of the insurers serving a specific market area.
Thus, the fewest problems seem to exist in the field of marine
transportation, where releases are almost always the result of
accidents or at least of incidents of short duration, and where
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international agreements provide a basic framework of liability rules
and insurance requirements (Treasury Department. 1962. 1963).
Land transportation (or transportation on inland waterways or
through the air over land) presents more difficult problems. Releases
in densely settled areas can expose large numbers of individuals to
hazardous materials directly or through contamination of surface
waters or groundwater. the soil. or the air. On the other hand.
releases of materials in the course of transportation are almost always
accidental, which means that action can be taken promptly to contain
the release and to minimize exposure. Even though the loss potential
can reach disaster proportions. the large number of risk units should
make it possible to spread the risk. provided universal or near univer-
sal participation can be obtained.
The problems tend to be most serious where hazardous materials
are stored or disposed of. The risk burden of existing sites containing
materials accumulated over a longer period will have to be shared by
all. Even if attempts are made to force liability for cleaning up these
sites on the generators of the substances (provided. of course. that
they can be identified. that they still exist. and that they are solvent).
the costs will have to be borne indirectly by the community. The temp-
tation is great to force these costs on insurers on the basis of liability
policies written many years ago. However. since this particular risk
was not considered at the time when those policies were designed and
their premiums established. and since no reserves exist to cover the
claims. the necessary funds must be taken from surplus. exposing
present policyholders in unrelated lines of business to an increased
risk of insolvency and creating a need for general premium increases
for present policyholders to make up the loss.
In the case of most disposal facilities. the risk of liability contin-
ues even when the facility is closed. Many of the materials retain their
hazardous properties indefinitely. That they will eventually escape is
certain; it is only uncertain when. No insurance scheme has been
designed or proposed that would provide the necessary long-term cov-
erage. Apart from the length of the time involved and the difficulty of
predicting losses and calculating premiums. the fact that closed facili-
ties have no revenues from which to pay premiums creates doubts about
the economic viability of any such scheme. In the USA. the Superfund
Act of 1960 has created a special fund for postclosure claims. It is
financed through contributions paid by operating facilities (Treasury
Department. 1962).
It has even proved quite difficult to secure the availability of the
funds that are needed to pay for the work involved in closing and seal-
ing a disposal site. and for the monitoring that is required under the
environmental regulations for a certain period after closure. US regu-
lations require the necessary amount to be estimated and to be
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accumulated in a trust fund over the active period of the facility. If
for some reason the facility must be closed prematurely, the amount in
the trust fund may still be inadequate. This risk of premature closure
is one that could be covered by insurance. Indeed, such insurance is
anticipated in the relevant regulations, and an appropriate policy has
been offered in the market. This coverage, of course, is unlike any of
the conventional property or liability insurance coverages but resem-
bles in many respects a life insurance policy.
Finally, special insurance problems are presented by the contrac-
tors that perform clean-up and remedial work in connection with
releases, removing hazardous materials and contaminated soil from one
site, transporting and separating them, and depositing them again at
some other site. These contractors may become subject to liability like
anyone else who handles hazardous materials. The difference is that, if
they are unable to obtain adequate insurance coverage and conse-
quently are unable to continue their operations, the entire system of
environmental control could be disrupted.
It should be pointed out that most of what has been said so far
about availability of insurance applies to small and medium-size opera-
tions. Large manufacturers, because of the volume of their operations,
are in a position to absorb (or self-insure, or retain) the cost of all but
the very large claims, and they need to obtain insurance coverage only
for the amount by which a catastrophic loss may exceed the amount of
the retention. Also because of their volume, they can negotiate
comprehensive insurance agreements covering all of their (excess)
risks on terms and at premiums that are not available to ordinary poli-
cyholders. They are also likely to have their own captive insurance
companies, which give them direct access to the international rein-
surance market. Like everyone else, however, they feel the effects of
general movements in the insurance and reinsurance markets.
17.5. Challenges
17.5.1. Market prospects
The insurance market, nervous though it is, has the capacity to
respond quickly to a strong and broad demand for coverage. The with-
drawal of some commercial insurers and reinsurers from the pollution
liability insurance market has caused concern that there may not be
enough insurance coverage available for all existing risks. Paradoxi-
cally, however, it is also true that the demand for the coverages that
are offered has been less than expected. All the pools have complained
about the small volume of business that they have been able to attract.
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Pool managers and insurers agree that coverage amounts could be
increased substantially if the volume of business increased.
If, for whatever reason, the response of the existing commercial
insurance market should be too slow or too timid, the demand, if suffi-
ciently strong, can be expected to turn quickly to alternative sources
of supply. The most obvious reaction to an unresponsive established
market is the formation of cooperative or mutual insurance organiza-
tions. This approach has been used many times in the history of the
insurance business, most recently for medical malpractice liability,
municipal risks, and lawyers' professional liability. In the current dis-
cussion, mutuals are rarely mentioned, but there has been much talk
about association captives and risk retention groups, both of which are
essentially just different names for the old concept of mutual
insurance.
The experience of mutual insurance organizations for professional
liability risks suggests that their development tends to be slower in
times of a soft commercial market, when coverages are readily available
at low premiums. That, in addition to the relatively low level of risk
awareness, may explain why so far there seems to have been little
interest in mutual insurance in the hazardous materials industry. The
interest can be expected to increase as coverage in the commercial
market becomes more expensive and more difficult to obtain.
Mutuals are voluntary organizations of businessmen. To be effec-
tive, they must operate in most technical respects like commercial
insurers, and over time they tend to be assimilated by the commercial
market.
Eventually, if a perceived shortage of insurance coverage is not
filled either by the existing market or by newly created mutuals, it may
become necessary for the government to step in. Government action
may take the form of providing encouragement for the formation of
mutual insurance organizations, or of requiring their formation, or of
requiring insurers to establish a supplementary system for making
insurance available for those facilities that cannot find an insurer in
the market. If the need for insurance coverage is considered crucial
for public policy, the government may even have to assume the role of
an insurer of last resort.
17.5.2. Remaining limitations
Even the most responsive commercial market and even the most
comprehensive mutual insurance plan cannot solve all the problems of
insuring the risks of hazardous materials, however. We can expect cov-
erage to be available, but it will have its price, which will be higher
than what insureds used to pay for liability insurance in the times of
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cash-flow underwriting, and it will not provide the long-term security to
which insureds had become accustomed under the traditional
occurrence-style policy.
Rather, the coverages that are available now and will be available
in the future are limited in several respects:
(1) Their amounts are fairly modest compared to the catastrophic
dimensions of potential liability.
(2) They are claims-made policies and thus provide coverage only for
claims made within the period specified in the policy.
(3) They do not cover the cost of clean-up measures on the insured's
own premises except under exceptional circumstances.
(4) Many policies exclude specific substances (e.g. asbestos) by name,
or exclude certain types of injury or damage (e.g. genetic damage).
In addition, insurers are extremely selective in their underwriting, and
consequently, coverage will be unavailable, or available only at a prohi-
bitive price, for high-risk facilities.
No insurer can be expected to assume the risk of change of risk
factors associated with long-latency claims, at least not until the pace
of development in technology, science, medicine, the law, and the econ-
omy stabilizes sufficiently to permit reliable long-range loss projec-
tions and corresponding financial planning. Therefore, claims-made
policies will be the rule rather than the exception. One possible alter-
native, suggested by Spiihler in his Discussion of this chapter, would be
to provide for automatic termination of coverage upon exhaustion of the
policy limits.
The claims-made policy is by no means an ideal contract instru-
ment. For one thing, by designating the making of a claim as the crucial
event for triggering the insurer's liability, the policy changes the con-
ditions governing interpretation and application of the rules concern-
ing notice of loss and cooperation, creating uncertainty and danger of
abuse. On the one hand, the insurer will have to insist, as always, on
being informed promptly of any event that is likely to result in a claim.
Ordinarily, this information is used for efforts to avert or minimize the
loss. Under a claims-made policy, however, the insurer may use the
information to cancel the policy or to refuse to renew it before the
claim is actually filed, and thus to escape liability. On the other hand,
the insured, who is bound by the policy to cooperate with the insurer
in trying to avert or minimize the loss, is under the temptation, once he
knows facts that could lead to a claim, to precipitate the claim before
the policy expires and before the insurer acquires the knowledge that
would induce it to cancel. The task of reconciling the conflicting
interpretations and interests will fall on the courts, which will be
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tempted, as usuaL to favor the insured. In the meantime, there will be
considerable uncertainty about the extent and effect of the informa-
tion that the insured must provide to the insurer.
Second. the separation of the traditional bond between the range
of covered claims and the activity from which they arise has serious
and far-ranging consequences for the protection that can be provided
to injured persons and the public through mandatory liability
insurance. The effectiveness of liability insurance requirements as a
device to protect injured persons rests on the fact that ordinarily they
can be enforced conveniently in conjunction with licensing and other
regulatory controls at the time when the liability-prone activity takes
place. If. however. in order to protect potential claimants. a policy
must be renewed for many years after the activity has ended, the
insurance requirement becomes for practical purposes unenforceable.
In other words. claims-made policies are useless as means to
satisfy a statutory insurance requirement, except with respect to
claims involving the short-term effects of an accidental (conspicuous)
incident. And, since it appears that for the foreseeable future claims-
made policies will be the only commercially available type of liability
insurance. this means that mandatory or compulsory insurance can no
longer be considered a viable option for securing payment of third
party compensation or clean-up costs.
In fairness it must be pointed out that even an occurrence-based
liability insurance policy could not provide full protection for long-
latency claims over several decades. To begin, the amounts of coverage
would become inadequate as a result of general currency depreciation.
In addition. every system of compulsory insurance has to deal with a
number of other problems related to definition, enforcement, availabil-
ity, premium control. and protection of third party claimants against
defenses based on violations of the insurance contract.
To criticize commercial insurers for their reluctance to provide
long-term coverage for liability risks would be not only futile but
indeed unjustified. The real culprits are the uncertainty and the con-
fusion that exist with respect to causation and liability over long
periods of time. Indeed, it appears that the problem is not so much
with the insurers' inability to provide coverage for an existing liability
risk but rather with the inability of the liability system to deal with
situations for which it was not designed. Widespread dissatisfaction
with the performance of the conventional liability system has been the
reason why the rules have been changed and are likely to be changed
further with a view to making it easier for victims to receive compensa-
tion for losses that according to widely held perceptions deserve to be
compensated. This state of affairs reduces considerably the range of
potential alternatives.
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17.5.3. Potential actions and alternatives
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The US insurers have recently concentrated their efforts on a cam-
paign to halt or even to reverse the trend toward expansion of liability.
This raises several questions. First. one might ask why the insurers.
which are only indirectly affected and could presumably protect their
own interests adequately by increasing premiums and Limiting cover-
ages, have chosen to fight the battle of those who are affected immedi-
ately by increased risks and higher insurance costs and who therefore
would presumably be able to present a much more convincing argument
in the political arena. Second. if the insurers succeeded in eliminating
some claims, that would not prevent the underlying release, exposure,
injury, or loss from occurring and consequently would not eliminate but
only redirect the pressure for some kind of compensation, except
perhaps in the case of some types of nonpecuniary or punitive damages.
In most respects, those trying to restrict tort liability can expect
to succeed only if they can offer a preferable or at least acceptable
alternative source of compensation. The insurers' own interests are
affected not by the liability rules as such but by the tendency of the
courts to misinterpret policies to expand coverage retroactively to
include new risks and changed liability rules. This problem caLLs for
different remedies.
Legislatures have tended to respond to the generaLLy perceived
need to make compensation available to those who suffer injury or loss
due to exposure to hazardous materials, without requiring the victims,
or the government with respect to clean-up expenses, to incur the
cost, delay. and uncertainty associated with a tort liability claim, by
establishing compensation funds of various kinds. The scope of these
funds is usuaLLy Limited to specific types of poLLution or specific classes
of materials, and most of the funds existing in the USA are in fact
intended primarily or exclusively for financing government clean-up
operations. Some details are provided by Pfennigstorf (1979).
ALL specialized poLLution compensation funds suffer from two
weaknesses. First, because they are specialized, they require
claimants to show not only that they suffer from a specified health
defect but also that they were exposed to a specified material or type
of material under qualifying circumstances that may serve as a basis for
a presumption of causation. Even with very broad and generous
presumptions. the burden is a heavy one for many claimants consider-
ing the long periods of time involved. Because of the inherent complex-
ity of the factual situations and the need to establish a causal connec-
tion between exposure and injury. the procedures cannot be much less
complex. protracted. and costly than those involving liability under
tort law, and they cannot even offer much more certainty with respect
to the outcome.
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The second weakness of special compensation funds is that they
do not, as a rule, preclude the injured person from pursuing a liability
claim under tort law. Since the range of compensable damages and the
amount of compensation provided by the funds are limited, there is a
continued incentive for claimants to try to obtain a larger award,
including nonpecuniary damages and perhaps even punitive damages,
through a court action. Only very feeble attempts have been made so
far to discourage such actions, and it is unlikely that they will ever be
precluded completely.
It may be time for insurers and insurance buyers to reconsider
the basic principles on which the business of liability insurance has
been conducted. Where the liability risk is of a long-term nature, it
calls for long-term coverage. Indeed, the business of liability insurance
has to some extent already been transformed from a short-term busi-
ness into a long-term business. Insurers have had to adopt some of the
techniques usually associated with such long-term coverages as life or
disability insurance. The next logical move would have to be toward
longer contract terms, or contracts written for indefinite terms, as are
customary in Europe, with restricted termination and ample periods of
notice, or some other means of assuring continuity of coverage. The
amounts of coverage would have to be adjustable, as would the premi-
ums. In addition, there could be sizable premium deposits at the begin-
ning of the contract, as well as special reserves to spread out the
long-term risk. Conversely. there would have to be a provision to let
the policyholder share in investment income and in savings from lower
than expected claims. A long-term adjustable liability policy along
these lines would assure a measure of continuity and perhaps a more
equitable allocation of risks. Otherwise, however, it would still leave
much to be desired. It would not unburden the insured of the risk of
change in the risk situation, it would not solve all problems inherent in
the liability system, and it would most certainly create some new prob-
lems of its own.
Indeed, the scope of available insurance coverage is not likely to
improve significantly as long as compensation is legally tied to specific
substances, exposures, or conditions. The problems of causation and
proof that have been associated with the conventional tort liability
system can be eliminated only by a scheme that relies neither on indivi-
dually established liability nor even on individually established causal-
ity but is instead based on the principles of all-risks. first party
insurance.
This approach would not make it necessary to abandon or weaken
the "polluter pays" principle. On the contrary, it, and it alone, would
make it possible to allocate the costs of pollution commensurately with
the available evidence of causation, Le. on a collective rather than indi-
vidual case-by-case basis. Under a tort system of liability, depending
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on the weight that is given to the statistical evidence, the claimant
receives full compensation or nothing, or perhaps partial compensation
reflecting the statistical data for his group. None of the results is
satisfactory. The recent tendency has been to award full compensa-
tion, resulting in a cost burden on the polluter that is inconsistent with
the available evidence in that it disregards the effect of other actual
or potential contributing factors or alternative causes.
Under a general all-risks first party compensation system, all
injured persons would be compensated fully in accordance with the
standards of the system, regardless of the cause of their injury or
disease. However, for all the diseases for which the available evidence
indicates that exposure to a specific hazardous substance or condition
is a contributing factor, an appropriate portion of the total cost of the
benefits would be allocated to those determined to be responsible for
the release or the exposure, as a group. The collective cost allocation
would thus treat both injured persons and responsible polluters as
groups rather than individuals and would thereby avoid the problems of
unclear or multiple causation at both ends of the chain.
There are precedents for this approach. Specifically, article L
213-1 of the French Code des assurances imposes on all automobile
owners subject to obligatory liability insurance a special charge, to be
collected by the insurer along with the premium, to reimburse the car-
riers of social sickness insurance for a part of the medical costs attri-
butable to automobile accidents but not compensated through the lia-
bility system.
Even the most effective system of general compensation as just
outlined will not make liability insurance obsolete. Individual liability
remains a viable option in all cases where causation and blame can be
determined with little difficulty and conventional means. For this and
other reasons, the tort liability system is unlikely to lose its attrac-
tiveness for injured persons and their attorneys, at least as long as it
offers rewards that, although more chancy and more difficult to obtain,
are potentially much larger than the benefits that can be provided by
even the most generous first party compensation system.
From this perspective, any change in the law that would limit the
amount of damages recoverable under tort law to the actual economic
loss and to certain maximum allowances for pain and suffering and
other nonpecuniary damages would not only limit the size of individual
claims but would at the same time reduce the incentive for injured per-
sons to resort to tort actions in search of large awards.
17.5.4. Cballenges for insurers
The discussion so far has focused on the limits of the risk protection
that can be provided by commercial insurers, and on possible
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alternatives. It should be clear, though, that these limits and problems
affect only a relatively small part of the universe of risks associated
with hazardous materials. They constitute exceptions. Insurability,
with appropriate caution. remains the rule. What needs to be done is to
identify more precisely those risks that can be covered, the conditions
under which they can be covered, and the premiums at which they can
be covered. This is primarily a matter of technical research, claims
analysis, and actuarial studies. In the second place. it is a matter of
coverage design and policy drafting.
The US insurers have taken the bold and unpopular steps of
changing to claims-made coverage and of excluding all pollution liability
from the general liability insurance policy. They have not yet. how-
ever, found the courage to exclude coverage for punitive damages and
to limit coverage for general (nonpecuniary) damages. An effort by the
Insurance Services Office to exclude punitive damages from generallia-
bility coverage failed for lack of support at a time when irresponsible
competition in the commercial insurance market was at its peak. Cover-
age of punitive damages under a policy of liability insurance has always
been questionable and is indeed considered contrary to public policy in
several states. The same reservations apply to general damages to the
extent that they are imposed to punish or deter. As long as the insur-
ers do not take these actions, which are clearly within their power and
responsibility, their efforts to have liability rules changed by legisla-
tion will continue to lack persuasiveness and indeed credibility.
Elimination or limitation of coverage for punitive and general dam-
ages would be beneficial in several respects. Apart from being able to
better predict future claims, the insurers would eliminate the major
incentive for judges and juries to escalate awards in reliance on the
presumed "deep pockets" of the insurers.
Much remains to be done by insurers, especially in the USA. with
respect to the definition of the events that they intend to cover as dis-
tinguished from those that they do not want to cover. The struggle
that began with the accident formula and continued with the
occurrence definition and the limited pollution exclusion has not ended
with the introduction of the claims-made policy and the total pollution
exclusion in the general liability policy.
Now, as always, the insurers that agree to cover the risk of liabil-
ity for pollution or for the effects of exposure to hazardous materials.
even if they do not limit the coverage to "sudden and accidental"
releases, do not intend to cover the consequences of every release of
whatever nature. It is obvious, for instance, that the insurer does not
intend, and the insured does not expect, the policy to cover claims
based on events that are part of the normal everyday operation of the
insured plant or facility. Although. as noted earlier, claims of this kind
still retain some elements of randomness in incidence and amount of
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resulting loss, most insurers and business managers regard them not as
a risk to be insured but as a regular cost of doing business. US insur-
ers now rely primarily on the exclusion of "bodily injury, property
damage, or environmental damage which is expected or intended from
the standpoint of the insured". This formula has its own shortcomings,
however. They have been discussed extensively by Pfennigstorf (1979).
It may become necessary in the future to spell out in more detail which
situations are and which are not meant to be covered. Pfennigstorf
(1979) and Spiihler in his Discussion of this chapter have outlined the
different factors that insurers may have to consider in developing more
detailed risk classifications and more precise definitions of coverages.
Some environmental impairment liability insurers hope to achieve
the desired limitation of coverage by providing that there will be no
coverage if the insured violates applicable laws or regulations in the
area of environmental protection.
Faron (1986) has suggested that even clean-up expenses can be
covered in the case of precisely described substances, situations, and
operations (such as gasoline tanks at service stations), where loss pat-
terns show great similarity, where there is sufficient loss experience
to make the risk calculable, and where there is a sufficient number of
units of risk exposure to permit an adequate spreading of the risk.
The insurers' efforts to define the limits of their coverages have
often been frustrated by the courts. In many cases, there was indeed
an ambiguity, for which the insurers had to accept the blame and the
economic consequences. In many other cases, however, the courts have
distorted the meaning of a clearly written clause to make the insurer
pay for losses that were not intended to be covered. Most recently, in
the context of losses caused by hazardous materials, US insurers have
appealed to the Congress for help in their struggle against unsym-
pathetic courts, and the Congress appears to be ready to provide that
help in the form of rules governing the interpretation of certain words
or clauses in existing policies (such as "sudden and accidental" or
"expected or intended").
17.6. Conclusions
The role of insurance in dealing with the risks of hazardous materials is
a complex one, shaped by conflicting interests and public policy goals.
Those working with hazardous materials want the broadest coverage for
all the risks that they face, including those that no one is yet aware of,
at the lowest price. In the context of environmental policy, however,
the role of insurance is ambivalent: if preventing harm to the environ-
ment and to individuals and deterrence of pollution are perceived as
the primary goals, any kind of insurance must be viewed with suspicion,
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as a potential cause of distortion in the allocation of social costs.
Where the compensation of victims of pollution and the financing of
clean-up and rehabilitation measures are concerned, however.
insurance is an ally.
If a potential polluter is unable to obtain insurance and conse-
quently goes out of business voluntarily or is bankrupted by uninsured
claims. this might be welcomed. from a strictly environmentalist point
of view, as the expected and intended result of deterrence through
effective cost allocation. Different public policy goals may. however.
require the polluter to continue its operations. either because its prod-
ucts are considered essential for the commonweal or because its termi-
nation would have unacceptable economic or social consequences.
About 30 years ago. the deterrent effect of potentially ruinous
uninsurable liability caused US power companies to refuse to commit
themselves to nuclear energy when it became available for private use.
They changed their minds only after the Congress, through the
Price-Anderson Act of 1957. had limited their liability. prescribed the
details of the necessary insurance coverage. and introduced the
federal government as an insurer of last resort. In some quarters there
are now serious misgivings about that decision.
Nevertheless. we may soon face a similar situation in the hazard-
ous materials area, with one important difference: nuclear power in
the 1950s was merely considered desirable as an alternative to conven-
tional power generation relying on shrinking supplies of fossil fuels.
The present need for hazardous waste disposal sites and clean-up con-
tractors, in contrast, is immediate and urgent. If they cannot obtain
insurance. they must be allowed and indeed be required to operate
without it, irrespective of their economic viability. and some way must,
and will. be found to provide adequate compensation to the persons who
may be injured as a result of the operation, and to pay for necessary
clean-up in the event of a release.
Moreover. persons who are injured by exposure to a hazardous
substance. or who suffer from symptoms that are believed to be caused
by such exposure. are popularly perceived as deserving compensation.
It is this perception that has been primarily responsible for the recent
expansion of liability by courts and legislatures, and thus indirectly
for the present restriction of available liability insurance. For the
sentiment favoring compensation. it does not matter much whether the
responsible polluter is insured. whether liability can be established
under tort law, whether a polluter can be identified, or even whether
there is medical evidence linking the injury to the exposure.
The introduction of the claims-made policy may become the final
proof that the popular demand for broad and uncomplicated compensa-
tion can no longer be satisfied through liability insurance or through
liability claims. but requires an all-risks-type first party compensation
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system under which persons suffering from injuries and diseases
receive compensation without regard to the cause or causes. Political
factors are likely to make this conclusion difficult to accept, and it will
be even more difficult to decide on the details of an appropriate alter-
native system. There is an important role to play for private insurers
in such a system. What that role will be will largely depend on the
insurers' ability and willingness to recognize the demand and to
cooperate with legislatures and regulators in designing and implement-
ing the system.
In conclusion, it is worth repeating two statements made earlier in
this paper. First, in the vast majority of activities or situations involv-
ing hazardous materials, insurance performs its function as a risk-
spreading mechanism without difficulty. Limited or unavailable
insurance coverage is the exception, not the rule. Second, in a system
of environmental control the role of insurance, although important, can
only be ancillary, as a backup mechanism for compensating economic
losses and financing clean-up expenses. Neither compensation nor
insurance, however, can be an acceptable substitute for prevention,
removal. or neutralization.
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17.D1. Discussion
J.G. Cowell [1]
17.D1.1. Introduction
In$Ur1.ng lIna MlInllg1.ng HlI%lIraoU$ R1.$k$
Hazardous waste is rightly being seen as the key problem of the
present and future generations of mankind. My concern, as an execu-
tive of the Comite Europeen des Assurances, is with "concepts and pol-
icies" - in particular with problems of compensating injury or damage
caused by the generation, movement, and disposal of hazardous waste.
The Global 2000 Report to the President of the USA (Barney,
1981) on entering the twenty-first century reminds us that "environ-
mental problems do not stop at national boundaries". The Report con-
tinues:
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be more
crowded, more poLLuted, less stable ecologicaLLy, and more
vulnerable to disruption than the world we Live in now. Serious
stresses involving populations, resources and environment are
clearly visible ahead. Despite greater material output, the
world's people will be poorer in many ways than they are today.
Environmental issues have become beloved of the media. Hardly a day
goes by without the appearance of some item or other concerning the
environment [2].
Product liability was the issue of the 1970s. Environmental
impairment liability (ElL) is the issue of the 1980s and beyond. And
legal developments in the field of defective products are now being
applied to environmental impairment. What we are seeing today is the
snowball effect of heightened public awareness of the pollution problem
- not least in the light of the Mexico City (19 November 1984) and Bho-
pal (2 December 1984) disasters.
And, inevitably, everyone wants to get on the bandwagon -
lawyers, legislators, regulators, consumers, scientists, engineers, and
even insurers. There is a growing feeling among insurers and reinsur-
ers that it is only within the last two or three years that we have even
begun to perceive the true dimensions of the environmental impairment
risk. And we still have a long way to go before we fully understand the
insurance implications of this increased awareness of the problem.
17.D1.2. Key problems
I should like to address the question of risk spreading and risk bearing
under four heads:
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(1) The problem of underwriting separate ElL cover.
(2) The problem of mobilizing capacity and coverage.
(3) The problem of legal liability and insurance cover.
(4) The problem of anticipating future developments.
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First, however, I shall briefly consider risk management.
There is a fundamental misconception about the risk management
discipline which still rears its head whenever risk management is under
discussion. Risk management is not just a new way of looking at the old
loss prevention long practiced by insurance carriers. It is rather a
new approach to an old problem - the problem of risk rendered more
acute than ever before by the accelerating pace of technological
development.
There is a basic difference in this new approach. The risk
manager is concerned with the identification and treatment of risk
which may, but need not, include consideration of risk transfer, usually
to an insurer. The insurer is concerned with the insurability of risk,
and his risk engineering services are geared to improving the quality of
risk from the point of view of insurance. Insurance has (and will con-
tinue to have) an important role to play in dealing with risk. But it is
not the only answer to risk. Traditionally, insurers have limited them-
selves to - or at least concentrated on - the risk transfer option.
Today, insurers are having to become involved in what may be called
the "whole risk" approach - seeing risk in its entirety, not solely in
terms of whole or partial transfer of risk to insurers. Other risk
financing options are available (self-insurance, captives, mutual funds,
etc.) and need to be assessed objectively. It is with this in mind that
we should address the problems raised earlier.
The Problem of Underwriting Separate ElL Cover
The problem of underwriting ElL is complicated by the fact that the
notion of suddenness has lost much of its meaning in cases of gradual
pollution involving leakage or seepage. Here the settlement of claims is
complicated by numerous factors such as:
(1) Delays before the occurrence or manifestation of injury or damage
(e.g. harmful effects developing over an extended period of time).
(2) Delays after the occurrence or manifestation of injury or damage
(e.g. identification of the cause of injury or damage, identification
of the person liable).
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Separate ELL insurance for land-based risks is unlikely to take off
in Western Europe in the immediate future. First. the insurance buyer
in Western Europe is not at all convinced that he needs separate ELL
cover. And this for a very good reason. In most countries the commer-
cial liability policy usually covers sudden and unexpected events. By
implication it excludes events which are neither sudden nor unex-
pected. Unfortunately. however, there is no clearly established cutoff
point between sudden and nonsudden events - and the courts are well
known for finding against insurers in case of doubt. Consequently. the
insurance buyer sees no reason why he should buy (necessarily expen-
sive) ELL insurance when he can already obtain cover under the com-
mercial liability policy. In the circumstances the outlook for separate
ElL insurance looks bleak.
Liability insurers can be forgiven for envying their opposite
numbers in property insurance who have very largely succeeded in
mastering the problems of risk analysis and risk control. Property
insurance (damage to own property) is characterized. above all, by
knowability and calculability. Property insurers know the limits of
insurability in the sense of being able to quantify their exposure to
loss. The same cannot necessarily be said of liability insurers.
In effect, the boundaries of liability insurance (damage to third
parties) are constantly being rolled back beyond the horizon. This is
particularly true of environmental impairment where liability insurers
are finding themselves increasingly obliged to cover risks which. quite
simply, are unknowable and therefore incalculable. Roger Anderson
has suggested:
What. Bhopal has demonst.rat.ed is t.hat. while t.he act.ual chance of
somet.hing happening might. be remot.e. t.he losses t.hat. can be
incurred in t.oday·s t.echnological environment. are huge. Claims
incidence becomes irrelevant.. as does t.he mat.hematical probabil-
it.y of a catast.rophe. (Editorial. Insura.nce Week, 18 January
1985.)
Does this mean that such risks are uninsurable? Not necessarily
- although underwriters differ on the extent to which you can put a
price on risks which are unknowable. After all. it is much easier to be
wise after something has gone wrong than it is before. It also means
that we have to recognize the implications for liability insurers of
being obliged to pay claims today in circumstances which quite simply
could not have been conceived when first going on risk. Bhopal COUld.
in fact. happen anywhere. And the final cost of such a disaster will be
measured not in hundreds but in thousands of millions of dollars.
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The Problem of Mobilizing Capacity and Coverage
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The problem of mobilizing capacity and coverage to deal with ElL expo-
sures is a very real one. The US market for ElL has virtually dried up,
and European markets are becoming distinctly nervous. Insurers are
equally worried about the sort of losses they may be called upon to
compensate under the commercial liability policy, and are not too sure
what to do about it.
One reason is the very diversity of insurance markets, which is
both their strength and their weakness: their strength because the
competitive spirit among insurers generally ensures the availability of
some sort of cover provided you are ready to pay the price; their weak-
ness because that same competitive spirit makes them more than reluc-
tant to pool their resources or adopt a uniform approach to underwrit-
ing. Furthermore, insurers and insurance buyers rarely agree on what
is the right cover at the right price. There is more than a grain of
truth in the couplet that "those who can afford insurance don't need it,
and those who need insurance can't afford it",
Again, there is something to be said for the view that "exceptional
risks require exceptional measures", Nuclear risks are a case in point.
Pools were (and still are) seen as the only way of effectively mobilizing
maximum capacity to provide the necessary coverage for what were
(and still are) exceptional risks. But we would be wrong to strain the
comparison between nuclear risks in particular and environmental risks
in general. We can, however, draw a number of useful lessons from
experience in the nuclear field. First, nuclear liabilities are excluded
from the commercial liability policy and are written exclusively by the
nuclear pools - except in the case of marine risks written on the open
market in London. Second, governments recognize that there are limits
to what insurers can offer by providing backup guarantees to supple-
ment cover given by the pools. Third, liability insurance in respect of
nuclear exposures is compulsory. This is not the case in respect of
(other) environmental exposures in Western Europe.
Pooling experiences outside the nuclear field in Europe have
hardly been satisfactory so far. very largely because the pools (in
France, Italy, and The Netherlands) are having to compete on unequal
terms with cover given under the commercial liability policy. True, the
US Insurance Services Office recommendation on excluding all pollution
cover from the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy comes into
force on 1 January 1986. But the lesson does not yet appear to have
been learnt in Europe.
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The Problem of Liability and Cover
There is frequent confusion between LegaL Liability and insurance cover.
This is true whether or not we are speaking about compuLsory
insurance. Any decision whether or not Liability shouLd be Limited in
amount is a matter for the legislator but there is no question whatso-
ever of insurers being in a position to provide unlimited cover for
high-exposure risks. Insurers must be in a position to calcuLate, no
matter how imperfectly, their exposure to potentially catastrophic
loss, particuLarly where such calculation is complicated by low fre-
quencyof loss.
This contrasts with experience in the field of motor insurance
where high frequency of loss allows insurers to calcuLate their expo-
sure with greater (but not absolute) certainty. The fact that most
motor insurers presently provide unlimited cover in respect of bodily
injury should not allow us to overlook the fact that the idea of unlimited
Liability (and unlimited insurance cover) was born at a time when it was
impossible to imagine anyone accident pLacing the future of the motor
insurer in jeopardy: insistence today on unLimited cover in high-
exposure areas could well lead to insurers quite simpLy withdrawing
from the market.
The Problem ofFuture Developments
It is becoming increasingly clear that insurers face even greater prob-
lems in the field of environmental impairment than elsewhere in civil
Liability insurance. What concerns insurers most is Lack of clarity,
especially concerning the system of liability. How do you put a price
on future claims caused by factors which could not have been known to
the underwriter when he went on risk? Whether or not we shall find a
satisfactory "insurance solution" depends very much on how far we go
in applying the "polluter pays" principle and "cradLe-to-grave" ruLes of
Liability [3].
How, in fact, do you determine the moment of loss? Was it at the
design or production stage? Was it at the moment of first exposure
(e.g. first exposure to asbestos dust)? Was it at the moment of first
appearance of symptoms of injury? Was it at the moment of medicaL
diagnosis?
These questions are not academic. They are vital to determining
which insurance policy should cover the injury or damage. Historically,
insurers have tried to address these questions in two ways: first, by
providing cover under the policy in force at the time the act giving rise
to injury or damage was committed; second, by providing cover under
the policy in force at the time the injury or damage occurred. Both
the act committed basis (only used to any extent in Switzerland) and
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the occurrence basis (widely used in Europe and North America) have
distinct drawbacks.
Cover under a policy often written 20 or more years ago is likely
to be wholly inadequate in today's conditions - not least in the light of
monetary inflation. Furthermore, it may prove impossible to trace the
policy in force at the time the act was committed or the injury or dam-
age occurred. Difficulties are compounded in toxic waste cases involv-
ing a large number of generators using the same pits. ponds, landfills.
etc. US courts have typically driven a bulldozer through insurers'
defences (e.g. by holding all insurers liable to compensate victims from.
say. the moment of first exposure to the moment of medical diagnosis).
Europe has been comparatively immune from the toxic waste litigation
fever which has gripped the USA. But this may not always be the case,
particularly in the light of increased public awareness of the long-tail
problem where injury or damage can only become apparent many years
after first exposure.
One way of dealing with the problem has been to write policies on
a claims-made basis. This is the method favored by reinsurers and
ElL underwriters. though liability insurers in general are reluctant to
abandon practices established over many years. Cover in this case is
provided under the policy in force at the time the claim was notified to
the insurer. Both insurer and insurance buyer are relatively secure in
the knowledge that the level of indemnity is (more or less) adequate to
meet today's level of claims. In addition. liability of the insurer is cut
off at the end of the policy period: the only real problem occurs where
there is no insurance in force to cover future claims (e.g. in case of
bankruptcy or cessation of activity).
Finally. there is the question of liability itself. Should liability be
channelled? And. if so. who should be liable? Alternatively, should lia-
bility fall on the holder of the waste - the person having care, custody,
and control of the waste at the time of injury or damage?
These are issues on which insurers will have to think very care-
fully in the light of future demands for ElL cover (under a separate pol-
icy or under the commercial liability policy). Insurance can do much to
compensate for damage to persons and property. It can never be a
substitute for a properly developed program of loss prevention and loss
control. And it certainly does nothing to reduce the need for tighter
administrative supervision over hazardous waste movements.
17.D1.3. Conclusion
Insurers have mixed views on compulsory insurance. In the end it may
be the only way of dealing with selection against insurers. and mobiliz-
ing capacity and coverage in the ElL field. Compulsory insurance does
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raise serious problems of enforcement and identification of the poLLuter
- not to mention the desirability of further state intervention. Insur-
ers should not be expected to act as policemen or to bear the burden
of unidentified or uninsured poLLuters. Appropriate arrangements to
back up insurance cover will have to be investigated. .
It is anybody's guess whether cover will continue to be offered
under the commercial liability policy or will be provided under
separate cover. Certainly, many ElL underwriters favor writing and
rating the ElL exposure separately. Others see a pooling of resources
as the only realistic solution to a problem which can only get worse
before it gets better.
Litigation attitudes must (and will continue to) influence develop-
ments on both sides of the Atlantic. But we should always keep in mind
the fact that the prevailing wind in liability blows from West to East:
what happens in America today could happen in Europe tomorrow -
despite real differences in law and practice including, of course,
heightened Litigation consciousness. contingency fees, punitive dam-
ages, and jury system.
The English statesman Canning once remarked that he had caLLed
the new world into existence to redress the balance in the old. When
we look at some of the excesses in the field of litigation in the USA we
can be forgiven for thinking that it is we in the old world who need to
redress the balance in the new.
Notes
[1] The views expressed here are t.hose of t.he aut.hor alone and do not.
necessarily represent. t.hose of t.he Comlt.~ Europ~en des Assurances or
its member associations.
[2] See. for example. t.he Wa.ll street Journa.l on wast.e clean-up (31 May
1985) and wast.e reduction (4 June 1985).
[3] "Von der Wiege bis zur Bahre" (Goet.he) ["From Cradle to Grave"].
Reference
Barney, G.O. (1981). The Global 2000 Report to the President (Council on
Environmental QuaUt.y and Depart.ment. of Stat.e, Washingt.on. DC).
17.D2. Discussion
J. Spuhler
17.D2.1. Preliminary remarks
In contrast to Pfennigstorf's approach in outlining the role of
insurance in risk spreading and risk bearing in connection with hazard-
ous materials and the problems involved from the standpoint of a
lawyer. in the foLLowing the issues are viewed from the viewpoint of an
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underwriter. It is therefore necessary to broaden the range of the
discussion in the following manner:
(1) It is not only the situation during transportation, storage, or
disposal of hazardous materials that creates all the problems, but
each and every phase during the lifetime of such materials: pro-
duction, storage. transportation, handling, use. consumption,
disposal, and redisposal.
(2) The problems around hazardous materials cannot just be discussed
and analyzed with regard to such materials in their "waste" state,
because it is an impossible task to distinguish clearly between the
state of "usefulness" of a product and that of its being a "burden"
which somehow has to be got rid of properly.
(3) The kind of insurance cover for injuries, damages, economic
losses, and nonpecuniary losses is not of primary importance to
uncover the problems arising from hazardous materials. This is to
be observed despite the fact mentioned by Pfennigstorf that lia-
bility insurance has been focused primarily on such materials and
harmful occurrences initiated by them.
In addition to this broadening of the discussion, the following cen-
tral question must be taken into account: To what extent do the funda-
mental goal of insurance and the basic principles attached to it
correspond to the specific situations arising from the unique qualities
of hazardous materials by gaining, producing, transporting, storing,
handling, using, and disposing of them? In this context, the fundamen-
tal goal of insurance consists in the transfer of uncertain burdens
resulting from unforeseen events hitting a firm or an individual person
to well-defined and limited costs within a well-defined period of time so
that as a residual there are no, or only restricted, imponderabilities
left to a firm or an individual.
Now, before being in a position to outline an acceptable solution
for insurance coverage in respect of hazardous materials, we have to
consider the primary qualities of such materials as far as they are
related to primary insurance principles.
17.00.2. Insurance-related. unique qualities of hazardous
materials
Hazardous materials may at any time and anywhere cause bodily inju-
ries, property damage, nonpecuniary claims, clean-up, and removal to a
very large number of firms and individuals within a very large area.
The very high monetary extent may be created by an accident or from
nonsudden pollution that occurs gradually over an extended period of
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time. with the causal initiation of the relevant events very often a long
time in the past. Within this general situation. the following general
items have to be observed: the instability of the risk situation, the
kinds of consequences arising from the risk. the long-range character
of the risk. the extent of compensation arising from the risk. and the
determination of the event turning the risk into an actual loss.
Analysis of these items discloses the following.
Instability of the Risk Situation
The calculation of the premium for an insurance coverage valid over a
medium period of time requires a certain minimum degree of stability of
the risk situation. This prerequisite is not given in connection with
hazardous materials for the following reasons:
(1) New technologies facilitate the discovery and tracing of toxic
effects of products which were previously considered as abso-
lutely safe. Or an unforeseen mixing of products which them-
selves are completely nontoxic may bring about a highly toxic
conglomerate. This perpetual and very often drastic change in
the situation calls - under fixed premiums and policy conditions -
for a drastic limitation of the underwriter's engagement in
respect of the period of time at risk. This means that the policy
period is shortened or that policy wordings contain a clause that
gives to the underwriter the right to change at least the premium
rate charged within short intervals.
(2) Furthermore. the abrupt and unforeseeable changes on the legal
scene bring about a highly uncertain state for the underwriter.
This is particularly true in the field of liability insurance. New
legislation introducing strict liability rules or imposing specific
costs on the insured, as well as court decisions. lead to unantici-
pated aggravation of the risk borne by the underwriter.
Kinds of Consequences Resulting from Hazardous Materials
The consequences of hazardous materials consist primarily of bodily
injuries to people who are in contact with such materials in the course
of their daily work or to people who find themselves "outside" the
actual handling area. The range is practically unlimited, as the air and
flows of water very often act as carrying media for a toxic release lead-
ing to the harmful impact on human beings over a very large area. The
same effect can be noted with respect to property damage. Many pro-
duction sites have to stand idle for a long time owing to their contami-
nation by accidently released hazardous materials used there. and this
leads to very significant loss of use. In addition to bodily injuries and
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property damage, the underwriter is increasingly faced with non-
pecuniary losses resulting from the release of hazardous materials.
Furthermore, various kinds of costs for the prevention of expected
losses and for the limitation of losses that have already occurred as
well as clean-up costs and costs for restoration may be incurred.
These facts lead to the following conclusions:
(1) The kinds of consequences show that it is not only liability
insurance but all lines of insurance that may be impacted by
hazardous materials. This is very significant, as most insurers
today do business in all lines of nonlife insurance.
(2) The buyer of insurance coverage is not primarily concerned about
the type of insurance he needs. This is illustrated by the fact
that it is immaterial to him whether he is financially hit by loss or
damage to his own property or by his own bodily injuries on the
one hand, or by those of others due to his failures, negligence, or
undue activities for which he has to stand good on the other hand.
17.00.3. Long-range character of risks inherent in hazardous
materials
Hazardous materials do not necessarily cause negative effects on the
spot when being gained, produced, and so on. And, very often, their
negative effects cannot be discovered at the moment when they arise.
This causes the high degree of uncertainty about the state of risk at
the time of granting insurance coverage. Such a situation is highly
undesirable for the underwriter, as he aims at limiting his engagement
in respect of the period of time as set forth in the policy.
In the light of these conditions, the so-called "claims-made" poli-
cies were created and offered on a large-scale basis. The negative
effects of this type of policy are far smaller in practice than stated by
Pfennigstorf. If the relationship between insurer and insured is based
on a common understanding and on the principle of mutually honoring
each other's interest, the claims-made policy must be considered as a
well-based instrument for solving the present problems in the best pos-
sible way.
fflgh Extent of Compensation Arising from Hazardous Materials
The consequences of negative effects are of an extent that cannot be
compared with anything else. This is primarily seen in the field of lia-
bility insurance. The present demand in respect of the extent of
insurance cannot be met by the insurers. Their bad experience in
product liability and environmental impairment liability brought about
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severe restrictions in order to secure a sound balance between their
overall engagements and their financial standing. The question arises
as to whether the situation could be improved by transferring the cov-
erage for environmental impairments from the general liability policy
into a special environmental impairment liability policy on a larger
scale than today. This question must be answered in the negative. The
underwriter's engagements cannot be increased by creating separate
policies for risks that have been part of another kind of liability policy
hitherto. His engagements in each of the two types of policies have to
sum up within a well-defined period of time.
Absence of WeLL-determined Events Resulting
from Hazardous Materials
The absence of well-determined events resulting from hazardous
materials places quite a restriction on the insurability of negative
effects due to such materials. All kinds of wordings - be they
accident-oriented or based on the term "occurrence" - in fact show
very serious failings. On the other hand. sound underwriting is not
possible by offering coverage to each and every origin of claims. No
coverage can be given to willful acts or omissions. The same is true for
all planned and intended operations which are connected with negative
effects arising from hazardous materials. The effects arising from
situations of this kind have to be balanced out financially by including
their consequences in the production and handling costs. This attitude
concerning willful and random acts and omissions very clearly shows
where we have to draw the line between the transfer of risks to the
insurer on the one hand and the financing of losses by funds to be
accumulated by the polluters on the other. Thus we come to the con-
clusion that insurance is aimed at covering the negative consequences
of nonroutine and irregular operations in the course of any activity.
17.00.4. OuWne of an acceptable solution
Considering the general goal of insurance as well as the basic princi-
ples of underwriting associated with that goal. we can outline the
framework for an acceptable solution to be realized by insurance in
relation to hazardous materials as follows:
(1) The negative effects must be uncertain at least as to the moment
when they may arise. And they must not have occurred prior to
the inception of an insurance cover. Furthermore, they must be
free from any willful act or omission.
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(2) In order to safeguard the balance between prefixed premiums and
the extent of the engagement of the insurer, it must be possible
for the insurer to alter the premium rate and the extent of cover-
age during the course of the policy to match the major alterations
in the assumptions previously taken into account when establish-
ing the insurance coverage.
(3) The consequences covered must be of an objective and real
nature. Nonpecuniary and noneconomic losses must be excluded.
(4) Consequences resulting from normal gaining, producing, handling,
using, transporting, storing, and disposing cannot be subject to an
insurance coverage. They represent part of the ordinary well-
expected costs of the business activities.
(5) High amounts of insurance asked for must be limited and they must
be supported by an adequate deductible to be borne by the
insured.
(6) In order to cope with the unrealistic interpretation of policy
wordings by courts, in order to escape the task of setting a strict
line between "accidental events" or "occurrences" and "gradual
developments and emissions", and in order to bring about a clear
assignment of these to a specific moment of time, a very reason-
able kind of coverage in respect of the amount available to cover
losses consists in the following scheme.
A prefixed amount - say, US $50 million - agreed upon by
insurer and insured sets the limit up to which the total of all
losses and costs resulting from hazardous materials within a
specific period of time and being claimed against the insured are
paid by the insurer. At the moment when the said amount is
exhausted, the policy lapses automatically; otherwise the policy
ends at the end of the period agreed upon between insured and
insurer. Such a setup has the advantage of avoiding misinterpre-
tation of the policy wording in respect of the parts mentioned
earlier and therefore results in a high degree of determinateness
for both parties involved.
17.02.5. Concluding remarks
Insurers are constantly studying ways and means to improve the
insurance coverage of hazardous materials in order to meet the needs
of insureds in accordance with the constant developments in technol-
ogy, economic situations, medical know-how, as well as in law and its
interpretation by courts. However, legal and court-related exaggera-
tions do not solve the problems. Part of the burden arising from haz-
ardous materials can be transferred to insurance setups in all lines
underwritten today. And this part will be taken by the insurers in
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fulfilling their task in respect of their set goaL. But the rest of the
burden has to be met by other means.
Epilogue
From Seveso to Bhopal and Beyond
P. KlemdorJer and H. Kunreuther
A principal objective of the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA) Conference was to develop a set of recommendations
for future studies between researchers and practitioners that would
improve the management of hazardous materials. To this end we invited
six practitioners to participate in a panel discussion followed by small
group meetings [1]. Each of the small groups was asked to outline a set
of research needs in their area with a concern for linking theory with
practice. The research recommendations developed by the small
groups are presented below by linking them to the following themes
highlighted by the conference:
(1) Problem context. There is a need to increase our understanding
of the problems and opportunities facing firms which manufacture
products that create toxic waste, the alternatives open to trans-
porters of hazardous materials, and the challenges facing
interested parties involved in the siting of storage and disposal
facilities.
(2) Risk analysis. There is a need to document the potential bene-
fits and inherent limitations of risk analysis both at the assess-
ment level and at the level of how data are communicated to the
different interested parties (e.g. the public, industry). In partic-
ular, we need to understand how bargaining and negotiation can
facilitate the decision process and enable interested parties to
reach compromise solutions.
(3) Risk management and insurance. There is a need to under-
stand the role that legal institutions and regulation can play in
facilitating the production, transport, and storage of hazardous
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materials. What is the appropriate role of insurance in dealing
with these problems?
We now summarize a set of key ideas raised by the panel members,
open discussions at the Conference, and research recommendations
from the small groups by specifying a set of topics related to the above
three areas.
E.l. Problem Context
E.1.1. Production of hazardous materialJl
In his panel presentation. Perry Hopkins provided a set of principles
for firms to follow in preventing and dealing with Bhopal-like incidents.
In particular, he emphasized the importance of firms recognizing the
need for expertise and safety in technology when they deal with highly
hazardous materials which are also essential for meeting society's
needs. Manufacturin2 line management must be full participants in the
development and implementation of all business planning involving
hazardous materials, and they need to participate actively in develop-
ing industry standards. government regulations and laws for the
management of hazardous materials worldwide. Hopkins also pointed
out the need for improved methods of detection of hazardous materials
discharged into the atmosphere from devices that relieve pressure in
vessels that might otherwise rupture. Currently, there are no means to
neutralize, disperse or otherwise protect the environment from these
discharged materials.
Key Research Areas for Production
(1) How do we reconcile differences between allowable concentrations
or doses in the workplace and those in the external environment?
(2) How can industrial firms remain competitive while still addressing
the hazard and risk concerns of the public?
(3) How does one introduce industrial practice and compliance tech-
niques into small firms for problems involving chronic and gradual
pollution, as well as possible explosive accidents?
(4) Determine the effects of various organizational structures and
managerial behavior on the levels of risks in a firm.
(5) Undertake a state-of-the-art survey of current safety apparatus
used in industry and its effects on reduction of risk (e.g. the use
of dated or modern equipment).
(6) Undertake case studies of management practices in dealing with
risks for firms of different sizes, including a survey of risk levels
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accepted by safety managers in different types of industrial facil-
ities.
(7) What are effective procedures for developing trust between the
public and firms? How do successful companies deal with this
issue?
(8) How do different firms deal with mismanagement issues? Can risk
scenarios playa creative role in this process?
1:.1.2. TnuuIportation of hazardous materials
In the panel discussion, Frederik BjllSrkman stressed the importance of
the carrier of hazardous materials as an identifiable party in the
hazardous materials process. He indicated that the public is fre-
quently unaware of the sender or the receiver of the goods, but can
normally identify and will demand compensation from the transporter.
For this reason, local authorities frequently place a number of restric-
tions on carriers to protect the general public.
Key Research Areas Jor Transportation
(1) What is the linkage between the transportation of hazardous
materials and the siting of disposal facilities from the point of
view of managing risk and dealing with the costs of an accident?
(2) Can one determine minimal acceptable standards for transporting
hazardous goods? What is the evolution and rationale of interna-
tional conventions regarding these standards?
(3) Can one develop regulations for dealing with transportation of
goods that have an opportunity of being appropriately monitored
and controlled? What is the past experience with these types of
regulations in different countries?
(4) What are appropriate liability and insurance mechanisms for cov-
ering transport of hazardous materials? How easily can these be
enforced in practice?
1:.1.3. Siting of storqe and disposal facilities
Research in this area needs to be designed so that consideration is
given to the technical, social, political, and economic aspects of the sit-
ing process. As in the other areas, there is a need to investigate imple-
mentation problems associated with siting a new facility and ways of
enforcing any rules and regulations. As was pointed out by a number of
participants in the meeting, the siting issue encompasses a wide variety
of problems at all levels, including legal issues, public participation, as
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well as the role of policy tools such as compensation and insurance for
facilitating the process.
Key Research Areas for Siting
(1) What are the trade-offs between equity and efficiency considera-
tions in making sitLn'l decisions?
(2) What role can risk assessments play in siting decisions? Can one
develop a set of criteria for evaluation of the risks resulting from
siting in one place versus another?
(3) Does insurance availability influence siting? What type of
insurance would be most useful in this connection?
(4) How can one bring the public effectively into the siting process?
In what ways can technical assistance be useful in enhancing pub-
lic participation?
(5) How can one enhance public trust in institutions and facilitate the
siting of hazardous facilities?
(6) What role can compensation and benefit sharing play in conjunc-
tion with other policy instruments such as regulations for facili-
tating the siting of hazardous facilities?
E.2. Risk AnalJllis and Decision Processes
1:.2.1. Risk aBsessment
Orio Giarini, in his panel discussion comments, indicated that in the
nineteenth century it was much easier to determine risks from indus-
trial plants such as a textile mill by undertaking a specific inspection.
In the last 20 years. technology has changed so rapidly that it is diffi-
cult for those in the plant to fully understand technological risks and
even more difficult for outsiders, such as insurance inspectors, to mon-
itor and understand these risks. This may create moral hazard prob-
lems if those inside the firm have a better conception of the risk than
those outside (e.g. insurers). This is one reason that insurance for
many types of risk is not available today. To improve the situation with
respect to risk assessment, the following research needs have been
outlined.
Key Research Areas Jor Risk Assessment
(1) Creation of new data bases and coordination of existing ones on
the toxicity of chemicals in different environments and on their
physical effects.
Ep1.wgue: From Seveso to Bh.opal and Hetlond 503
(2) Development of simple assessment models that contain only key
variables and can be applied to a number of different situations
without large expenditures of time or money.
(3) Conducting of a survey of risk assessment activities of interna-
tional and national institutions.
(4) Development of worst case scenario methodologies for use in a
variety of industrial settings.
(5) Impact of scientific uncertainty in undertaking risk assessments
and settling differences between experts. What role can science
courts play in adjudicating the process?
E.2.2. Risk perception and. communication
There was considerable discussion at the Conference on the differ-
ences in perception between experts undertaking risk assessment and
the lay public. There was general consensus on a need to study ways of
improving the communication of information on the nature of the risk to
the general public as well as the costs and benefits of alternative pol-
icy strategies.
Key Research Areas for Risk Perception and Communication
(1) How can one make risk information more relevant to specific
interested parties (e.g. top-level officials, lower-level executives.
government agencies)? How do different political regulatory sta-
tutes and cultural factors affect these communication needs?
(2) How can one better communicate uncertainties with respect to
probabilities. consequences. and trade-offs between different
alternatives? What is the role of computerized decision support
systems in improving the way individuals process this information?
(3) What information about risks do people feel they need in contrast
to information that the government feels may be "good for them"?
Do people want to know about the chances of potentially cata-
strophic accidents in the future (e.g. an earthquake in California)
if they are living in the area? Does framing of data in different
forms (e.g. gains versus losses) change people's cognitions or just
their responses?
(4) What do people feel is a fair political process and how does that
affect the way information is/should be presented to them? Is it
useful to consider compensation or benefit sharing as a way of
facilitating communication?
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E.2.3. Research on bargaining and negotiations
In his panel discussion, Karoly Blird indicated the need to focus on the
different interested parties affected by hazardous materials and to
determine the appropriate role of insurance and compensation as pol-
icy tools for facilitating bargaining and negotiation. He indicated that
one needed to link these alternative mechanisms to the objectives of
society. For example. there are differences between socialist economic
planning. where insurance is compulsory. and the available coverage in
other countries where a voluntary system is in place. Political. psycho-
logical, social, and economic conditions may set up different atmo-
spheres for bargaining and negotiating on environmental matters.
Key Research Areas for Bargaining and Negotiation
(1) What is and should be the role of experts and expert knowledge in
the negotiation process? Should expert knowledge be used as a
tool for bargaining or is it perceived as a constraint on bargain-
ing?
(2) What is the best way to prepare people for negotiation? Are
existing training programs helpful in resolving conflicts on
environmental problems?
(3) At what stage in the policy process - policy formation, standard
setting, implementation - do bargaining and negotiation occur?
What opportunities exist for bargaining and negotiation that are
not presently being exploited?
(4) How do bargaining and negotiation processes differ among political
cultures? Are there specific lessons that can be transferred from
one country to another?
E.3. Risk Management
E.3.1. Legal institutions
In his panel discussion, Ludwig Kramer indicated that in the European
Economic Community Treaty there are over 100 binding legal instru-
ments which relate to risk and the environment. He pointed to the
Seveso Directive as a model for dealing with plant safety practices and
one that is likely to be exported from Europe to the USA. Since con-
flicts over values, facts, and policy actions will continue to be adjudi-
cated by law, it is clear that legal institutions and practices will be a
cornerstone of risk management. The following areas were deemed
especially important research topics here.
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(1) What are the potential reforms to the legal system in the USA with
respect to toxic tort and compensation for damages? Are there
any lessons from European countries which may be helpful in this
regard?
(2) Evaluate the joint and several liability system in the context of
hazardous materials. What are the costs and benefits of continu-
ing with this type of arrangement?
(3) What are the economic incentives of toxic tort law and liability
with respect to product developments (e.g. pharmaceuticals) and
health and safety procedures within firms?
(4) How does the legal framework influence the availability of
insurance? What reforms would be helpful in providing increased
coverage against environmental pollution damage?
K.3.2. Regulation
Several of the panelists discussed the importance of regulations. with
appropriate monitoring and control procedures, as risk management
tools for the hazardous materials problem. The question of when to
utilize regulations produces a wide range of responses. In some cul-
tures. there is a reluctance to impose regulations unless there is a
clear failure of market-like mechanisms such as effluent-charge incen-
tive systems. In other countries, regulations are a way of life. The
hazardous materials problem is viewed by most countries as one that
needs to be at least partly remedied through regulating activities of
plants, transporters and those who operate storage and disposal facili-
ties. In addition, the public is extremely reluctant to sanction new
facilities that have the potential of causing damage to health and safety
without assurance that strict regulatory and control procedures will be
enforced.
Key Research Areas on Regulation
(1) What are the interrelationships between standard setting, moni-
toring, and enforcement of regulations in the responses of firms
producing hazardous materials as by-products?
(2) What is the relationship between self-regulation by firms and
externally imposed regulations by government agencies?
(3) What are the appropriate regulatory authorities and enforcement
mechanisms associated with hazardous materials storage and
disposal facilities? How will regulations facilitate the siting pre-
cess?
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(4) What types of regulations can assist the process of bargaining and
negotiations for transport. storage, and disposal of hazardous
materials?
(5) What role can regulation play for dealing with hazardous materials
problems when the causality of certain health effects cannot be
ascertained?
(6) What lessons can be learned from international comparative
research on hazardous materials regulations for model regulatory
legislation?
E.3.3. Research on m.w-ance
In his commentary. Michael Stradley pointed out that the market for
environmental impairment liability has collapsed in the USA. Reinsur-
ers throughout the world are reluctant to provide coverage in the USA
because of the uncertainty as to the magnitude of claim settlements in
court. This has created a lack of capacity in the industry and raised
questions as to alternative mechanisms for insuring interested parties
against potentially catastrophic losses.
Key Research Areas for Insurance
(1) How can uninsurable events be made insurable for protecting
against damages from hazardous materials? What actions are
needed to increase the capacity of insurers and reinsurers?
When can claims-made rather than occurrence-based policies be
helpful in this regard?
(2) Is there a need for government involvement for dealing with cata-
strophic losses through some type of reinsurance program? Is the
Price-Anderson Act or the Black Lung Program a useful model for
some type of government-private system in the USA?
(3) What type of self-insurance plans by industry are likely to be suc-
cessful in filling the gap in lnsurance protection?
(4) What are the incentive effects of insurance in increasing the
safety level and protective activities of industrial firms?
In order to undertake research on these issues, there needs to be
an open dialogue between the academic community and real world prac-
titioners. The IIASA Conference on Transport, Storage. and Disposal of
Hazardous Materials was designed as a first step in this direction.
Hopefully, the process will be accelerated in the coming years.
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131, 132
Damages, uncertainty, 471-472
Dangerous goods, 2
Data, risk analysis, 297-298, 305
Data bases, statistical, 235, 260
Data collection, crises, 35
Deadlines, siting prooedure, 167
Death, activities increasing
chances of, 315, 316
Decision analysis, 298, 381, 382
Decision problems, value tree
analysis, 353, 358-359
Decision trees, waste disposal facH-
ities, 148, 151, 162, 163
Decision makers, value tree
analysis, 375, 378, 379, 384
Decision making,
hazards, 37-38,178
information, 315-316
Decision,
hazardous waste management, 146,
169
Justification, 406,408
Decontamination, ICMESA plant,
72-73
Delphi method, 262
Demographic models, 245-246
Denial of orisis, 30-31
Department of the Interior,
Minerals Management Service,
356, 358, 361
Department of the Navy, 361
Deregulation, 392, 408
Design,
accidents and, 3, 19, 20
defects in, 56
Detection systems, collisions,
287-288
Deterrence, role of liability, 458
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Developers,
negotiated siting agreements, 165
waste disposal sites, 156
Diethylene glycol, 60
Dinoseb,95
Dioxin, 2, 15, 17,93,123,415
Direct response mode, encoding
methods, 261
Disability insurance, 467
Disagreement, negotiation, 192-195
Disaster costs, environmental dam-
age, 99-105
Disaster potential, risks, 346
Disasters, large scale, 13-14, 469
Discharges, 431
Discovery rule, ton actions, 422
Diseases,
latency periods, 250
risk agents, 249
Displays, risk estimates, 266-272
Dniester river, 94
Documentation, transborder flows,
168
Dose,
estimation, 250
relationship with exposure, 252
Dose levels, human and animal,
247-248
Dose-response assessment, 6,
246-255,256,257,262,263,308
Dread, risks, 163-164
Drinkin~water, pollution, 94, 126
Dupont Company, 95,435
Dust, lead contaminated, 86
Duties, legally enforceable, 421
Earth movements, 87
Ecological preserves, Southern
California, 356
Economic crisis, effects on safety
policy, 42
Economic effects, hazardous waste,
147
Economic vulnerability, hazardous
materials users, 416-418, 436
Effective dose, 247
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Efficiency,
negotiation and, 176
regulation, 392, 412
Electricity rates, reduction, 156
Emergencies,
planning, 2, 26-29
stabilizing, 26-29
Emergency phase, Seveso, 63-70
Emergency systems, 17
Emissions, toxic subslances,
230-231, 431
Emotional aspects, attitudes to
hazards, 339
Emotional communications, 340
Employers, hazard communication,
426
Encoding methods, subjective pro-
bability, 261
Energy, release of stored, 67-66
Enforcement, hazardous materials
regulations, 160, 391, 443-444
Engineering aspects, accidents,
47-59
Engineering risk analysis, 429-430
Engineering risk assessments, 235
Environmenlal conservation, trust
funds, 156
Environmenlal damage,
air and water pollution, 66, 92-96
compensation, 79-60, 107-120
disaster costs, 99-105
hazardous wastes, 64-67
industrial activities, 4
noise, 96, 97
radioactivity, 96-96
release of stored energy, 67-66
worst case, 96-99
Environmental Defense Center,
361-362
Environmenlal effects, hazardous
waste, 147
Environmenlal groups, 170, 402
Environmenlal impact slatements,
192, 354, 356, 359
Environmenlal impacts, probability
distribution, 256
Environmenlal impairment, nonsud-
den, 154, 449
Environmental impairment liability,
7-6, 127, 446-453, 456-462,
470, 466, 467-466
Environmental monitoring, 416
Environmental policy, role of
insurance, 463-464
Environmental Protection Agency,
121,145,159,205,307,313,406,
427
Environmental risks, regulation,
369-390
Environmental transport models,
exposure assessment, 243-245
Environmenlalists, stakeholders,
353,359,364,373
Epidemiological surveillance,
Seveso, 61, 62
Epidemiology, dose-response
assessment, 246-252
Equal weight law, man-made
accidents, 131-133
Equity,
hazardous waste siting, 212-215
negotiation and, 176
ERAS (International), 460
Ethical basis, siting, 221-222
Ethics, risk imposition, 212-215
Ethylene dibromide, 313, 321-322
Ethylene glycol. 60
European Economic Community, 145
Directives, 76-77
Seveso Directive, 27-26, 56-59,
395, 396, 434-435, 439, 504
Evacuation, 101-102
hazardous waste areas, 64
Mississauga, 16, 92, 96, 123
Seveso,3
Evaluation, risk regulation, 392
Evasion, collisions, 267-266
Event trees, 6, 239, 264, 261,
263-264,265,266,266,294.296,
300, 302-303, 304, 309
Events, insurable, 470-471, 496
Evidence, rules of, 425
Exclusion clauses,
environmenlalliability, 460
pollution claims, 470
Index
Exemptions, government regula-
tions, 433
Exothermic reactions, explosive,
48-49,60
Expense, monitoring, 232-233
Expenses, clean-up, 472
Expert witnesses, toxic tort cases,
425-426
Expertise,
communicators, 341
risk regulation, 395-396
Experts,
credibility, 199, 412
disagreement, 329
risk,323
risk analysis and, 289, 303-304
subjective probab1l1ty, 260-261
Explosions, 2, 17,87, 89-90,91,
431
costs, 100
TCP, 48-49
Exposure,
assessment, 240-246, 257, 262,
263
chemical hazards, 6
control limits, 443
length of, 250
levels, 249-250
measurement, 250
relationship with dose, 252
Extrapolation,
animal-to-human, 251-252
statistics, 236
Extreme value theory, 236
Factor analysis, risk characteriza-
tion, 327-328
Faots, disagreement on, 192, 193,
194
Factual information, company pro-
vision, 425-426
Factual knowledge of hazards, 336
Failure,
disagreement confused with,
192-195
probab1l1ty, 291-292
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Failure mode and effects analysis,
237
Failure modes, reliab111ty analysis,
279-280
Failure rates, log-normal distribu-
tions, 260
Fairness,
reRulation, 392, 412
Fatalities, probab1l1ty, 269
Fatal1ly data, 234
Fault, establishing, 154
Faull trees, 6, 237-239, 264, 280,
281,284,285,286,288,294,298,
300, 302-303, 309
Fear, 339
risk information, 310-311
Fear appeals, 340
Federal courts, hazardous waste
disposal, 427-428
Federal Flood Insurance Program,
160
FederalleRislation, liab1l1ty, 468
Federal regulatory agencies, 398
Field measurement techniques,
exposure assessment, 241-242
Financial responsib1l1ty, waste
disposal, 175
Fire, San Juan Ixhuatepec, 52
Fire accidents, oompensation,
129-130
Fire departments, 182-183
Fires, 14, 87, 89-90, 91
costs, 100, 130-131
liquefied petroleum gas, 122
Finns, hazardous waste deoislons,
169
Firm's costs, waste control,
149-151
First party oompensation, 481,
484-485
Fish, effects of effluent discharge
94-95
Fishermen, stakeholders, 359, 361,
361-362, 373
Fishing, water pollution, 126
Fixed premiums, 465
Flare tower, MIC manufacture, 53,
54,56
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Flexibilit.y, rules, 400
Flixborough, 14, 18,38, 87, 416
Fluorine, 86, 122
Food, exposure assessment., 240
Food and Drugs Administ.ration, 398
Food-ohain models, 245
Framing effeots, information
presentation, 312, 326
Franoe, 105, 106, 117, 121-122
environmental impairment.
insuranoe, 451
nuolear indust.ry, 158, 398
regulat.ory st.yle, 402
Frequenoy,
major disast.ers, 103
peroeived, 329
risk-oausing event.s, 235
Fund Convention, 455
Funding Agreement., 457
Funiwa, oil spill, 81
Game t.heory, 298
Gamma multi-hit. models,
dose-response, 253-254, 255
GARPOL,126
Gas esoape, Bhopal, 50-52,54-56
Gas explosions, 14
Gas indust.ry, Mexioo, 24, 25
Gas release, 14
Gast.roint.estinal t.raot., sympt.oms,
74
Gaussian plume models, 244
General oommeroial liabilit.y, 154
General damages, 482
Geographioal researoh, hazards,
318
Germany, 109, 220
regulat.ory st.yle, 403-404
Goodness, ut.ilitarian index, 384
Goods, non-fungible, 188-190
Government., st.yles of, 395-407
Government. powers, in hazardous
mat.erials disput.es, 185
Government. regulations,
oomplianoe, 432-433
hazardous mat.erials, 416
Government. supervision, inade-
quat.e, 19
Government.s, role in oompensation,
118-119
Gray Rooks power plant., 158
Ground penet.rat.ion remot.e sensing,
242
Groundwat.er t.ransport. models, 245
Gut.t.man-Lingoes multiple disorim-
inant. analysis, 336
Handling, hazardous mat.erials, 2
Haverill, Massaohuset.ts, 158
Hazard analysis, 301
Hazard oommunication regulations,
426
Hazard identification, 5
Hazardous mat.erials, 2
disast.ers, 469
gradual release, 469-470
hist.orical background, 2-4
insurance-relat.ed qualities,
493-495
problems for insurance, 467-473
production, 500-501
public policy, 145, 145-146
sea t.ransport., 454-457
t.ransportation, 5, 8, 122,
182-183, 196, 501
Hazardous wast.e disposal, 417
siting models, 216-220
Hazardous wast.e facilities, siting,
146, 147, 155-168, 200-202,
204-206, 216-220
Hazardous Wast.e Inspect.orat.e, 401,
444
Hazardous wast.e management.,
planning, 176-177
policy inst.rument.s, 4-5
regulat.ory st.yles, 7
syst.ems approach, 206-208
Hazardous wast.e sit.es, 146, 147,
155-168,417,501-502
olean-up, 205, 420, 427-429, 438,
475
cost.s, 459
insurance, 474-475
Hazardous wast.es, 2
classification, 168
Ind.ez
Hazardous wast.es (cant.)
environmental damage, 84-87
land disposal, 208-209, 222
Seveso, 23,24, 36
Hazardousness, nat.ure of, 464
Hazards,
anticipation, 41-43
at.tit.udes, 335-336
decision making, 37-38
identification, 299-300
overaLL knowledge of, 27
public perception, 42, 209-212
recognition of reaLit.y, 32
taxonomy, 211-212
Healt.h and Safet.y at. Work et.c. Act.
1974, 443
Healt.h and Safet.y Commission, 443,
444
Healt.h and Safet.y Executive, 39,
443, 444
Healt.h effects,
air poLLution, 117
nonsudden, 154
probabiLit.y dist.ribution, 256
Seveso, 61-62
wast.e faciLit.y siting, 147,
159-160,208-209,213
Heait.h monit.oring, 418
Seveso, 61-62
Healt.h sciences, 430-431
Healt.h stat.us, laboratory animals,
246
Heavy metal wast.es, 95
Hepat.omegaly, Seveso, 75
Hist.orical risk assessment., 234
HNS Convention, 455, 456
Hoffmann-La Roche, 15, 18, 124,
415
Human behavior, nat.ural hazards,
318
Human faotor, in risk analysis, 304
Humans, comparabiLit.y of animal
research results, 247, 308
Hygiene regulations, Seveso, 70, 73
ICMESA, 60, 64,65, 71,72
ILLness, fut.ure risk, 419, 420
521
Immunological investigations,
Seveso, 74-75, 76
Impact. assessment.s, 223
Impact. mat.rix, value t.ree analysis,
355, 364-368
Imperial Chemical Indust.ries, 299
Incentive compatible mechanisms,
164-165, 170
Indirect. response mode, encoding
met.hods, 261
Individual exposure monit.oring,
242, 243
Individual risks, 263
Indust.rial aotivities, environmental
damage, 4
Indust.rial applications, radioele-
ment.s, 98
Indust.rial disast.er funds, 105
Indust.rial emissions, environmental
damage, 79-80, 416
Indust.rial firms, risk levels,
432-433
Indust.rial hazards, conurbations,
25
Indust.rial plant.s,
air poLLution, 92-94
proximit.y t.o urban areas, 41
wat.er poLLution, 94-96
Indust.rial wast.e,
coast.al discharge 94-95, 95-96
soil contamination, 85-86
Influence diagrams, 281
Information,
accident.s, 21
deoision making, 315-316
during crises, 32-34, 36
hazards, 27-28, 425-426
preferred sources, 343-344
present.ation, 312
refusal to provide, 460
right. t.o, 402
risks, 503
safet.y problems, 38
Informed consent., hazards,
325-327
Injury data, 234
Inspections, wast.e disposal facili-
ties, 159
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Inspectors, risk regulation, 401
Installations, proximit.y, 19
Instit.ut.e, West. Virginia, 20, 25, 327
Instit.utions, public dist.rust,
215-216, 218
Insurabilit.y, 466
Insurance, 2, 416-418
chemical hazards, 431-436
encouraging safet.y, 442
environmentalliabilit.y, 4, 7-8,
170,448-453,458-462,470,
486, 487-488
gradual contamination, 420
hazardous wast.e siting, 146, 147,
155-168, 175-177
pollution, 106-107, 118-119,
126-127, 128-129
pricing, 433, 439
problems, 473-475
research, 506
restrictions on scope, 458
risk management. and, 7-8
risk prevention, 429
role in environmental policy,
483-484,500
role in risk reduction, 445-446
sea t.ransport. of hazardous
mat.erials, 454-457
special problems of hazardous
mat.erials, 467-473
t.echnical limitations, 465-466
wast.e disposal, 174-175
wast.e generators, 147-155
Insurance companies, stakeholders,
156-157
Insurance law, 7
Insurance market.,
prospect.s, 475-476
rest.raint.s, 472-473
shrinkage of capacit.y, 461-462
Insurance Services Office, 126,
482,489
Int.erest. groups, 394
formal st.ruct.uring, 403-404
hazardous mat.erials disput.es,
184-186
regulatory process, 399
Int.ernal Union of Marine Insurance,
454
Int.ernational At.omic Ener~y
A~ency, 335
Int.ernational Instit.ut.e for Applied
Syst.ems Analysis, 335
Int.ernational issues, hazardous
wast.e management., 168-169
Int.ernational Maritime Organiza-
tion, 113, 455, 456
Irrelevance pit.fall, value t.ree
analysis, 374-375, 378
Irrigation wat.er, pollution, 94
Istanbul, 95
IsUt.ut.o Superiore di Sanita, 63
Itai Itai disease, 95
Italy, environmental impairment.
insurance, 451
Ixt.oc One, oil spill, 81-82
Jackson Township, New Jersey, 95,
126-127, 419-420
James Bay, Virginia, 415
James River, 95
Japan, 84, 95-96,105, 109,117
Joint. and several liabilit.y, 424, 428
Joint. Tort.feasors Cont.ribution Law,
424
Journalist.s, risk stories, 323
Judgmental perspective, risk
assessment., 258-259, 260-262,
268
JUdicial review, regulations, 399
Jury, role in det.ermining damages,
471
Justification, decisions, 406,408
Kepone, 95, 415
KLearchos, 95
Knowabilit.y, risks, 163-164
KnOWledge, fact.ual, 336
Laborat.ory animals, 246
Land Compensation Act., 117
Land disposal, hazardous wast.es,
208-209,222
Land t.ransportation, insurance,
474
Index
Latency periods, diseases, 250
Latin Hypercube Sampling, 264
Lead poisoning, 86
Lease sales, offshore oil drlLLing
356-358
Legal action, compensation,
113-114
Legal institutions, 2,7, 499-500,
504-505
Legal procedure, waste disposal,
202
Legal regulations, waste disposal,
201
Legal system, chemical hazards, 7
Legal uncertainties, hazardous
materials risks, 467-468
Legislation,
hazardous materials, 494
liability, 468
response to Seveso, 63
Lekkerkerk, waste dumps, 84
LiabiLlly,
apportioning, 154
environmenlal impairment,
448-453
hazardous materials, 416
Joint and several, 424, 428
Limiting, 109, 436, 455, 469-471,
479, 490
marine transport, 455-457
offshore oil instaLLations, 115
poLLution, 108
purposes, 458
risks, 442
source of compensation, 468
lanker splLLs, 111-115
two tier, 455-456
uninsurable, 484
waste disposaL, 174-175
waste dumps olean-up, 116-117
waste generators, 147-155
Liability coverage, 104, 119-120
LiablLlty insurance, 467, 488
Liability slandards, hazardous
waste disposal, 427-428
Licensing, 401-402
risk regulation, 391
523
Life expectancy, loss of, 314, 315
Life insurance, 467
Lifetime risks, measurement, 250
Limits, liablLlty, 109, 436, 455,
469-471,479,490
Liquefied natural gas, facilities,
158
Liquefied natural gas plants, siting,
170
Liquefied petroleum gas, 50-52
Liquefied propane gas, 2
Litigation,
environmental impairment, 492
expense, 472
Lobbying, interest groups, 399
Local authorities, regulatory
enforcement, 444
Local communities, stakeholders,
359
Loc& newspapers, 343
Locational opportunism, slUng
model, 217, 221
Log-normal distributions, failure
rates, 260
Logical communications, 340
Logit models, dose-response,
252-253, 254, 255
Lombardy Regional Council, 63
Long Beach, California, 357-358
Long-latency claims, 477, 478
Los Angeles, 87, 362
Los Angeles port authorities, 361
Loss-of-containment accidents, 52
Losses,
catastrophic, 469
environmental impairment
insurance, 448, 451-452
predicUon, 433-434, 466
scenarios, 450
Love Canal, 84, 163, 176, 204, 395,
448
Low doses, 254
LULU, 5
Lvov, 94
Maintenance, 19, 20
Malformation rates, Seveso, 75
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Man-made accidenls, equal weighl
law, 131-133
Managemenl,
accidenls and, 3
mislakes, 56, 57
role in hazardous malerials plan-
ning, 500
rouline, 21-22
Managemenl capaoilies, crises,
34-43
Manlel-Bryan equalion, 252
Manufaclure, TCP, 48-49
Marine accidenls, 95
Marine environmenl, effeols of oil
spills, 80-84
Marine insurance, 8, 108, 454-457,
473
Marine sedimenls, conlaminalion,
86-87
Marine lransporlalion, insurance,
473-474
Massachusells, 220, 459
Massachusells Hazardous Facilily
SiUng Aulhorily Acl, 158, 165,
167,173,181
Maximum lifelime risks, 269, 272
Measuremenl, risks, 312-313
Mechanislic dose-response models,
253-254
Meda, 15, 62
Media,
hazards and, 309, 310
risk oommunicalion, 322-325,
328-329
working wilh, 32-34, 36
Media accidenls, 17-18
Medialion, 374
dispule resolulion, 199, 200
regulalory process, 413
Medical applicalions, radioele-
menls, 98
Medical surveillance, 426
cosls, 419, 420
Seveso, 61,62
Medlum, communicalions, 340,
342-344
Mercury, 86-87,95-96, 127
MERLA Acl, 127
Message, communicalions, 340
Melal processing, waler pollulion,
94
Melhyl isocyanale, 20,39, 53-56,
124, 416
Mexico Cily, 2, 3, 14, 18-19, 24-25,
50-52,395,486
Michaelis-Menlen nonlinear kinel-
ics, 254
Mililary lraining, inlerference
wilh,361
Minamala Bay, 87, 96
Minamala disease, 95-96, 98
Mindsel, organizalions, 29-30, 37
Minerals Managemenl Service,
Deparlmenlof lhe Inlerior, 356,
358, 361
Miners, pneumoconiosis, 160
Mines, disused, 84
Mining accidenls, cosls, 100
Mining wasles, 95
Mississauga, 14, 16-17, 25, 28, 42,
92, 98, 123
Mislakes, crises, 35
Milzushima, oil spill, 84
Mobile, Alabama, 371-372
Mobilizalion, during crisis, 23
Modeling,
dose-response I!ISsessmenl,
251-255
exposure assessmenl, 243-246
reRulalions, 412
risk analysis, 281-282
risk eslimalion, 262-266
risk-source characlerizalion,
236-239
risks, 393
uncerlainly, 257
Monelary oompensalion, 465
Monelary loss, hazardous malerials,
495
Moniloring,
exposure assessmenl, 241-243
risk regulalion, 391
risk-source characlerizalion,
231-233
Indez
Monitoring (cant.)
TeDD,70-73
wast.e disposal facilities, 159
workforce, 426
Monsanto, 435
Mont Louis, 31, 32
Mont.e Carlo simulation, 264
Mont.edison, 95
Moral code, indust.ry. 421
Moral issues, hazards, 338-339
Mortality rat.es, oomparative, 314
Motivational bias, subjective pro-
babilit.y, 261
Multi-hit. models, dose-response,
253-254, 254, 255
Multiattribut.e ut.ilit.y models, stake-
holders, 355, 368-372
Multiat.t.ribut.e utilit.y t.echniQues,
350, 381
Multiattribut.e utility t.heory, 328.
384
Multinationals, 25
Multiple discriminant. analysis, 336,
338
Multispect.ral overhead imagery,
242
Multistage models, dose-response,
254,255
Municipal wast.e dumps, wat.er pollu-
tion, 95, 419-420
Mut.ual insurance organizations, 476
Myt.hs, propensit.y t.o believe, 23
National Wildlife Federation, 200
Nat.ural disast.ers,
compensation, 129-130
probabilit.y, 294
Nat.ural hazards, human behavior,
318
Negligence, 422
Negotiation, 504
compensation, 177
disagreement., 192-195
failure, 184-186
hazardous facilities, 196
hazardous mat.erials, 178-181
hazardous mat.erials t.ransporta-
tion, 5
525
Negotiation (cant.)
hazardous wast.e siting, 157-161,
219,220
impediment.s t.o, 181-195
regulations, 402-403
wast.e disposal, 202
Net.herlands, 94, 117, 121
regulat.ory st.yle. 405-406
New Jersfl'll tJ. Ventron, 422-423
Newport. Beach, California. 358
News clearinghouses, 325
News media, risk information,
322-325
Newspapers, 342, 343
Niger delta, oil slicks, 121
Niigata, 96
No-fault. liabilit.y, 120
Noise,
compensation, 117, 127
environmental nuisance, 96, 97
Nort.h Andover. Massachusetts, 158
Not. in my backyard, 5, 371-372
Nuclear accident.s, compensation,
127-128
Nuclear indust.ry, 25, 48, 395, 398,
484
insurance coverage, 164
liabilit.y premiums, 129
pools, 489
Nuclear plant.s,
compensation for damage,
109-111
environmental damage, 96-98
France, 158
Nuclear power, at.tit.udes t.o, 215,
335-339
Nuclear Wast.e Policy Act., 207
Nuisance, 422
Objective met.hods, risk assessment.,
258-260
Objectives, value t.ree analysis, 379
Objectives hierarchies, 351
Occupational exposure, benzene,
412-414
Occupational Healt.h and Safet.y
Administ.ration, 413, 426
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Occurrence basis, coverage, 490,
491
Occurrences, liabilily policies,
469-470
Ocean lransport, oil products, 455
Office of Technology Assessmenl,
US Congress, 203, 205, 215, 459
Offshore oil developmenl, 6
value lree analysis, 356-372
Offshore oil inslallalions,
compensalion, 115
environmenlal damage, 81-82, 83
Offshore Pollulion Liabilily Agree-
menl,115
Oil blowouls, 115
Oil companies,
slakeholders, 361, 362
value lrees, 363
Oil induslry, disaslers, 87
Oil pollulion, damage claims, 18
Oil producls, sea lransporl, 8, 455
Oil slicks, cosls, 100, 103, 121
Oil spills, 14, 80-84
Oil slorage lanks, bursting, 84
Oil lransporl, compensation,
111-115
One-hil models, dose-response,
233, 254, 255
Ontario, 371-372
Onlario Wasle Managemenl Corpora-
tion, 165-166, 167
Openness, siling procedure,
166-167
Operaling cosls, reduclion,
432-433
Operaling errors, 56, 57
Operalional deficiencies, accidenls
and, 3
Operations, nonrouline, 496
OPOL,115
Opponenls, slakeholders , 359-361
Opposition, hazardous wasle siles,
206
Organizalional breakdown, crises
as, 22-24
Organizalional capacily, response
lo accidenls, 29-34
Organizalions,
adapling lo social requiremenls,
39-40
response lo crisis, 34-43
Orly, 117, 127
Osaka, 117
OUlpuls, risk assessmenl, 266-273
Packaging, hazardous malerials,
182
Paramelric sensilivily analysis, 272
Palhological examinalions, labora-
lory animals, 246
Pee Engineering, 94
Pedialric screening, poslnalal, 75
Pemex, 19, 50-52
Performance lesting, 233-234
Peripheral nerve impairmenl, 76
Peroxide, explosions, 87
Peslicide planls, 2
Peslicides, 52, 95
Pharmacokinelic dose-response
models, 254
Phosgene, 122-123
Pipelines, leakage, 94
Planners, 170
Planning,
emergency arrangemenls, 28-29
hazardous wasle managemenl,
176-177
Planls, design and layoul, 56-57
Plume models, Gaussian, 244
Pluralisl groups, in polilicallife,
400
Pneumoconiosis, 160
Poinl sensitivily analysis, 272
Poisonous gas release, 14
Policeman, insurance induslry as,
459, 460, 461, 462
Policy dialogues, 199, 200
Policy inslrumenls,
hazardous wasle managemenl, 4-5
risk managemenl, 2
siling, 222-224
Policy periods, limiled, 471
Policy-relevanl groups, values,
381-382
Ina8:J:
Pollt.ioal breakdown, crises as,
24-26
Pollt.ical cult.ure, inst.it.ut.ionallzed
dist.rust., 399
Polit.ical groups, stakeholders, 353
Polit.ical issues,
hazards, 338-339
risk regulation, 394, 397
Polit.ical parties, 185
Polit.ical power, hazardous wast.e
sit.es and, 217
Pollt.ical process,
modeling, 382
risk analysis in, 295-296
Polit.icians, 170
PoLLutant.s,
mult.iple, 424
t.ransformat.ion, 244
"PoLLut.er pays" principle, 118, 154,
480-481, 490
PoLLut.ers,
insurabilit.y, 484
mult.iple, 424
PoLLution,
coastal wat.ers, 86-87
oompensation, 107-109
cost.s, 105-106
gradual, 487-488
insurance, 128-129, 451, 453
offshore oil instaLLations, 115
PoLLution compensation funds,
479-480
PoLLution cont.rol, standards,
105-106
PoLLution disast.ers, compensation,
106-107
PoLLution liabilit.y, 157, 470, 482
PoLychlorinat.ed biphenyls, 16
Pools, environmental impairment.
Insurance, 451, 452, 465, 473,
475-476, 489
Population, informing, 27-28
Population effect.s, biological moni-
t.oring, 242-243
Population groups,
exposure assessment., 240-241
risks, 245-246, 263
527
Population probabilit.y functions,
259
Port aut.horit.ies, stakeholders, 361
Potash mines, 94
Potassium wast.e dumps, 94
Poza Rica, Mexico, 92
Practical approach, risk assess-
ment., 186-188, 198
Pragmatism, negot.iat.ion and, 178
Prediction, losses, 466
Predictive data bases, risk assess-
ment., 154
Preferences, communities, 164-166
Pregnancy, unfavorable out.comes,
75
Pregnancy Reglst.er, Seveso, 75
Premiums,
aviation insurance, 128
environment.al impairment., 448,
449
fixed, 465
rat.es, 497
risk insurance, 442
Preparation, accident.s, 37-39
Press releases, 35
Pressure vessel t.est, risk analysis
example, 285-286, 302-303
Prevention, accident.s, 19,20,
37-39
Price compet.it.ion, insurance, 473
Price-Anderson Act. 1957, 160, 484,
506
Pricing, insurance, 439
Principal component.s analysis,
334-335
Privat.e insurance, alt.ernative t.o
government. regulation, 418
Privat.e-government. insurance
programs, 160
Proactive response t.o crisis, 32
Probabilistic analysis, 264
Probabilistic risk t.heory, 430
Probabilit.y,
consensus on, 289
nat.ural disast.ers, 294
of failure, 291-292
risk analysis, 278
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Probabilit.y (cant.)
risk-causing event.s, 235
risks, 164
scenarios, 281-282
Probabilit.y densit.y funct.ions, 267,
268
Probabilit.y dist.ribut.ions,
displays, 266-272
risk estimat.es, 255-266
Probabilit.y scales, encoding
met.hods, 261
Probabilit.y t.rees, 264
Probabilit.y wheels, 261
Probit. models, dose-response,
252-253, 254, 255
Production, hazardous mat.erials, 2
Proof of causation, 425-426
Propane, 2,16,87
Propert.y damage, hazardous
mat.erials, 494-495
Propert.yinsurance, 467
Propert.y owners, st.akeholders, 361
Propert.y values,
disposal sit.es, 159-160
effect.s of airport. noise, 117
Proponent.s, stakeholders, 359-361
Prot.ection and Indemnit.y Clubs,
454, 456, 473
Prot.ective mechanisms, t.hreat.
analysis, 283
Providence, Rhode Island, 159
Psychomet.ric paradigm, risk per-
ception, 316-318, 334
Psychomet.ric research, risk per-
ception, 320, 321,322, 328
Public confidence, regulat.ory
approaches, 403
Public dist.rust., inst.it.utions,
215-216, 218
Public health, Seveso and, 3
Public healt.h aut.horities, 15
Public information, 3, 5, 21, 33-34,
36,176,307-308,333-345
Public int.erest. groups, 170
Public int.erests, wast.e regulation,
407
Public officials, stakeholders, 353
PUblio opinion, major accident.s
and, 42
Public participation, siting pro-
cedure, 167
Publio perception, risks, 162-164,
198-199, 209-212, 216, 218,
220, 289-290, 309-312,
393-394,412,503
Public policy,
chemical safet.y, 76-77
hazardous mat.erials, 145,
145-146
prot.ection, 418
Punitive damages, 419, 421, 438,
482
Radiation, low-level exposure, 308
Radioactive cobalt., 98
Radioactive damage, compensation,
109-111
Radioactive effluent., 97
Radioactive substances, transpor-
tation, 98
Radioactive wast.e,
disposal, 215
dumped at. sea, 97
siting, 207-208
Radioactivit.y, environmental dam-
age, 96-98
Radioelement.s, medical and indus-
t.rial,98
Railway accident.s, cost.s, 100
Railways, noise, 96, 97
Rank correlation, uncertaint.y, 272
Realit.y, perceptions of, 334
Red sludge, 95
Reference gambles, 261
Refinery accident.s, 122
Regional response, Seveso, 62-63
Regional siting st.rat.egies, 207, 208
Regression analysis,
dose-response assessment., 251
Regulation, 446, 499-500, 505-506
chemical indust.ry, 395
cost.-benefit. analysis, 438
environmental risks, 389-390
hazardous mat.erials, 180, 416
Indez
Regulation (cant.)
indust.rlal activities, 427-429
informal, 392
insurance, 461
need for, 443-444
nuclear Indust.ry, 395
wast.e management., 159, 175, 176
Regulatory decisions, monit.oring
and, 231-232
Regulatory officials, as expert.s,
401
Regulatory practice, comparison,
406-407
Regulatory process, difflcult.1es,
392-395
Regulat.ory requirements, changing,
392-395
Regulat.ory stakeholders, 359-361
Regulat.ory st.yles, 7,395-404
convergence, 404-407
Rehabllltatlon, Seveso, 70-73
Reinsurance, 450-451, 465, 475,
506
Relevance,
risk Information, 327
t.est. condlt.1ons, 234
Rellablllt.y analysis, syst.ems,
285-286, 298
Rellabillt.y conslst.ency, 290, 291
Remot.e sensing t.echniques, expo-
sure assessment., 242
Representation, Int.erest. groups,
184-186
Resldent.s, stakeholders, 353
Resource Conservat.1on and
Recovery Act., 152, 156, 159,
160,204,205,395,439
Resouroes for t.he Fut.ure, 209
Response surface, 264
Response syst.ems,
conventional, 22
emergencies, 27-29
Restatement 01 Torts, 423
Ret.ribut.1on, role of lIablllt.y, 458
Rhone Poulenc, 129
Rhone River, 94
Rice fields, pollut.1on, 95
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Right. t.o know, 402
RiJnmond, 56
Risk,
accept.able, 393, 397, 412
allocat.1on, 221
anticipation, 41-43
anxiet.y and, 190-192
avoidance, 221-222
charact.erizatlon, 321-322
chemical hazards, 415-416
classification, 483
conditional, 293
imposition, 212-215
instabilit.y, 494
long range, 495-496
measurement., 312-313
modeling, 431
obJect.1ve, 289, 297
pooling, 465
prediction, 433-444
reduct.1on, 171-172, 222-223
stat.1st.ical presentation, 313-316
t.rue, 333
uncertaint.y, 208-209, 467-469
uninsurable, 466
unknowable, 488
voluntary assumption, 221, 222,
224
Risk acceptance, 346, 347
Risk agents, diseases, 249
Risk analysis, 2, 5-6, 277-293,
295-298, 299-305, 324, 41B,
429-436, 436-437, 445, 446,
488,499,502-504
Risk appraisal, 296
Risk assessment., 6, 196, 333-334,
379, 445, 502-503
dose-response assessment.,
246-255
exposure assessment., 240-246
limitations, 308-309
met.hods, 270-271
out.puts, 266-273
prediotlve data bases, 154
risk-source charact.erizatlon,
229-239
Risk attribut.es, offshore oil dril-
ling, 368-370, 371-372
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Risk bearing, 464
Risk characlerization, 327-328
Risk communicaUon, 6, 307-308,
333-345
framing effecls, 326
implicaUons of research, 320-322
improving, 323-325
media, 328-329
lwo way, 347
Risk conlroL. 488
Risk creators,
adversarial process, 399, 400
consensual process, 400
Risk esUmaUon, 5, 6, 235, 255-266
displays, 266-273
Risk faclors, unknown, 250-251
Risk imposiUon, 222
Risk information, 307-308
media, 322-325
QuantitaUve, 325-326
relevance, 327
Risk levels, induslrial firms,
432-433
Risk managemenl, 2, 299, 430,
436-437,450,452,487,504-506
case sludies, 2-3
conflicls, 178
insurance and, 7-8
Risk models, 262-266
incommensurable, 186-188
sources of uncertainly. 272-273
validily, 265-266
Risk perception, 162-164,
209-212, 216, 218, 289-290,
309-312, 346-348, 503
cognitive representations,
327-328
oommunication and, 316-322
inaccurale, 309-310
psychomelric paradigm, 316-318,
334
Risk profiles, 235
Risk reduction, 222-223
Risk regulation, 390-395
Risk scenarios, 432, 434
Risk sharing, 108-109, 221, 223
Risk spreading, 8, 464
Risk slruclures, branching,
181-184
Risk-source characlerization,
229-231, 257, 262, 263
accidenl investigation, 233-234
modeling melhods, 236-239
moniloring, 231-233
performance lesting, 233-234
slatistical melhods, 234-236
River Wabigoon, 95, 127
Rivers, pollulion, 94
Road lransporl, hazardous maleri-
als, 122
Rohm and Haas, 435
Roissy Airporl, 127
Rules, flexibilily, 400
Rural communities, hazardous wasle
siting, 213
Sabotage, 43
Safe doses, estimales, 254
Safely,
absolule, 289-290
preventive global analysis, 57-58
social demand, 42-43
Safely assessmenls, 38-39, 40, 58,
399
Safely cases, hazardous facilities,
434-435
Safely engineering, 418, 430
Safely legislation, need for,
443-444
Safely measures,
Bhopal,20
gross disproporlion yardstick,
397
risk analysis, 295
Safely policy, Union Carbide, 20,
40-41
Safely problems, expression, 37-38
Sail damage, 94
Salvage operations, oillankers,
456-457
San Diego, 358
San Juan Ixhualepec, 18-19, 24-25,
395
engineering aspecls, 50-52
San Nicholas Islands, 356
Sandrine River, 94
Sanla Barbara, 359
all spill, 81
Sanla Barbara Channel, 357
Sanla Barbara Counly, 361-362
Sanla Monica, all developmenl,
371-372
Sanla Monica Bay, 358
Sardinia, 95
Scarificalion, salls, 71, 72
Scenarios, 432, 434
losses, 450
risk analysis, 281-282, 284, 293,
298, 300-301
Science, credibilily, 394
Science wriling, enhancing, 324
ScienUfic evidence,
crediblllly, 408
loxic lorl cases, 425-426
ScienUfic findings, heallh and
environmenlal risks, 421
Scienllflc slance, 333-334
Scienlisls,
credibilily, 341
role in regulalory process, 404,
405-406
ScienUsls' InsUlule for Public
InformaUon, 325
Sea accidenls, cosls, 100
Sea lransporl, hazardous maleri-
als, 8, 454-457
Self-insurance, 160-161, 487, 506
Self-policing, regulalory compli-
ance, 396-397, 400, 401
Sellafield, 97
SensiUvily analysis, 355, 370-371,
374
Separalion of powers, 399
SeverilY,
accidents, 131-132
relaUonship wilh frequency, 103
risks, 334,346
Seveso, 1, 2, 14, 24,60-63, 93,
123-124,128,163,395,415,448
calendar of slalements, 15-16
emergency phase, 63-70
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Seveso (cant.)
en~ineerin~aspecls, 3, 48-50
heallh impacls, 73-76
public heallh aspecls, 3
rehabllllaUon, 70-73
wasle drums, 17-18, 23, 24, 36
Seveso DlrecUve, 27-28, 58-59,
76,395,396,434-435,439,446,
504
Shipowners, liabilily, 111, 113, 114,
455-456
Showa Denko Company, 96
Sickness insurance, 117
Signals, accidenls as, 321, 328, 330
Sile monilorin~, 242, 243
Siles, looking for, 201
SiUng,
conceplualizalion of problem,
220-221
conflicls, 203
decisions, 169
hazardous wasle facllilles, 4-5,
146, 147, 155-168, 200-202,
204-206, 206-216
improved paradi~m, 220-224
liquefied nalural gas planls, 170
models, 216-220
normallve crileria, 166-168
policy lools, 222-224
radioaclive wasle, 207-208
slages, 157-161
slakeholders, 170
Skewness, probablllly curves,
268-269
Sla~ heaps, 87
Smallesl space analysis, 336, 338
Soap, hazardous wasles, 459-460
Social cosls,
accidenls, 318
environmenlal impairmenl, 484
wasle conlrol, 148-149, 150,151
Social demand, safely, 42-43
Social faclers, risk percepllon, 320
Social insurance syslems, 467
Social issues, hazards, 338-339
Social psychology, communicalion,
339-341
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Social requirements, of organiza-
tions, 39-40
Social securit.y, 117
Societal risks, 458, 459
Societ.y of Pet.roleum Engineers,
361
Socioeconomic impact.s,
hazardous wast.e sit.es, 213
offshore oil drilling, 362
Socioeconomic stat.us, hazardous
wast.e sit.es and, 217
Sociological research,
hazards, 320
risk perception, 322
Soft. drinks, hazardous wast.es,
459-460
Soil,
contaminant. absorption, 245
indust.rial wast.e contamination,
85-86
radioactive contamination, 98
TCDD levels, 64, 68-71, 74
Sophisticat.ed approach, risk
assessment., 186-188, 189, 198
Soundproofing, airport. noise, 117,
127
Source, communications, 340, 341
Sout.hern California, offshore oil
drilling, 356-372
Special compensation syst.ems,
117-118
Special issues, for stakeholders,
359, 361
Spills, 431, 472
Sponsorship, value t.ree analysis,
374-375, 378
Spontaneous abortion rat.e, Seveso,
75
Stabilizing, emergency sit.uations,
26-29
Staff t.raining 20
Stakeholders, 2, 5, 6
hazardous wast.e siting, 156-157,
170,216
identification, 354, 359-361
multiple, 349-350, 351
refusal t.o cooperat.e, 375
Stakeholders (cant.)
relationship wit.h analyst., 382
value t.rees, 361-362
wast.e disposal facilities, 161-166
Standard Oil, 111
Standard set.tin~, risk regulation,
390, 401-402
Standards, waste disposal facilities,
159
St.at.e aid, indust.rial disast.ers, 105
Stat.e aut.horit.y, sit.e selection by,
218
St.at.e court.s, common law adapta-
tions, 421-426
St.at.e le~islation, liabilit.y, 468
Stat.e siting efforts, 205-206
Statistical data, risk analysis,
289-292, 297-298
Statistical met.hods,
probabilit.y dist.ributions, 259-260
risk-source charact.erization,
234-236
Statistical presentation, risk,
313-316,393
Stat.ut.es, hazardous mat.erials, 180
Stat.ut.es of limitations, t.ort. actions,
422
Stat.utory insurance requirement.s,
478
St.ochastic sensitivit.y analysis, 272
St.orage, hazardous mat.erials, 2
Stora~e tanks, leaka~e, 94
St.rict. liabilit.y, 422-424, 427-428,
438, 494
Subcont.ract.ors, stakeholders, 361
Subsidiaries, minimum asset., 170
Sulfur emissions, 117
Sulfur oxides, 93
Superfund, 116, 152, 160, 204, 205,
459
Superfund Act., 474
Surface wat.er t.ransport models,
244-245
Swiss Re, 450
Switzerland, 109, 117
Synergism, chemical hazards, 241,
308
Indez
Syslem reliabilily analysis,
278-281, 300
Syslems approach,
hazardous wasle managemenl,
206-208
siling, 222
Taclical breakdown, crises as,
21-22
Taft, Louisiana, 17
Ta.nio, 80, 81
Tanker accidenls, 80-81, 82
Tanker spills,
civilliabilily, 108
compensalion, 105, 111-115,
120-121
cosls, 100, 103
Tariffs, environmental impairmenl,
449-450
Tax base, communilies, 159-160
TCDD, 49, 60
levels in environmenl, 63-70
moniloring, 70-73
permissible levels, 72
soil concenlralions, 74
TCP, 48-49
Technical complexily, risk, 323
Technological disaslers, 1
Technology, alliludes lo, 394
Television, 342, 343
Terrorism, 43, 301
Tesl condilions, relevance, 234
Telrachlorobenzene, 48
Telraelhyl lead, 95
Third parly liabilily, 98-99, 119,
418
cargo, 454
Threal analysis, 282-283, 293, 298,
301-302, 304
Threal polenlial, risks, 328
Three Mile Island, 33, 97, 395, 417
compensalion, 127-128
Time factor, crises, 36
Time schedules, siling procedure,
167
Tokuyama Bay, sedimenl contamina-
lion, 86-87, 95
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Tokuyama Soda, 87
Tolerance dislribution models,
dose-response, 252-253
Toluene, 94
Torrey Ca.nyon, 448
Torllaw, 7, 417, 419-429, 467, 468,
471, 484
Torl liabilily, reslriclion, 479
Total accidenl rale, 269
TOVALOP, 115, 455
Toxic substances,
emissions, 230-231
low-level exposure, 308
Toxic Substances Conlrol Acl, 199,
439, 440
Toxic wasles, disposal, 395
Toyo Soda Kogyo, 87
Trade unions, 402
Trade-offs, risks and benefils, 412
Trail Smeller, 92
Trajectory models, almospheric
lransporl, 244
Transborder flows, hazardous
wasles, 168-169
Transporl accidenls, 122
Transporlalion,
explosives, 87
hazardous malerials, 2, 5,
182-183, 196, 454-457, 501
radioactive subslances, 98
Trespass, 422
2,4,5-lrichlorophenol, 48-49
Truslfunds, 223, 475
environmenlal conservalion, 158
loxic exposures, 160
Uncerlainly,
damaRes, 471-472
negalive effecls, 496
regulalions, 400, 412
risk analysis, 289-292, 305
risk eslimales, 255-266, 316, 329
risks, 208-209, 346, 393,
395-396, 467-469
sources of, 272-273
views of, 186-188
Underwrilers, 460-461
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Underwriting, environmental
impairment.liabilit.y, 487-488
Unexpect.ed, helplessness before,
30-31
Union Carbide, 17, 19-20.25,
38-39, 40-41, 53, 125, 129, 327,
416, 417, 462
Union Carbide India Lt.d, 52
Unit.ed Kingdom, 117
nuclear indust.ry, 398
regulat.ory st.yle, 392, 401, 402,
408
Seveso Directive implementation,
434-435, 439
Unit.ed Kingdom At.omic Energy
Aut.horit.y, 344, 345
Unit.ed Stat.es, 105, 106, 109, 116,
121, 152
environmental impairment.
insurance, 451, 506
liabilit.y, 467-468
liabilit.y awards, 417-418
nuclear industry, 398
regulatory st.yle, 392, 398, 408,
411-414
risk analysis, 434, 435-436
t.ort.law, 419-429
Uranium, 98
Uranium hexafluoride, 31
Urban areas,
accident.s in, 19
proximit.y of indust.rial plant.s, 41
US Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment., 203, 205
Validit.y, risk models, 265-266
Valley of t.he Drums, 176, 204-205
Value conflicts, hazardous wast.e
siting, 211, 212, 213, 216
Value scales, encoding met.hods, 261
Value t.ree analysis. 6. 349-351.
377-385
conflict. resolution. 373-374
offshore oil driling, 356-372
pit.falls. 374-376
stages, 351-356
Value t.rees.
building, 354
combined, 362-368
stakeholders, 361-362
Values,
disagreement., 192, 194-195
policy-relevant. groups, 381-382
st.akeholders, 349-350
Vegetation, TeDD levels, 64
Velbert., Germany, 415
Vent. gas scrubbers, 53, 54
Vent.ura. 359
Violations, government. regulations,
433
War damages, risks. 458
Wast.e, Seveso, 17-18
Wast.e disposal, 395
Wast.e disposal sit.es, insurance,
459-460
Wast.e dumps, 84-85
clean-up cost.s, 105, 115-117,
121-122
Wast.e generation, continuing. 431
Wast.e generat.ors, stakeholders,
156
Wat.er, exposure assessment., 240
Wat.er pollution,
compensation, 105, 126-127
indust.rial plant.s, 94-96
Wat.er supply, contamination,
419-420
Wes-ConInc, 158, 159
West.ern Oil and Gas Association,
362
Whit.edog Indian Reserve, 95
Wide-bodied aircraft, 128
Wilhelmshaven, 158
Windscale, 97
Workforce,
informing, 27-28
monit.oring, 426
Yokkaichi. 92
Zero risk, 198-199


